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Dissertation 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the actual and potential role of Finnish civil society 
organizations in developing new forms of cross-border cooperation with Russia. 
It puts forth the concept of civic neighborhood as a bottom-up alternative to the 
official notion of ‘EUropean’ Neighborhood. As the period to be analyzed begins 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it covers the era during which Finnish-
Russian bilateral relations became a part of broader EU-Russia relations. The 
formation of civic neighborhood is studied on the basis of two major empirical 
primary datasets, of which one consists of interviews and another one of 
published newspaper materials. The two datasets provide different, yet 
mutually complementary perspectives on the phenomenon under study. It is 
vital to study both perspectives as perceptions, since images of the other and 
discursive relations are not mere results of cooperation practices but also – and 
more importantly – their prerequisites.  
The optimal way to normalize neighborly relations is to increase people-to-
people interaction, and preferably this ought to occur from the bottom up rather 
than the top down. While state institutions and structures may contribute to the 
shaping of the general operational environment, the maintenance of civil society 
cooperation cannot be expected to rest entirely on the state. In light of the 
current trends that reduce the funds allotted for cross-border cooperation on the 
one hand, and the decentralization and privatization of public services on the 
other hand, it would be fruitful to conceptualize a cross-border space for social 
contracting and entrepreneurship through civil society organizations. This 
would allow the civil society organizations to gain further leverage to fill in the 
gaps created by borders and bordering, and to bridge the apparent intersectoral 
crevasses. 
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Väitöskirja 
 
ABSTRAKTI 
Tämä tutkimus käsittelee kansalaisyhteiskunnan todellista ja potentiaalista 
roolia Suomen ja Venäjän välisen rajan ylittävän yhteistyön kehittämisessä. Se 
nostaa esiin kansalaisnaapuruuden käsitteen alhaalta ylös rakentuvana vaihto-
ehtona viralliselle ajatukselle ’Eurooppalaisesta’ naapuruudesta. Analyysissä 
tarkasteltava ajanjakso alkaa Neuvostoliiton romahtamisesta ja ulottuu vuoteen 
2010, minä aikana Suomen ja Venäjän kahdenväliset suhteet ovat tulleet osaksi 
laajempia EU:n ja Venäjän välisiä suhteita. Kansalaisnaapuruuden muodostu-
mista tarkastellaan tutkimuksessa kahden pääasiallisen empiirisen primaari-
aineiston avulla, joista ensimmäinen koostuu haastatteluista ja toinen 
sanomalehtimateriaalista. Nämä kaksi aineistoa tarjoavat erilaiset ja toisiaan 
täydentävät näkökulmat tutkittuun ilmiöön, joiden molempien tarkastelu on 
tärkeää, sillä käsitykset, toiseuden ilmentymät ja diskursiiviset suhteet yleensä 
eivät ole vain rajat ylittävän yhteistyön seurauksia, vaan myös – ja mikä 
tärkeintä – niiden edellytyksiä.  
Optimaalinen tapa naapuruussuhteiden normalisoinnissa on ihmisten 
välisen henkilökohtaisen vuorovaikutuksen lisääminen, minkä tulisi tapahtua 
ennemmin alhaalta ylös kuin ylhäältä alaspäin. Valtiolliset rakenteet voivat vai-
kuttaa yleiseen toimintaympäristöön, mutta kansalaisyhteiskunnan yhteistyön 
ei voida olettaa olevan kokonaan valtion vastuulla. Kun otetaan huomioon 
viimeaikainen yhteistyöhön kohdistettujen varojen väheneminen sekä julkisten 
palveluiden hajauttaminen ja yksityistäminen, olisi kaukonäköistä käsitteellistää 
kansalaisjärjestöjen avulla rajat ylittävä tila sosiaalisille ja yhteiskunnallisille 
sopimusjärjestelyille ja yrittäjyydelle. Tällä tavoin kansalaisjärjestöt voivat saada 
lisää vaikutusvaltaa täyttääkseen rajojen ja rajaamisen luomia kuiluja sekä 
kaventaakseen yhteiskunnallisten sektorien välisiä railoja. 
 
Asiasanat: kansalaisyhteiskunta, naapuruus, rajat ylittävä yhteistyö  
      
 
Foreword 
This is an inquiry into coalition forming among people, less so of that between 
states.  As  a  human  geographer,  I  find  it  interesting  to  explore  how  people 
interact not  just with  the world  around  them, but  also with  each other  –  and 
how the changing world impacts their behavior. But this study deviated greatly 
from  its  original  premise.  It  combines my  own  interests  in  also  international 
relations, political sociology, and history, all of which offer valuable insight into 
the topic at hand. The focus on civil society was chosen for its ability to function 
as  a  locomotive  for  cooperation,  often  overlooked  by  grand  scale  policy 
proposals, aiming to bring the two sides closer to each other. This study aims to 
underline the dynamics from below – as the process of European integration is, 
after all, a result of civil society pursuit. 
The  evidence  of  globalization  is  all  around  us,  yet  geography  remains 
overwhelmingly  important  –  and  so  does  history.  One’s  life  is  still  largely 
defined by his or her place of birth and where one choses  to  live after  that.  In 
most  cases,  these  two  coincide  as despite  increased mobility  surprisingly  few 
people live outside the country in which they were born. While reasons for this 
are multiple,  it  is clear  that belonging  to a certain nation has a certain appeal. 
The  territorial  trap  endures  and  endures,  because  people  prefer  confined, 
familiar spaces. As a container, the nation‐state has, however, become  leaky as 
there are ever increasing challenges to state authority. Following ideas put forth 
by Rumford, this study maintains that the focus should indeed be shifted from 
the state towards borders that are woven into the fabric of society. It is borders, 
not necessarily states, that are the key to understanding networked connectivity. 
Borders  are  no  longer  at  the  edges,  in  the  marginal.  They  have  become 
important  spaces  of where  questions  of  identity,  belonging,  political  conflict, 
and societal transformation are discussed and acted out. That is why they have 
also found their way into the heart of politics. 
I  have proven  by  actual  trial  that  a dissertation, which  takes  five  years  to 
write,  takes only about  three days  to  read! Certainly,  to write some 400 pages 
can be done more quickly, but I was always keen to believe that one has to know 
his  or  her  topic  before  writing  about  it.  This,  however,  presented  another 
problem. The more one learns, the more he or she understands how much else 
there  is  to  learn.  If  I  feel more  ignorant  now  than when  I  commenced  this 
journey, I must have learned a great deal. 
To write a foreword for this body of work is all the more daunting. I regret 
that  the  lack  of  space  prevents  me  from  having  the  satisfaction  of 
acknowledging all of  those who have,  in a way or another, given  their help  in 
    
 
putting this book together. I cannot, however, let this opportunity pass by 
without expressing my deep obligations to the pre-evaluators of this 
dissertation, Professor Vladimir Kolossov (who also kindly agreed to be my 
Opponent) and Dr. Docent Pirjo Jukarainen. Your insightful comments and 
suggestions for improvements have played a key role in turning my manuscript 
into an academic dissertation.  
With this dissertation, I attempt to bring to fruition a set of ideas planted in 
my mind by my supervisors Professor Heikki Eskelinen, Professor Ilkka 
Liikanen, and Professor Markku Tykkyläinen, all of whom took care of their 
respective duties in an exceptional manner. I thank you for having believed in 
the merits of this study and providing the encouragement that has helped me 
see it through to completion. Without your constant support and constructive 
feedback throughout my doctoral studies, this dissertation would have never 
been possible. I am also deeply indebted to Professor James W. Scott who has 
not only been a great inspiration to me, but has included me in many of his 
projects. Working with him has been not only beneficial, but also a great joy. I 
am proud to be in such company. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Martin van der Velde, from whom I have 
learned a lot during the last years. My gratitude goes also to Prof. Jopi Nyman for 
his valuable guidance. In order to mention all those who have helped me during 
the course of these years would take another 400 pages; I trust that you know 
who you are. I promise to thank you in person the next time our paths cross. 
In addition to the multiform support provided by the Karelian Institute and 
the Department of Geography at the University Eastern Finland, this work has 
profited from generous financial support from the Onnenmäki Foundation, the 
Fulbright Center, the American-Scandinavian Foundation, the North Karelia 
Regional Fund of the Finnish Cultural Foundation, and the Foundation for 
Municipal Development. I also wish to acknowledge the Russia in Europe 
Doctoral Program in Border Studies, coordinated by the Karelian Institute, which 
granted me an ideal supporting frame for conducting my research – a special 
thanks to its Coordinator Dr. Joni Virkkunen for all of his help. My thanks go out 
also to The Finnish Doctoral Program for Russian and East European Studies, 
coordinated by the Aleksanteri Institute at University of Helsinki, and the 
Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias at San Diego State University, 
especially to its Director Dr. Paul Ganster for his kind help and assistance.  
I wish to thank my beloved sons, Gabriel and Benjamin, who have taught me 
valuable lessons about life and how to prioritize. Last, but certainly not least, I 
wish to thank my wife, Kate, for her help in finalizing this work, but more 
importantly for her unending patience. 
 
Vantaa, May 11, 2013 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 PROLOGUE 
 
Borders have long been one of the most central topics to political geography. 
However, much has changed since the pioneering framework of early border 
studies. The focus of border studies has developed in relation to the 
predominant geopolitical models and visions – from studying borders as 
delimiters of territorial control and ideology towards areal differentiation and 
later towards more dynamic role of borders as bridges rather than barriers. The 
emergence of globalization and the rhetoric of a ‘borderless world’ only fuelled 
interest in borders. The apparent renaissance of border studies that followed 
acquired an increasingly interdisciplinary take. The significance of borders is 
doubtlessly in flux, but instead of disappearing altogether, the borders 
themselves seem to be merely changing their institutional form. The traditional 
definitions and comprehensions of borders have been challenged primarily 
because the context in which they were created and existed has also altered. 
Borders continue to separate us; we live in a world of lines and compartments. 
Even though we may not necessarily see these lines, they order our daily life 
practices, strengthening our belonging to, and identity with, certain places and 
groups and in so doing perpetuate and re-perpetuate notions of difference and 
othering (Newman 2006). 
This study draws on the experience from the border between Finland and the 
Russian Federation 1  where CBC has reflected both the political and socio-
cultural change as well as politically and economically motivated interaction. 
The border provides an illuminating laboratory in which to study border change 
– or the lack thereof. Finland’s post-WW II relationship with the Soviet Union, 
and more recently with Russia, has been both close and distant – at times both 
concurrently. It has been shaped by a common history, Cold War realities, 
pragmatism, interdependencies and the lessons learned from devastating armed 
conflicts. 
Despite these tensions, the basis for civil society’s role in cross-border ties 
was also forged already during the Soviet era. The 1948 Agreement of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (the YYA treaty) began to serve 
as the key document for governing post-war relations between the two 
countries. Dictated by the treaty, post-WW II Finnish foreign policy towards the 
Soviet Union was based on the principle of ‘official friendship.’ Even though the 
                                                          
1 The Russian Federation is hereafter referred to as Russia. 
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border remained heavily guarded between two separate armies, a sound and 
trusting relationship with the Soviet Union was sustained in order to avoid 
future conflicts with the ideologically alien superpower at Finland’s doorstep. 
Interestingly, while such a friendship was orchestrated at the level of 
intergovernmental relations, it was put in practice through paradiplomatic links 
within which Finnish civil society organizations (CSOs) also played an 
important role (e.g., Eskelinen, Liikanen & Oksa 1999). 
As the geopolitical situation ameliorated in the wake of the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, Finnish-Russian cooperation began to develop rapidly. After being 
practically closed for decades, a more open border enabled actors from the both 
sides to interact with each other. In addition to historical ties and the related 
‘nostalgia tourism,’ much of this early cooperation was fuelled by the 
paradiplomatic friendship-town system and then increasingly by the 
Neighboring Area Cooperation (NAC) funded by the Finland Government. 
More open conditions also revealed the stark contrasts between the two sides. In 
Finland the formation of civil society has deep roots, and CSOs are perceived as 
serious partners for the public sector. In Russia the operations – or even the 
existence – of civil society as a social force independent from state ideology 
remained practically illegitimate until the collapse of Communism.  
The practices and rhetoric of cross-border cooperation (CBC) underwent an 
exceptionally deep change, overlapping with broader changes in political 
perspectives as regional and local level actors were now also allowed and able to 
take an active role in cross-border relations by cooperating directly across the 
border (see Eskelinen, Liikanen & Oksa 1999). The administrative discussion 
concerning CBC policies acquired a new European twist when Finland joined 
the European Union (EU) in 1995. Suddenly, activities formerly administered 
through bilateral, state-level agreements became part of the broader dynamics of 
international politics and EU-Russia relations. This further fuelled cross-border 
interaction, and the related programs and projects became streamlined to fall in 
line with the policy frames defined by the EU and the new Europeanizing 
rhetoric (Liikanen et al. 2007). With the introduction of EU policy frames 
picturing a ‘Wider Europe’ and European ‘Neighborhood’ in the early 2000s, the 
focus of CBC shifted from technical aid and regional development towards 
external relations and the fostering of interaction between the EU and its 
neighbors. Such an ambitious vision of a ‘ring of friends’ around the Union was 
considered necessary in order for the EU to safeguard the transnational space 
beyond its external borders (Scott 2005).  
The first backlash to this vision took place when Russia, the EU’s largest 
neighbor, opted out of joining the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the 
most explicit form of geopolitical integration between the EU and its immediate 
region, thereby rejecting the presumptions embedded in the policy. Instead, 
relations with Russia are nowadays developed under a ‘strategic partnership,’ 
which, however, also receives funding through the European Neighborhood 
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and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Accordingly, this study follows the 
suggestion made by Scott and Liikanen (2010, 423) that understandings of 
‘Neighborhood’ ought not to be strictly limited to specific policies but can also 
be interpreted in terms of a political, cultural and socio-economic space within 
which the EU exerts transformative power beyond its borders. This is to say that 
cooperation agendas concern not only ‘high politics’ and that more attention 
should be paid to bottom-up dynamisms.  
What stood out from the new CBC program documents was that the border-
spanning activities they outlined were portrayed as laying ground for a new 
type of cross-border regionalization – even at the external borders of the Union. 
In order to accomplish this, more attention had to be paid to people-to-people 
connections. As the EU had already discovered civil society as a political force 
central to modernizing and democratizing EU governance, these new 
documents now expanded the civil society dimension to cover also CBC across 
the external border of the Union. While CSOs had already played a role in the 
Finnish-Russian bilateral CBC from the start, the Europeanization of the civic 
agenda politicized the cooperation and elicited the centuries-old interface 
between Western and Eastern notions of civil society. Given that civil society is 
characteristically not a stand-alone concept but is commonly paired with the 
concept of the state (O’Dowd & Dimitrovova 2006), the EU’s attempt to promote 
civil society cooperation could thus also be interpreted to involve an indirect 
agenda of reshaping political institutions in the neighboring states. 
In contrast to explicit programs and policies, such as the Finnish government 
funded NAC or the ENP, this study draws attention to less formal and more 
subtle channels and networks through which the delimiting characteristics of 
the border can be eroded away and new, less loaded and more pragmatic 
relations formed in their place. In engaging in various cooperation practices 
across the border, individual citizens as well as various types of civil society 
organizations are building a new civic2 neighborhood, crucial not only for the 
bottom-up diffusion of ‘Europe’ beyond EU borders and also for fostering the 
less value driven people-to-people connections that would form the foundation 
for the development of interaction and integration.  
The formation of the civic neighborhood is studied with the help of two 
major empirical primary datasets, one consisting of transcribed interviews and 
another comprised of materials gathered from newspapers. The two datasets 
provide different yet mutually complementary perspectives on the phenomenon 
in question. Following Habermas (1991) civil society is approached here not only 
from an institutional angle but also from a discursive vantage point; i.e., not 
                                                          
2 I have chosen to use the word ‘civic’ instead of ‘civil’ in order to imply (inter-)action that is 
voluntary and takes place between or among citizens and other non-state groups but does not 
exclude action undertaken under the direction of the state if it is determined to contribute to the 
public good as defined by the people. 
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only as a sphere of organization but also as a sphere for public discussion. It is 
expected that civil society plays a vital role as a field of discursive practices that 
shape the image of Russia, and, at the same time, the image of Russia as a 
neighbor influences and even directs civil society engagement. The newspaper 
material is thus used to illuminate the state of public debate within which cross-
border relations have evolved. The interview material is then used to provide a 
complementary perspective emphasizing institutional practices that have 
influenced these perceptions. It is vital to study both sides of the coin as 
perceptions, image of the other, and discursive relations altogether are not only 
a result of CBC practices but also – importantly – their prerequisites. 
Defining what is meant by civil society is a political project in itself. It is a 
social construct that is often invoked in debates on democracy, governance and 
intercultural understanding. A comparative setting, here between Finland and 
Russia, confirms that using the term ‘civil society’ in a global sense obscures as 
much as it illuminates, proving that the nature of civil society can only properly 
be understood within the context of, or in terms of, particular societies (Crook 
2002, 2). In the Western European context, the idea of civil society gives 
expression to the expectations of European citizens of more direct participation 
in their future and the collective choices that it entails (Mokre & Riekmann 
2006). With fiscal retrenchment, reduced redistributive outlays, and the 
privatization of public services, debates on civil society have also increasingly 
focused on its role in economic life and in the support of social welfare policies. 
As a political and increasingly economic force, civil society organizations and 
philanthropic associations are often seen as a mirror reflection of an increasing 
lack of confidence in the capacity of traditional governance modes to address 
problems of modern societies. By the same token, organizations of the ‘social 
economy,’ such as cooperative style enterprises, mutual help societies, and 
voluntary associations have long played an important role in national and 
regional development in Western countries. 
Within the context of post-socialist transformation in which the Finnish-
Russian CBC largely developed, civil society is understood not only as a 
democratizing force but also as an actor capable of compensating for state 
‘dysfunctionality’ (Fritz 2004). In Russia, in particular, the state has reduced its 
involvement especially in social welfare services. Here, CSOs have stepped in to 
provide basic services to those who have suffered the most from economic 
change. In addition to these vital services, CSOs have also been engaged in areas 
of local development that encompass cultural, educational, training, and 
business development activities – areas where the state has shown little 
presence, either for ideological or practical reasons (Laine & Demidov 2013). To 
understand the dynamics underpinning civil society involvement in social 
welfare and local development issues in Russia, it is necessary to assume an 
unbiased perspective. Russian civil society needs to be approached as a ‘cultural 
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formation’ (Kennedy 2002), as a product of a specific context within which it has 
evolved.  
 
 
1.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
1.2.1 Niche and Approach 
On the face of it, the significance of Finland’s borders appears unaffected. The 
border with Russia remains secure and well controlled; younger generations can 
hardly remember that there would have ever been a ‘real’ border with Sweden, 
and even fewer recall that Finland shares some 730 kilometers of borderline with 
Norway somewhere up north. Running through nothing but forest and some 
occasional lakes for almost its entire length, the Finnish-Russian border does not 
inevitably appear to be a pressing research object, at first glance. In terms of 
dynamics, it fades in comparison with other EU borders as well as with other 
seemingly asymmetrical borders, such as the border between the United States 
and Mexico.  
Given what was stated above, the scholarly and popular attention the 
Finnish-Russian border has attracted, and continues to attract, is astonishing. 
Even though many of these writings discuss not the border per se but what lies 
beyond it, it is the border that has gained a sizable symbolic load. The lengthy 
shared border with Russia is still commonly put forth as excuse for why various 
issues are as they are and not necessarily as they could or should be. Everybody, 
even those who have never seen or crossed it, seem to know the meaning of it 
and what it stands for, and thus many statements on it go unquestioned. Alas, 
quantity does not compensate for quality. It has been customary to assume a 
rather (banal) nationalist stance and build on uncontroversial acceptance of the 
historical setting and current state of affairs. Their actual merits aside, such 
writings reproduce a particular image and perspective and in so doing diminish 
room for alternative views. While historical perspective and context specificity 
are crucial for understanding a particular border, the Finnish-Russian one in this 
case, placing it in the greater European perspective broadens the analytical 
frame and allows for the interpretations that a more narrow approach might 
preclude. 
Similarly, the borders of a particular discipline, geography in this case, might 
also confine the analytical lens. Even if disciplinary specialization has its 
benefits, a strict immersion in a particular field, as Strober (2006, 315) notes, may 
limit social innovation and the intellectual horizon of researchers. 
Interdisciplinary research, in turn, runs counter to the disciplinary taken-for-
grantednesses, thus allowing more holistic, richer understanding of the topic at 
hand. As Baerwald (2010, 494–495) remarks, the drive to study the broad 
ranging and intertwined problems that encompass a complex mix of phenomena 
and processes, which taken together lie beyond the margins of existing 
   23 
 
disciplines, has impelled the conduct of research that necessitates inter-, if not 
postdisciplinary approach.  
Fortunately for geographers this is not a major cause for concern. While 
many traditional disciplines are defined by the topics that they study, 
geography has been inherently interdisciplinary since its establishment as a 
modern discipline. Among the classics, Richard Hartshorne (1939) 
acknowledged that geography could never be understood as a discrete science 
but rather as a synthetic, unsystematic enterprise that aggregated data from the 
other sciences to create a larger understanding. In 1934, A. E. Parkins contented 
himself with summing up quite insightfully that “ g eography is what 
geographers do” (Martin & James 1993, 356) – as a result there has been plenty 
of room to maneuver within the discipline. The active pursuit of inquiries 
related to space, place and interactions leads geographers to venture far from 
the field’s core and explore realms where geographical perspectives intersect 
with those from other fields (ibid., 495–496; Gober 2000, 4).  
Recently, geographers have delved, inter alia, into the interrogating 
potentials for a democratic governance of borders (Anderson, O’Dowd & Wilson 
2003), exclusion and discrimination (van Houtum & Pijpers 2007, van Houtum & 
Boedeltje 2009), the technologization of borders and visualization practices 
(Amoore 2009), violence of borders and ‘teichopolitics’ (Elden 2009; Rosière & 
Jones 2012), the relationships between ‘traditional’ borders and the so-called 
borderless world of networked, topological space (Paasi 2009), external drivers, 
such as the EU and CBC (Johnson 2009; Popescu 2008), the conflicting logics of 
‘national’ borders and ‘supranational’ unity (Sidaway 2001), and the ‘new’ 
European borders as ‘sharp’ markers of difference (Scott & van Houtum 2009). 
However, geography by no means monopolizes border studies. Borders have 
spread also not just into international relations, political sociology, and history, 
but also into cultural studies (Rovisco 2010) and philosophy (Balibar 2009). The 
bordering (border-making) perspective not only transcends disciplinary 
boundaries, but it takes a step further by advocating that scientific knowledge 
ought not to be privileged over everyday geographical imaginations and 
popular geopolitics (Scott 2009).  
In the field of border studies, theorizing has proven to be quite a challenge. 
All borders are unique, and each of them is related in different ways to local, 
regional, state-bound, and supranational processes – the geosociologies of 
political power (Agnew 2005, 47). As a result of this, however, concerns have 
been raised that during the past decade border studies have been overly focused 
on case study material, which has been thought to overshadow attempts to 
develop the discussion of concepts, theories, and common ideas (Newman 
2012). There is little abstract theorizing in border studies, and those who have 
attempted to theorize on borders have run into unique circumstances that make 
it impossible to conceptualize broad scale generalizations (Kolossov 2005; 
Newman 2006).  
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Even so, attempts have been made. Van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002) 
have sought to understand borders through sociological concepts of ordering 
and othering. Brunet-Jailly (2004; 2005) has put forth an attempt to theorize by 
drawing the general lessons that single case studies can offer. The same logic has 
been used more recently by Moré (2011). Newman, who earlier went against the 
grain by calling for a general border theory (Newman 2003a/b; cf. Brunet-Jailly 
2004; 2005; Kolossov 2005; Paasi 2005a/b; Rumford 2006), finally gave up and 
accepted that “it is futile to seek a single explanatory framework for the study of 
borders” (Newman 2006, 145). Border as a research topic is complex, making the 
study of borders so diverse, both in terms of geographic and spatial scales, that 
any attempt to create a single analytical metatheory is doomed to failure. 
Borders as a topic of research must be untangled in a context specific manner. 
We need not restrict ourselves to mere case studies, but go one step further to 
establish broader conceptualizations, trajectories, and even a common glossary. 
While all borders are unique, they are still affected by the same global 
phenomena; it is their regional implications that differ.  
Even if most scholars have given up on the enterprise, Payan (2011) 
continues to insist that in order to advance the field of border studies beyond 
purely descriptive work, “[c]ontinued theorizing on borders is not only a 
pending task but necessary today, particularly because the optimistic discourse 
on a borderless world… has fallen flat and there is in fact a renewed importance 
assigned to borders both in the political and in the policy world.” He claims that 
the path to border theorizing is not closed but only out of sight because border 
scholars have been looking in the wrong place. Precisely due to the fact that 
border scholars are spread around the world and are in fact disciplinary and 
geographical specialists, “often miss the forest for the trees, and need to take the 
bird’s eye view and find what unites us” (ibid.).  
What unites us, Payan (2011) suggests, is our methods: in order to theorize 
on borders, scholars need to engage in a dialogue on the methodological 
strategies as well as the tools used and pick those that can enhance our 
explanatory power. Even though Payan is correct in arguing that more 
comparative work in teams is needed in order to discover the optimal tools to 
identify what actually gives shape and character to the borders of today, his 
argumentation postulates that border studies would form its own academic 
discipline, no different in nature, say, from geography, sociology, history, or 
anthropology with their own accustomed and well established currents of 
research. That, border studies is not. Instead, borders studies’ main contribution 
lies in its ability to draw these disciplines together. It is fueled by the diversity 
carved out by its eclectic multidisciplinarity. Creating a metatheory and naming 
the variables to be used by all would only restrict the potential that border 
studies as a discipline has to offer. 
This study combines my own interests in geography, international relations, 
political sociology, and history. I am a firm believer that geography, even if 
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subjective, matters in the understanding of a wide variety of processes and 
phenomena – and borders are evidently not an exception. Despite the forces of 
globalization, we remain located somewhere and this has an impact on how we 
perceive that which surrounds us. Newman’s (2003a, 130) notions that “the 
longer they [borders] remain in situ, the harder they are to remove or change” 
seems valid and clouds the assumption that humans would interact most with 
those to whom they are the closest – the axiom being that the way in which a 
border is perceived affects the volume of interaction across the border. A good 
policy then needs geography and history. A historical approach complemented 
with postmodern concepts, which acknowledge that postmodernism is a 
historical condition in itself, provides an essential context for the analysis. 
Even if geographical realities do not change, their meaning for different 
purposes may. Relying on the ideas of North (2005), a change is, for the most 
part, a deliberate process shaped by the actor’s perceptions on the consequences 
of their own actions and beliefs, which are typically blended with their own 
preferences. Choices and decisions are made in light of those perceptions with 
the intent of reducing uncertainty in pursuit of a given goal. As a result, borders 
may lose some of their functions while simultaneously obtaining new ones; 
these functions are seldom stable but rather under continuous change. Borders 
may not disappear completely, but they can become more transparent and 
permeable in terms of some of their functions. A gradual opening of a 
previously closed national border enables the formation of new forms of 
interaction between countries but may also reveal political, cultural, and 
economic inequalities. All this makes them more tangible for people, especially 
borderland-dwellers. In some cases, a border may be so profoundly rooted in 
the minds of people that some of the border’s functions may never lose their 
relevance even if the actual institutional border would eventually subside. 
It has to be acknowledged that in order to appreciate the big picture and to 
challenge its taken-for-grantednesses, a purely geographical approach would be 
insufficient. In addition to taking a spatial perspective, it is necessary to view the 
context both temporally and structurally (cf. de Blij 2005). This study takes 
O’Dowd’s (2010) call for “bringing history back” in seriously. He argues that in 
privileging spatial analysis – space over time, that is – many contemporary 
border studies lack an adequate historical analysis of state and nation formation. 
A failure to acknowledge the historical positioning thus easily leads to a 
disfigured perspective of the present. Over-emphasizing the novelty of 
contemporary forms of globalization and border change, propped up by poorly 
substantiated benchmarks in the past, failing to recognize the ‘past in the 
present’ as in the various historical deposits of state formation processes, and an 
incapacity to recognize the distinctiveness of contemporary state borders 
deceptively discount the “extent to which we continue to live in a ‘world of 
diverse states’” (ibid., 1032–1034).  
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While the field of international relations has evolved from its positivist 
premises – from a single means of understanding and studying world politics 
towards a more nuanced and holistic approach –it still remains insufficient for 
the understanding of the big picture. Despite recent efforts to broader the field, 
it remains tied to great power politics and its basic units of analysis remains the 
modern state. As such, alone it is incapable of explaining the multileveled and 
multiscaled processes that take place today.  
There is a clear need to incorporate several voices that are, in turn, able to 
communicate with each other. Warkentin (2001, 14–15) suggests placing people 
at the center of things: “[p]eople are not only at the center of world politics, but 
they ‘make’ politics” (ibid., 15). Accordingly, attention needs to be paid to 
morals and ethical values as the basis of people’s decision-making and 
interaction with one another. Consequently, civil society, which can be 
appreciated as an aspect of politics, is a dynamic phenomenon created and 
shaped by individuals through social interaction. He specifies, firstly, that 
people as agents, as actors and doers, have the ability to make things happen 
and, secondly, people are also social beings, naturally oriented towards 
establishing and maintaining social relations and conducting their lives within 
the context of relational networks (ibid., 17). 
As was already mentioned, the EU’s emerging politics of regional 
cooperation have placed increased attention on the actual and potential roles 
attributed to civil society. Civil society is understood as a political force central 
to the development of a wider community of values and societal goals; it is seen 
to have a modernizing and democratizing function within state-society relations 
(Scott & Liikanen 2010, 424). It also provides a significant political forum for the 
articulation of social, cultural, environmental, etc. agendas. As a forum, as a 
public space, it has become increasingly transnational. CSOs now operate not 
just within and but also beyond the state. The number of organizations and 
networks operating across the border, often through concrete projects, has been 
on the increase not only within the EU but also between the EU and neighboring 
states.  
The EU cannot build its CBC agendas only on ‘high politics’; the building of 
‘Neighborhood’ must encompass also social and cultural issues. However, the 
previously unseen premium placed on the role of transnational civil society 
cooperation raises also the issue of the EU’s impacts on civil society agendas in 
the neighboring countries and the EU’s ability to promote CBC across its 
external borders. The EU’s normative power is not only exercised through 
explicit policies but also through more subtle and informal channels (Scott & 
Liikanen 2010, 424).  
Borders offer us a useful lens to view the changing shape of governance. 
Through the processes of horizontal political socialization (‘network 
governance‘), the overall societal significance of the EU acquis has not only 
increased but also extended beyond its borders (Filtenborg, Gänzle & Johannson 
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2002). Europeanization proceeds through the cooperation practices of CSOs that, 
intentionally or not, promote and develop ‘EU values,’ creating an informal 
institutional basis for their diffusion beyond the confines of the EU (see, e.g., 
Scott & Liikanen 2010; Laine & Demidov 2013). 
At the EU-Russian interphase, Western explorations of its complexity have 
often been eschewed in favor of a normative approach in which the relationship 
between civil society and the state is underpinned by liberal democratic 
assumption rather than by engagement with wider debates about the politics of 
post-Soviet development. The turmoil of the 1990s in Russia allowed the EU, in 
particular, to insist that relations with a nascent Russia be built on the principle 
of conditionality with the underlying objective of steering Russia gently yet 
forcefully on its path to a ‘better,’ i.e., European, future. Gauging the 
development and progress of Russia’s civil society sector on the basis of 
‘international norms’ privileged form above function. However, in order to 
comprehend Russian civil society’s role as an agent of social change it is more 
telling to assume a more pragmatic, contextualized and less value-laden 
approach and seek to understand the political role of CSOs, the logics that 
inform their agendas as well as their embeddedness within more general 
societal contexts. 
 
1.2.2 Research Objectives and Focus 
This study of human geography focuses on the cross-border cooperation 
practices of civil society organizations at the Finnish-Russian border. While it is 
acknowledged that the concept of ‘cross-border cooperation’ or ‘CBC’ connotes 
a direct links to EU policies and objectives, it is used here more broadly to refer 
to transnational interaction, the processes of working or acting together for a 
common purpose or benefit across borders. Empirically, this study analyzes the 
development of the operational forms of cooperation on the one hand and that 
of the discursive practices that shape the image of Russia on the other and tries 
to unearth the relationship between the two. The analysis begins from the onset 
of collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, covering thus a period during which 
Finnish-Russian bilateral relations became enveloped into the broader EU-
Russia relations. Thus, even though the analysis draws from the border, it 
cannot exclude the wider entities that it divides. Critical notions concerning the 
theories of Europeanization and post-national borders raise the question how 
thorough and how rapid the change in practices of CBC has actually been on the 
regional level and in civil society relations that have stood in the center of the 
new EU policies. While the focus remains on the Finnish-Russian cooperation, 
setting this binational context against the EU framework allows us to examine in 
which ways the changing contexts that govern cooperation have affected the 
perceptions of Russia and the work carried out in practice. 
Through the analysis of perspectives of civil society actors and those voiced 
in the media, this study strives to achieve a better understanding of present-day 
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multi-layered Finnish-Russian and EU-Russian relations, especially with respect 
to the role that civil society plays. Furthermore, the goal is to introduce new, 
more nuanced perspectives to the discussion on Europeanization of the 
institutional and discursive practices of CBC. The research executes this analysis 
by exploring empirical experiences from cross-border cooperation as well as 
popular perceptions towards Russia as a neighbor and as a partner. Extra focus 
is placed on the role of the EU in shaping its relations within ‘wider Europe.’ 
The analysis is anchored by two main thematic questions: 
 
1. How has the actual role of Finnish civil society organizations in 
developing new forms of cooperation with Russia changed, and what 
might their future roles potentially be? 
2. How has the image of Russia portrayed in the public discussion within 
Finland evolved, and how has this affected civil society cooperation?  
 
Though formulated as two separate questions, the two inquiries are interlinked. 
The latter question aims to enlighten the discursive practices – not just as a 
context for CBC but also as a sphere for public discussion. The former explores 
the CSOs’ institutional role – civil society as a sphere of organization. Particular 
focus is placed on the impacts of CSO networks, the organizational and financial 
arrangements that characterize them, as well as the social and technical issues 
that condition – and often complicate – civil society cooperation. The public 
discussion and the image of Russia it portrays are then analyzed specifically 
within the CBC context. It is assumed that the ‘gestalt’ in image of Russia differs 
from the image of Russia as a neighbor and as a partner for cooperation. 
The answering these research questions is done from various angles, all of 
which have their own specific questions guiding the analysis. In geographical 
terms, this study aims to clarify what is special about the Finnish-Russia border 
and what makes it a special case within the European frame and likewise within 
the frame of other asymmetric borders. In historical terms, it asks how the 
specific history of the border and the Finnish nation influence the current 
situation and events. Does the understanding of historical positioning help 
explain the way things are today? Structurally, this study ponders how the 
contemporary forms of globalization are influencing the functions and the 
distinctiveness of state borders. Is the world becoming borderless or do borders 
continue to profoundly influence us? Finally, contextually, this study aims to 
find out to what degree do the practices and rhetoric of regional level CBC 
projects reflect changes in the definitions of CBC in EU level policies and to 
what degree do they still carry traces of preceding traditions of Finnish political 
culture and Finnish-Russian relations. 
The research questions necessitate familiarization firstly with the state of 
border research and especially with how cross-border cooperation has been 
analyzed (Chapter 2). Secondly, it is necessary to outline the development of the 
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concept of civil society and the specificities of the Finnish and Russian 
conception of it (Chapter 3). Thirdly, these two themes have to be placed in the 
broader European context, to which they are inherently linked (Chapter 4).  
 
1.2.3 Research Process and Methodology  
Narrowed views of the world tend to be misleading. In order to create a 
research design across many disciplines and to unearth a more profound 
understanding of a research problem, the subject needs to be approached from a 
variety of perspectives and with different tools. As distinct methodologies each 
have their particular strengths and weaknesses, using more than one allows us 
to gain a clearer and more complete picture of the social world and make for 
more adequate explanations (Creswell 2009). 
A multimethodological approach is used in research situations within which 
the problem can be better understood through both investigation and 
interpretation (Rauscher & Greenfield 2009). This has been increasingly the case 
during the postmodern era as many of the research agendas are already from 
the start too broad, complex and multidisciplinary to be confined to a narrow 
methodical frame. The requirements during the different phases of a research 
project all make their own specific demands on a general methodology 
(Creswell 2009). Accordingly, mixed methods research has become more 
prevalent as researchers seek a more complete understanding to research 
problems in the social sciences (Whitney 2010).  
The research here is based on methodological triangulation, a mix of material 
and methods involving the mapping of actors, newspaper screening and 
semiotic analysis, basic background and more thorough in-depth interviews (96 
in total), document analysis, and active participant observation. Empirical work 
also includes the gathering of supporting material by collecting other relevant 
official documents, political statements, press material, reports of debates and 
brochures, and by participating actively in not just academic but also more 
practical civic activity related conferences, seminars, forums, workshops, and 
other types of meetings in Russia and Finland, as well as elsewhere in Europe. 
This was felt necessary to experience first-hand how cooperation is planned, 
maintained, and generally discussed in practice. Correctives and supplements to 
views brought up in the interviews were later on gatherer through numerous – 
less formal but enormously useful – personal communications. 
While the main focus of this study is on the Finnish perspective of the topic 
at hand, material was also collected from Russian actors as CBC by nature 
involves actors from both sides of the border. Without the Russian perspective, 
the analysis and results derived from it would be inevitably lop-sided and 
therefore incomplete. Out of the aforementioned 96 interviews, 28 were 
conducted on the Russian side of the border in the Republic of Karelia, the city 
of St. Petersburg, and Vyborg, a city within Leningrad oblast. I owe a debt of 
gratitude to Andrey Demidov and Dr. Elena Belokurova for conducting these 
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interviews and providing me with the resulting material as my own language 
skills would have not allowed me to do so.  One additional interview focusing 
on the EU-Russia level issues was conducted in Brussels. 
The insights acquired from the interviews, local seminars, and personal 
communications are reflected against official documents and statements 
originating from national sources and the EU, as well as the newspaper material. 
As a process, the newspaper analysis was clearly the most time consuming 
phase but also one of the most revealing ones for it provided an exceptional 
historical record of a day-to-day basis of ephemeral information (for a more 
detailed description, see subsection 5.1.2), much of which tends to be forgotten 
or purposefully left out from interviews conducted in retrospect. The interviews 
of cross-border actors, of course, provided deeper, more detailed and practical 
information. This was needed in order to put the partial interpretations and 
rhetoric that had arisen from the newspaper material and also from official 
documents and statements, as well as policies formulated locally and regionally 
based upon them, into perspective. As already mentioned, the newspaper 
material from the leading Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, is, however, 
not only used to inform the context for cooperation but also analyzed in terms of 
the public sphere with the aim of tracing what sorts of opinions, images and 
perceptions arise from public discussion.  
 
1.2.4 Research Material and Its Use  
The mapping of actors and potential respondents was an important activity as it 
provided an overall picture of the CSOs operating within Finnish-Russian cross-
border contexts. Upon completion a broad constellation of CSO actors and 
agencies relevant to CSO activities emerged and interviews carried out. Most of 
the interviews were conducted in connection to the EUDIMENSIONS3 project. A 
total of 96 persons from 78 organizations were interviewed. The distribution of 
selected organizations is based on the mapping exercise conducted and reflects 
the prevalence and activeness of the respective sectors in CBC. On the Finnish 
side, the primary research area included the provinces of North Karelia, South 
Karelia, and Kymenlaakso. Also actors active in the border region, yet based 
elsewhere (most notably in Helsinki), were included. The basic interviews were 
conducted in late 2007 and early 2008 and the in-depth interviews in late 2008 
and early 2009.  
The research commenced with a set of basic interviews in order to ferret out 
the most relevant CSOs to investigate. An indicative list of questions and the 
                                                          
3 EUDIMENSIONS “Local Dimensions of a Wider European Neighbourhood: Developing Political 
Community through Practices and Discourses of Cross-Border Cooperation” project was supported 
by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Program for Research and Technological 
Development of the European Union under PRIORITY 7 (Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-
Based Society), Area 4.2.1 “New Borders, New Visions of Neighbourhood.” Contract no: CIT5-CT-
2005-028804. The project ran from May 2006 through June 2009.  
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topic to be discussed was sent to the interviewees upon their request. The 
persons to be interviewed were first contacted by telephone and in some cases 
by e-mail to explain the purpose and focus of the research. While general 
understanding of CSOs and their cooperation activities had been formed 
through various documents and online research during the mapping exercise, a 
more thorough and up-to-date picture was formed during the basic interviews.  
The more involved interviews aimed to gather perceptual information on the 
contexts within which civil society cooperation is developing between 
Finland/the EU and Russia. Both the political and social contexts in which CSO 
are embedded and have a bearing on CBC were discussed. Interviews consisted 
of both simple structured questions and section of open-ended questions. 
However, as the interviewees formed a rather heterogeneous group, the 
interviews often developed into rather open narrative interview on the personal 
experiences of the interviewee in question. This openness allowed the 
interviewee to steer the discussion and, instead of answering a pre-defined set of 
questions, introduce the aspects and issues concerning the topic at hand which 
he or she felt to be the most imperative. Whenever possible these interviews 
were recorded and always with the consent of the interviewee. While interviews 
were set up with a particular person from a particular organization, in a number 
of cases the person in question was joined by other representative(s) of the same 
organization as it was felt that expertise from different tiers or sections of the 
organization was needed in order to competently answer the questions. 
Several interviewees in the very beginning of the research asked that their 
names not to be used. The reason for this was that it would prevent them from 
mentioning critical aspects of their experiences as it might harm their future 
initiatives. I firmly believe that for the purposes of this study, what was said was 
more important that who said it. As no apparent benefit would result from 
using the names of the interviewees, the decision was made to conduct all the 
interviews anonymously as to allow unrestricted opinions to be voiced. The list 
of organizations can be seen in appendix I, and an indicative list of the interview 
questions is found in appendix II. As there have been many developments since 
the interviews were conducted, in numerous occasions it was necessary to 
update the information via phone or e-mail. 
Newspaper analysis was seen as particularly fitting to complement the 
insights gained from the interviews of the civil society actors. The public 
discussion, for which the opinion pages of Helsingin Sanomat provide a forum, is 
relevant here firstly for it forms an important aspect of civil society. Secondly it 
provides a contextual frame for the interpretation of the interview material (see 
subsections 5.1.2-3). Media plays an important role in the formation and success 
of a strong civil society structure not just by swaying public opinion but also by 
influencing and even directing social change. As Galaty (2003, 2) explains, by 
providing accurate and timely information the media is a tool that can help put 
civil society principles into action and enable more effective participation in a 
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civil society framework. Responsible journalism also helps to reinforce 
accountable behavior in society and drive public perception, by either creating 
or eroding support for the work of governments, CSOs and businesses (ibid.). 
Newspapers and the media in general play a crucial role also in terms of border 
work in defining how CSOs involved in CBC regard the ‘other.’  
A total of 4,708 opinion articles were collected from the years 1990–2010 as a 
resource for analyzing the Finnish context within which Finnish-Russian CBC 
has developed. The collected empirical material consists of opinion pieces: 
editorials (E), op-eds (OE), and the letters to the editor (L). The fundamental 
logic and methodological basis of the approach relies on social semiotics (see 
subsection 5.1.6). As social semiotics investigates human signifying practices in 
specific social and cultural circumstances and tries to explain meaning-making 
as a social practice, the aim here is to situate what has been reported in the 
context in which it has occurred in order to investigate the discursive field in 
which they exist and describe the potential changes in the foci of the debates by 
interlinking them with the broader changes that have occurred at the border. 
This is not an attempt of a quantitative extrapolation from a few individuals and 
their opinions to many. I rather seek to give a contemporary human voice to 
situations often talked about in retrospect and in a very academic and formal 
manner and to move, following Kuus’ (2011a) example, these specific anecdotes 
and incidents to the broader discursive field that has enabled these particular 
incidents and constrained others. 
The number of articles used, was then narrowed down to 2,383 articles as 
only those relevant to the study were chosen for further scrutiny. A large 
encompassing database was nevertheless needed to begin the analysis of the 
border and to observe which topics received mention as opposed to presuming 
in advance which topics must be important. The core of the semiotic analysis 
involves coding the articles with signifiers. Based on the work of Hall (1986), 
Edensor (1998; 2002), and Wodak (2004; 2008), five categories of signifiers have 
been distinguished: places (specific geographies and landscapes), activities 
(performances of longer duration), and objects (abstract or physical, people) but 
also stories (narratives, myths) and events (lasting limited duration of time). In 
addition to determining the signifier, it is important to establish the connotation 
of the signified. I confine myself to a coding of articles that is based on their tone 
with respect to Russia (negative, neutral or positive). The thematic 
categorization is adopted from Virtanen (2004); though given that most articles 
consisted of elements based on which they could have been placed under more 
than one of the categories, the use of the themes loses some of its applicability. 
Despite the context specificity and codedness of the newspaper material, the 
Finnish language material is presented here in English. While having to accept 
that some things are lost in translation, I firmly believe that the benefits of this 
approach outstand its drawbacks, already for the reason that this is something 
that has not been done to any major extent before. Finnish-Russian relations are 
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written and talked about differently in Finnish and in English – and by different 
people, to different audiences. Even though exceptions certainly exist, in 
academia, those who seek to emphasize that internationalization and 
Europeanization have tended to write in English while more national and 
bilateral issues are commonly discussed in Finnish. Public opinion and its 
spontaneous, unstructured representations are logical and with every reason 
largely limited to national fora. 
 
 
1.3 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
1.3.1 Finland and Its Neighboring Regions 
For the majority of its 1,340-kilometer length from the Gulf of Finland to the 
high north, the Finnish-Russian border runs through forests and extremely 
sparsely populated rural areas, the metropolis of St. Petersburg lying some 150 
kilometers from the border being the only notable exception. Even though small 
towns and villages are located near the border, urban centers are situated far 
away from each other and from the border precluding the existence of any 
authentic twin cities. The actual borderline is beefed up on either side by a 
special border zone, accessible only with permission from the Border Guard 
authority. At its widest stretches on the Finnish side, the zone is three kilometers 
in width. On the Russian side, the actual width of the zone has been altered on 
several occasions and has ranged anywhere between five and 130 kilometers. 
During the Soviet period, the zone ballooned up to 200 kilometers in width.  
In 2010, the population living on the Finnish side in the border municipalities 
amounted to approximately 300,000 and in the border provinces (maakunta) 
numbered around 1.14 million. A common characteristic of the border region is 
that with the exception of the main regional centers, such as Joensuu and 
Lappeenranta, population continuously dwindles. On the Russian side, 
population in the three border regions (Leningrad Oblast, the Republic of 
Karelia, and Murmansk Oblast) totals 3.47 million while the city of St. 
Petersburg with more than five million inhabitants makes up a separate 
administrative unit inside the Leningrad Oblast and forms a federal subject of its 
own. Certainly the use of administrative units in defining the border region 
presents a typical modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP), which needs to be 
taken into consideration during the analysis. Already the mere sizes of these 
units differ greatly between the countries; the three Russian regions cover an 
area (401,800 km2) larger than Finland in its entirety (338,424 km2). Depending 
on the definition, Finland itself could be considered to be a border region while 
the three Russian regions in question form only a small fringe of Russia’s vast 
territory. 
During recent decades, Finns had grown accustomed to the fact that the 
interaction across the eastern border was highly regulated and restricted. Even if 
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the border today is far from ‘open,’ the situation has changed remarkably. New 
crossing points have facilitated a rapid increase in the total volume of cross-
border traffic. Currently, there are nine international border crossing points 
along with several temporary border crossing points that are subject to license. 
The number of border crossings skyrocketed from less than a million in 1990 to 
10.7 million in 2011 (Finnish Border Guard 2011). In view of Russia’s recently 
granted WTO membership and the possibility of a visa-free regime in the 
foreseeable future, interaction across the Finnish-Russian border can only be 
expected to increase in the years ahead. The number of border crossings is 
expected reach 20 million in five years even if the visa regime would stay in 
force (Finnish Border Guard 2013). 
Interestingly, whereas in the early 1990s most people crossing the border 
were Finns, recently it has been Russians whose share constitutes the vast 
majority of the crossings (Figure 1). In 2010, Finland granted over 950,000 visas 
to Russian citizens, which made Russians to make up over half of the tourists 
visiting Finland (Torstila 2011). Given that the Finnish embassy in St. Petersburg 
is famous throughout Russia for being one of the most liberal ones there is 
(Makarychev 2012), a practice has evolved whereby the Finnish visa is used to 
travel also elsewhere within the Schengen zone.  
 
 
 
 
 
The so-called opening of the border can easily be seen from Figure 2, which 
illustrates the increase in border crossings at the Vaalimaa border crossing point, 
the oldest and busiest border-crossing point at the Finnish-Russian border. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the border became more porous for everyday 
people. On average, more than approximately 8,700 people cross the border at 
Vaalimaa daily; that is twice the number of crossings during the entire first year 
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that the border crossing point was opened to traffic in 1958 4 . Today the 
Vaalimaa border crossing point is not only the busiest border crossing point 
along the Finnish-Russian border, but also the most trafficked at the external EU 
border with Russia altogether.  
 
 
 
 
When compared to another asymmetrical border, for example the United States-
Mexico border where an estimated half a million illegal border crossings take 
place yearly, the numbers of illegal crossings in the Finnish-Russian case are 
miniscule; e.g., a total of seven in 2011. While the obvious differences in the 
respective populations explain much of the story, the extremely low number in 
the Finnish-Russian case also suggests that the border is highly controlled. 
The importance and impact of freedom of movement on Finnish-Russian 
relations have remained underutilized; while institutional barriers have relaxed, 
the border still poses a barrier to spontaneous interaction typical to many other 
border settings. Nevertheless, alongside tourism, shopping excursions, and 
business travel, migration from Russia to Finland has increased. Migration has 
contributed to a growth in the number of bicultural people, which in turn can be 
seen as a potential resource for cross-border interaction. The net migration from 
Russia to Finland increased significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and has consisted of approximately 2,000 people annually since 2000. According 
to Statistics Finland, there were 29,585 Russian citizens living in Finland in 2012, 
but the number of native Russian speakers had already reached 58,331, slightly 
more than one per cent of the entire population of Finland. Most of these 
individuals live in the capital region or inhabit the Eastern part of Finland. 
                                                          
4 The Vaalimaa border crossing point was officially opened for tourism and freight traffic in August 
1958. However, during the first years the border crossing point was open only in certain months. By 
1966, the traffic had increased to the extent that it was decided to keep the crossing point open year-
around, even if only during the daytime. It was not until 1993 when the border crossing point was 
opened for 24 hour per day traffic. See Kononenko and Laine (2008). 
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- ) of the Russian Federation, 
especially the Republic of Karelia, the Leningrad and Murmansk oblasts, and the 
city of St. Petersburg (Figure 3). According to the 2010 census, out of Russia’s 
total population of 143 million, 13.6 million (9.5 per cent) live within the 
1,677,900 square kilometer area of the Northwestern Federal District. The 
metropolitan area of St. Petersburg extends into Leningrad Oblast and boasts 
more denizens than the whole of Finland.  
In the early 1990s, most of the activities initiated by Finnish CSOs were first 
directed towards St. Petersburg. The difference in scales became apparent also in 
the assessment of problems and needs, some of which were unheard of within 
the Finnish context. Practical operations revealed that there where profound 
differences between the countries with respect to the very systems through 
which the work had to be carried out (Skvortsova 2005, 38). Soon after, activities 
began to spread largely to the small villages of nearby regions, most importantly 
the Republic of Karelia, where the presence of Finnish CSOs has remained 
strong ever since. 
 
 
 
 
 
The activity sectors and themes are also clustered geographically. While 
organizations have formed their own multinational networks within the Barents 
region in the north and Baltic region in the south, Karelia in the middle is still 
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largely treated in binational terms. For example environmental cooperation is 
undertaken throughout the border area yet through different frames depending 
on the location. Along with social and health-related organizations, older 
cultural CSOs also focus on Karelia – largely due to the historical reasons – 
while many newer organizations see the metropolis of St. Petersburg as a 
fascinating target. Interestingly, the cooperation in the field of sport has 
practically vanished. Economic and political cooperation tends to cover Russia 
more broadly. 
 
1.3.2 Shifting Significance of the Finnish-Russian Border 
The significance and resultant role of the Finnish-Russian border have been 
highly varied, reflecting not only Finnish-Russian relations but also changes in 
global geopolitics (Paasi 1999b, 669). The border which today separates Finland 
and the Russian Federation was first drawn as a result of the Treaty of Nöteborg 
in 1323 between the then rulers of Sweden and Novgorod, a medieval Russian 
state. Being a demarcation zone between resurgent Swedish and Russian rule 
and emerging empires, and thus also linked to the division between eastern and 
western Christianity, the border was frequently redrawn according to the 
changing balance of power. The border came to separate two cultures, religions, 
and languages, yet in geographical terms it did not follow any logical contours 
nor did it erect any clear-cut natural barriers to interaction. For centuries, the 
border in practice did not exist at the regional level and people were free to 
move back and forth. 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire gained 
supremacy, which in 1809 resulted in the Swedish Empire relinquishing the 
territory of Finland. Finland became an autonomous grand duchy within the 
autocratic Russian Empire. During this period of autonomy, Finland maintained 
a national economy and a customs border with Russia; however, the border was 
otherwise an open one and very much a formality (Paasi 1996; Liikanen et al. 
2007, 22). In economic terms, the growing metropolis of St. Petersburg had 
important effects on the Finnish side of the border due to its constantly 
mounting demand for goods and labor (Katajala 1999). Finland retained its own 
religious organizations as well as the laws and administrative structures 
established under Swedish rule. For the first time in history, Finland formed an 
administrative unit of its own (ibid.). 
The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of an active nation-building 
process in Finland whereby the border became progressively defined in terms of 
an autonomous nation-state (Liikanen 1995). Broad social and political 
mobilization enforced the nature of the border as a political, social, and cultural 
dividing line at the beginning of the twentieth century (Alapuro 1988). As 
internal problems together with the losses in the First World War fuelled a 
revolution in Russia in spring of 1917, Finland took advantage of the turmoil 
and began to probe possibilities for its own independence. Following the 
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Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia later that year, Finland immediately seize 
the opportunity and declared its independence on December 6, 1917.  
The  independence  gained  also  ushered  in more  freedom  of  action  to  the 
competing  internal groups and  fuelled  the power struggle between  the  ‘Reds,’ 
the Social Democrats  led by  the Peopleʹs Deputation of Finland and supported 
by  the Russian Soviet Republic,  and  the non‐socialist,  conservative‐led Senate 
forces,  the  ‘Whites’ who were  supported by  the German Empire. The struggle 
soon  escalated  into  a  bloody  and  traumatic  civil war  and  a Bolshevik‐backed 
abortive  revolution  in  1918.  The  war  was  a  definitive  catastrophe  for  the 
newborn Finnish nation and society at large. It broke up, inter alia, the Finnish 
labor movement  into  the moderate  Social Democrats,  the  left‐wing  socialists, 
and communists (Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999). 
The Republic of Finland and Soviet Russia signed a peace  treaty  (Treaty of 
Tartu)  in 1920  in order  to  stabilize political  relations  and  settle  the borderline 
between  them.  In Finland, a strong effort was made  immediately  to secure  the 
border against Soviet Russia (and later the Soviet Union) in order to signify the 
territoriality of an independent state. A heavily guarded, hostile military border 
was  formed  and  all  forms  of  cooperation  interrupted.  During  the  interwar 
period,  the desire  redefine  the border along ethnic  terms by uniting  the Finns 
and  the  Karelians  within  one  state  enjoyed  strong  support  among  the 
intellectual  and military  elite but was not  adopted  as part of  the official  state 
politics (Ahti 1987). The border was redrawn for the last time during World War 
II during which two wars between Finland and the Soviet Union were fought5. 
Under an interim peace treaty in 1944, Finland had to cede large portions of its 
domain  to  the  Soviet Union,  and  almost  the  entire population  of  these  areas, 
more than 420,000 people, was resettled to different parts of Finland. 
As  Paasi  (1996;  1999b/c)  has  scrutinized,  the  construction  of  exclusive 
political borders was a decisive part of  the process of Finnish nation‐building 
and  strengthening  the  state. A determined  effort was made  to  cast  the  Soviet 
Union, the ‘other,’ under a dark shadow whereby the border became a mythical 
manifestation of  the  ‘eternal opposition’ between  the  two  states  and  a  crucial 
constituent  of  Finnish  national  identity  (Paasi  1997;  1999b).  In  connection  to 
World War  II,  an  endeavor  to  extend  Finland’s  territory  towards  its  ‘natural’ 
border  in  the  east,  a  counter move  to  the  Soviet  offensive  and  the  following 
invasion attempt, eventually led to Finland having to cede considerable portions 
of its territory to the Soviet Union.  
The  border  between  Finland  and  the  Soviet Union was  the  longest  border 
between a western capitalist state and a socialist super power (Paasi 1999b, 670). 
In addition  to  its  ideological weight,  the border was  increasingly perceived as 
playing distinct historical, political, natural, and yet artificial roles (Paasi 1996), 
the  influence  of which  are  still  felt  today. Within  the  Cold War  geopolitical 
                                                          
5 The Winter War (1939‐1940) and the Continuation War (1941–1944). 
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order, Finland sought neutrality and became placed into the grey zone between 
the Eastern and Western blocs. Whereas Finland had been a ‘Western’ country in 
the geopolitical literature prior to World War II, many post‐war representations 
placed  it  in  Eastern  Europe  (Paasi  1996)  as  “a  semi‐independent  oddity 
positioned under the Russian sphere of influence” (Moisio 2003a). The blame for 
this,  Moisio  explains,  was  put  on  the  ‘incorrect  activities’  of  Cold  War  era 
politicians  who  expressed  ‘dangerous  loyalty’  to  and  fraternized  excessively 
with the Soviet Union: “Finland indeed told to others that it is a part of the West, 
but its practices referred to a deep need to please the eastern neighbor.” 
The crux of  the matter was  that  the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, 
and Mutual Assistance  allowed  the  Soviet  Union  to  interfere with  Finland’s 
domestic  life. The agreement  served as  the key document  for governing post‐
war  relations  between  the  two  countries  and  defined  also  the  international 
status  of  Finland  not  only  in  regards  to  the  Soviet  Union  but  to  Western 
countries as well  (Liikanen et al. 2007, 27). The border  itself  remained heavily 
guarded  between  the  two  armies,  as  the  treaty  did  not  necessitate  military 
cooperation,  as  had  been  the  case  in  the  Soviet  satellite  countries  of  Eastern 
Europe (Nevakivi 1994). 
Even  though  the new geopolitical  regime based on  the YYA pact  included 
more  extensive  economic  interaction  between  the  countries  under  centralized 
bilateral  agreements,  the  border was  a  closed  one  for  the most  part,  and  the 
longer  it remained closed,  the wider  the gap between  the countries grew. This 
was  hardly  helped  by  the  fact  that  during  the Cold War  the  border  became 
increasingly  seen as a  line divining  two competing  socio‐political  systems,  the 
communist  and  the  capitalist,  and  forming  a  ‘civilizational’  frontier  zone 
between East and West. A closed, politically and  ideologically charged border 
had  a  severe  impact  on  the  development  of  the  border  area,  as  cross‐border 
connections were cut and investments to this buffer zone remained slim.  
During October and November 1991, the two countries held negotiations on 
the new Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation that would replace the 
YYA  pact.  The  urge  to  sign  a  contract with  the  already  doomed  to  collapse 
Soviet Union was grounded  in  the desire  to nullify  the YYA  treaty as soon as 
possible  but  also  in  the  confusion  about what was  to  follow  and who would 
have  the  authority  to  enter  into  treaties. The  initialing  of  the  text  of  the  new 
treaty took place on December 9, 1991 and was set to be signed on December 18, 
1991  in Moscow. The  treaty was, however, rejected  in  the  last minute by Boris 
Yeltsin, who  had  been  elected  to  the  newly  created  post  of  President  of  the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on June 12, 1991. 
The  situation  changed  radically  once  the  Soviet  Union  ceased  to  exist. 
Finland recognized the Russian Federation as the Soviet Union’s successor and 
was quick to draft bilateral treaties with  it. The treaty on Good Neighborliness 
and Cooperation was adapted to the new political situation and finalized with a 
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newly formed Russia in January 1992, and in so doing nullifying the YYA treaty 
and the previous special relations dictated by it.  
The  YYA  treaty  had  been  “a  child  of  its moment  of  birth,  and  an  unfair 
ballast  to  Finland.”  Nevertheless,  many  agreed  that  it  had  “still  served… 
reasonably  well  the  relationship  between  the  countries  in  the  Cold  War 
conditions” as, with the exception of the note crisis of 1961, “the Soviet Union 
did not,  fortunately,  resort  to  its outright abuse.”  (OE 21.1.1992.) Whereas  the 
YYA  treaty  had  been  a  document,  “in  which  the  Soviet  Union  threatened 
Finland with providing  assistance  if  Finland did not  seat  and  give paw,”  the 
new agreement was seen not to form a “barrier to friendship,” as its predecessor 
had  been,  but  “provided  opportunities,  not  threats  in  guises”  (OE  13.7.2007). 
The  new  agreement,  named  straightforwardly  as  the  “Agreement  on  the 
Foundations  of  Relations  between  the  Republic  of  Finland  and  the  Russian 
Federation”6 was seen to provide an exception and a refreshing breath of fresh 
air  in  the midst  of  deception  and  cover‐ups.  The  same  clear  line  continued 
through 12 articles of the compact and readable agreement.  
Under  the new agreement, Finland became  the  first  country outside of  the 
former Soviet Union to sign a new political agreement built on the Commission 
on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE)  principles  of  directly  with 
Russia.  It  also  began  to  form  the  basis  for  Finland’s  Neighboring  Area 
Cooperation  with  Russia.  However,  on  the  other  hand,  the  treaty  allowed 
Finland  to make  the move  towards what was consider  to be  its right reference 
group (Sutela 2001, 6–7); in March 1992, only a few weeks after signing the new 
cooperation treaty with the Russian Federation, the Government of Finland with 
the support of Parliament, applied for EU membership. 
Moisio  (2003b)  has  aptly  asserted  this  decision  was  fundamentally  about 
applying  for  recognition  for  its  own  other  Western  Europeanness.  It  was 
essential  to  show  the others  that “the  story we  told about our  country’s place 
among  the nations” was  indeed  true. The  international Finlandization debate, 
Moisio  explains,  had  questioned  the  story  as  Finns  told  it  to  themselves  and 
instead situated Finland  in  the “wrong place,”  from which Finland aspired,  to 
escape from with the help of EU membership.  
Finland’s entry into the EU and western links in security and defense policy 
altered  its  location  in  the geopolitical  imagination  (Paasi  1999b,  670). With  its 
membership, Finland tried to prove its “cooperation abilities with other nations 
it  deemed  as  good,”  so  that  all  the  speculations  and  explanations  about  the 
position  of  Finland  would  become  redundant  (Moisio  2003b).  These  new 
conditions  allowed  also  freer  and more  critical  and more public debate. Most 
notably,  a  number  of  organizations  began  actively  promoting  debates  on  the 
future of the ceded areas, at times in Ratzelian spirit by and seeking to heal the 
                                                          
6 Finnish Treaty Series 63/1992. 
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wounded  body  of  the Maiden  of  Finland  and  fixing  her  natural  living  space 
(Paasi 1999b, 672). 
When joining the Union in 1995, Finland jumped aboard a moving train. The 
process  of  European  integration  was  underway  and  had  been  fuelled 
remarkably, first, by the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 and, second, 
by  the new enlargement prospects evoked by  the collapse of  the Soviet Union 
and  the  end  of  the Cold War.  By  its  nature  this  process  necessitated  policies 
aiming  to  transcend  internal  borders,  perceived  in  Schumanian  spirit  as 
products  and  remainders  of  former  conflicts.  Borders  were  depicted  as  the 
results of the differentiation of groups in space. Keeping ‘us’ apart from ‘them,’ 
they were perceived to preserve heterogeneity and a  lack of coherence, both to 
be replaced with unity and common Europeanness. As integration was assumed 
to  follow  from  increased  interaction,  borders  as  barriers  had  to  be  eroded, 
whereby  the  role  of  borderlands  as  integrators  became  of  high  importance. 
Underpinned by a strong regional development and spatial planning rationale, 
cross‐border  cooperation  became  a  tool  for  building  cohesion  and  blurring 
divides while local cross‐border diplomacy enjoyed, first and foremost, a more a 
symbolic status. 
With the EU membership, activities formerly administered through bilateral, 
state‐level agreements became a part of  the broader dynamics of  international 
politics and EU‐Russia relations. The binational border was suddenly upgraded 
to  an  external  EU  border,  and  this  necessitated  also  amendments  in  political 
language and rhetoric. As Emerson (2001, 29) states, the Finnish‐Russian border 
served  as  a prime  example of  a  clean‐cut periphery where one  empire  ended 
and  another began. The Finnish domestic debate  thus  acquired  an  alternative 
thread, which depicted Finland, having the only EU land border with Russia, as 
a sort of a bridge builder between the two. For this reason and also because of 
the  increased  importance of the EU’s borders that was observed  in the key EU 
decision‐making bodies, Finland now had a unique opportunity to profile itself 
in the field. 
Given its geographic location, Finland became a logical avenue for increasing 
EU‐Russian  trade. The  Finnish  easterly  business  expertise  stemming  from  the 
Soviet  era  was  used  to  market  Finland  both  as  a  gateway  to  Russia  and  a 
window to the West. As a new EU member state, Finland was also interested in 
providing the EU with a special agenda towards its Russian border, i.e., towards 
the  “challenges  and  possibilities  presented  by  having  Russia  as  a  neighbor” 
(Stubb  2009).  This  then materialized  in  the  form  of  the Northern Dimension 
initiative. 
The  opportunities were  not,  however,  really  realized  until  it  became  clear 
that  Finland’s  distinction  of  being  Russia’s  only  EU  neighbor  would  be 
threatened  by  the  upcoming  2004  enlargement.  While  the  domestic  debate 
remained  largely  unchanged,  at  the  EU  level  Finland  began,  willfully  and 
consistently, proclaiming itself as something of a litigator of Russia in all things 
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Europe,  even  if  with  only  occasional  success,  claiming  to  possess  Russian 
expertise that others did or could not have. The Finnish‐Swedish border became 
an  internal  EU  border,  yet  practically  nothing  changed,  as  passage  had  been 
unrestrained already for decades. Thanks to the Nordic Passport Union, also the 
Finnish‐Norwegian  border,  now  officially  an  external  EU  border,  remained 
uncontrolled. As of 1996, all Nordic countries  joined  the Schengen Agreement, 
which  became  fully  applied  from  March  25,  2001  onwards.  In  the  Finnish 
context,  the word  ‘border,’ when used without any  specifying country names, 
thus refers commonly to the border with Russia. 
The  2004  enlargement  of  the  EU  and  the  introduction  of  ENP  policy 
epitomize a political attempt to extend the ‘de‐bordering’ momentum of the late 
1980s and 1990s beyond the territory of ‘Core Europe.’ The EU embarked on an 
ambitions mission to look beyond its internal borders and create a transnational 
space extending beyond its external borders by engaging neighboring states in a 
new process of cross‐border regionalization. Despite being marketed as ‘Ring of 
Friends,’  this  approach  embodied  an  apparent  shift  whereby  the  1989–2003 
‘scars of history’ discourse that had attempted to transcend borders began to be 
replaced  by  a  securitization  discourse.  Particularly  the  external  borders  re‐
emerged in practical and discursive/symbolic terms as markers of sharp – to an 
extent civilizational – difference (van Houtum & Pijpers 2007).  
Suffering  from  an  acute  form  of  enlargement  fatigue,  the  EU  moved  to 
stabilize  and  consolidate  itself  as  a post‐national political  community.  Formal 
relations with the neighboring countries were privileged at the expense of local 
cooperation, which as a consequence became increasingly based on context and 
need ad hoc. This transformed the integrative role of the borderlands to that of a 
buffer  zone  or  a  filter.  While  the  new  forms  of  regional  cooperation  were 
presumably based on mutual  interdependence,  the EU’s restrictive border and 
visa regimes gave an unambiguously exclusionary impact, making the EU seem 
to be a contradictory international actor. 
Nationalist  populism,  already  on  the  rise  since  9/11  and  the  following 
terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, was fuelled further, inter alia, by threat 
scenarios of  illegal  immigration,  islamophobic  readings of  a potential Turkish 
EU membership, and a general loss of control over not just borders but domestic 
issues of all sorts. The emphasis on cultural‐civilizational difference in defining 
‘European’  became  mainstream  political  discourse  and  led  to  a  heightened 
demand  for more  defensive  borders  for  the  EU  as  a whole. On  the  level  of 
member  states,  the  reclamation  of  national  identity  and  sovereignty,  often 
termed  as  a  ‘re‐bordering’  of  national‐states within  the  EU,  led  the  national 
governments  to propose policies of  their own and  in so doing challenging  the 
EU’s  top‐down  supranational  thrust.  In Finland,  the  rise of national populism 
was,  and  is,  not  directed  in  any  specific way  against Russia  or Russians  but 
builds the argument that immigrants in general are threatening Finnish jobs and 
welfare  (welfare  chauvinism)  and,  in  more  extreme  cases,  Finnish  culture 
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(cultural  nationalism).  Similar  tendencies  are  apparent  in  Russia,  where  its 
leadership  has  resorted  actively  to  nationalist  rhetoric  and  foreign  threat 
scenarios  in order  to  lead  the  lower  and  the upper  classes  and  to  control  the 
growing middle  class  and  civil  society  in  between.  In  all,  this  situation  has 
created a complex political‐territorial environment for CBC as the less powerful 
but still active  local  institutions  in  the border regions react  to  the national and 
supranational policies affecting them. 
 
1.3.3 Russia: So Near and yet so Far 
Today,  the spectrum of Finnish‐Russia relations  is unprecedentedly broad and 
diverse. Even though the dialogue between the two countries has become more 
‘normal,’  Finland  has  sought  to  continue  the  ‘special  relationship’  and  stay 
among the  ‘good countries’ (Table 1). The presidents, the Prime Ministers, and 
Foreign Ministers meet regularly during bilateral visits but also at international 
and European forums. Within the Cabinet Finland’s relationship with Russia is 
discussed on a regular basis. In addition, the aim has been to create direct and 
effective relations between all ministries and key government bodies with their 
counterparts in Russia. According to Alexander Rumyantsev (2012), the current 
Russian ambassador to Finland, Finnish‐Russian relations are built on mutually 
beneficial  issues.  According  to  him,  these  include  open  political  dialogue, 
increasing  trade, more  than  ten million border crossings, a gas pipeline  in  the 
Baltic  Sea,  the  Saimaa Canal,  the Helsinki‐St.  Petersburg  high‐speed  railway, 
and cultural cooperation. 
Even though Finnish‐Russian relations are commonly addressed from a more 
or less equal footing – in the media and also in academia – it is hard to erase the 
apparent  fact  that  the  relationship  is,  in  the  end,  quite  a  typical  relationship 
between a small state and a superpower. Russia is not Sweden for Finland, nor 
should it be (Lounasmeri 2011a, 15). Such neighborly relations are always more 
important  for  the  smaller  country  –  Finland  needs  Russia,  but Russia would 
quite  likely manage  just  fine without Finland. The city of St. Petersburg alone 
has  a  greater population  than  Finland  as  a whole. By  total  area, Russia  is  50 
times larger than Finland, and the Soviet Union was 66 times larger.  
The  two  countries  share  significant  overlaps  in  history,  and  with  the 
exception of a couple of conflicts, the relationship between the two has remained 
somehow  ‘special.’  With  a  common  border  of  more  than  1,300  kilometers, 
Finland has always been closely tied to its eastern neighbor. Despite the physical 
proximity, the Cold War era closure of the border increased the mental distance 
between  the  two  sides.  For  a  long  time,  a  good  fence  indeed  made  good 
neighbors,  but  it  also made  the  other  side  seem  increasingly  unfamiliar.  The 
resultant ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality sketched in the minds of many has proven 
to be far more deeply rooted and harder to erase than the border per se.  
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Table 1. An index of friendliness towards Russia. Zero indicates the lowest rate of 
friendliness towards Russia and 1 the highest (Braghiroli & Carta 2009, 12) 
 
Estonia 0 Eastern Divorced 
Lithuania 0  
Poland 0.11  
Latvia 0.17  
Czech Rep. 0.19  
Slovakia 0.25   
Sweden 0.3 Vigilant Critics 
United Kingdom 0.39  
Romania 0.44  
Slovenia 0.44  
Portugal 0.47  
Bulgaria 0.5   
Hungary 0.53 Acquiescent Partners 
Denmark 0.55  
France 0.55  
Ireland 0.55  
The Netherlands 0.55  
Belgium 0.64  
Germany 0.64  
Luxembourg 0.64  
Spain 0.64  
Finland 0.69  
Italy 0.72  
Austria 0.75   
Greece 0.89 Loyal Wife 
 
 
The  Finnish  nation‐building  process  in  the  late  nineteenth  century 7  and 
particularly  the post‐Civil War White history reading have projected Russia as 
eternal other to Finland. In order to build a coherent nation, it was necessary to 
define who  ‘us’  actually were  and what was actually  ‘ours’  –  and  in order  to 
demarcate that, a border was utterly needed. In a way, the Finnish identity was 
built on differences vis‐à‐vis  its neighbors; Finns were  something  that Swedes 
                                                          
7 Different stands existed. The Fennoman conservative Finnish Party was split in two in 1894 when a 
more critical faction of the party founded the Young Finnish Party and advocated passive resistance 
towards Russia. The remaining Finnish Party, now the ’Old Finns’, supported appeasement and saw 
cooperation with Russia as a way to enact its language policies (see Liikanen 1995, 349–351).  
     45 
 
and Russian were not. Accordingly,  the borders have played a key  role  in  the 
Finnish nation and  identity building;  to remove  them would  therefore remove 
part of the Finnish identity. 
Balancing at the border of East and West was not taken as a zero–sum game. 
Finnish President Paasikivi’s dictum that if one bows to the West one is bound 
to turn one’s bottom to the East – and vice versa – has never been put to a test. 
The mutually understood fact that “We cannot do anything for geography, nor 
can you”8 has  been,  contrary  to  its  original  connotation,  transformed  to mean 
that  the  two  countries  now  had  a  lot  of  potential  to  utilize  the  opportunities 
offered by geographical proximity (see Stubb 2008). 
The overriding question of Finnish foreign policy, as Finland’s  long‐serving 
President (1956–1981) Urho Kekkonen (1958) explained, is the relations with her 
Eastern neighbor “upon which our destiny rests” and the “future of our nation 
depends…” – “[t]his always has been  the case and always will be.” Kekkonen 
had  co‐opted many  of  his  ideas  from  his  predecessor,  J. K.  Paasikivi, whose 
thinking  derived  from  Lord  Macaulay  suggestion  that  the  beginning  of  all 
wisdom  lay  in  the  recognition  of  facts. Paasikivi’s  famous  foreign  policy  line 
maintained  that Finnish  foreign policy  should never  run counter  to  the Soviet 
Union  and  our  Eastern  neighbor must  be  convinced  of  our  determination  to 
prove  this. The  Finnish‐Soviet  relations  in  aggregate  became  later personified 
strongly by Kekkonen, who discussed important issues directly with the Soviet 
leadership often with little or no consultation with his own administration or the 
parliament (Saukkonen 2006). 
The Paasikivi  line,  ranking all other  issues behind  relations with  the Soviet 
Union,  was  adhered  to  for  decades.  Outside  the  country,  the  line  became 
dubbed  ‘Finlandization,’  a  term  coined  in  1961  by  German  political  scientist 
Richard Löwenthal. The pros and cons of this policy are still actively debated. A 
secret CIA Intelligence Report of August 1972, which was approved for release 
in  May  2007,  found  that  “the  Finns  have  ingeniously  maintained  their 
independence,  but  a  limited  one  indeed,  heavily  influenced  by  the  USSR’s 
proximate military might,  a  preconditioned  prudence  not  to  offend Moscow, 
and the existence of various Soviet capabilities to complicate Finland’s domestic 
life”  (Central  Intelligence  Agency  1972,  3).  Whereas  the  right‐wing 
commentators  accuse  the  Finnish  government  of  continuing  the  policy  of 
Finlandization,  commentators  more  towards  the  left  underline  that  such  an 
approach was, and  to a  limited degree  still  is, necessary  in order  to  cope and 
deal  with  a  culturally  and  ideologically  alien  superpower  without  losing 
                                                          
8 On October 5, 1939, Russia invited J. K. Paasikivi to Moscow to discuss land questions at the 
Finnish‐Russian border. Soviet head of state Joseph Stalin, being frustrated 0ver negotiations that 
were not progressing, burst out: “We cannot do anything about geography, nor can you. Since 
Leningrad cannot be moved away, the frontier must be further off.” The failure of these negotiations 
led to war (Paasikivi 1958). The beginning of the dictum was later used by Paasikivi himself on 
several occasions. 
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sovereignty. Finlandization has remained a sensitive issue in Finnish public 
discourse to this day. 
As a Grand Duchy under Russian rule, Finland had maintained a custom 
border with Russia. Russia had been clearly the most important trade partner for 
Finland for decades until the World War I changed the situation profoundly. 
With the outbreak of war in 1914, Finland's foreign trade grew as a result of 
increased orders from Russia. At the same time, the trade deficit deepened due 
to the foreclosure of Western markets. A couple of years later, the situation 
changed even more drastically as a result of the Russian revolution and civil war 
in 1917; all forms of trade were terminated (Figure 4). Russia’s share of Finnish 
exports and imports fell abruptly from 97 and 68 per cent respectively to zero 
(Finnish Customs 2007). The trade between the countries remained at very low 
levels throughout the entire 1920s and 1930s. 
After the Second World War, trade upticked again, even though otherwise 
the border remained practically closed, as Finland was forced to pay the Soviet 
Union’s sizeable war reparations. From the 1950s onwards, Finnish-Soviet trade 
was based on a bilateral clearing agreement, which dictated that both Finnish 
imports to and exports from the USSR had to be equal in value. This meant that 
the more Finland purchased supplies from the USSR, the more the USSR was 
obligated to purchase supplies from Finland. This system was often presented, 
particularly in Soviet propaganda, as an example of how a large socialist 
country and a small capitalist country can engage in mutually beneficial 
cooperation and trade (Laurila 1995, 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the strained relations during the post-World War II climate, the Soviet 
Union was, until its collapse, by far Finland’s most important trading partner. 
Even though largely politically determined, the bilateral trade had helped 
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Finland to industrialize and contributed to its welfare in several ways. The 
Finnish economy had been structurally dependent on this trade with its Eastern 
neighbor to such an extent that its sudden disappearance contributed to an 
economic recession in Finland, which soon deepened into a depression on a 
scale not seen since the early 1930s. 
Trade relations have been on the mend from the 1998 Russian financial crisis. 
Even though trade and investments have not boomed hand in hand with levels 
of cross-border traffic, during the last decade trade between the countries grew 
steadily. A major driver behind the growth of Finnish exports to Russia was re-
exports, i.e., goods that are imported by a purchaser in one country who then 
exports the product to a third country without processing (Ollus & Simola 2007). 
The most recent economic crisis slowed down exports to Russia by not less than 
47 per cent and imports by 31 per cent respectively between 2008 and 2009 
(Finnish National Board of Customs 2009), thought already in 2011 imports (85 
per cent of which was energy) rebounded over the pre-crisis figures to more 
than EUR 11 billion and exports more modestly from EUR 4 billion in 2009 to 
EUR 5.3 billion in 2011 (Finnish National Board of Customs 2012). 
As Haukkala (2003; 2009) argues, Finland has gained Russian elite’s trust due 
to its historically rooted tendency towards pragmatism. He points out that 
unlike many central and eastern European countries traumatized by communist-
era experiences of direct coercion and ideological subjectification, Finland’s 
relationship with Russia has always been based on more or less voluntary and 
down-to-earth interaction. The continuation of this ‘special relationship’ does 
not imply that problems do not exist. Recent bilateral issues include, but are not 
limited to, persistent truck queues at the border, airspace violations, the 
pollution of the Baltic Sea, and an increase in Russian duties on wood exported 
to feed Finland’s pulp and paper industry, the latter of which has, however, now 
been somewhat eased as the WTO welcomed the Russian Federation as its 156th 
member on August 22, 2012. The so-called Karelian question, the debate over 
Finland’s re-acquisition of the ceded territories, and potential borderline 
adjustment pops up in the public discussion every now and then but cannot be 
regarded as a political issue as both of the governments in question agree that 
no open territorial dispute exists between the countries9.  
On the other hand, Russia has retained its position as Finland’s favorite 
enemy. As stated by the former Minister of Defense Jyri Häkämies (National 
Coalition Party) in his (in-)famous speech given at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington on September 6, 2007, the three main 
security challenges for Finland are “Russia, Russia, and Russia.” It is unclear 
                                                          
9 Whereas Russian leadership has indicated on several occasions that it has no intention to take part 
in discussion concerning the matter, Finland's official stance is that the borders may be changed 
through peaceful negotiations, although there is currently no need to open talks, as Russia has 
shown no intention discussing the question.  
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whether the uproar that followed was sparked by Häkämies being simply 
wrong or perhaps because his remarks had hit too close to the mark.  
As the Cold War came to end along with the Soviet Union, academic research 
devoted to the topic of Russia was downscaled in most western countries. In 
Finland, however, the opposite happened. A freer climate allowed for more 
objective research. Even so, most studies have focused on what Russia lacks 
rather than on what it has to offer. Few studies explore Russia as it was, but 
instead approach it as being always undergoing some kind of reform or 
transition into something (Smith 2012). As a result, the knowledge and 
understanding of the current situation in Russia as well as the factors behind it 
remained slim. This, in turn, limited the ability to realistically assess the impact 
of Russia on Finland and the rest of Europe as well as the extent to which there 
could be a meaningfully debate about what should be done and, in particular, 
what can be done. 
 
 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE WORK 
 
With this introduction I have tried to explain the premises for this dissertation 
and clarify the methodological choices made and utilized throughout the 
analysis. Next, in chapter two, I start with a discussion on the underpinnings of 
borders and cross-border interaction. The chapter maintains that in order to 
understand borders today, we must first understand how they came to be. It 
further underlines that a multifaceted understanding of the political, social and 
symbolic significance of borders is needed in order to interpret the broad socio-
political transformations that have taken place in Europe. 
In chapter three, I introduce the specificities and complexities of civil society, 
as without an understanding of them, we cannot seek to understand the 
potential that civil society organizations stand to play in CBC. It begins by 
suggesting that the EU’s borderland provides a fascinating context within which 
deep-rooted ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ understandings of state and civil society 
meet and overlap. Building on numerous earlier studies, it suggests that civil 
society should be understood as an arena that occupies the space where the 
other arenas of the society interact and overlap and where people associate to 
advance common interests. 
In chapter four, I discuss Europeanization as a new frame for cooperation at 
the Finnish-Russian border. It analyzes how different understanding of the EU 
lead to different understandings of its external borders and what can or should 
be accomplished by cooperating across them. The concept of Europeanization is 
understood as a process away from state-centeredness and as a phase during 
which new supra-national administrative structures were put in place in the 
development of the Finnish-Russian relations. 
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Chapter five seeks to trace the development of the discursive practices that 
shape the image of Russia within the context of CBC by analyzing the public 
discussion in Helsingin Sanomat during the years 1990–2010. The newspaper 
material is thus used to illuminate the state of public debate within which cross-
border relations have evolved and how the perceptions have affected cross-
border practices. Chapter six turns this setting around and studies how the 
practices have influenced these perceptions. It focuses on the institutional 
practices of civil society and presents the main findings of the interview material 
by placing them in the broader frame of the Europeanization of cooperation. 
Lastly, in chapter seven, I seek to summarize the analysis, provide answers to 
the research question and draw recommendations for the future.  
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2 Understanding Borders 
and Cross-Border Interaction 
As the new civic neighborhood that this study aims to illustrate is being built 
across a border between two very different neighbors, it is necessary to get 
acquainted with how borders have and can be understood. The logic here is that 
the way the border is understood defines how, by whom, and for which purpose 
it can be crossed, transcended, or even eroded. Applicable models of cross-
border interaction are introduced as to outline the role that the civil society 
actors in particular could play in neighborhood building. 
 
 
2.1 USES AND ABUSES OF BORDERS 
 
The simplest way to understand the significance of borders is to examine them 
by their function – borders serve a purpose (van Houtum 1998, 21). Even though 
borders limit our lives, they also continue to influence socio-spatial behaviors 
and attitudes, how we perceive different places (Hallikainen 2003, 18), and how 
we perceive and interpret our own actions. Borders help us to create and 
perceive differences, indispensable for us in order to construct contexts and 
meanings (Hall 1999, 152) and to construct meanings in order to make sense of 
an otherwise complex society in which we live (Paasi 1999a).  
 
2.1.2 Nations and Nationalisms in a Borderless World 
When discussing cross-border interaction and integration, one must be aware of 
the broader context within which these processes take place. A constantly 
widening and deepening integration process, rescaling of the state, 
strengthening regionalization, and the raising influence of trans- and 
international organizations, as well as globalization in general have 
undoubtedly shaken the role of the nation-state. For a geographer in this 
‘borderless world,’ there is no business like border business (Newman 2006). 
While the processes of globalization certainly threatened the particularity of 
borders, this did not lead to the devaluation of history, but rather to more 
complicated ways of grasping the past (Dirlik 2002a/b). If we accept that borders 
only came into existence with nation-states as suggested, e.g., by Giddens (1985, 
50), it is also logical to suppose that as the role of the nation-state crumbles so 
would that of its borders. Globalization, in particular, initiated a development 
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once deemed to lead to the end of the nation-state and the disappearance of 
international borders (Ohmae 1995), if not geography altogether (O’Brien 1992). 
Certainly, globalization has caused the institutional crumbling of borders, 
compaction of cross-border social relations, increased interdependence and 
cross-border activities, and the intensification of flows. The EU serves as a fitting 
example of this. Yet, as Edensor (2002, 1) notes, the scalar model of identity and 
society remains primarily anchored in national space both at theoretical and 
popular levels. This is apparent in the Finnish-Russian case, as this work aims to 
show. These tendencies occur simultaneously, working often in cross-purposes. 
In Europe and in North America, free trade regimes have pressured 
governments to ease regulations, to open new markets (Keohane & Milner 1996) 
and enhance sub-national entities’ role vis-à-vis that of states as economic 
players (Ohmae 1990). In all, the relations of states and other government tiers 
with market forces have been in flux, making governing much more complex. 
This, Sassen (1996) suggests, has led to new legal regimes that “un-bundle 
sovereignties” and “denationalize territories,” which in turn have had 
“disturbing repercussions for distributive justice and equity.” State spaces are 
thus being “recalibrated,” which has made the regional–central government 
relations more horizontal, competitive, and developmentalist (Brenner 2005). 
Another approach to the topic has been to consider society as a functional 
network of regional and global flows (Lash & Urry 1994; Urry 2000; Vartiainen 
1997). Castells (1996; cf. Blatter 2004) suggests a fundamental transformation of 
the relationship between politics and market forces: from “spaces of places” to 
“spaces of flows.” He argues that networks should be seen as a new space for 
social interaction, which is not only the gradual extension of historical trends 
but also has its own novel characteristics and dynamics. Wellman’s (2001) idea 
of a paradigm shift from group-centered relations to ‘networked individualism’ 
posits that new personalized technologies, such as e-mail, mobile phones, and 
social media, are part of an ongoing global shift from societies built on place-
based solidarities to ‘networked’ societies organized around individuals’ 
personal networks.  
The conception of the nation-state has been appropriately criticized for its 
taken-for-grantedness as a geographical entity. Instead, it has been suggested, it 
is precisely the unquestioned nature of territorial imagination that functions as a 
significant seat of social power (Olsson 1991; Pickles 2003). While the 
transformations depicted above have overshadowed the conception and 
prominence of a nation-state, they have done little to dim its role in people’s 
minds. Nationalism, Jusdanis (1991, 165) points out, allows people to forget 
contingency. It continues to play an important role behind people’s opinions 
and views as well as actions, or lack thereof, based upon them. Ideologies, such 
as nationalism, and its reflections are not necessarily right or wrong, but they 
help construct meaning in the given context, are charged with emotions and 
therefore uphold the belief systems that people have about their own country 
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and its neighbors. In this sense, the Finnish-Russian border is still often seen 
very much as a traditional binational interstate border, on the different sides of 
which Finnishness and Russianness, respectively, is acted out in the frame of a 
nation-state. Such a collective ‘practice of nation’ affects also political behavior 
by relocating the emphasis of understanding away from powerful social actors, 
official institutions and mechanisms, important policy decisions, and ‘critical 
junctures’ to the everyday repetition of national ‘rituals’ typified by, and 
enshrined in, popularly resonant myths, memories, and symbols (Githens-
Mazer 2007). 
Deconstructing what is meant by a nation and nationalism is also needed in 
order to better understand Europe’s changing borders and accordingly also 
interaction and integration across them (see subsection 3.3.1). Despite growing 
centrifugal forces, the Finnish case, inter alia, clearly suggests that the nation-
state has endured as an ideal mode of organization and the pre-eminent spatial 
construct. The scientific perspectives on it have, however, evolved. The geo-
deterministic reading saw nation-state as means for safeguarding self-
determination and territoriality, the functionalist account stressed its usability 
for territorial organization and geopolitical stability, while the postmodern era 
and the advocates of critical realism began to see the nation-state in terms of 
systemic regulation and consolidation of power. Giddens (1985, 5–6, 11, 172) 
famously describes the state as a ‘bordered power container,’ and Taylor (1994, 
152) puts forth that apart from power, states have developed into wealth, 
cultural, and social containers as well. Similarly, Agnew (1994) draws attention 
to the different assumptions that are rooted in our understanding of the modern 
nation-state. He argues that nation-states have been taken as historical and 
territorial givens without taking into considerations the social, political, and 
economic processes involved in their emergence and existence. The geographical 
assumptions – 1) states as fixed, pre-existing units of sovereign space, 2) the 
domestic/foreign polarity, 3) and states as ‘containers’ of societies bound neatly 
by their territorial borders – have led into the ‘territorial trap,’ which could be 
escaped only by fundamentally rethinking the validity of these underlying 
assumptions (Agnew 1995, 379). 
The social construction of the nation as a political institution originates from 
state attempts to commit people to a territory (Taylor & Flint 2000, 29–30). This 
has succeeded to an extent; even if the traditional role of the sovereign territorial 
state has become less of a focus of attention and been challenged by a variety of 
competing spaces and networks of political, economic, and social significance, 
territory remains of paramount interest (Elden 2005, 9). The “territory’s 
continuing allure” (Murphy 2012) has been explained from the perspective of 
human territoriality (Sack 1983), spatial-socialization (Paasi 1996, 8), state-driven 
knowledge production (Häkli 1999; 2002), or regimes of territorial legitimation 
(Murphy 2002), that is, the resilience of territorial nationalism in local and global 
affairs. 
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The significance of nationalism lies in its power not only to uphold the belief 
systems that people have about their own country and its neighbors – 
preventing, in so doing, people from re-examining the opinions and viewpoints 
that they have assumed. It molds a territory into a ‘national space’ and 
maintains borders to other comparable units. It affects not only the people living 
within the territory but also those in neighboring territories who must re-
conceptualize and re-construct the adjoining spaces and either accept or reject 
the national assertion of others upon those places (O’Loughlin & Talbot 2005, 
28–29). The same applies also the logic of Europeanization, whereby the border 
regions adjacent to the EU external border have become branded as a European 
Neighborhood. In the case of Russia, such reconceptualization has been 
accepted on the regional level (where the ENPI funding can be applied) while at 
the state level the neighborhood rhetoric was famously rejected (see subsection 
4.4.2). 
However, as Sahlins’ (1989) work illuminates, national borders are not 
always imposed merely by the center; it was the local society that “brought the 
nation into the village.” Local, every-day perspective is thus not always 
apolitical, something opposed to top-down political perspective. Peoples’ 
emotional attachment to places and their perceptions and feelings about 
particular places give them meanings (ibid.). This is what Agnew (1987) has 
termed as a ‘sense of place’ in contrast to mere ‘place as location.’ The history of 
a nation, its struggles, conflicts, defining moments, and tragedies all happen in 
particular places, but they also have an influence on how the place is 
experienced. Furthermore, as O’Loughlin & Talbot (2005, 29) observe, these 
incidents also shape the character of the whole nation as well. 
While many aspects of globalization challenge territorial sovereignty, it has 
remained one of the leading principles upon which international relations are 
based (Murphy 1996). Häkli’s (2008) study of Finland has shown that the idea of 
territorial space is not defunct or redundant but rather a continuously relevant 
form of social spatiality complementary to networked and fluid spaces (see Law 
2002). State borders continue to be deeply constitutive of the way in which social 
change, mobility and immobility, inclusion and exclusion, domestic and foreign, 
national and international, and internal and external, as well as ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
are thought about (O’Dowd 2010, 1034). It is these long-term social processes, 
along with the collective memory of borders, which are embodied in everyday 
life experiences and remain continually present immediately under the surface 
of new policies (Bucken-Knapp & Schack 2001, 16). While there are clear 
interests on both the governmental and non-governmental level to promote 
CBC, the reality of this cooperation often shows the persistence of state borders 
(ibid.).  
O’Dowd (2010, 1034; cf. Rumford 2008) makes a valid point by arguing that 
while much of the contemporary analysis of borders and globalization insists 
escaping from state-centric thinking and advocates grasping the novelty and 
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promise of the new world order ‘beyond the nation-state,’ even those social 
scientists, who are most critical of state-centric approaches, continue to use the 
territorially bounded state as an abiding reference point. The ‘borderless world’ 
debate (see Parker et at. 2009) once fuelled by the acceleration of new forms of 
economic, political, and cultural globalization has been replaced by increased 
attention to a ‘world of borders’ (O’Dowd 2010). Even though this approach 
acknowledges, thanks to the increased interdisciplinariness of border studies, 
that state borders are only one type of borders among many, they continue to 
outrank their alternatives within and beyond the national state. There has not 
been a clear-cut turn development toward post-national borders; state borders 
prevail even if in a reconfigured form. 
The global primacy of state borders cannot but be taken as a sign of the 
hegemony of the nation-state ideal. The fact that borders are seen as important is 
not so much resistance to globalization but a particular historically and socially 
situated process that necessarily happens because small countries need to 
delineate space that they can claim as ‘theirs’ in order to confirm the continuity 
of their identities (Shklovski & Struthers 2010, 13). The increased nationalist 
politics and populism in Finland, among many other European countries, serve 
as a proof that the EU has not overshadowed the nation-state and national 
identities, but for many the significance of Finnishness has become only more 
valuable and significant because of the EU. There are close to 200 independent 
countries, around 300 international land borders – and at least double the 
narratives (Paasi 2010). Belonging to a certain nation has an enduring appeal, 
and despite increased mobility surprisingly few people live outside the country 
in which they were born.  
As Anderson (1995, 79) once stated, nation-states appear drawn on the 
political map of the word in such a permanent manner that, at times, they may 
seem even as ‘natural’ formations. Such false imagination is commonly 
cemented by cartographic illustrations such as the one presented in Figure 5, 
which creates an illusion that Finland, with a clearly demarcated territorial 
space, would have existed already for centuries. As Häkli (2008, 18) clarifies, in 
the mainstream ‘nationalistic historiography’ of Finland, the awareness of 
Finnish identity has typically been postulated into historical contexts where it 
could not have existed and the related historical events are presented as causal 
chains leading to the ‘predestined occurrence’ of Finland gaining independence 
in 1917.  
Still, as the rise of the territorial and administratively separate state had 
preceded the Finnish nation-building process, the course of events in Finland 
took a rather banal form, equating the state with society and everyday life. To 
build a nation, it was necessary to define who the people were. Fixed borders 
around the territory that then became called ‘Finland’ helped to define its 
people, the Finns. As a result, the most social, cultural, economic, and political 
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practices in Finland are still today informed by modern cartographic reason 
(Häkli 2008, 6) – a look at the world as regions and territories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While it certainly is important to break away from traditional territorial imagery 
as the dominant conception of space, it is still useful to analyze how national 
territories are produced and how this production is related to other kinds of 
spatialities pertinent to nation-building and national identities (Häkli 2008, 6). 
Nation-states are inescapably defined by their respective borders. These borders 
have their physical manifestations (a geographically drawn line), but they also 
have tangible symbolic and mental manifestations. In trying to determine the 
actions and behavior of people at and within the national borders, the borders 
themselves are no longer seen merely as territorial lines at a certain place in 
space but as symbols of processes of social binding and exclusion that are both 
constructed or produced in society. Borders are reproduced via perceptions, 
symbols, norms, believes, and attitudes (van Houtum 2000, 7), for instance, in 
situations of conflict where historical memories are mobilized to support 
territorial claims, to address past injustices, or to strengthen group identity – 
often by perpetuating negative stereotypes of the ‘other’ (Papadakis 2005).  
Geographical borders continue to function as physical manifestations of state 
power, but they also serve as symbolic representations of statehood to citizen 
and non-citizen alike. While the nation-state has undoubtedly endured the 
pressures of globalization, the exclusively state-oriented approach with a focus 
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on the interstate relations serves only to confirm the already existing political 
borders. 
 
2.1.3 Development of Early Border Studies10  
 
Borders as Delimiters of Territorial Control and Ideology 
Borders have long been one of the most central topics in political geography 
(Kristof 1959; Mignhi 1963; Prescott 1987; Paasi 1999a; Kolossov 2005). The 
pioneering framework for early border studies was developed by Friedrich 
Ratzel (1844–1904). Ratzel’s ambition was to establish geography as a holistic 
discipline that could tie both physical and human (social) elements together and 
be scientifically grounded in Darwinian laws of natural selection and evolution. 
In his 1897 Politische Geographie, Ratzel introduced the first systematic approach 
to political geography. It put forth an exceptionalist myth about the ‘organic’ 
relationships between volk (people), boden (territory), and staat state  and the 
concept of ‘lebensraum’ or “living space” and put forth the notorious idea about 
the state or empire as a living organism with internal organs, external protective 
boundaries, and an inherent drive towards expansion (see Ratzel 1903). Ratzel’s 
ideas did not, however, emerge in a vacuum but, as Paasi (1999a, 12) points out, 
most of them had gained significance already before the actual 
institutionalization of geography. 
Rudolf Kjellén (1869–1922) was struck by Ratzel’s ideas. He agreed that the 
state was a kind of living organism, which had a soul and a brain embodied in 
the government, the empire forming the body, and the people its members. He 
underlined that such a state must have natural borders and territory. It was, 
however, Ratzel’s student Otto Maull (1887–1957) who actually systematized his 
teacher’s bio- and geo-deterministic principles in practice. For Maull, natural 
determination was the central element influencing the Society-Environment-
System (Mensch-Umwelt-System), but he also emphasized the importance of the 
“willful political act” to establish states and boundaries. He specified that state 
was not an ‘organism’ in a biological sense, but rather an ‘organization,’ created 
by human societies to ensure the survival and viability of cultural groups (see 
Maull 1925).  
While studying state formation in Europe, Maull focused attention on the 
morphological features of borders 11 , and their relations to the political 
conditions of nation-states. He made a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
                                                          
10 This chapter is based on the background research for the EUDIMENSIONS project and the 
author’s collaboration with Prof. James Scott throughout the project. Though direct references have 
not always been possible, I wish to acknowledge I have become more knowledgeable about many of 
these ideas by way of Prof. Scott. 
11 Maull’s (1925) scientific vocabulary included, for example, such concepts as: grenzsaum (border 
zone), grenzlinien (border line), trennungsgrenzen (dividing borders), strukturgrenzen (structural 
borders) and strukturwidrige grenzen (anti-structural borders).  
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borders. The most important indicators determining this division were 
defensive characteristics of a border and its stability. Good borders dovetail with 
natural and/or socio-ethnic borders, whereas anti-structural bad borders neither 
correspond to physical features of the landscape nor follow the borders of socio-
cultural areas. In addition, bad borders do not have a border zone, allowing the 
border to function as both a connecting and filtering feature. These kind of bad 
borders are, Maull (1925) claims, places where conflicts between two states are 
most likely to happen. The characterization was adopted also by S. W. Boggs, 
who elaborated upon the notion by arguing that good borders serve the 
purposes for which they have been designed, with a maximum of efficiency and 
a minimum of friction, while interstate conflict is due to bad borders that did not 
respect organic territorial limits. 
Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), inspired by work of Kjellén, strived to develop 
political geography into an applied science. He focused on studying borders as 
delimiters of territorial control and ideology and asserted that the state’s will to 
expand is part of its natural survival strategy. He further argued that the state’s 
will to expand is part of its natural survival strategy, a teaching that has been 
seen to influence the development of Adolf Hitler's expansionist strategies. Ellen 
Semple (1863–1932), in turn, promoted the German school of anthropogeographie 
successfully in the United States and introduced some of Ratzel’s ideas to the 
Anglophone community. 
 
Borders as Means of Description and Classification  
The determinism that had helped provide the theoretical foundation for 
imperialist geopolitics and national-socialist ideology would be replaced after 
World War II by a generally positivist drive for objective facts, scientific rigor, 
and ‘value-free’ studies of borders (Scott 2006, 103). The institutionalization of 
academic disciplines accelerated, yet borders remained relegated to sub-
disciplines, such as regional politics, regional economics and regional sociology, 
political anthropology, political geography, and geopolitics (Anderson, O’Dowd 
& Wilson 2010, 4). The latter two sub-disciplines had a long tradition of 
empirical research on borders, but in the 1960s and 1970s they almost died (see 
Taylor & Flint 2000, 49–52). Particularly political geography remained 
fragmented and lacked a central ‘metatheory’ until the late 1970s. Instead, 
functionalism, positivism, and a focus on ‘Kantian’ space prevailed (van 
Houtum & Scott 2005, 7–10).  
Within the above mentioned parent disciplines, studies of border focused 
towards description, classification, and morphologies of state borders and 
likewise became concerned with the emergence of core areas of nation-state 
formation and the ‘centrifugal’ (i.e., fragmenting) and ‘centripetal’ (i.e., 
integrating) forces that influenced the growth and development of states (van 
Houtum & Scott 2005, 7–8). The widely used but “fundamentally illogical” 
(Hartshorne 1936, 57) division of ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ borders came to an end 
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when political geographers began to emphasize that all political borders are 
consequences of conscious choices and thus artificial (e.g. Minghi 1963, 407; 
Prescott 1965; de Blij 1967).  
For Richard Hartshorne, geography was a study of areal differentiation. 
Accordingly, his research on borders was grounded in the study of border 
landscapes; he suggested that the interaction between political borders and 
cultural landscapes were an important source of spatial differentiation. 
Hartshorne (1936) elicited a genetic border classification, according to which 
borders could be classified as pioneer, antecedent, subsequent, consequent, 
superimposed or relic based on the stage of development of the cultural 
landscape in the border area at the time the border is laid down. He understood 
that the geo-deterministic mindset of the German tradition of anthropogeographie 
had served to discredit Political Geography and proposed that the analysis of 
the functioning of the state would provide a meaningful context for scientific 
rigor (Hartshorne 1950, 129)  
Ladis Kristof, Julian Minghi, and Victor Prescott, all prominent scholars of 
the functionalist school, focused research attention on the emergence of borders 
based on forms of social-political organization and processes of nation-building. 
Kristof (1959), followed Hartshorne’s ideas on political geography, and similarly 
devoted himself to the systematic study of borders and boundaries as aspects of 
‘Realpolitik’ and as organizing elements of the state. Kristof considered borders 
first of all as legal institutions: “...in order to have some stability in the political 
structure, both on the national and international level, a clear distinction 
between the spheres of foreign and domestic politics is necessary. The boundary 
helps maintain this distinction.” 
Kristof (1959) also made a distinction between frontiers and boundaries by 
suggesting that “while the former are the result of rather spontaneous, or at least 
ad hoc solutions and movements, the latter are fixed and enforced through a 
more rational and centrally coordinated effort after a conscious choice is made 
among the several preferences and opportunities at hand.” He specifies that 
etymologically the word ‘frontier’ refers to what is in front, the foreland, of the 
hinterland, the motherland, the core of the state, kingdom or empire. “Thus the 
frontier was not the end… but rather the beginning… of the state; it was the 
spearhead of light and knowledge expanding into the realm of darkness and of 
the unknown” (Kristof 1959, 270). Whereas boundaries are inner-oriented, 
frontiers are outer-oriented, with their attention directed to those areas of 
friendship and danger, which exists beyond the state. Accordingly, boundaries, 
in Kristof’s conceptualization, are centripetal in their function; they divide and 
separate, strengthening the territorial integrity of the state, while frontiers, in 
contrast, are centrifugal in character; they are outwardly oriented, integrate 
different ecumenes and challenge the control functions of the state. (Ibid. 270–
272.)  
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Minghi (1963, 428) urged political geographers to acknowledge that 
“boundaries, as political dividers, separate peoples of different nationalities and, 
therefore, presumably of different iconographic makeup.” He suggested, the 
political geographers should obtain a more interdisciplinary approach and 
undertake investigations in the sociological, cultural, and economic areas “for 
the spatial patterns of social behavior can be even more important than other 
patterns in determining the impact of a boundary and its viability as a national 
separator” (ibid.). Prescott (1965), in turn, was mainly concerned with 
identifying spatial relationships between politics and geography. He saw the 
exercise of political sovereignty, of which borders are the formal delimiters, as 
an important source of morphological and functional variation of space (van 
Houtum & Scott 2005, 10). 
 
 
2.2 CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON BORDERS 
 
While the dynamic role of borders had been overlooked and borders as a 
research topic neglected during the preceding decades, the predominant 
geopolitical atmosphere directed research interests back to borders around the 
turn of 1970s and 1980s. Increased velocity and volatility of globalization and, 
later, the post Cold War ‘disorder’ and the associated tearing down the East-
West division revealed that the empiricism, description, and categorization had 
their deficiencies. With the end of the Cold War, the previously stable border 
concept began to change and border studies began to be acknowledged as a 
discipline in its own right. Influenced by the broader critical turn in the social 
sciences, border studies became more inclusive towards the ethics of borders. 
Since the end of the Cold War era, state borders have increasingly been 
understood as multifaceted social institutions rather than solely as formal 
political markers of sovereignty. Whereas the field had earlier pre-dominantly 
focused on the study of the demarcation of boundaries (i.e., the borderlines), the 
focus arguably shifted to borders as broader constructions. Dissatisfaction with 
the apolitical and ‘objective’ assumptions of empiricism fuelled the application 
of various critical approaches. Some of them became associated with 
postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives, which analyze the social 
construction of borders in terms of discourses, agency, and practices (van 
Houtum & Scott 2005, 1; Scott 2006, 103). Border scholars became interested in 
the social production of borders, sites at and through which socio-spatial 
differences are communicated. Borders, as a consequence, became viewed as 
relational, not given. 
 
2.2.1 Post-National Practices of Borders 
The concept of post-national borders implies a certain obsolescence of the ‘state 
model’ in the face of an increasing interpenetration of national societies by 
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global processes  (Kolossov 2012, 15). The  term should not be  taken  to suggest 
that a disappearance of states or the decline of state territoriality per se. Instead, 
the  concept  refers  to  new  form  of  territorial  sovereignty  based  on  shared 
political responsibilities between states and the emergence of new borders, new 
border  functions  and/or  new  methods  of  territorial  control  that  go  beyond 
traditional notions of state  territoriality  (ibid., 16).  It allows us  to  focus on  the 
sub‐  and  supranational  logics  of  political  interaction,  which  transcend  the 
jurisdictional  and  conceptual  limits  of  state  the  ‘national’  by  creating  new 
political functions of CBC. 
McGrew and Held (2002), for example, offer an illustrative perspective of the 
post‐national by underlining  that globalized power  involves a hybridization of 
national and international political spaces in terms of: 
 
 shifting of political power away from nation‐states, 
 emergence of transnational political communities,  
 conditioning of  state sovereignty by interdependencies and inter‐
relations that crisscross state territories, 
 new boundary problems that result from globalization processes, and 
 increasingly blurred distinctions between domestic and foreign policy 
concerns. 
 
The emergence of new political and economic units that partly  incorporate but 
also  operate  beyond  the  context  of  the  nation‐state,  such  as  communities  of 
states,  networks  of  cities  or  cross‐border  regions,  is  another  example  of  post‐
nationalization (Kolossov 2012, 16). European integration has promoted perhaps 
the most concrete notions of post‐national polities and borders proposed to date 
(Joenniemi 2008). This has  taken place  in concrete  forms of shared sovereignty 
and  community  policies,  the  support  of  local  and  regional  cross‐border 
cooperation,  and  more  subtle  discursive  and  ideational  forms  of 
Europeanization (Bialasiewicz, Elden & Painter 2005). 
Critical  geopolitics  can  also  be  seen  to  have  emerged  out  of  the  need  to 
investigate not only the legible reality of world politics, but also various social, 
cultural  and  political  practices  (Dalby  &  Ó  Tuathail  1998,  2).  It  regards 
geopolitics  as  a much  broader  phenomenon  than what  has  been  traditionally 
described by analyzing  the geopolitical  imagination of  the  state,  its  foundational 
myths, and national exceptionalist lore (Agnew 1983). A particular attention has 
been paid  to  the boundary‐drawing practices and performances, both material 
and conceptual, that characterize the everyday life of state (Dalby & Ó Tuathail 
1998, 3). In this view, foreign policy can be seen as a “specific sort of boundary‐
producing  political  performance”  (Ashley  1987,  51)  as  it  invokes  the making  of 
‘foreign’ as an  identity and space against which a domestic self  is evoked and 
realized.  Dalby  and  Ó  Tuathail  (1998,  4) maintain  that  “geopolitics  is  not  a 
singularity but a plurality… it is not a centered but a decentered set of practices 
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with  elitist  and popular  forms  and  expressions”  that  are diffused  throughout 
societies.  They  propose  a  three‐fold  typology  of  geopolitical  reasoning, 
consisting of practical, formal, and popular geopolitics (Figure 6). Each of these 
different forms of geopolitics has different sites of production, distribution, and 
consumption,  yet  linked  together  they  comprise  the  geopolitical  culture  of  a 
particular  region  or  state  (Dalby & Ó  Tuathail  1998,  5). Geopolitics  saturates 
throughout  everyday  life;  its  sites  of  production  are multiple  and  pervasive, 
ranging from official memorandum to newspaper headline or a cartoon.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. A critical theory of geopolitics as a set of representational practices. Adopted 
from Dalby and Ó Tuathail (1998, 5) 
 
 
Lewis  and  Wigen  (1997)  use  the  concept  ‘metageographies’  to  refer  to  the 
geographical  structures  that  people  use  to  order  everyday  long‐term  spatial 
information. These structures are based on perceptions, experiences, and myths 
that,  for  the most  part,  go  unexamined. According  to  these  lines, Ó  Tuathail 
(2002) puts forth that ‘geopolitical codes,’ i.e., a set of assumptions that the state 
apparatus  uses  to  evaluate  other  states  and  regions  beyond  its  borders,  are 
passed on  to  the public  through  special kind of  ‘scripts’ or performances  that 
impart  a  conditioned  way  of  viewing  a  situation  or  region.  Governments, 
geopolitical  intellectuals,  and  foreign  policy  elites,  O’Loughling  and  Talbot 
(2005, 26) have discovered, use these kinds of codes to promote specific agendas 
or  actions  “that  could  in  turn  mobilize  public  opinion  to  influence  those 
actions.”  
Building on the theory of critical geopolitics worked out by Toal (1996) and 
other authors, Kolossov (2003; OʹLoughlin, Ó Tuathail & Kolossov 2004a/b; 2006) 
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has  studied how ordinary people  feel  about  their own  country,  its neighbors, 
and their place in the world and strives to find out to what extent the people are 
willing  to  adopt  the  official  level  geo‐visions,  as well  as  to what  extent  the 
actions  and  decisions  at  the  state  level  are  impacted  by  the  perceptions  and 
preferences of the lower levels. He makes a distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
geopolitics  whereas  ‘high’  geopolitics  is  a  field  of  politicians  and  experts 
creating the concepts that they need in order to ground and justify the actions of 
the state at the international level, the place of the country in the world, and the 
system of international boundaries. Kolossov (2005, 624–625) explains that ‘low’ 
geopolitics is a set of geopolitical concepts, symbols, and images, for example, in 
the media,  advertising,  and  cinema  (see  also  Sharp  2000). These  two  sides  of 
geopolitics  need  to  match,  to  the  largest  possible  extent,  in  order  for  the 
government to legitimate its activity (ibid.).  
The  (low)geopolitical  knowledge  that  an  individual  collects  through 
perception but also through ignorance, stereotypes, and prejudices shapes shape 
his  or  her  feelings,  opinions,  and  ideas  towards  the  other  (Laine  2008,  16).  It 
forms a basis of the “world geopolitical vision,” which includes representations 
about  the  territory  of  the  ethnic  group  or  political  nation,  its  boundaries, 
preferable  models  of  the  state,  historical  mission,  and  forces  preventing  its 
realization (Dijkink 1996; Taylor & Flint 2000). Such a geopolitical vision of the 
relation between one’s own and other places, Dijkink (1996, 10) argues, involves 
feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage and/or invokes ideas about a collective 
mission or foreign policy strategy. Such a vision may or may not correlate with 
reality or a ‘normative preference’ (O’Loughlin & Talbot 2005, 27). It is a product 
of  national  history  and  culture:  a  “synthesis  of  views  professed  by  different 
strata  of  the  political  elite,  academic  experts,  the  creative  intelligentsia  and 
public  opinion  as  a  whole”  (Kolossov  2005,  625).  Be  it  as  it  may,  they  do 
constitute  one  of  the main  components  of  the  image  of,  and  also  interaction 
with, the other. 
In order to form a coherent picture, it is necessary to apply a holistic view on 
borders. Kolossov’s  (2005)  PPP‐approach  looks  first  at  the  practice  of  borders 
with  a  focus  on  informal  cross‐border networks  in  business,  local  authorities, 
CSOs,  etc.  It  regards  borders  not  simply  as  legal  institutions  ensuring  the 
integrity of state  territory but  rather as a Lefebvrian product of social practice 
and integrates analyses at different spatial levels. The scale, form, and objectives 
of border activity are determined by  the border regime, which,  in  turn, has an 
influence on it; the intensity of this activity depends on the role that the border 
plays or is granted to by the state, supra‐national, and regional actors. Second, it 
considers border policy at different  levels and  legal  infrastructures determining 
the  relationship between  the barrier  and  contact  functions of  the border. This 
infrastructure  mirrors  the  strategies  of  the  state,  border  regions,  and  local 
authorities and  includes  the  tools designed  to stimulate and/or  to  limit border 
activities as well as territorial integration. Third, the approach studies perceptions 
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of  the border,  i.e.,  the character,  the evolution and  the channels of  influence of 
social representations on  the border regions, on relations between neighboring 
states and regions, CBC, and ‘high’ and ‘low’ geopolitical discourse (ibid., 625–
626). 
 
2.2.2 Borders as a Construct 
Affected  by  the  critical  perspective,  the  significance  of  borders  became 
interpreted  in  a  variety  of  ways.  They  were  understood  as  socio‐cultural 
constructs,  and  as  such  they  could  be  also  be  deconstructed.  Constructivist 
approach seeks to better understand how people construct borders according to 
their own  experiences and knowledge.  In  trying  to determine  the  actions and 
behavior of people at and within  the national borders,  the borders  themselves 
are no  longer  seen merely as  territorial  lines at a certain place  in  space but as 
symbols of processes of social binding and exclusion  that are both constructed 
or produced  in society as well as reproduced via perceptions, symbols, norms, 
belief, and attitudes (van Houtum 2000, 7). 
Anssi Paasi’s  (1996) pioneering work on borders  is based on  a  rejection of 
positivism  and  a  criticism  of  the  concepts  and  empirical  frameworks.  He 
analyzes people’s everyday reproduction of borders by combining the analyses 
of  structural  features  and processes with  the  knowledge  emerging  from  local 
social  settings and  contexts. For Paasi,  there  is no  central  ‘essence’  to borders, 
frontiers,  regions, or even nation‐states. Even  if materially embedded, borders 
are  socio‐cultural  constructs  constantly  subject  to  change.  Likewise, 
representations, such as maps, are cultural texts which help construct the world 
rather than just mirror it. Paasi builds on Balibar’s (1998) suggestion that instead 
of disappearing, ‘borders are everywhere.’ He suggests that borders ought to be 
seen  as  symbols,  discourses,  and  institutions  that  interpenetrate  all  realms  of 
society and that exist everywhere in society not only in border areas (Paasi 2009, 
230; Paasi & Prokkola 2008). Today’s borders vacillate  (Balibar 2002). They are 
no longer mere lines on a map nor are they localizable. Instead, they are used in 
creating categories and social distinctions. Such a development has taken quite a 
step from traditional border studies to a direction where a territorial link is not 
always required. 
While its true that border studies have become increasingly interdisciplinary 
and  various  borders,  distinguishing,  for  example,  neighborhoods,  localities, 
cities,  regions, macroregional blocs, nations,  ethnic,  religious,  cultural, gender, 
and civilizational groupings  (see O’Dowd 2010, 1034)  for  the sake of avoiding 
extending border studies to cover practically all social sciences, it might be more 
beneficial to draw the border somewhere and grant some societal distinctions an 
exemption from being bordered. More importantly, Paasi (2001, 141, 143) aptly 
argues  that borders are  relevant not  just  for  their  function but also because of 
their meaning; “attention should be paid not only to how ideas on a territory and 
its boundaries shape society’s spatial  imaginations... but also to analyzing how 
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these  ideas gain  significance  as  far as  the  spatial  identity of  territorial  entities 
and the people living in them is concerned.” As the meaning of different borders 
varies  contextually,  Paasi  (2009,  226)  proposes  that  this  could  be  done  by 
‘reading’ the meanings of borders from the complicated practices and discourses 
taking  place  in  such  fields  of  social  action  as  the  economy,  politics,  culture, 
governance, and socialization. Borders are not neutral lines, but rather pools of 
emotions, fears, and memories that can be mobilized apace for both progressive 
and regressive purposes (Paasi 2011, 62). 
Building  on  Shields  (1991) work  on  social  spatialization,  Paasi  (2009,  226) 
argues that more attention should be paid to how specific spatial ideas about a 
territory  and  its  boundaries  have  been  constructed  and  how  they  shape  the 
images  held  by  the  society  concerned.  By  reinstating  Georg  Simmel’s  1903 
dictum that “[t]he boundary is not a spatial fact with sociological consequences, 
but a  sociological  fact  that  forms  itself  spatially”  (Simmel 1997, 142), Paasi  re‐
enacts  his  earlier  concept  of  spatial  socialization  (Paasi  1996),  i.e.,  “the  process 
through which individual actors and collectivities are socialized as members of 
specific  territorially  bounded  spatial  entities,  participate  in  their  reproduction 
and  ‘learn’  collective  territorial  identities,  narratives  of  shared  traditions,  and 
inherent  spatial  images  (e.g., visions  regarding boundaries,  regional divisions, 
regional  identities,  etc.), which may be,  and often  are,  contested”  (Paasi  2009, 
226).  
Spatial socialization is part of the process of ‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu & 
Passeron 1998),  through which  territoriality  is practiced –  in other words, how 
the state territory is produced and reproduced among citizens through national 
education,  especially  in  history  and  geography,  and  the  operations  of media 
(Paasi  2009,  226). Besides  the  analysis  of  existing  and past  institutional,  legal, 
political,  and  administrative  practices  and  discourses,  Paasi  (2009,  228)  pits 
newspapers,  for  instance, among  the most  interesting documents  for  studying 
spatial  socialization  for  they  form  a  channel  through which  the  processes  of 
signification, legitimation, and domination take place in ordinary life and power 
relations and system integration (Giddens 1984) become realized. 
Paasi  (1996;  also  2009)  explains  that  the  practice  of  spatial  socialization 
accumulates  in  ‘socio‐spatial  consciousness,’  an  abstraction  striving  to  make 
sense of the social construction of spatial and social demarcations in the making 
of  territories.  It  is not a sum of  individual  ‘mental maps,’ but  rather a  form of 
collective  consciousness,  which  ‘stretches’  individual  actors  through  various 
institutional  practices  (education,  culture,  politics,  economics,  administration, 
and  communication) and discourses as part of a  continuity  constituted by  the 
bounded society and of how this society is represented in territorial ideologies. 
Occurring  on  or  through  different  socio‐spatial  scales  (e.g.,  regionalism  and 
nationalism),  this  consciousness  manifests  itself  simultaneously  in  various 
institutionalized  social  practices,  through which  actors  reproduce  themselves 
and the social structure and through which the power relations operate. (Ibid.) 
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Socio‐spatial  consciousness  renders  it  possible  to  understand  the  relation 
between human action and social structures, i.e., the rules and resources which 
are recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems (Giddens 1984), 
in  the  production  and  reproduction  of  collective  meanings  associated  with 
borders  (Paasi  1996). While  some  generations  transform  territorialities  and  its 
borders  in  concrete ways,  the  following generations  reproduce and  selectively 
shape  the memorized  territoriality, whether  in words,  deeds  or  the material 
symbols used  in  the discursive  landscape  of  social  power. As  the  newspaper 
material  analysis  conducted  for  this  study  suggests,  the defining moments  of 
Finnish history are constantly  relived and  reproduced by younger generations 
(see chapter 5).  
Due to spatial socialization, state borders are commonly meaningful to most 
inhabitants but of particularly importance to those who have to face the border 
area in their everyday lives as border citizens or as border crossers, who enter, 
adapt  to,  or  challenge  the  readymade  worlds  of  practices  and  discourses 
regarding  ‘us’  and  the  ‘other.’  As  explained  by  van  Schendel  (2005), 
borderlanders  are  able  to  ‘jump’  scales  (local,  national,  regional,  global)  and 
construct  the  scale  of  the  border  for  themselves.  The  national  border  is  not 
necessarily experienced only as an immediate limit but may rather be perceived 
as a ‘local’ phenomenon, a nation‐state ‘edge,’ a transnational staging post or it 
may be reconfigured as a portal. 
Paasi  (2009)  utilizes  Moscovici’s  (1981)  theoretical  idea  of  social 
representation to better understand how  individual people come to terms with 
the more general idea of socio‐spatial consciousness. Social representations, such 
concepts, statements, and explanations emerging from daily life in the course of 
inter‐individual communication, Paasi  (2009, 228) argues, provide a mediating 
category  between  a more  general  socio‐spatial  consciousness  (and  the  role  of 
borders  in  it) and the  interpretations of spatiality emerging from everyday life. 
For  example,  in his own  study about  the Finnish‐Russian border, Paasi  (1996) 
finds  that  different  generations  of  Finns  live  in  different  ‘worlds’  as  far  as 
meanings  attached  to  the border  are  concerned  indicating  that  in  this  specific 
national context  the content of spatial socialization differs from one generation 
to another. 
Henk  van Houtum  has  sought  to  understand  the  complex  construction  of 
borders  from  a  political,  economic,  socio‐cultural,  and  psychological 
standpoints. He asserts  that  the notion of border only really  takes on meaning 
when understood as a product of ‘bordering,’ i.e., the everyday construction of 
borders  through  ideology,  discourses,  political  institutions,  attitudes,  and 
agency  (van Houtum  2002;  van Houtum  &  van Naerssen  2002). Within  this 
context,  borders  can  be  read  in  terms  of  a  politics  of  identity  (feelings  of 
belonging, us versus them, who is ‘in,’ who is ‘out’), in terms of a regionalization 
of difference (defining who is a neighbor, a partner, a friend or rival), or in terms 
of  politics  of  ‘interests,’  in  which  issues  of  economic  self‐interest,  political 
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stability,  and  security  play  a  prominent  role  (Scott  2009,  235).  Van Houtum 
further argues that borders exert both an ideational power that helps individuals 
and  societies  form  identities  along with  a  sense of  security  and  comfort.  (van 
Houtum 2002; van Houtum & Scott 2005).  
Elden (2010, 811), in contrast, downgrades the role of bordering practices by 
insisting  that borders “only become possible  in  their modern  sense  through a 
notion  of  space,  rather  than  the  other way  round.” Territory  ought  not  to  be 
understood through territoriality but through an examination of the relation of 
the state to the emergence of a category of ‘space’ as a political category: owned, 
distributed, mapped,  calculated,  bordered,  and  controlled  (Elden  2007;  2010, 
810).  This  requires  rethinking  unproblematic  definitions  of  territory  as  a 
‘bounded  space’  or  the  state  as  a  ‘bordered  power  container,’  because  both 
presuppose the two things that should be most interrogated: space and borders.  
In their attempt to better understand the threats that the nation‐state as well 
as  the border  identities  and  regions  tied  to  it  face, Donnan and Wilson  (1994; 
1999) bring an anthropological focus to border studies. They stress that local and 
regional cultures in borderlands are not just reactive agents, but they also play a 
proactive  role  in  policy  formation,  representation,  and  reception;  the  state 
policies  which  may  encourage  cooperation  or  conflict  involve  aspects  of 
‘national’  life but require also commitment  from  the regions and  localities  that 
straddle  the  border  (ibid.,  11–12;  see  edited  volume  by  Pavlakovich‐Kochi, 
Morehouse  &  Wastl‐Walter  2004  for  illustrating  examples).  In  an 
anthropological  sense,  culture  ties  the  people  and  institutions  of  the  inter‐
national borderlands to people and institutions within their own country and to 
those further very far away. Such cultural landscapes, which transcend political 
borders, are defined by the social interactions that construct them. They cannot 
be  deduced  from  knowledge  of  the  political  and  economic  structures  of  the 
states at  their border but  through an  investigation of how nation and state are 
routinely lived and experienced by ordinary people. (Ibid., 12–13.) 
Rumford  (2011,  67)  proposes  that  instead  of  “seeing  like  a  state”  (a 
constraining lens given the increasing heterotopia of contemporary borders), as 
described earlier by Scott  (1998), border scholars should move  toward “seeing 
like  a  border”;  i.e.,  disaggregate  the  state  and  the  border  in  order  to 
conceptualize the multiple actors and sites of borderwork. Rumford (2008; 2011) 
puts forth that the literature has seriously neglected the way in which ordinary 
citizens,  entrepreneurs,  and  grassroots  activists  can  construct,  shift,  or  even 
erase  borders  by  creating  borders  which  facilitate  mobility  for  some  while 
creating  barriers  to mobility  for  others,  appropriating  the  political  resources 
which bordering offers as well as contesting  the  legitimacy of or undermining 
the  borders  imposed  by  others.  In  addition  to  broadening  the  concept  of  de‐
/bordering  from an exclusive business of nation‐states  to  include also citizens, 
and  indeed  non‐citizens,  Rumford  also  extends  this  process  from  the  stateʹs 
external borders to the interior of a polity.  
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The argument that Rumford (2008; 2011) advances is that changes to borders 
are  in  fact  more  far‐reaching  than  can  be  captured  by  either  the  idea  that 
‘borders  are  everywhere’  or  a  security‐driven  rebordering  thesis.  Rumford 
(2011)  asserts  that  rather  than  curtailing  mobility,  borders  can  also  actively 
facilitate  it.  He  depicts  borders  as  ‘engines  of  connectivity’  thought  which 
bottom‐up activity provides borderworkers with new political and/or economic 
opportunities.  Instead  of  viewing  bordering  in  terms  of  securitization, 
borderwork  opens  up  the  possibility  to  do  so  in  terms  of  opportunities  for 
humanitarian assistance targeted at those who may coalesce at the borders. The 
development of Finnish‐Russian CBC from the early 1990s onwards can be seen 
as a practical manifestation of this (see subsection 4.5.2). 
When  seeing  like  a  state,  one  is  committed  to  seeing  borders  as  lines  of 
securitized defense, Rumford’s (2008; 2011) suggestion to try to see like a border 
involves “the recognition  that borders are woven  into  the  fabric of society and 
are  the routine business of all concerned.” Borders are not only at  the borders, 
bordering processes permeate  everyday  life;  borders  can  be  found  “wherever 
selective  controls  are  to  be  found”  (Balibar  2002,  84–85).  Borders  are  neither 
necessarily  always working  in  the  service  of  the  state, perceivably  ineffectual 
borders of the nation‐state may fuel border‐workers to engage in local bordering 
activity  designed  to  enhance  its  status.  Furthermore,  borderwork,  and  the 
border it constructs, is not an activity of the marginal, but it may be the project 
of those seeking to gain further advantage in society, for instance entrepreneurs 
or  affluent  citizens. The  capacity  to make or unmake borders becomes  thus  a 
major source of political capital. Lastly, borders can be  ‘invisible’  (to some but 
not to all) or designed not to be seen. Borders can be highly selective and work 
so  as  to  render  themselves  invisible  to  the majority  of  the  population, while 
constituting a formidable physical barrier to outsiders. (Rumford 2011, 68.) 
 
2.2.3 Pragmatist Reconfiguration of Borders 
Finally,  a  pragmatic  view  of  geographical  research  on  borders  focuses  on 
problem‐oriented aspects of  state borders and CBC. O’Dowd’s work offers an 
insightful  example  of  bordering  processes  within  the  context  of  European 
integration and enlargement. Based on the history of state formation in Europe, 
O’Dowd (2002, 29) asserts that functions and meanings of state borders seldom 
remain  fixed or  stable  for  long periods.  In  the project of European  integration 
and  enlargement,  Europe’s  borders,  he  suggests,  have  been  reconfigured  in 
terms of  their  function as barriers, bridges,  resources, and  symbols of  identity 
(O’Dowd  2002,  21–29). He  also  considers  that  the  existence  of  territorial  state 
borders  have  been  a  sine  qua  non  for  the  development  of  representative 
democracy. European integration with its ‘democratic criteria’ in turn has led to 
more  ‘democratic  regulation’  of  borders,  which  critically  influences  the 
prospects for cross‐border cooperation. (Ibid., 30.) 
 68     
 
The pragmatic approach underlines that even  if  in flux, borders continue to 
serve  a purpose. They mark out, distinguish, but  also  regulate,  if not  express 
control,  prevent  or  facilitate.  Borders may  lose  some  of  their  functions while 
simultaneously  obtaining  new  ones;  they  are  seldom  stable,  but  rather under 
continuous change. Whereas some of  the border  functions can be  refuted by a 
single political decision –  if desired,  a border may, however, be  rooted  in  the 
minds of the people in such a profound manner that some of its functions may 
never  lose  their  relevance  even  if  the  actual  institutional  border  would 
eventually subside. Westlund (1999) specifies that technical‐logistical and political‐
administrative  borders  in  particular  are  much  less  resistant  to  change  than 
cultural‐historical, geographical, and biological borders. 
O’Dowd  argues  for  the multilevel  contingency  of  cross‐border  interaction. 
Generalizations  are  often difficult  to make  for  the EU’s  borders  are  also very 
heterogeneous.  This  is  reflected,  for  instance,  in  the  segmented  nature  of  its 
external  border.  Its  Mediterranean,  Balkan,  Central,  and  Eastern  European 
borders each involve different kinds of interaction with a variety of ‘others’ with 
varying claims and prospects to be  included into the EU (O’Dowd 2001). More 
recently, O’Dowd (2010, 1034) has  justly criticized the ‘borders are everywhere’ 
approach, which uses ‘borders’ as a synonym for all kinds of social controls, for 
“overextending the metaphor.” He sees that what goes on within the territory of 
the  state  actually  increases,  if  anything,  the  state’s  effective  territorial 
sovereignty and hence the significance of its external borders. Thus, highlighting 
the diffusion of  ‘bordering’ practices  throughout  the state  territory deceptively 
obscures  the  significance, multidimensionality, and ambiguity of  state borders 
(ibid., 1038).  
 
 
2.3 BORDERLANDS AND CROSS-BORDER GOVERNANCE12 
 
What can be drawn from above is that borders are not merely lines drawn on a 
map,  but  they  need  to  be  understood  as  broader  socio‐cultural  phenomena. 
Even though an explicit crossing of a border occurs obviously only at the very 
border,  the  impact of  a border may  reach deep  into  the  interior of  a  country. 
Borders do not have a bearing only on cross‐border traffic, but they also have a 
impact,  to  give  an  example,  on  cross‐border  governance,  particularly  with 
respect to territorial, urban, and environmental planning. Increased porosity of 
borders both enables and requires CBC. 
 
2.3.1 Defining Borderlands 
The borderland,  the areas adjacent  to a given border,  transforms hand‐in‐hand 
with  the  function and  role of  the border per se. The  term  ‘borderland’  is used 
                                                          
12 This chapter is based on Laine (2008; 2012). 
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here willfully to emphasize its vague and undetermined character, distinct from 
a  ‘border  region,’ which  particularly  in  the  European  context  often  bears  the 
connotation of being based on administrative units. A borderland is a nebulous 
zone in which the impact of the neighboring state and the border between these 
states is felt. A border with a high barrier function restricts exchanges across it 
whereas more open border facilitates cross‐border  interaction (van Geenhuizen 
& Ratti 2001).  
Based on this notion, it has been suggested (e.g., Mc Kinsey & Konrad 1989; 
Martinez 1994a/b) that the width of the borderland is dependent on the intensity 
of  exchanges  across  the  border;  the  more  open  a  border  is,  the  wider  the 
borderland.  Nevertheless,  a  closed  border,  across  which  exchanges  are 
negligible, also has a strong impact on the areas adjacent to it. Whereas an open 
border  tends  to  fuel  the  formation  of  functional  cross‐borderlands,  a  closed 
border tends to create peripheries suffering from the cut‐off effect of the border. 
Even  if different by nature,  in both cases the  impact of the border on the areas 
that  it divides  is  remarkable. Thus,  the width  and  range  of  the borderland  is 
dependent on the impact of the border; the stronger the impact – whether it be 
negative or positive – the wider the borderland (Laine 2008).  
Borderlands have distinct  features  and unique  characteristics due  to  either 
increased  interaction  or  lack  thereof. The  imminence  of  the  ‘other’  has  had  a 
severe impact on the way in which borderlands have evolved and developed. In 
the past, the respective center commonly wished to secure itself from undesired 
influences  from  the outside and hence hesitated  to  invest  in  the border areas, 
where  the  likelihood  of  conflict  was  perceived  to  be  the  greatest.  As  a 
consequence, border regions fail to develop at the same pace with the rest of the 
country.  In  certain  places,  borderlands  transformed  even  into  vacuum‐like 
spaces  where  no  central  power  reached  and  where  political  dividing  lines 
restricted  interaction across the border (Merkx 2000). Conversely, the  influence 
of borderlands on national politics and policies has most often been limited (van 
Houtum 1998, 20), and their role in national decision‐making processes is closer 
to that of an object rather than a subject. 
Borderlands  are  often  characterized  by  isolation,  backwardness,  and 
disregard. The  center‐oriented  production  of  services  and  the  organization  of 
activities  have  transformed  borderlands  into  resource  restricted  backwoods, 
which  have  been  more  dependent  on  national,  rather  than  transborder 
connections  (Urwin &  Rokkan  1983). Also,  people  living  in  these  areas  have 
been marginalized in geographic, economic, social, and political terms, the most 
visible  aspect  of which  being  an  unbalanced  division  of wealth  between  the 
center  and  the  periphery  of  a  country  (Hansen  1983;  van Houtum  1998,  20). 
Given  the  insufficient  subsidies  available  for  these  ‘less‐favored’  areas, 
peripheral borderlands have been  forced  to  fight harder  and harder  to  attract 
investments,  employment,  and  ultimately  people  (Käkönen  1999,  379), which 
has led to a vicious cycle in which border areas have become even more under 
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populated  and  regressive,  reducing  the  already  slim  prospects  for  future 
development  within  the  area.  Due  to  their  disadvantageous  geographical 
location, as well as position in relation to a center, borderlands are often referred 
to as ‘peripheral’ (Eskelinen & Snickars 1995).  
 
2.3.2 Modeling Borderland Interaction 
The effects of the openness of a border are dependent on the specific conditions 
of  each  borderland  and  cannot  be  determined  a  priori  (Clement  2004,  54). 
Despite their unique features, the dynamics between two borderlands separated 
by a border can be better understood through illustrative models. These models 
are  seldom  fully  transferable,  yet  they  do  offer  valuable  insights  as  a  good 
number of borderlands worldwide share similar characteristics. As an example, 
van  der  Schelde  and  Hœkveld  (1992)  have  developed  a  workable  model 
emphasizing the functional aspect of cross‐border regional systems that operate 
within borderlands (Figure 7). They see these systems not as massive quantities, 
but as multilayered structures in which every layer has its own scale and is part 
of a more extensive layer. The regional systems may extend across a border at all 
levels  (‘transnational,’  ‘intra‐regional,’  and  ‘level  of  the  neighboring 
borderlands’),  generating  cross‐border  interactions  and,  in  so  doing,  affecting 
the regional development of the entire borderland. (Ibid. 486, 493.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Influence of the opening of a border on the increase in regional systems cross-
border interactions. Adapted from van der Schelde & Hœkveld (1992) 
 
 
Van der Schelde and Hœkveld  (1992, 497–498)  found out  that  the capability of 
regional systems to cross the border is dependent not only on the characteristics 
and function of the border, but also on the way the actors in the daily regional 
systems  adapt  to  external  stimuli  originating  in  the  encompassing  systems  of 
which the studied regions form a part (the so‐called external context). The lower 
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the barrier effect, the better chances these regional systems have to extend across 
a border. Yet, even  if an open border allows  interaction,  it does not mean  that 
interaction would  immediately occur  if  local actors were not able to adapt and 
make  use  of  the  external  (social  or  spatial)  context:  “[i]nternational  flows 
traversing a region do not necessarily affect that region; rather, their importance 
depends on the nature of the regional systems they connect” (ibid. 486). 
Giaoutzi  et  al.  (1993)  endorses  that  cross‐border  interaction  does  indeed 
occurred through multilayered structures. They sought to identify obstacles for 
interaction  with  the  help  of  an  enlightening  layer‐model  of  networks.  They 
make a distinction between social, legal, economic, political, and cultural layers, 
which  together produce  a  complex  interaction‐structure defined  as  the  spatial 
layer  (ibid.,  105). This helps us understand  that different networks operate  in 
different  layers. As  a  state  border  crosses  these  layers,  it  creates  obstacles  to 
interaction  and  networks.  Whereas  the  political‐juridical  state  border  in 
Giaoutzi’s  et al.  (1993) model  crosses  all  the  layers  similar way, Schack  (2000, 
205) makes  an  important  correction  by  demonstrating  that  every  layer  has  a 
border of its own and that the border crosses the layer at different points (Figure 
8). The spatial layer is thus not a representation of a network pattern, but that of 
a society. Each missing link in the networks of each layer represents a border in 
that  particular  context.  For  this, we  can  deduce  that  a  border  has  a  different 
meaning  in  different  contexts;  i.e.,  it  may  be  possible  to  cross  a  border 
effortlessly in one context, while it seems difficult in other contexts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. A layer-model of networks (A) by Giaoutzi et al. (1993) and its alteration, a 
multilayer model of borders (B) by Schack (2000, 205–206) 
 
 
Notwithstanding  the  heterogeneity  of  borderlands, Martinez  (1994a;  see  also 
1994b)  has  succeeded  in developing  a workable  generalization  about  features 
common  to  all  borderlands  and  to  posit  a  classification  scheme  based  on  the 
intensiveness  of  cross‐border  interaction.  The  fundamental  argument  behind 
Martinez’s  (1994a) scheme  is  that as  the geopolitical climate  relaxes, more and 
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more  borderlands  evolve  towards  convergence  rather  than  divergence.  He 
proposes four models of borderland interaction as part of this process: alienated 
borderlands,  co‐existent  borderlands,  interdependent  borderlands,  and 
integrated  borderlands  (Figure  9).  Each  of  these models  illustrate  a  different 
degree of cross‐border interaction and prevailing tendencies in a borderland; as 
the barrier effect of a border diminishes, a more intensive interaction across the 
border may take place. Hence, the area where the influence of interaction can be 
felt expands further inland and the functional borderland increases in size.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Four paradigms of borderland interaction. Adapted from Martinez (1994a/b) 
 
 
Varying  inclinations may be manifested at  times but generally one of  the  four 
conditions is predominant (Martinez 1994b, 6). Alienated borderlands refer to a 
borderland where daily, routine interaction across the border is practically non‐
existent  owning  to  extremely  unfavorable  conditions. Major  causes  for  such 
alienation  can  be  warfare  or  other  political  disputes,  intense  nationalism, 
ideological  animosity,  cultural  and  religious  dissimilarities,  or  ethnic  rivalry. 
Under such conditions, international strife may easily lead to militarization and 
the  establishment  of  rigid  control  over  the  border.  (Ibid.,  2.)  Co‐existent 
borderlands in Martinez’s (1994a, 2–4) classification refers to a situation in which 
unfavorable,  international  conditions  still preclude binational  cooperation, but 
the countries separated by a border have succeeded  in reducing border‐related 
conflicts to a manageable level, allowing minimal border stability to prevail. In 
such a situation,  international contacts are possible, yet mainly on an  irregular 
basis. The border is no longer closed, but its barrier function is still high enough 
to forestall people from crossing it routinely.  
Interdependence can exist when a border region on one side of the border is 
symbiotically  linked with the borderland on the other side of the border (ibid., 
4–5).  Symbiosis,  by  definition,  implies  complementarily,  most  noticeably  in 
economic and social fields. Borderlands no longer merely exist in close physical 
association,  but  they  need  each  other  and  interact  in  a  prompt  and  enduring 
manner for the benefit of both areas. Stable conditions and increased interaction 
have led to an expansion of borderlands and encouraged borderland dwellers to 
attain friendly and cooperative cross‐border relationships. Lastly, at the stage of 
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integrated  borderlands,  neighboring  countries  eliminate  all  major  political 
differences between  them; stability  in  the area  is now strong and perceived as 
permanent and the economies of both countries are functionally merged (ibid., 
5). An extremely low barrier effect of the border allows unrestricted movement 
of people and goods across the border, which enables regional systems to extend 
deeper  across  the border. As  a  consequence,  the  functional borderland grows 
deeper  inland  and  borderland‐dwellers  perceive  themselves  as members  of  a 
single cross‐border social system (ibid.). 
Topaloglou et al. (2005), in turn, have developed an informative typology of 
the  EU  border  regions  based  on  a  fuzzy  cluster  analysis  of  EU  NUTS  III13 
divisions (Table 2). Like Martinez above, Topaloglou et al. also propose there to 
be  different models  of  interaction, which  can  be  found  in  different  contexts. 
While  the  format of  the collected data  that  they use makes  the actual analysis 
and  its  interpretation  seem  exceedingly  economy  oriented,  quantitative  and, 
hence,  somewhat  rigid,  their  study  makes  an  important  contribution  in 
suggesting  not  only  that  the  European  borders  are  diverse  and,  more 
specifically,  already  the  border  regions  themselves  constitute  a  highly 
heterogeneous group of regions. While they correctly argue that “[b]orders are 
‘melting’ in the EU external space and ‘freezing’ in the external one, drastically 
affecting  the development prospects of border  regions”  (ibid., 85–86), perhaps 
an  even more  important  conclusion of  their work would be  to underline  that 
studying  the border  from  the national angle  is  likely  to obscure  the difference 
among  the  different  border  regions;  i.e.,  to  approach  borders  as  non‐
homogenous entities. 
Accordingly,  placing  the  external  EU  border  in  its  entirety  into  the most 
disadvantaged  cluster E  is unquestionably a  cursory oversight  as  the  regional 
differences are not by any means limited to the internal borders. Taking a more 
regionally oriented approach would, however,  reveal  that,  for example,  in  the 
Finnish  case  Lapland  and  Northern  Ostrobothnia  would  be  well  placed  in 
cluster B,  if not  in A  –  though only due  to  their  links with both Sweden  and 
Norway. Still, also the Finnish regions bordering only Russia, from the Gulf of 
Finland  to  Kainuu,  also  have  their  regional  characteristics.  Kymenlaakso 
particularly, through which the Helsinki‐St. Petersburg axis runs, can hardly be 
characterized as a border region “with  low market potential and no prevailing 
positive  characteristics.”  It  is  true,  as  Topaloglou  et  al.  (2005)  argue,  that  the 
process  of  integration  in  Europe  remains  associated  with  significant 
differentiation in border zones. The examples taken from the external EU border 
                                                          
13 Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) is a geocode standard for referencing the 
subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes within the European Union. Eurostat has 
established a hierarchy of three NUTS levels for each EU member country. In Finland, there are two 
NUTS I regions (Mainland Finland and Åland), five NUTS II regions (Suuralueet), and, as of 2011, 19 
NUTS III Regions, which coincide with the Finnish provinces (Maakunnat). 
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could, however, be used  to demonstrate  that a higher  level of  integration does 
not automatically lead to greater convergence. 
 
 
Table 2. The EU NUTS III border regions typology (Topaloglou et al. 2005, 84)  
 
CLUSTER CHARACTERISTICS  EXAMPLES 
A 
Highly integrated border regions with advanced 
economic performance, many cultural similarities 
and small size. 
Border regions in the 
EU15 core, Scandinavia, 
Ireland, UK  
B 
Border regions that enjoy agglomeration 
economies but need significant structural 
adjustments in order to deal with the increased 
competition. 
Border regions in the 
Baltics, Slovakia, Czech 
Rep., Poland 
C 
Highly integrated border regions that present 
significant economic performance, though much 
cultural dissimilarity. 
Border regions in France, 
Germany, Spain, Portugal, 
Italy, Austria 
D 
Border regions with high development potential 
due to their favorable geographic position, but 
with low economic performance. 
Border regions in the 
western side of the EU 
new member-states 
E 
Border regions with low market potential and no 
prevailing positive characteristics 
Border regions in the EU 
external borders prior to 
enlargement 
 
 
Whether studied either  from  the national or  from a more regional perspective, 
the  setting  in  which  Finnish‐Russian  cooperation  takes  place  appears  to  be 
rather  asymmetric.  According  to  a  conceptual  framework  developed  by 
Clement, Ganster and Sweedler (2005), cross‐border interaction at such unequal 
borders is characterized by economic and non‐economic asymmetries. They see 
that  interaction  is  based  on  economies  of  scale;  i.e.,  both  physical  and  social 
infrastructure  as well  as  the marketing  and  lobbying  efforts  that  ought  to  be 
undertaken  and  financed  by  all  parties  deriving  positive  externalities  they 
generate.  These  externalities  are  economic  complementarities  that,  in  turn, 
generate  a variety  of  both  economic  and non‐economic  cross‐border  linkages. 
The  linkages  represent  opportunities,  which  can  lead  to  higher  levels  of 
development  if managed  properly.  The  negative  externalities,  challenges  that 
can  hinder  development,  must  also  be  managed  as,  say,  pollution  or 
communicable diseases that can potentially spill over onto the other side of the 
border.  In asymmetrical  settings also  transaction  costs are  likely  to be high  in 
comparison  to expected profits. Due  to a  lack of  information,  legal constrains, 
different business practices, language and culture, resources and time often have 
a better rate of return if invested domestically. (Ibid., 229–230.) 
Kozák  (2010)  has  also  studied  asymmetry,  thought  through  more  of  an 
international  relations  perspective  focusing  on  conflicting  issues  and  tensions 
between  the  two countries. He maintains  that a  ‘weaker’ state and a  ‘stronger’ 
state have different policy options when  approaching  each other. The weaker 
state  can  chose  to  ‘close’  (i.e.,  isolate)  itself  off  in  an  attempt  to  protect  and 
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safeguard its national institutions or policies against the overpowering influence 
of  the  stronger  state.  This  often  induces  the  weaker  state  to  emphasize  a 
legalistic concept of national sovereignty and  to strive  to protect  itself  through 
tariffs  or  active  government  role  in  the  economy.  The  weaker  state  may 
alternatively opt to  ‘open’ itself up towards the stronger state, i.e., to lower the 
economic  and  political  barriers  in  an  attempt  to  diminish  the  asymmetry  by 
raising  its  level  of  economic  and  social  development  to  be  on  par with  the 
stronger state. (Ibid.) 
The stronger state has four basic options in asymmetric relations. In addition 
to closing  itself off (insulating itself against problematic  issues arising from the 
asymmetry) or pursuing ‘open’ policies (assisting the weaker state with its most 
serious  problems  and  trying  to  solve  contentious  bilateral  issues  in mutually 
acceptable ways),  it  can  choose  to  ignore  or  to dominate  the weaker  state. A 
strong  state may  ignore  the weaker  state by  focusing  its attention  to  relations 
with  other  strong  states  or  a  different weaker  state.  Domination,  in  turn,  is 
usually manifested  in  use  of  overwhelming  (military)  force  to  advance  one’s 
interests or promote one’s values. (Kozák 2010.) While Kozák’s  logic, based on 
the  US‐Mexico  setting,  cannot  be  directly  applied  to  the  Finnish‐Russian 
situation – where also  the EU now plays a significant  role,  its brigs up a vital 
issue: the same border, and the relations across it, may look very different and 
be given different value  from different directions. This  is  to say  that while  the 
relations  with  Russia  remain  of  utmost  importance  to  Finland,  for  Russia 
Finland is just one neighbor among many.  
Brunet‐Jailly’s  has  taken  a up  the  challenging  task  of developing  a  border 
model  that  would  allow  scholars  to  compare  borders  effectively  and  thus 
expand  the  scholarly  ʹboundariesʹ  of  their  respective  fields  of  study  (Brunet‐
Jailly 2004; 2005; 2007a/b). To understand borders and borderlands, he asserts, 
social scientists need to focus on the lenses of analysis that underscore the tug of 
war between agency (human activities and  individual ties and forces spanning 
the border) and broader structural processes in the multi‐scalar construction/de‐
construction of states  that  frame  individual action and  their concurrent  impact 
on border regions and policies.  
National governments, Brunet‐Jailly  2011,  1–2)  asserts,  are key players, yet 
governing  has  become more  complex, which  in  turn modify  the  influence  of 
central  governments  on  borders  and  borderlands.  The  borderland  dweller’s 
priorities  and  perceptions  often  function  at  cross‐purposes  with  those  of 
national governments. This  is particularly the case when national governments 
seek  to manage and control  the cross‐border processes  in borderlands  in ways 
that  challenge  the  interests  and  accustomed  patterns  of  interaction  of  local 
residents;  the  local  political  clout  either  enhances  the  border  effect  or 
strengthens communication within the borderland, hence challenging the central 
government’s  border  policies  (Brunet‐Jailly  2007b,  352,  355–356).  The 
accustomed  interaction  of  individuals  and  organizations  across  borders 
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cultivates  varying  degrees  of  interdependence  that  in  turn  contributes  to 
varying degrees  of  ‘porosity,’  creating  “problem(s)  for  the makers  of  security 
policy” (Brunet‐Jailly 2007a, 2). 
Based  on  an  extensive  review  of  border  literature, Brunet‐Jailly  suggests  a 
workable  model,  his  theory  of  borders  (Figure  10).  He  approaches  borders 
through  four  different  analytical,  border‐spanning  lenses,  all  of  which  are 
assumed to enhance or complement one another. The lens of ‘local cross‐border 
culture’ refers to the sense of belonging, common language, or ethnic, religious, 
socio‐economic background. ‘Local cross‐border political clout,’ in turn, includes 
active  local  civic  and  political  organizations  and  individuals  that  initiate  and 
expand  local  level  relations,  local  policy  networks,  local  policy  communities, 
symbolic regime, and  local cross‐border  institutions. The  lens of  ‘market forces 
and  trade  flows’  consists of various  flows of goods, people,  and  investments, 
while the ‘policy activities of multiple levels of government’ span the border to 
link local, regional, provincial, state, and central governments but also different 
task‐specific public and private sector organizations (Brunet‐Jailly 2005, 645.) 
 
 
 
Figure 10. A theory of borderland studies. Adopted from Brunet-Jailly (2005, 645; 2007b, 
355) 
 
 
The  different  lenses  in  Brunet‐Jailly’s model  contribute  either  to  the  growing 
integration  of  borderlands  or  work  at  cross‐purposes  to  one  another.  What 
emerges in the interplay of these lenses is a borderland region that is culturally 
emerging and integrating (Brunet‐Jailly 2005, 645). On the other hand, unilateral 
or mismatched approaches, which  fail  to engage  the  local population,  foster a 
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‘tug  of  war’  between  culture,  local  political  clout,  market  forces,  and  the 
multiple activities of governments in structuring borderlands (2007a, 4). 
Brunet‐Jailly  (2007b,  355)  proposes  two  hypotheses:  1)  The  more  culture, 
political  clout,  and  market  forces  are  integrated,  the  more  porous  the 
borderland,  and  conversely  2)  the  more  the  policy  activities  of  multiple 
governments  are  integrated,  the  less  porous  the  borderland.  With  empirical 
examples demonstrating  the validity of both of  them, Brunet‐Jailly  (ibid., 356) 
arrives at a dilemma. On  the one hand,  the  less  integrated a borderland  is,  the 
less need there is for governments to integrate their policies. On the other hand, 
the more integrated the borderland is due to similar culture, strong cross‐border 
clout,  and market  forces,  the more  need  there  also  is  for  the  governments  to 
better  integrate  their  policies.  While  the  basic  premise  applies  also  to  the 
Finnish‐Russian case, what stands out is that even though the local cross‐border 
political and cultural clouts as well as the government policies and market forces 
certainly penetrate the border, this increased interaction has not led to any major 
forms of integration.  
 
2.3.3 Openness vis‐à‐vis Interaction 
In  the  European  context,  it  is  commonly  expected  that  with  the  help  of 
multileveled governance border regions may be turned into places for action by 
encouraging its borderlanders to cooperate with their neighbors (Hooghe 1996; 
Hooghe & Marks 2001a/b; van Geenhuizen & Ratti 2001; Kramsch 2004). While 
the unification of Europe was set  it motion already soon after World War II as 
the  continent,  tired  of war,  began  taking  steps  to  prevent  future  conflicts  by 
learning  to  cooperate  with  former  enemies,  cross‐border  cooperation  as  a 
political  tool was not  actively practiced before  the  1990s. Prior  to  that,  it was 
rather  the  Council  of  Europe  (est.  1949)  that  promoted  the  pan‐European 
movement and cooperation between all countries of Europe. 
Today,  the greatest manifestation of European  integration  is, of course,  the 
European Union,  consisting  of  heretofore  27 member  states. As  the  threat  of 
conflict declined, borders became more  transparent and  the borderlands more 
stable  and,  therefore, more  attractive platforms  for  growth  and development. 
Former points of conflict began to transform into points of contact. As increased 
porosity  of  borders  enabled  the  expansion  of  borderlanders’  space  for  action 
(Ratti 1993) and  fuelled  the  transformation of  the borderland from a periphery 
towards  a  competitive  field  of  interaction  (Eskelinen  &  Snickars  1995),  the 
vicinity of a border was no longer seen solely as a disadvantage. In Morehouse’s 
(2004, 29)  terms, a border’s  function was no  longer merely  to  slice but also  to 
bind, whereby borderlands tend to airbrush differences.  
Under  the  dynamics  of  internationalization  and  global  interaction, 
‘cooperation’  and  ‘integration’  now  boast  decidedly  positive  connotations. 
Borders  are  no  longer  regarded  as  protective  bulwarks  but  increasingly  as 
inconveniences that should be removed in order to facilitate less confined forms 
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of cross‐border interaction. Even at the risk of losing the exclusive rights linked 
to nation‐state status, the countries of Europe have been willing to relax certain 
functions  of  their  borders  for  the  lure  of  the  common  good. As  flows  across 
these borders have intensified, influences from each side of the border have also 
been felt more forcefully than ever before; the axiom being that the intensity of 
transborder influence is relational to the openness of the border.  
An open border, it is assumed, no longer functions as a barrier but rather as a 
bridge connecting  two sides of a border  together, creating a meeting place  for 
actors from various levels. Despite its ill effects, most notably smuggling, illegal 
migration,  and other delinquencies, openness  is often  seen  in  a positive  light; 
openness encourages cross‐border activities, which is often envisioned to deliver 
growth.  Increased  cross‐border  interaction may also give  rise  to new  complex 
identities along with  creating  stronger  regional attachments across  the border, 
improving thus the competency of the border region. Lower barrier effect may 
enable a border  region  to develop by allowing borderland dwellers, business, 
inter  alia,  to  benefit  from  their  new window‐position. Openness  creates  new 
opportunities,  but  on  the  other  hand  also  more  competition  as  the  border 
seldom  opens  one way  only. Albeit  a  necessary  condition,  openness  alone  is 
insufficient  to  transform a border region  from a mere  transit zone  to what van 
Geenhuizen and Ratti (2001) refer to as ‘active space.’ In order to generate cross‐
border  interaction  and  subsequently  to deliver  social  added value  in  terms of 
cohesion  between  the  two  sides,  not  only  demand  but  also  creative  learning 
abilities and a concern for sustainability is required (ibid.).  
Borders are subject to continuous, albeit gradual, change not only in space but 
also  through  time.  Borders  seldom  evolve  linearly  from  being  closed  to 
becoming open; instead the development is usually more punctuated. A border 
may  also  become  permeable  for  some  functions  but  remain  impermeable  for 
others. This  is  illustrated  in border  scholars’ use of metaphors  such  as  ‘fuzzy 
borders’  (Walters  2006,  142),  ‘smart  borders’  (Delanty  2006,  190),  ‘gated 
community’  (Cunningham  2004),  or,  perhaps most  appropriately,  ‘borders  as 
firewalls’  (Walters  2006,  151–154).  The  dynamics  of  change  and  the  future 
opportunities  it  may  bring  along  with  it  are  often  based  on  the  mental 
construction that people have. In this respect, a border may well be open de jure 
but  closed  de  facto.  The  same  applies  to  interaction;  it  has  to  be  perceived  as 
mutually  beneficial  and  favorable  by  actors  themselves  in  order  to maintain 
itself and prosper.  
 
2.3.4 Reterritorialization and Regionalism  
The concept of  reterritorialization  (Sack 1983; Popescu 2008) provides a useful 
avenue  to  understand  how  territoriality  plays  its  part  in  cross‐border 
cooperation. Reterritorialization  indicates a restructuring of a  territory  that has 
experienced  deterritorialization  (Deleuze  &  Guattari  1987),  an  outcome  of 
globalization whereby culture, politics, and economies become untethered to the 
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national  territory.  As  a  concept,  reterritorialization  refers  to  a  multi‐scalar 
process by which the state is not disappearing but merely organized differently. 
Central to this process has been the multiplication of extra‐national channels for 
subnational  political  activity  (Hooghe & Marks  1996,  73)  and  the  consequent 
implementation of various CBC schemes. 
Increased  cross‐border  interaction  and  interdependencies  require  increased 
cross‐border governance (Kramsch 2004; Brunet‐Jailly 2007b, 356). In the EU this 
has  principally  taken  the  shape  of  subnational  cross‐border  regionalism,  the 
active promotion of the emergence and institutionalization of which became an 
important  objective  of  European  Union  regional  and  cohesion  policy.  As 
summarized  by Gualini  (2003,  43),  through  the  “creation  of  an  area without 
internal frontiers” (Treaty on EU‐TEU, Article 2) and the mainstreaming of CBC 
in  various  transnational  public  policy  programs,  cross‐border  regionalism 
extended  in  the  1990s  from mere  issues  of  center‐periphery  relationships  and 
uneven  development,  towards  everyday  practice  with  its  opportunities  and 
complexities. Cross‐border strategic alliances between cities, regions, and other 
subnational  governments,  as well  as  the  initiatives  of  cities  to  promote  their 
economic and political interests internationally, soon received also considerable 
research attention both in Europe and in North America (Briner 1986; Steiner & 
Sturn 1993; Cohn & Smith 1995; Church & Reid 1996). This was  followed by a 
discussion of networks of NGOs as new and influential actors on a transnational 
scale (Mathews 1997; Zabin 1997). 
The development of  regional  forms of cooperation across state borders has 
been characterized by a great variety of institutional designs and strategies; CBC 
frameworks consist of a myriad of systems operating at various  spatial  levels, 
involving both state and non‐state and even supranational actors that contribute 
to  regionalization  processes.  Cross‐border  regionalism  did  not  become 
exclusively  a  matter  of  creating  formal  or  semi‐formal  organizations,  but 
universities,  environmental  groups,  cultural  associations,  chambers  of 
commerce,  trade  unions,  and  other  non‐governmental  actors  have  also  been 
active  in promoting cooperation, even  if  they were not always able  to develop 
harmonious working  relationships with  formal  cooperation  institutions.  (Scott 
1999, 606–608.)  
The most visible form of cross‐border regionalization has been the emergence 
of  institutional cross‐border regions,  ‘Euroregions’ or  ‘Euregions.’14These cross‐
border  structures  comprise  of  regional/local  authorities  that  promote 
cooperation and coordination in regard to policy planning and implementation 
(Page & Sinclair 1993; Perkmann 2003a/b). Euroregions are  technically national 
creations, but in practice they are often assisted by CSOs, and they receive direct 
financial assistance from trans‐ and supranational bodies such as the Council of 
Europe (Popescu 2008, 429). They may be seen as an example of the  increasing 
                                                          
14 The naming convention varies in different contexts. 
 80     
 
influence of the EU (Brenner 1999; Perkmann 2003a, 153) and a new governance 
structure, “post‐modern challenge  to a nation‐state” Cronberg  (2003, 235–236), 
in which  the role of  regional governance  is strengthened at  the expense of  the 
nation‐state.  
Cannon  (2005,  3–4)  seeks  to  clarify  the  emergence of Euroregions with  the 
help of two opposing approaches: the cooperative and the competitive embodied in 
the works of James W. Scott and Oliver Kramsch, respectively. The cooperative 
approach  relies  heavily  on  the  role  played  by  the  EU  as  a  framework  and 
catalyst  for  cooperation;  particularly  through  the  use  of  cross‐border  and 
interregional  community  initiatives  such  as  INTERREG.  It  approaches  cross‐
border  regionalism  from  the  perspective  of  political  geography  and  spatial 
planning  and  assumes  a  critical  geopolitical  sensitivity  to  the  socio‐cultural 
construction  of  space  as  it  occurs  through  the  jargons  and  vernaculars  of EU 
institutions (Scott 2002).  
Whereas  Scott  is  interested  in  the  development  of  new  forms  of  identity 
through  the  formation  of  Euroregions,  Kramsch’s  interests  lay  in  the  spatial 
relationships  of  Euroregion  participants  (Cannon  2005,  4).  Kramsch’s  (2001) 
post‐colonial interpretation of the mechanics of the construction of Euroregions 
results  in  seeing  borderlands  as  sites  in  which  the  national  borders  and 
territorial  state  practices  are  brought  into  crisis  by  cross‐border  networks. 
Kramsch’s competitive school of transboundary regionalism, as it is dubbed by 
Cannon (2005, 4), describes the efforts of peripheral regions to level the playing 
field  with  more  central  regions  by  taking  advantage  of  the  cross‐border 
opportunities  offered  by  the  creation  of  the  single market  and  the  growth  of 
globalization.  
Gualini  (2003, 50)  sees  cross‐border  regionalism as part of  a process of  the 
‘relativization  of  scale’  of  which  the  most  notable  manifestation  is  the 
constitution  of  a  geography  of  overlapping,  experimental  and  often  unstable 
territorial domains of governance and  regulation. He asserts  that  cross‐border 
governance appears as a  result of processes of  ‘strategic selectivity,’ which  re‐
define the meaning of borders as historically determined institutional and socio‐
political constructs. That being  the case,  the created  image of  territoriality  that 
supports governance  initiatives  in  cross‐border  regions becomes  a  carrier of a 
political project. Visioning and sense‐making become components of institution 
building practices. (Ibid.) The emergence of cross‐border governance can be seen 
to  exhibit  the  practices  of  ‘imagined  communities’  (Anderson  1983)  and 
‘projecting  spaces’  (Liepitz  1994)  as  well  as  an  increased  importance  of  the 
politics of identity (Jessop 2000). 
Gualini  (2003,  50)  further  clarifies  that  another major  challenge  facing  the 
institutionalization of governance across borders has been caused by  the “self‐
deceiving  and  quasi  natural  character  of  territorial  identity  –  not  only  as  a 
community  of  interests,  but  quasi  as  a  community  of  destiny.”  A  sense  of 
community might  be  seen  as  a  precondition  for  cross‐border  regionalism,  he 
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argues, but it  is anything but an  ideal reference for establishing concrete forms 
of  collective  action  and  stable  patterns  of  governance. A  region  as  a  field  of 
forces, Gualini (2003, 50) suggests, is just an imagined community and needs to 
be seen in light of the processes of its social construction or, as Paasi (1986; also 
1999c, 2001) has put it, of a process of an institutionalization of a region, which 
entails  the establishment of a  territorial unit  in a spatial hierarchy of  territorial 
consciousness, i.e., in the structures of inhabitants expectations.  
In some cases, as Scott  (2006)  justly argues, Euroregions have been used as 
vehicles  to  extend  political  control  beyond  national,  and  even  the  EU, 
boundaries. This comes down  to what Popescu  (2008, 431–432) refers  to as  the 
“conflict of  territorial  logics,” which  functions as  the driving  force behind  the 
process  of  cross  border  reterritorialization.  The  sovereignty  based  territorial 
logic of  the nations‐state competes with  the border bridging  territorial  logic of 
cross  border  cooperation  and  it  is  at  the  border where  this  conflict  is  being 
negotiated.  From  the  perspective  of  the  Euroregion,  in  turn,  the  border  is  a 
barrier  to be overcome, and  from  the supranational angle,  the Euroregions are 
considered as having potential as  territorial policy  tools  to be used  in shaping 
the EU’s geopolitical imagination (Popescu 2008). There are, however, signs that 
the  Euroregions  are  not mere  tools  but  that  their  functioning  has  influenced 
national legal systems to be modified to facilitate CBC, encouraging small‐scale 
cross‐border  economic  investments  as  well  as  various  social,  economic,  and 
cultural cross‐border policies and events. While the Euroregions are not unified 
spaces  outside  the  nation‐state  and  the  EU’s  hegemony,  they  are  territories 
experiencing an ongoing process of  reterritorialization  in a multi‐scalar spatial 
context (Popescu 2008, 434).  
 
 
2.4 RECONFIGURING THE INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN 
 
The  intensity of cross‐border  interaction and common problems shared by  the 
two sides has forced the governments of neighboring countries to communicate 
better with each other. As  the Finnish‐Russian case exemplifies,  the number of 
high‐level visits and international agreements have only increased. As a border 
separating two different countries is always, by its nature, an international one, 
the interaction across it has also been considered to be an international (or more 
precisely  interstate)  issue, an aspect of  foreign politics  to be administrated and 
run by  the state officials  in state capitals.  In many cases,  the capital cities with 
their  respective  decision‐making  institutions  locate  at  safe  distance  from  the 
actual  border.  This  presents  a  problem  as  people’s  perceptions  of  a  subject 
matter  tend  to  be more  exaggerated  the  further  away  they  are  from  the very 
subject in question. Similarly, in the case of the EU, decisions about the external 
border and  interaction across  it are made  in Brussels  from where  they  cannot 
but seem at least somewhat distant.  
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The very same border is often seen in a very different light at different levels. 
While local issues at the border often involve also national interests, the state (or 
EU) level actors’ ability and/or will to pay attention to the local circumstances or 
problems  is more  limited. While  for  the  local  border  communities  the  border 
may have always been ‘intermestic’ (Lowenthal 1999), for the center the border 
still  fundamentally represents  the  limit of sovereignty and, hence, a separation 
between domestic and international politics. Even with the ENP, the fact that the 
EU’s  jurisdiction stops at  its political border  remains.  In order  to alleviate  this 
problem,  a  previously  unseen  premium  has  been  placed  on  the  role  of  civil 
society cooperation in addition to the more conventional political and economic 
aspects, as CSOs are commonly less restricted to move back and forth across the 
border.  
 
2.4.1 Multilevel Governance and Paradiplomacy 
The calls  for a wider understanding of power and agency  in studies of global 
governance have been widely heard and  responded  to.  In  contrast  to a world 
dominated  by  states  and  national  governments,  in  a  new  Europe  of  post‐
national  borders  (see  Berezin  &  Schain  2003),  there  are  various  spheres  of 
authority that do not necessarily coincide with conventional territorial divisions 
of  space.  Rosenau  (1999,  295)  advises  us  “to  focus  on  those  political  actors, 
structures,  processes,  and  institutions  that  initiate,  sustain,  or  respond  to 
globalizing  forces  as  they  propel  boundary‐spanning  activities  and  foster 
boundary‐contracting relations.” In addition to the fragmentation of power and 
increasingly  complex  vertical  relations  between  actors  organized  at  various 
territorial  levels,  there  has  simultaneously  been  increased  integration  and 
interdependency in horizontal relations between actors from public, private and 
voluntary  spheres15 (Rosenau  2004;  2005,  133–135).  Such  an  accumulation  of 
anomalies against  the state centric paradigm has necessitated a  transformation 
towards more multileveled governance. 
Multilevel  governance  (MLG)  refers  to  a  system  of  continuous negotiation 
among governments at several territorial tiers (supranational, national, regional, 
and  local).  It  entails  a  conception  of  the  EU  as  consisting  of  ‘overlapping 
competencies  among  multiple  levels  of  governments  and  the  interaction  of 
political actors across those levels’ (Marks et al. 1996, 167). This leads to a loss of 
the  ‘gate‐keeping role’ of the state, as  the conventional representation via state 
executives  is curtailed  (Hooghe & Marks 2001a).  In  so doing, MLG challenges 
the  conventional  structure  of  centralized  national  authority  that  is  exercised 
hierarchically  by  dispersing  governance  across  multiple  jurisdictions.  This, 
Marks and Hooghe (2000) explain,  is both more efficient than and normatively 
superior to central state monopoly. Governance must operate at multiple scales 
                                                          
15 He has suggested referring to these combined developments of fragmentation and integration as 
‘fragmeration.’ 
     83 
 
in order  to capture variations  in  the  territorial  reach of policy externalities. As 
these  externalities  arise  from  the provision of public goods vary  immensely  – 
from planet‐wide in the case of global warming to local in the case of most city 
services – so should the scale of governance. (Marks & Hooghe 2003.)  
Multilevel governance arises from the national governments’ perceived  lack 
of capacity to solve issues and push for desired changes by acting alone. Instead, 
“effective power  is shared, bartered, and struggled over by diverse  forces and 
agencies at national, regional, and global levels.” It is being repositioned and, to 
some extent, “transformed by the growing importance of other less territorially 
based power systems” (Held et al., 1999, 447). The notion of governance, per se, 
attempts  to  straddle  the  erected  borders  between  domestic  and  international, 
between  comparative  politics  and  international  relations,  between  public  and 
private  spheres,  and  between  the  state  and  civil  society  (Meehan  2003,  5; 
Aalberts 2004, 24). It is assumed to include the establishment and acceptance of a 
set of rules of conduct and norms that  ‘define practices, assign roles and guide 
interaction so as  to grapple with collective problems’  (Stokke 1997, 28). Unlike 
government,  governance  does  not  presuppose  a  material  existence;  it  rather 
involves  the  establishment  of  social  institutions  involving  state  or  non‐state 
actors as a basis for cooperation (Young 1997).  
Multilevel governance as a concept was  introduced  in  the early 1990s as an 
attempt  to move beyond  the reluctant cleavage between  intergovernmentalism 
and  neofunctionalism/supranationalism  debate  by  presenting  a  new  ‘in 
between’  (Aalberts  2004,  23–24,  27).  This  was  done  by  providing  a  better 
description  of  the  ‘nature  of  the  beast’  (Risse‐Kappen  1996;  Jordan  2001)  and 
shifting attention  from explanandum  to  explanans  (Jachtenfuchs 2001);  i.e., away 
from the process of integration to the subject itself: the EU as a complex and sui 
generis entity (Aalberts 2004, 27).  
As the discussion above suggests, debate concerning multi‐level governance 
has  focused  on  two  directions  of  intergovernmental  relations:  1)  horizontal 
relations  between  similar  governments  or  government  organizations 
(‘governance  issues’),  and  2)  vertical  relations  (‘intergovernmental  relations’) 
(Brunet‐Jailly 2010, 3–4). Hooghe and Marks (2001a/b; 2003), however, note that 
multi‐level governance is not only vertical and horizontal but also of 3) general‐
purpose  governance  (interaction  of  local,  regional,  national,  international,  etc. 
agencies  of  general‐purpose  jurisdiction)  and  4)  task‐specific  governance 
(interactions of actors from different societal sectors and levels within a specific 
policy process). Understanding  these different  types of multi‐level governance 
helps us to analytically examine the development prospects of borderlands and 
cross‐border interaction. 
Multilevel  governance  theorists  have  remained  remarkably  silent  on  the 
specific  relation  between  multilevel  governance  and  state  sovereignty  (cf. 
Aalberts 2004, 39). Those who have attempted to clarify the link, such as Hooghe 
and Marks  (2001a/b;  2003),  have  remained  hemmed  in  a  positivist  approach 
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(taking sovereignty as an objective,  ‘hard’  fact)  for which  reason  their analysis 
does not  account  adequately  for  the  endurance of  sovereign  statehood within 
the emerging hierarchical structures  in the European arena. Aalberts  (2004, 24) 
reasons that sovereignty must be addressed as what links the international arena 
to  the  domestic  by  combining  independence  from  outside  interference  with 
authority  over  jurisdiction.  Whereas  domestic  politics  is  organized  through 
supremacy  of  the  government  (hierarchy),  foreign politics  is  based  on  formal 
equality among governments (a lack of supremacy – anarchy). Thus, the modern 
state  system  on  the  one  hand  fostered  a  distinction  between  the  two, while 
providing  the  exclusive  terms  of  reference  to  bridge  the  divide  on  the  other 
(Caporaso 1996; Bartelson 1995). Such an international ‘living‐apart‐together’ of 
states  based  on mutually  recognized  sovereignty, Aalberts  (2004,  24)  argues, 
provided also the parameters for interaction between independent states. 
In  contrast, MLG  can be characterized as  ‘the world  turned  inside out and 
outside in’ (Anderson 1996, 135). It challenges both the external anarchy and the 
internal  hierarchy  element  of  the  Westphalian  principle  (Aalberts  2004,  25). 
However, this does not by any means suggest that states would not remain key 
actors in European politics (Keohane & Nye 1971; Walker 1994; Marks, Hooghe 
&  Blank  1996;  Tarrow  2001). Not  only  do  they  have  central  roles  in  national 
policy but they are also key figures in transnational actions. “To date,” Aalberts 
(2004, 32) notes, “national state  sovereignty has not disappeared  to make way 
for  a European  sovereign  state.” She  contrasts Walker’s  (1991,  458)  claim  that 
‘[a]s  a  practice  of  states,  it  [sovereignty]  is  easily  mistaken  as  being  their 
essence,’ by suggesting that it is not mistaken for being their essence but rather 
that  “this  ‘essence’  does  not  exist  apart  from  practice  and  mutual 
understandings”(Aalberts 2004, 39;  see Werner & de Wilde  2001, 304). Hence, 
“[a]s long as states accept and act upon each other as being sovereign, they are. 
In essence, this is what their individuality entails” (Aalberts 2004, 39, emphasis 
in the original). 
The actors  involved  in CBC range  from micro‐level groups and  individuals 
to supra‐national organizations. The transregional frameworks for CBC, such as 
the EU’s Northern Dimension, Marin (2006, 30) clarifies, ‘devolve’ the elements 
of  actorness  and  responsibility  for  implementing  common  regional  policies. 
Accordingly,  Perkmann  and  Sum  (2002,  5)  suggest,  European  integration 
provides sub‐state actors “opportunity structures to participate in  international 
activities.”  These,  they  argue,  include:  a)  the  recruitment  of  subnational 
authorities  as  policy  implementation  partners  on  the  part  of  supranational 
authorities  (Balme 1996); b) an  increasing role of subnational authorities  in  the 
formulation  and  implementation  of  ‘their’  nation‐state’s  foreign  policies 
(‘catalytic  diplomacy’  see  Hocking  1996)  a  growing  density  of  direct 
international  contact  among  subnational  authorities, bypassing  superior  levels 
of  government  (‘paradiplomacy,’  see  Duchacek  et  al.  1988;  Henrikson  2000; 
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Keating  & Hooghe  2006),  in  so  doing  creating  a  new  class  of  local  officials 
operating at the ‘interface of the state and Europe’ (Keating 1998, 182).  
The  ongoing  discussions  on  sub‐state  paradiplomacy  points  to  a  growing 
number of regional and  local authorities engaging  in  international cooperation 
(Blatter et al. 2009; Bursens & Deforche 2010; Cornago 2010; Criekemans 2010; 
Jeffery 2009; Rowe 2009). This process has been fuelled by the EU’s influence of 
blurring of the distinction between what is ‘international’ and ‘internal’ politics 
(Hettne  1999;  Joenniemi  1997), making  the  borders  seem,  to  use  Lowenthal’s 
(1999)  term  ‘intermestic,’  i.e.,  not  really  international  but  not  fully  domestic 
either.  As  Perkmann  (2003b,  6)  identifies,  this  is  exemplified  by:  1) 
‘Europeanization’  of  local  and  regional  governments  as  they  are  recruited  as 
‘partners’  into  various  EU  policy  fields  (Goldsmith  1993),  the  non‐central 
governments (NCGs) increasing role in formulating foreign and/or EU policy of 
nation‐states  (Hocking  1996)  and  by  increasing  number  of  NCGs  in  Europe 
involved in interregional and CBC initiatives that is increasingly paradiplomatic 
by its nature. 
 
2.4.2 International vs. Transnational  
Alongside  states, world politics  of  today  involves many non‐state  actors who 
interact with each other, with states, and with international organizations (Keck 
& Sikkink 1999, 89). The  increased  inclusion of  international organizations and 
non‐governmental actors to the relations between states on the one hand and the 
states’  increased  sensitivity  to  the decisions and actions by non‐state actors as 
well as events in other parts of the world on the other, have brought up the need 
to question the accustomed theories and concepts of International Relations.  
Credit  for  the coining  the  term  ‘transnational’  is usually given  to Randolph 
Bourne (1916), yet Karl Kaiser (1969; 1971) was among the very first IR scholars 
to  use  the  concepts  of  transnationalism  and  transactional  action.  While 
mainstream IR had focused on foreign affairs between nation‐states and global 
issues  among  states within  the  international  system, Kaiser  (1971,  791)  urged 
more attention to be paid to the “direct horizontal transactions between societal 
actors  of  different  nation‐states,  transactions which  bypass  the  institutions  of 
government but strongly affect their margin of maneuver; the various forms of 
mutual  penetration  of  formally  separate  entities;  and  the  growing  number  of 
non‐state  actors.” When  societal  actors  from  different  national  systems  come 
together for a specific issue, Kaiser (1971, 802) asserts, they form a ‘transnational 
society,’ which “cannot be understood geographically,” but rather functionally; 
i.e.,  “circumscribed  by  the  issue  areas  which  are  the  object  of  transnational 
interaction.” 
It is, however, more common to begin one’s review from the groundbreaking 
article  by Nye  and Keohane’s  (1971,  332)  in which  they  clarify  that whereas 
interstate interactions are “initiated and sustained entirely, or almost entirely, by 
governments  of  nation‐states,”  transnational  interactions  “involve  non‐
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governmental  actors  –  individuals  or  organizations”  (ibid.).  Transnational 
interaction,  by  their  definition,  may  involve  also  governments,  but 
nongovernmental actors must play a  significant  role. Nye and Keohane  (1971; 
335), however, also diffuse the term by adding that transnational relations also 
“include  the activities of  transnational organizations, except within  their home 
states, even when some of  their activities may not directly  involve movements 
across  state  boundaries.”  This,  they  argue,  suggests  that  “most  transnational 
organizations remain linked primarily to one particular national society” (ibid., 
336). 
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that the recognition of new actors 
does not indicate that this would happen at the cost of state, as Keohane & Nye’s 
emphasis on “free‐wheeling  transnational  interaction” seems  to  imply. Tarrow 
(2001,  3) makes  a  valid  point  by  noting  that  social movements,  transnational 
networks, and NGOs are not the only agents operating transnationally; states do 
not only have central roles in national policy but they have also always reached 
beyond  their  borders  and  played  a  key  transnational  role  (Huntington  1973). 
Tarrow argues that they do so increasingly, for instance by signing international 
agreements, interfering in the internal lives of other (usually weaker) states, and 
building international institutions (ibid.). In doing so, they often aim to respond 
to transnational activities that states cannot control (Keohane & Nye 1974) or to 
provide  ‘insurance’  that  other  states will  honor  their  commitments  (Keohane 
1989). As a consequence, the dominant states in the international system have a 
profound  effect  on  transnational  relations,  not  only  by  controlling  non‐state 
actors but often by subsidizing them (Uvin 2000, 15), and by providing models 
of transnational politics from their own domestic templates (Huntington 1973).  
Both  Risse‐Kappen  (1995)  and  Walker  (1994)  question  the  usefulness  of 
debate over the dominance of the state vis‐à‐vis non‐state actors in international 
affairs. They suggest that it is more beneficial to seek to understand the nature of 
their  interactions,  their  significance,  and  their  mutual  influence.  Even  so, 
Iwabuchi  (2002,  16–17)  emphasizes  that  the  “transnational  has  a  merit  over 
international  in  that actors are not confined  to  the nation‐state or  to nationally 
institutionalized  organizations.  They may  range  from  individuals  to  various 
(non)profitable,  transnationally  connected  organizations  and  groups,  and  the 
conception of culture implied is not limited to a ‘national’ framework. 
Even  though Rosenau’s approach hits  the mark  in capturing  the changes  in 
the ontology of the post‐Cold War world politics, Sending and Neumann (2006, 
653) make a valid point by claiming that he has still been unable to transcend the 
state‐centric  paradigm,  as Rosenau  himself  suggests.  Instead,  as  Sending  and 
Neumann note, he has rather began to use it ‘negatively’ by analyzing to which 
actors power has moved from the state. Authority, by consequence, remains the 
analytical core of the concept of governance, which makes Rosenau’s approach 
seem  to be  founded on a zero‐sum  logic whereby  the  increased power of non‐
state actors indicates that the power of states has been lost. 
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Sending  and  Neumann  (2006)  themselves  propose  a  more  Foucauldian 
approach, which  seeks  to  trace and  explain  the ways  in which  state and non‐
state  actors  perform  governing  tasks  dynamically  together.  It  builds  on 
Foucault’s  (1991)  term  of  ‘governmentality,’  a  specific  form  of  power  that 
operates through the governed and thereby moves focus from institutions (what 
actors  are)  to  practices  (what  actors do).  Performed  by  different  actors,  these 
practices  are  aimed  to  shape,  guide,  and  direct  the  behavior  and  actions  of 
individuals and groups in particular directions. (Sending & Neumann 2006, 656–
657.)  The  state  thus  no  longer  obtains  power  over  non‐state  actors  or  civil 
society; on  the contrary, political power operates  through  them: civil society  is 
“redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity 
that  is both an object and a  subject of government”  (ibid., 651). This blurs  the 
division between the state and civil society. 
Vertovec  (2004, 3) sums up  that  transnationalism broadly refers  to multiple 
ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation‐
states with the help of new technologies, especially telecommunications. Despite 
great distances and notwithstanding the presence of international borders – with 
all  the  laws,  regulations,  and  national  narratives  that  they  represent  – many 
forms  of  association  have  been  globally  intensified  and  now  take  place 
paradoxically  in a plant‐spanning yet common arena of activity. He notes  that 
whereas in some instances transnational forms and processes serve to speed‐up 
or  exacerbate  historical  patterns  of  activity,  in  others  they  represent  arguable 
new forms of human interaction (ibid.). 
 
2.4.3 Building a Transnational Space for Action 
Transnational spaces consist of persons, groups,  institutions, and organizations 
and the set of values, norms, and commitments they have (Faist 2000, 114). They 
form  a  transnational  society, which  constitutes  itself on  a  social  and  symbolic 
level  not  tied  to  geographically  territory  (ibid.,  122).  Pries  (1999)  rejects  the 
‘container’ approach and moves away from assuming the frames of nation states 
as appropriate units of analysis. He makes an analytical differentiation between 
the  relational  and  absolutistic  understanding  of  social  space16 (Pries  1999;  see 
2001;  2005).  He  proposes  that  transnational  studies  should  focus  not  on 
transnational relations in general but on “transnational societal units as relatively 
dense and durable configurations of transnational social practices, symbols, and 
artefacts”  (Pries 2007, 4). For  the space can only be described as relational and 
discontinuous,  the  socio‐spatial  references  of  analysis  have  been  transformed 
from  the  absolutistic  geographical  categories  into  pluri‐locally  situated 
                                                          
16 Pries (1999; 2001) suggests that while the absolutistic concept of socio‐spatiality assigns a 
geographical ‘container’ to every social formation, the relational understanding of socio‐spatiality 
presupposes the fluidity and inconsistency between social formations and their geographical 
references. Different types of social formations can share the same geographical container; 
alternatively, the selected social formation can be spread over different geographic‐spatial units. 
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topographies produced by  transnational everyday practices. The strengthening 
of  the  pluri‐local  and  border‐crossing  social  relations  and  fields  create  a 
transnational  space, which  spans  above  and  between  the  traditional  national 
container  spaces  playing  out  the  figure  of  concentric  circles  of  local, micro‐ 
regional, national, macro‐regional, and global phenomena. (Pries 2007, 20.)  
Keck  and  Sikkink  (1998;  1999)  argue  that  transnational  interactions  are 
structured in networks. A network presents a form of organization characterized 
by  voluntary,  reciprocal,  and  horizontal  patterns  of  communication  and 
exchange,  which  is  ‘lighter’  than  hierarchy  and  particularly  apt  for 
circumstances  in  which  there  is  the  need  for  efficient,  reliable  information 
(Powell  1990,  295–296).  Despite  the  differences  between  domestic  and 
international realms, the “network concept travels well because it stresses fluid 
and  open  relations  among  committed  and  knowledgeable  actors working  in 
special  issue  areas”  (Keck &  Sikkink  1998,  8).  Typically  such  a  transnational 
advocacy network (TAN) consists – inter alia yet seldom all at once – of research 
and advocacy groups, local social movements, foundations, the media, churches, 
unions, intergovernmental organizations, and parts of local governments, which 
have  come  together  to  communicate,  share  information and  services,  circulate 
personnel,  and  exchange  funds  in  order  to  influence  policy  or  address  a 
particular  issue  (ibid.,  9;  1999,  91–92).  Building  on  Mitchell’s  (1973,  23) 
definition, Keck and Sikkink (1999, 89) specify that these networks fall outside of 
our accustomed categories as they brush aside material concerns or professional 
norms;  instead  they  include  those  actors working  internationally  on  an  issue, 
who are bound together by shared values and a common discourse. 
A  transnational  network  is most  likely  to  emerge when  channels  between 
domestic  groups  and  their  government  are  ineffective,  setting  into motion  a 
‘boomerang’  pattern  (Figure  11).  Activists may  also  believe  that  networking 
would help them advance their campaigns, when conferences and other contacts 
create  arenas  for  forming networks  (Keck &  Sikkink  1998,  12). What  is  novel 
about  them  is  their  ability  to mobilize  information  strategically  to help  create 
new  issues  and  categories  and  persuade,  pressurize,  and  gain  leverage  over 
much more powerful organizations and governments. TANs tactics include the 
employment  of  information  politics  (providing  information),  symbolic  politics 
(framing, making  sense  of  a  situation),  leverage  politics  (calling  on  a  stronger 
actor, e.g., a  foreign  state when  the affected group  is weak), and accountability 
politics  (holding  politicians  accountable  for  their  principles  and  state  policies) 
(Keck & Sikkink 1998, 16; 1999, 95). 
With  the  help  of  these  tactics,  TANs  have  the  most  influence  on  issue 
creation  and  agenda  setting,  influencing  stateʹs discursive positions,  changing 
institutional procedures, changing policy, and  influencing state behavior (ibid., 
25;  1999,  98).  TANs  are  valuable  as  they  create  a  space  for  negotiation.  By 
building  new  links  among  actors  in  civil  societies,  states,  and  international 
organizations, they multiply the opportunities for dialogue and exchange. They 
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also make  international  resources available  to new actors  in domestic political 
and social struggles. In so doing, they contribute to a convergence of social and 
cultural  norms  able  to  support  processes  of  regional  and  international 
integration  and  to  help  transform  the  practice  of  national  sovereignty  by 
blurring  the boundaries between a state’s  relations with  its own nationals and 
the recourse both citizens and states have  to  the  international system.  (Keck & 
Sikkink 1999, 89.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. A boomerang pattern may occur when domestic NGOs blocked by the state (A) 
bypass it and directly seek international allies, activating a network whose other members 
pressure their own state (B) and a third-party organization, which in turn pressures the 
state (A). Adopted from Keck & Sikkink (1998, 13) 
 
 
Tarrow  (2005) notes  that Keck and Sikkink’s boomerang model  is essentially a 
bilateral  model,  which  ignores  other  means  of  transnational  advocacy, 
particularly direct action and the formation of direct access to intergovernmental 
organizations.  Bob  (2005)  criticizes  the  model  for  ignoring  the  disparities 
between  local  partners  and  intense  competition  among  them  for  partnership 
with  international NGOs. Accordingly,  Jordan and van Tuijl  (2000, 2061) point 
out that while some TANs are indeed cooperative, at times “they reflect as much 
inequality  as  they  are  trying  to undo.” Networks  start  from  a  common  issue, 
rather  than  shared  values; weaker  parties may move  closer  to  the  values  of 
stronger  parties  as  a means  of making  a  bid  for more  resources,  in  so doing 
comprising their own key concerns (Bob 2005; Jordan & van Tuijl 2000). 
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Yanacopulous (2005, 94) builds upon Keck and Sikkink’s model but suggests 
more attention be paid to variations in the strength of networks (cohesion) and 
resource  environments  in  which  different  TANs  operate.  Different  networks 
operating  on  different  issues  in  different  locations  and  time  periods  have 
different  resources  available  to  them.  Uncertainty  about  resources,  resource 
scarcity or competition may produce different network structures and  impacts 
on  their  success.  (Yanacopulous  2005,  98.) Carpenter  (2007,  644,  658),  in  turn, 
would  update  the model  by  including  the  question  of  issue  emergence  and 
adaptation, which she considers as precursors to effective normative and policy 
change. Carpenter argues that politicking and bargaining within the network are 
more  important determinants of  issue  selection  than objective  attributes of  an 
issue  or  preexisting  normative  frames  or  pressure  from media  or  real world 
events. Hertel (2006) concurs that the dynamics within TANs are more complex 
than recognized in the simple boomerang pattern. Members within the network 
may actually use contentious tactics against themselves,  including blocking the 
campaign’s progress and backdoor deals, depleting their scarce resources (ibid., 
265–266). 
 
2.4.4 De‐ and Re‐rooting Transnationalism 
“[T]he  terms  transnational  and  transnationalism  are  used  so  vaguely  and 
indistinctly  that  they  are  likely  to  become  ‘catch‐all  and  say  nothing’  terms” 
(Pries 2008, 1). Once limited to the political economy, the study of transnational 
relations  has  been  broadened  to  include  contentious  international  politics 
(Tarrow 2001, 4). Young (1997) predicts greater power for transnational regimes 
consisting of non‐state actors in the global governance system, whereas several 
others view the new world of transnational politics in more contentious, social‐
movement terms (Guidry et al. 2001). O’Brien et al. (2000) foresee global social 
movements  reaching  across  transnational  space  to  challenge  multilateral 
economic  institutions,  in  so doing producing  something akin  to a  ‘global  civil 
society’ (Wapner 1996; Kaldor 2003; Kaldor, Selchow & Moore 2012) or a ‘world 
polity’ (Boli & Thomas 1999). Tarrow (2001) rejects all of the above for they fail 
to  adequately  distinguish  the  difference  between  transnational  social 
movements,  international  NGOs,  and  activist  networks,  nor  do  they 
satisfactorily  specify  their  relations  with  each  other  or  with  states  and 
international institutions.  
Within this context, the issue of ‘scale‐jumping’ has to be addressed. It refers 
to a process whereby civil society groups bypass their respective national levels 
and  directly  petition  or  lobby  international  institutions  for  support.  Tarrow 
(2001, 15–16) explains that international institutions serve as a magnet; they offer 
resources, opportunities, and incentives for actors in transnational politics. They 
serve as a kind of a ‘coral reef,’ helping to form horizontal connections amongst 
activists with similar claims across boundaries. Beneficial as such,  this  leads  to 
an obvious paradox: international institutions are created by states, yet they can 
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be  the  very  arenas  in which  transnational  contention  is most  likely  to  form 
against states. As  international  institutions,  the European Commission being a 
prime  example,  seek  autonomy  in  order  to  mediate  among  the  interests  of 
competing  states,  they  can  provide  political  opportunities  for weak  domestic 
social  actors  (ibid.;  Imig  &  Tarrow  2001).  As  internationalization  proceeds, 
horizontal and vertical relations between state and non‐state actors operating at 
international, national, and subnational levels generate networks of formal and 
informal  institutions.  They  may  pose  threats  to  sovereignty,  but  more 
importantly they open up “an opportunity space into which domestic actors can 
move, encounter others like themselves, and form coalitions that transcend their 
borders” (Tarrow 2005, 25). 
The  determination  to  reject  the  old  nation‐bounded  research  perspective, 
which necessitated  thinking  in “clearly differentiated oppositions” has  led  to a 
new  “both/and”  logic  of  methodological  cosmopolitanism  (Beck  &  Sznaider 
2006,  18).  This  allows  simultaneous  examination  of  similar  phenomena  from 
different  analytical  angles  or  levels  (e.g.,  local,  national,  transnational,  and 
global), and includes the idea of plurality of personal identities and social roles 
across  nation  state  borders  (ibid.). Even  if undoubtedly  applicable,  one must, 
however, be aware of its flipside. Taking all in at once may easily lead research 
to become all‐inclusive and decontextualized. Even  though  transnational  flows 
discount  a  nationally  separated  border  both  from  above  and  below,  they 
concede  a  “more  locally  contextualized  manner  to  the  interconnections  and 
asymmetries that are promoted by the multi‐directional flow” (Iwabuchi 2002, 17).  
Transnationalism is surely a process that is evolving within different societal 
levels  and  involving  a  diverse  set  of  actors.  Collectively,  they  produce  a 
transnational  operational  space  that  is  evidently  more  virtual  than  it  is 
geographically  bound.  While  such  nonterritorial  entities  formed  by 
transnational  CSO  networks  have  certainly  weakened  state  sovereignty,  we 
should, however, not  jump from here directly to globalization and to what has 
been referred to as a global civil society. Tarrow (2005) makes an often‐neglected 
argument  that  “even  if  globalization  is  commonly  credited  for  inciting 
transnational activism,  it  is not  the  source of  transnational activities.”  Instead, 
Tarrow  suggests,  it  is  necessary  to  focus  on  internationalism  as  structures 
through  which  globalization  is  mediated,  and  its  relation  to  transnational 
collective  action:  “while  globalization  provides  incentives  and  themes  for 
transnational activism,  it  is  internationalism that offers a framework, a set of focal 
points, and a structure of opportunities for transnational activists” (Tarrow 2005, 3). 
Tarrow (2005, 42) notifies that, for the most part, transnational actors remain 
‘rooted’  in  local  conditions,  concerns  and  the  “social  networks…,  resources, 
experiences, and opportunities that place provides them.” They have the ability 
to “shift their activities among  levels, taking advantage of the expanded nodes 
of opportunity of a complex international society,” but most are still committed 
to  and  embedded  in  their  localities,  particularly  national  or  state‐level 
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conditions,  which  ultimately  shape  their  approaches  to  international 
opportunities  (ibid.,  43).  Similarly,  Prokkola  (2011)  has  revealed  that  while 
programs,  such  as  INTERREG  (see  subsection  4.4.1),  emphasize  the 
development of  functional, harmonious cross‐border  regions, at  the  local  level 
where these programs are implemented it is the state border which determines 
the norms and spatial organization of  the CBC practices, whereby also     cross‐
border networks are sparse compared with their national counterparts.  
Tarrow (2005, 5, 9, 33) identifies “six processes of transnational contention”; 
i.e.,  ways  in  which  activists  approach  internationalism  in  pursuit  of  their 
interests, that vary in their degree of local‐global integration: 1) global framing, 
2)  internalization, 3) diffusion, 4) scale shift, 5) externalization, and 6) coalition 
forming. The first two, global framing and internalization, are the least integrated 
and  denote  the  strategic  co‐optation  of  global  themes  or  ideas  in  essentially 
domestic  conflicts  and  the  broader  influence  of  international  pressures  on 
national  arenas,  respectively.  In  the  middle,  diffusion  implies  cross‐border 
replication of claims and  tactics, while scale‐shift  represents attempts  to  ‘move’ 
claims from one site or level to another. Finally, the greatest  integration occurs 
in externalization and in coalition forming, which comprise the projection of claims 
vertically and horizontally, respectively, to international institutions and groups 
with common cause. (Ibid.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Six processes of transnational contention. Adopted from Tarrow (2005, 33) 
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Tarrow  (2005,  33)  offers  a  two‐dimensional  grid  reproduced  in  Figure  12, 
whereby  the  x‐axis  “consists  of  the  degree  to which  a  particular  issue  is  of 
primarily domestic  or  international  importance”  and  the y‐axis  “the  extent  to 
which [an issue] brings activists out of their domestic context into transnational 
space.” These six processes are complex, and in practice they seldom occur alone 
or  can  be  found  in  pure  form.  “Transnational  activism,”  he  concludes,  “…  is 
more  like  a  series  of  waves  that  lap  on  an  international  beach,  retreating 
repeatedly  into  domestic  seas  but  leaving  incremental  changes  on  the  shore” 
(ibid., 219). 
 
 
2.5 SYNOPSIS: BORDERS AS COMPLEX CONSTRUCTIONS 
 
To appreciate a how border can be eroded, we must first understand how they 
came  to  be.  Scott  (2012)  has  explained  how  the  focus  of  border  studies  has 
developed  in  relation  to  more  general  discursive  shifts  and  predominant 
geopolitical  visions.  According  to  Hegelian/Darwinian  geodeterministic 
understanding,  represented  famously  by  Ratzel  and  Maull,  borders  were 
determined  by  the  physical  and  cultural  environment.  A  ‘Good’  border 
corresponded  with  physical  conditions,  and  anti‐structural  borders  were 
depicted as ‘bad’ borders. Bloch, Febvre, Vidal de la Blache, and Reclus among 
others, emphasized, in turn, historical geography and anthropology by arguing 
that  borders  had  been willfully  created  by  society. Whereas  for  Vidal  de  la 
Blache  (1913)  geography was  “a  science  of places  and  not  a  science  of men,” 
Reclus (1982) maintained that geography was “nothing but history in space”. It 
was,  however,  French  Marxist  sociologist  Henri  Lefebvre,  who  really 
expounded  the  concept  of  the  (social)  production  of  space.  In  his  famous  La 
Production de LʹEspace (1974), Lefebvreʹs argues that space is a social product, or 
a  complex  social  construction, which  affects  spatial practices  and perceptions. 
The argument can be seen as a major catalyst in shifting the research perspective 
from space, and its borders, to the processes of their production. 
The more  scientific  take  advanced,  for  instance,  by Christaller, Lösch,  and 
Hägerstrand  saw  borders  as  elements  of  the  physics  and  geometry  of  social 
relations. The neo‐Kantian functionalists, most notably Hartshorne, Kristof, and 
Jones,  presented  borders  as  functions  of  historical  evolution  and  events  that 
exhibited  essential  and  necessary  characteristics  for  the  consolidation  of  the 
state. While Marxian/Critical  understanding  has depicted  borders  as  systemic 
elements  of  capitalist  accumulation  and  concomitant  forms  of  stateness  and 
territorial  control,  the most  recent  approach,  put  forth  for  example  by  Paasi, 
Balibar,  and  van  Houtum  has  maintained  that  borders  are  complex  social 
constructions  in  terms  of  socio‐cultural  contention,  exercise  of  socio‐political, 
and  cultural  power,  as well  as manifestations  of  irrational  rationalities,  fear, 
exclusion, or paranoia. 
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The idealistic linkage between the concepts of territory, citizenship, and 
identity has gone too long inherently unquestioned. Such linkage has been 
actively maintained by cartographic projections, in which bright colors are 
habitually used to help the user find the borders between different state 
territories – to create an illusion that social processes would unfold neatly within 
these borders. Instead of merely reflecting reality, these maps have been more 
successful in influencing the realities of people. In addition to the public at large, 
the arrangement of political maps has also led to very statist and fixed studies of 
geography. 
Multifaceted understanding of the political, social, and symbolic 
significance of borders is needed to interpret the broad socio-political 
transformations that are taking place in Europe. Even if the truth is absolute, 
perceptions of it are always relative. Therefore, alleged facts, which are 
nothing but perceptions of truth, are also relative. Thus, the manner in which 
the EU is being constituted as a political community, a model of regional 
cooperation, and a geopolitical actor is not only dependent on the ways in 
which state borders are framed politically and exploited pragmatically but 
above all on the ways they are perceived in cultural-geographical terms. In a 
complex globalized climate, such endeavors come, however, with challenges. 
They require balance between understandings of borders as symbolic 
representations of cultural affinity, familiarity, and ‘otherness,’ as well as 
familiarization with the ideational representations of Europe vis-à-vis its 
neighbors and political consequences of EU border regimes and CBC policies. 
They also require balancing between a more open regional economic space and 
securitization policies. 
Borders are about power relations; the geopolitically weaker and stronger 
state see the border that separates them from different perspectives. But 
borders are also more than that. To follow Lösch’s (1954, 196–200) thinking, 
borders are like rivers that separate their banks out of proportion to their 
actual width. However, unlike rivers, borders are not located only at the very 
border (line) but have spread, if not everywhere then at least broadly in 
society. As Paasi (1996; 1999c, 84) maintains, borders are therefore one part of 
the ‘discursive landscape’ of social power that exists in social practices and 
relations. This is also why borders do not self-evidently disappear when some 
practices change. 
A borderland is an area, where the impact of a border is being most 
profoundly felt. Notwithstanding their context specificity, the dynamics of 
between two parallel borderlands can be understood through illustrative 
models. These suggest, inter alia, that cross-border systems are complex, 
multilayered, and multilevel structures. The capacity of these structures to 
stretch across the border depends not only upon the border’s characteristics, but 
also upon the actors’ ability to successfully adapt to external stimuli. The social, 
legal, economic, political, and cultural aspects form their own layers, which 
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together produce a complex interaction-structure. The border may seem 
different for each of the layers, which explains the multiple simultaneous 
meanings of borders; i.e., why the border may seem open for some and closed to 
others. 
Border change also has temporal aspect. As the geopolitical climate relaxes, 
borderlands evolve towards increased convergence. As the barrier effect of a 
border diminishes, a more intensive interaction across the border may take 
place. The process of integration remains, however, associated with the different 
roles that the border plays. While some borders (such as the internal EU 
borders) are being transcended and becoming zones of integration, others (such 
as the EU external border) get beefed up and are developing into zones of 
transition. Higher levels of integration may thus not automatically lead to 
greater overall convergence. 
An unequal border setting, such as the Finnish-Russia border, is 
characterized not only by various asymmetries but also complementarities that, 
in turn, generate a variety of cross-border linkages. Increased linkages are not 
only a result of successful policies and practices, but also an essential 
prerequisite for future development. The less integrated a borderland is, the less 
need there is for government to integrate their policies. On the other hand, the 
more integrated the borderland is due to similar culture, strong cross-border 
clout and market forces, the more need there also is for the governments to 
integrate their policies.  
The global era has altered the understanding of power and agency. The 
frame of a nation-state is too small for solving big problems and too large to 
solving the small ones (Touraine 2000). The state is not, however, disappearing 
but merely being organized differently. State sovereignty and authority has been 
weakened upwards, downwards, and sideways. There are increased 
negotiations not just among governments at several territorial tiers but also 
between the various sectors of society. The sub-state paradiplomacy has been 
fuelled by the EU’s influence of blurring the distinction between what is 
‘international’ and ‘internal’ politics. The world politics of today involve many 
non-state actors who interact with each other, with states, and with international 
organizations, at times skipping a level or two in between. When taken together, 
these revolutionary changes have led to a transition from international (border 
confirming) to transnational (border eroding) relations, implying, as a result, a 
clear shift away from state-centeredness. 
During the last two decades, cross-border regionalism has been promoted as 
the means to manage increased cross-border interaction and support increased 
cross-border governance in the EU-Europe. The so formed transnational 
operational space is, however, evidently more virtual than it is geographically 
bound. Even so, most transnational actors remain ‘rooted’ in their local 
conditions and structures, which ultimately shape their approaches to 
international opportunities. In order to move beyond debate over the role of 
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various actors and sectors in international affair and better understand how they 
are interlinked and what is their mutual influence, we must understand and 
define what is meant by state and civil society. This is be explored in the 
following section.  
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3 Understanding Civil 
Society  
In addition to understanding borders and their impact on CBC, it is also 
essential to scrutinize thoroughly the second key concept of this study, civil 
society, when exploring the potential for the new civic neighborhood. This must 
be done as what is understood by it defines largely what can be expected of it. 
The basic premise here is that what is meant by civil society remains open to 
diverse interpretations (Cohen & Arato 1992; Kaldor 2003; Wiarda 2003; 
Edwards 2004). Its definitions have changed over time, but even in its current 
use the concept has various connotations in different countries and languages 
(Kocka 2004, 65; Alapuro 2008, 72). Certainly, civil society is a product of the 
‘West,’ but that tells us little as there are undoubtedly a number of civil society 
models in the West, the French differing from the British and the American 
conception being quite different from that of, say, Germany.  
Because of the load, indeterminacy, and the context dependency of the 
concept, analyzing CSOs’ role in a cross-border setting is quite a task. In order to 
get to the root of the issue, one is forced to deal with some of the major divisions 
in social and cultural studies, and trace how the utilization of different traditions 
and models have led to different manifestations of civil society. As the following 
aims to show, the frame of interpretation, and the related assumptions about 
civil society, varies greatly depending on the tradition that is followed and the 
conception or model that is applied. 
CBC practices of CSOs are interesting to study from this perspective, as it is 
these very practices through which actors representing different traditions meet 
and face each other. At the Finnish-Russian border, the Nordic – to the extent 
that Finnish civil society can be seen to represent it – Russian, and the EUropean 
interpretations meet and intermesh. Given the recent emphasis the EU has 
placed upon civil society also in CBC context, it is also important to ponder 
whose conception of civil society is being promoted in conjunction to the EU’s 
neighborhood building. Even thought in principle many would agree that civil 
society is needed and that in can make a difference in a cross-border context, in 
practice such a transnational, even binational, civil society often descends into 
difficulties because of the different expectations, resources, and abilities the 
partners from different societal contexts may have.  
In the following, I first outline the historical premises for the formation of 
civil society as to show how much the understanding of the concept has evolved 
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during the last centuries. This is then followed by more detailed discussion on 
the current usage of the concept; i.e., the subject that this study focuses on. 
Before turning into the geographical variations of the current use of the civil 
society concept, section 3.3. briefly reviews the connection between civil society 
and nationalism. The cross-border setting reveals how different historical 
trajectories have led to different understandings of nationalism, which have led 
to different understandings of what is a nation, what is a society, and what is the 
relationship between the two. Different understandings of nationalism also 
influence how borders, and cross-border interaction and integration for that 
matter, are perceived. The chapter concludes with a synopsis about state-society 
relations in the Finnish context and my own interpretation of civil society as an 
arena. 
 
 
3.1 DEBATING CIVIL SOCIETY: CONTESTED 
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 
TRAJECTORIES 
 
3.1.1 Classical Civil Society as Partnership of Individuals 
Even though the contemporary understanding of civil society refers commonly 
to the public sphere, as set apart from the state and the market, it has not always 
been so. Many of early European political thinkers saw civil society as a 
synonym for a type of political association whose members are subject to laws, 
which ensure peaceful order and good government (Keane 1989, xvi). The 
origins of the concept of civil society trace back to the communal life in the polis, 
the Greek city-state (as separate from the oikos, the household). Socrates (c. 469 
BC–399 BC) proposed that ‘dialectic,’ a form of public argument to uncover 
truth, was imperative to ensure ‘civility,’ in contrast to barbarity, in the polis and 
‘good life’ of the people (O’Brien 1999). This rational dialogue was to test the 
individual’s arguments against societal arguments in order to find the proper 
balance between the needs of the two (Setianto 2007). For Socrates’ prized 
student, Plato (c. 437 BC–347 BC), the ideal state was a society that was just and 
allowed people to dedicate themselves to the common good and practice civic 
virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice (Ehrenberg 1999, 5–6). 
Aristotle’s (384 BC–322 BC) was the first to use the term koinonía politiké, a 
political association/community/society/partnership17. For him, koinonía politiké 
was an independent and self-sufficient association of free, equal, and like-
minded persons united by an ethos, a common set of norms and values 
approved and honored by its members (Barker 1946, book 1; see Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, books VIII–IX & Politics, book 1). As Cohen and Arato (1992, 
                                                          
17 Numerous different words have been used in different translations. Koinonía (κοινωνία), a 
derivative of koinos (‘common’), means in the literal sense of a community of sharing in common. 
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84) bring forth, koinonía politiké was, however, only a koinonía among many; the 
term koinonía was used to designate all forms and sizes of human association, 
the members of which were held together by something they had in common 
and could share with each other. However, while all associations have an end, 
the political association has the highest: it channels the collective pursuits to 
serve the common goal of attaining a good society.  
Whereas today a political association or a community is often understood as 
being a state, for Aristotle the state was a foreign concept. For him, koinonía 
politiké designated above all a politically united community, a city as a political 
‘partnership’ of individuals coming together not for the sake of social life but 
rather for the sake of good actions and in order to attain self-sufficiency (Barker 
1946, 5, 120 [1253a, 1280b, 1281a]). Aristotle thus saw that contiguity and 
consanguinity, as well as the social life arising from these ties, are the necessary 
basis but that the essence is cooperation in a common scheme of good life, and 
the ultimate form of such co-operating is the polis, of which individuals are 
dependent on. Individuals are, by nature, political animals (zoon politicon), 
which, when perfected, are “the best of animals” and political because we are 
“furnished” with capabilities such as speech, which allows for communication 
and the ability to perceive and determine what is just (Barker 1946, 7 [1253a]. 
Thanks to these capacities, human beings can be habituated to virtue, which can 
be best done through participation in the communal life in the polis, the civil 
society.  
Cicero (106–43 BC) referred to a civilized political community, which was the 
equivalent of res publica (commonwealth), ‘an assemblage (of men) associated by 
a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests’ (Cicero 
1966). It includes groups, institutions, and individuals united by laws and 
institutions, which organize their activities in such a way as to create a flexible 
equilibrium among them. For justice and reason are rooted in man’s natural 
’social spirit,’ such organization induced individuals to forego a measure of self-
interest in the interest of the common good (Ehrenberg 1999; Islamoglu 2001, 
1891).  
 
3.1.2 Community with Virtues Derived from Natural Laws 
The first known translation of koinonía politiké was by Willem van Moerbeke 
who used communicatio politica and civilis communitas as translations of koinonía 
politiké in approximately 1260. It was not, however, until the fifteenth century 
that Leonardo Bruni, a Florentine humanist, challenged the earlier translation 
with societas civilis, a term that would famously enter into all European 
languages. (Colas 1997, 27–28; Hallberg & Wittrock 2006, 30.) 
In the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin (1530–1596) built upon Aristotle by 
arguing that the state is a natural fact: “The state [république or res publica] is the 
civil society that can exist on its own without associations, and other bodies, but 
it cannot do so without family” (Bodin in Bobbio 1989, 35; see Bodin 1576, III, 7). 
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Bodin claimed that there are various forms of the political ethos (mores), which 
affect the shaping of various forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy (Butigan 1998). Bodin’s main idea was to create an ethos of 
pacification, peaceful coexistence, and cooperation between citizens, which would 
secure the stability of public goods and institutions even in a society lacking 
consensus on its highest values. In Bodin’s eyes, the best way to guarantee this 
was the absolute sovereignty of state power. (Rhonheimer 2005, 21.) 
The Aristotelian logic of a society as a work of nature was not challenged 
until the seventeenth century, when most notably Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) 
and John Locke (1632–1704) argued that societies are formed as the result of a 
social contract between human beings. Hobbes believed that in their original 
state of nature people lived in a society of “all against all” and had to compete 
for scarce resources. This, he argues in Leviathan (Chapter 14), creates a war in 
which every person is governed by his own reason and has a natural right to do 
anything to preserve his own liberty or safety (Hobbes 1909, 99). As constant 
war and insecurity allowed no development and made the life “solitary, poore 
[sic], nasty, brutish, and short,” Hobbes saw that people needed agreements 
based on the natural precepts and the general rules of reason18 amongst each 
other in order to create peace and, hence, improve their lives (ibid., 97, 100 
[Chapter 14]). 
Only through such mutual contracts between individuals, the state of nature 
could be left behind and the formation of a common power, the Leviathan, the 
civil government, the state that is, became possible. Whereas in the state of 
nature individuals fought against each other, in civil society the impartial state 
maintained peace in a community of people acting in a civic manner (Hobbes 
1909, 105–109; Setianto 2007). The motive to come together was not that people 
were naturally inclined to do so, as Aristotle had asserted, but because they 
were driven by the fear of coercive common power (Hobbes 1909, 101, 105). The 
existence of such a power, the state, thus created a condition in which the state 
of nature gave way to civil society; i.e., it became rational for people to act in a 
civil manner and cooperate rather than fight for their vested interest.  
More recently, in his reappraisal of Hobbes’ political theory, Skinner (1996) 
suggests that Hobbes actually repudiated the entire classical theory of eloquence 
and its ideal of the vir civilis, the good citizen, the virtuous, wise, rational man. 
Instead, according to Skinner’s (1996, 291) interpretation, Hobbes had claimed 
that reason unaided by eloquence would be sufficient to persuade others of the 
truths of civil science, that eloquent men would have not sustained but 
                                                          
18 That every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and secondly that a 
man be willing, when others are so too, to give up his right to all things in order to attain peace and 
security, and be contented with so much liberty against others as he would allow other to obtain 
against himself (Hobbes 1909, 100 [Chapter 14]). 
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destroyed civil life, and that the most important duties of citizenship are 
grounded in the private sphere. 
In addition to the vertical relationship between the state and the people, 
Hobbes suggested there to be a various horizontal relationships among the 
people, which formed civil society. In the societas civilis cum imperio19 typical to 
the Age of Absolutism, these horizontal links were, however, waved aside by 
competition among various bearers of authority and political power (nobility, 
church, estates, cities, etc.) dependent and marginalized by the state, which 
eventually led to the state to establish itself as the sole sovereign power over an 
increasingly disempowered societas civilis sine imperio (Holenstein 2009, 16).  
Whereas Hobbes wanted all lawmaking, both judicial and executive powers, 
to be exercised in a single body (a parliament or ideally a monarch) and to have 
authority even over the individual’s religious doctrines and beliefs, Locke made 
a separation between the legislative and executive powers in order to prevent 
the power of government from threatening the rights of the society (O’Brien 
1999; see Locke 1965, §§ 143–144, 150, 159). Locke’s ideas were grounded in the 
doctrine of a God-given Natural Law, which posits that individual citizens have 
certain natural rights as human beings that cannot be taken away from them 
(Locke 1965, §§ 86–87; see Laslett 1960, 341–342).  
Locke promoted the civic virtue of tolerance, and advocated that individuals 
be allowed to meet together, form associations, and enter into relations of their 
choice – the government being a unitary outgrowth of the freedom to form an 
association. He saw that communities are formed when people unite in order to 
further their, and their community’s, interests. By agreeing to form a legislature, 
people give their individual power up to the community. Even though Locke, 
just as Hobbes, did not generally hold that the state and civil society would be 
separate realms but rather to co-exist, in Two Treaties of Government (Chapter 
XIX) he does, however, inconsistently assert that the dissolution of legislative 
power does not necessarily mean the end of society, whereas if society is 
dissolved its government cannot remain (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 88).  
 
3.1.3 Enlightenment Ideal and the Epistemological Centrality of 
Morality and Reason 
A number of thinkers contributed to the advancement of the concept of civil 
society during the Age of Enlightenment. Human beings began to be seen as 
rational and capable of shaping their own destiny without an absolute authority 
exerting control over them. Montesquieu (1689–1755) developed the distinction 
between a nonpolitical civil society (l’état civile) and the state (l’état politique) 
further. Largely under Bodin’s influence, Montesquieu came to believe in the 
“rule of law” within a civil society. Whereas as governments use laws to 
                                                          
19 The distinction between societas civilis sine imperio and societas civilis cum imperio originates from 
German historian August Lugwig von Schloezer (1735–1809). 
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influence and steer human conduct, civil society uses moeurs (nonlegal 
internalized restrains established by custom), manières (conduct not regulated by 
law or religion (Montesquieu 1949; Richter 1998, 39–40). Rousseau (1712–1778) 
contrasted Locke’s idea of expanding individual rights by arguing that it 
ignored common goods and would ultimately lead to a war among people. 
Instead he proposed20 a new social order that would maintain harmony and 
provide equality and freedom for all: the State, as a supreme power, would 
govern, enact laws, and define the common good (Colás 2002), whereas civil 
liberty emerges when all people are willing to abide by the general will in their 
believe that it will lead to common good.  
It was first and foremost the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers David Hume 
(1711–1776), Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), and Adam Smith (1723–1790), who 
began to refer to civil society clearly as a network of human relationships 
separate from, or even opposed to, the State. The distinction, according to 
Ferguson (1995), was necessitated by the rise of state despotism, i.e., by the 
state’s endeavor to ‘cover’ society by forcing its way through it ‘from above’ 
(Holenstein 2009, 16). Hume suggested that people set their goals on the basis of 
morality but use reason in achieving them21. By using reason to follow their self-
interests in an enlightened manner, people would then eventually achieve the 
interests of society as a whole. While rejecting the social contract theory, 
Ferguson presented civil society as a developed and redefined society, whereby 
civil liberties were safeguarded by the government and a certain level of social, 
political, and particularly economic (commercial) advancement 22  has been 
reached. He saw civil society as opposed to a rude nation (Ferguson 1966; 
Pietrzyk 2001) and believed that through governmental policies, education, 
gradual knowledge, and development, rude society might be transformed into 
civil society (Setianto 2007). 
Smith agrees with Ferguson that the binding principle of civil society is a 
private morality predicated on public recognition by one’s peers, joined through 
bonds of moral sentiment (Smith 1976). He laid the foundation for civil society 
as an economic society separate from, but protected by, the State and mediated 
by a social order constituted by private property, contracts, and ‘free’ exchanges 
of labor (Smith 1993, 36; Mclean 1997). For Smith, civil society was not only a 
refuge from the economic realm but also a wellspring of economic abilities. In 
Smith’s view, liberal commercial society both required and encouraged civic 
virtue (Setianto 2007). Inspiration by Ferguson and Smith, the firm distinction 
between the civil society, family, and the state became the key of the German 
conception of civil society later advanced by Hegel. 
                                                          
20 See The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right (1762).  
21 See Treatise on Human Nature (1739).  
22 See An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767).  
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Whereas Smith understood individuals to be mainly motivated by self-
interest, for Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) this was an inadequate basis upon 
which to construct a moral order because it is not grounded in a sense of mutual 
obligation and respect (Calabrese 2004, 318). Instead, for Kant, civil society 
meant that the ends sought by one should not be won at the expense of the 
wellbeing of another (Kant 1997, 28). For him, the public sphere was the place 
where the private interests of members of civil society can be reconciled with the 
universal moral obligations, and that individuals need to accept a political 
authority (the State) in order to achieve a condition of justice and rights (Kant 
1991, 54–55). Accordingly, the main purpose of civil society is to force human 
beings to respect one another’s rights (Setianto 2007). Kant was ahead of his time 
by suggesting that civil society would not need to be nation-bound but rather 
universal. What he, however, found problematic was that establishing a “perfect 
civil constitution,” which could administer justice universally is “subordinate to 
the problem of law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot 
be solved unless the latter is also solved” (Kant 1991, 45–47). 
 
3.1.4 Classical Modernity and the Distinction between State and Civil 
Society 
Whereas the classical thinkers emphasized the identity of the state and society, 
during the modern era the two began to be seen as independent entities. G.W.F. 
Hegel (1770–1831), the leading thinker of the Romanticism, saw human needs, 
the satisfaction of individual interests, and private property as the defining 
features of civil society. He treated civil society as a "system of needs" in which 
individuals reconcile their particular private interests with social demands and 
expectations, which are ultimately mediated by the universal state (Hegel 1991).  
For Hegel, the significance of civil society is that individuals find satisfaction 
only in relation to other free individuals who are not family members but rather 
independent persons (Peddle 2000, 118–120). Hegel argued that civil society is 
well suited to balancing the diverse range of human needs and interests but that 
the state, as the highest form of ethical life, gives order to the system of needs by 
ensuring the stability of private property, social class, and the division of labor. 
Being the realm of capitalist interests, civil society was not always necessarily 
civil and without conflict. The state’s task was thus to correct the faults of civil 
society. In short, a well functioning civil society cannot exist without the 
guidance of the state. 
Hegel’s modern understanding of civil society changed the meaning of civil 
society entirely: whereas as for Kant ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ and ‘Staat’ had been 
synonyms, for Hegel they became antonyms (Zaleski 2008, 264)23. Hegel used 
the German term ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ (bourgeois society) to denote civil 
society as ‘civilian society’; i.e., a sphere of economic and social arrangements 
                                                          
23 See Philosophy of Right (1821). 
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regulated by civil code rather than being directly dependent upon political state 
itself (Honderich 2005, 143, 367–368). In contrast to the two preceding dyadic 
models 24 , Hegel provided a triadic scheme, in which civil society as an 
intermediate moment of ethicity (i.e., being ethical) became situated between the 
macro-community of state and the micro-community of the family (Bobbio 1989, 
31)25. Whereas both the family and state had their own well-defined categories, 
Hegel’s civil society was a fuzzier concept including practically everything that 
was left outside the two. 
Hegel’s followers split based on their political leanings. To the right, Hegel’s 
theory led to a liberal distinction between political society and civil society 
encompassing all non-state aspects of society, including culture, society, and 
politics (Zaleski 2008, 263–265). Alexis de Tocqueville followed Hegel’s 
perception of social reality in general terms by distinguishing between political 
society and civil society but contested Hegel by putting weight on the system of 
civilian and political associations as a counterbalance to both liberal 
individualism and centralization of the state. According to his liberal stance, the 
effectiveness of civil society as an “independent eye of society” depends upon its 
organizational form (Tocqueville 1969). Building on Montesquieu’s template, 
Tocqueville used the term mores to denote the totality of intellectual and moral 
state of a nation, the totality of customs, public opinion, and beliefs, which he 
saw as having a greater influence upon democracy than laws and the physical 
environment (ibid.). 
On the left, Hegel’s ideas became the foundation for Karl Marx’s (1818–1883) 
civil society as an economic base in contrast to the ‘superstructure’ of the 
political society, the state (Marx 1977). Marx gave civil society a more politically 
charged name, ‘bourgeois society,’ as for him it was a product of an historical 
subject, the bourgeois, which legitimates its struggles against the absolutist state 
in the language of the rights of man and citizen, which in reality serves only the 
particular interests of the bourgeois (Richter 1998, 33; Hefner 2003, 153). He 
rejected the positive role of the state put forth by Hegel as he saw that, under 
capitalism, the state functions as a repressive apparatus, an instrument of class 
domination, and as subject to conditions from civil society (Bobbio 1989, 27–29; 
Marx 1970). He agreed with Hegel that civil society was where the real action is, 
yet he conceived it to be so robustly shaped by class antagonism that it could not 
ensure the common good among competing interests (Brown 2001, 74). In a 
bourgeois society, people treat one another as a means to their own ends and, in 
so doing, are isolated from other people (Anheier, Glasius & Kaldor 2001, 12–
13).  
                                                          
24 The Aristotelian dichotomy between family and state and the Hobbesian natural law model based 
the dichotomy between state and nature/civil society. 
25 See Philosophy of Right §§ 182-256 (1820) and Outlines of the Philosophy of Law (1821). 
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Gramsci (1971) followed Hegel in distinguishing civil society from the State, 
but preferred the Marxian thought that the historical development of society 
occurred in civil society and not in the State. However, whereas Marx had 
considered civil society as being coterminous with the socio-economic base of 
the state, Gramsci located it in the political superstructure and made it the locus 
of the formation of ideological power. For him, civil society was a sphere 
wherein ideological apparatuses operate and whose task it was to exercise 
hegemony and through hegemony to obtain consensus (Bobbio 1989, 29). While 
in Marx’s writings civil society is portrayed as the terrain of individual egotism, 
Gramsci described civil society as a sphere of both the individual and 
organizations with the potential of rational self-regulation and freedom (see 
Bottomore 1983).  
Gramsci’s interpretation of civil society consists of all sorts of social and 
cultural interactions (most notably the church, but also schools, associations, 
trade unions, and other cultural institutions) separate from economic 
interactions. It encompasses the set of ideological-cultural relations, which 
occupies the so-called ethic-political moment that confronts and dominates the 
economic moment. Even though Gramsci portrays civil society as the arena, 
separate from state and market, he specifies that the distinction between the 
state and civil society is only methodological for even a policy of non-
intervention like laissez faire is established by the state itself (Gramsci 1971, 160).  
He presents a fully developed civil society as a trench system able to resist 
the ‘incursions’ of economic crises and to protect the state (Gramsci 1971, 238). 
The state, narrowly conceived as government, is protected by hegemony 
organized in civil society while the coercive state apparatus fortifies the 
hegemony of the dominant class. However, while Gramsci accepts a role for the 
state in developing civil society and in shaping public opinion, he warns against 
perpetuating state worship (ibid. 268). Civil society, he came to believe, was the 
reason why a communist revolution had been much easier to have in Russia 
than in Italy. Whereas “[i]n Russia the state was everything…, in the West, there 
was a proper relationship between state and society and, and when the state 
trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed” (ibid., 238). 
As Fleming (2000) notes, Gramsci’s work fuelled twentieth-century analysts 
to add three crucial components to the understanding of civil society. Firstly, it 
was understood that civil society was more than a mere transmitter of 
established practices or beliefs; it formed a site of social contestation, in which 
collective identities, ethical values, action-orienting norms, meaning alliances 
were forged. Secondly, the dynamic, creative side of civil society became 
emphasized in the formation on informal networks, initiatives, and social 
movements, which transcended the framework of formal associations. Thirdly, 
largely thanks to Habermas (1991), civil society became seen as ‘public sphere,’ a 
coercion-free arena for discussion and mutual learning, detached from the 
systematizing effects of the state and the economy, where people come together 
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to form a common discourse, the public, and in doing so compel the state to 
legitimate itself before public opinion (ibid.). Habermas’ stance assumes a 
democratic deficit, that the government is not fully representative of the people, 
whereby civil society takes on a dual function of ensuring that those who 
exercise power do not abuse it and of transforming the system to regenerate 
more democratic practices (Habermas 1996, 365–368).  
 
3.1.5 Postmodern Civil Society as Basis of Democracy 
Just as the French revolution had fuelled an adjustment of the actual meaning of 
the concept of civil society in the early nineteenth century, so did the emergence 
of political opposition to the authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet bloc in 
the late 1980s. While civil society had been in limbo for decades, the concept was 
suddenly revived in the early 1990s as its role in democracy, democratization, 
and development became understood (Jensen & Miszlivetz 2005, 3). Since then, 
globalization and the related formation of a ‘global civil society’ (Kaldor 2003) 
have been the leading force behind the civil society development. The 1990s did 
not witness only a multiplication of NGOs but also a globalization of New Social 
Movements (NSMs). Kumar (2000) explains that even though the NSMs had 
linked people together to bring about a social change at the regional or national 
level already since the mid-1960s, with the help of global CSOs or international 
NGOs (INGOs), these movements were able to establish cross-border linkages 
and/or operate at international level, becoming thus mega-movements or trans-
national social movements (TSMs). 
Along with NSMs, postmodernism has brought along, inter alia, a heavy 
emphasis on transformation theory (Collard & Law 1989), organization theory 
(Greenwood & Hinings 1996), social capital (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995), 
political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995), and resource 
mobilization (McCarthy & Zald 1987). Furthermore, New Public Management 
(Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Borins 1994; Hughes 1998) became an increasingly 
dominant paradigm for public sector reform. In Finland, the economic recession 
of the early 1990s hoisted CSOs to function as a partial substitute of threatened 
public services. In a broader context, the ‘Washington Consensus,’ which 
combined neo-liberal economic strategy with an emphasis on liberal 
representative democracy (Edwards & Hulme 1995), of the early 1990s 
portrayed the state more as a problem than a solution, which in turn had a 
significant influence on theoretical debate. The new conditionality presumed by 
the related funding mechanism, portrayed civil society as a sort of panacea, the 
‘magic bullet’ (ibid.), replacing the state’s service provision and social care 
(Zaleski 2006). 
The Tocquevillean line of thought, which placed citizens’ associations in the 
core of civil society and thus to democracy, was famously refreshed by Putnam 
(1993; 1995), who stressed the production and accumulation of social capital, 
which he saw as an essential element of good performance of any society, by 
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arguing that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a sense network of 
reciprocal social relations. His basic thesis was not, however, altogether new as 
social capital had already been elaborated on by Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman 
(1988), both of whom stressed the less normative aspect of civil society, the 
importance of civic participation and the various social benefits generated by it. 
Nevertheless, Putnam popularized its utilization and fuelled further interest on 
the topic. By forming association – the coming together of people for common 
purpose, the line of thought goes, teaches the “habits of the heart” (Bellah et al. 
1996) of social behavior and binds individual citizens to an idea of unity larger 
than selfish desires, thus making both a self-conscious and active political 
society and a vibrant civil society functioning independently from the state. 
Social participation and networking, in turn, are ultimately grounded on the 
notion of social trust; a willingness to put one’s trust in others.  
 
 
3.2 CURRENT UNDERSTANDING: DEFINING THE 
RESEARCH SUBJECT 
 
It is universally talked about in tones that suggest it is a Great Good, but for some 
people it presents a problem: what on earth is it? Unless you know, how can you tell 
if you would want to join it? (John Grimond, in The Economist's ‘The World in 2002’) 
 
While the twentieth century, in aggregate, was about the neglect and even the 
systematic destruction of civil society through statist ideologies, the twenty-first 
century has so far allowed its rediscovery and restoration. Such a civic 
renaissance was an outcome of fresh outpouring of social entrepreneurship and 
civic reinvention, lost faith in centralized systems of government, and increased 
efficiency and credibility of CSOs, as well as a renewed quest for values and 
interest in volunteerism (Eberly & Streeter 2002, 3). Also, increased new and 
inherited wealth has made unprecedented resources available for charitable 
investment (Walters 1997, 2; Havens & Schervish 1999, 1). As a result, civil 
society has became understood as to form an essential mediating structure not 
only because it stands as a buffer between the individual and the large 
impersonal structures of the state and the market but also because it plays a 
crucial role in cultivating citizenship as well as generating and maintaining 
values in society. Without civil society, “values become another function of the 
megastructures, most notably the state” (Berger & Neuhaus 1977, 2). 
That being said, the growth of the anti-globalization movement and obvious 
bumps on road towards democracy, for instance in Russia, caused the 
universality and legitimacy of civil society to be questioned. The neo-liberal 
Washington Consensus became replaced by a ‘post-Washington Consensus’ that 
now acknowledged that the state does indeed play an important role in 
democratic development (Öniş & Şenses 2005). As apparent particularly in times 
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of challenging crisis, state-centered policies became again very en vogue and 
civil society relegated to the role of a supporting actor at best (Freise, Pyykkönen 
& Vaidelyte 2010). 
 
3.2.1 Plurality of Civil Society 
Civil society is equally traditional and modern (Tilmans 2008, 3; Kocka 2007, 85–
86). As described above, its meaning has changed on a number of occasions 
(Khilnani 2001, 17). Despite its opposite origins, in everyday contemporary 
practice civil society is assumed to form the antithesis of the state. If civil society 
is defined in opposition to the state then it is difficult to provide a positive 
definition of ‘civil society’ because it is a question of listing everything that has 
been left over after limiting the sphere of state (Bobbio 1989, 22, 40). It is, 
however, even more important to acknowledge, as Giner (1995, 304) notes, that 
“[t]here is no such thing as the classical conception of civil society. There is a 
Lockean interpretation, but there is also a Hegelian one; and then there are 
Hobbesian, Marxian and Gramscian theories of it.” 
Wiarda (2003, 137) makes the valid observation that in theory civil society 
sounds wonderful, yet in reality it is often less than that. Civil society cannot be 
seen as plainly a magic formula that will inevitably lead to democratic and 
socially just outcomes and save the world. It can be seen to include also less civil 
actors, operations and objectives of which are, for instance, disintegrative, 
clientelistic, unrepresentative or otherwise biased, divorced from power 
realities, or even illegal. It is beneficial where it works; yet it has also been 
conceived in statist and corporatist terms or as an arena of elitist competition 
rather than self-sustaining cooperation underpinned by a strong popular base. 
(Ibid.) 
Civil society is a product whose origins are inherently and distinctly Western 
(Warkentin 2001, 11; Kocka 2004, 76). Western, particularly Western European 
and North American, urban societies are regarded to have been better suited to 
the development of a stable pluralist civil society than others, yet even there the 
development might have occurred as an ‘unintended outcome’ of the efforts of 
statemakers as argued by Tilly (1975, 633). Be it as it may, this type of 
ethnocentric account overlooks the great diversity of the concept of civil society, 
and fails to see its different manifestations in different (non-Westerns) societies 
(see Kaviraj & Khilnani 2001). 
Being fundamentally Western ought not to be taken to suggest that civil 
society cannot exist elsewhere. Rather an analysis has to acknowledge and 
address this bias (Warkentin 2001). It has become palpable that transplanting a 
workable model from its original context to another with dissimilar history, 
economy, societal structure, and political culture is not an unproblematic task. 
Recognizing that civil society does indeed mean different things to different 
people provides us with the keys to move forward for it moves us beyond broad 
generalizations and normative thinking. 
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But as the concept is Western, we need to specify what, then, is actually 
meant by it. In general terms, ‘Western’ is used to refer to an emphasis on 
individualism, absence of feudal and semifeudal restraints, freedom of 
association, liberty, participatory and pluralist politics, along with middle-class, 
entrepreneurial, and free-market economics (Wiarda 2003, 13). Most frequently, 
it refers to the Montesquieuan understanding of civil society as a multitude of 
independent citizens' associations that mediate between the individual and the 
state and, if needed, defend the freedom of the individual against usurpation by 
the state. The logic stressing the civil society’s associational core and the 
development of individual meaning and identity was then promoted and 
developed further by Tocqueville and fuelled the contemporary communitarian 
theorist, such as Etzioni, Bellah, Taylor, and Putnam, in their critique to the 
presentation of humans as atomistic individuals put forth by Locke, Hobbes, 
and more recently Rawls (1971).  
Edwards (2004) suggests that in addition to civil society as ‘associational life’ 
or as ‘the good society,’ its function as the ‘public sphere,’ as the arena for 
argument and deliberation as well as institutional collaboration, ought not to be 
forgotten either. Acknowledging that all of these three schools of thought have 
something to offer, yet none of them provide complete and convincing picture of 
civil society by themselves, Edwards (2004) call for integrating these different 
perspectives into a mutually supportive framework. After all, in all three schools 
civil society is an essentially collective, creative, and value-based action, 
providing thus an essential counterweight to individualism, cynicism, and 
overbearing influence of state authority (ibid.).  
 
3.2.2 A Sector of its Own? 
Civil society is not as clearly defined or a demarcated arena of its own as are 
those surrounding the state apparatus or business life (Ilmonen 2005, 8). In 
Finland, the term third sector has been broadly used in reference to the public 
sector and the private sector. For Etzioni (1973, 318), who is believed to have 
coined the term, the third sector was separate from and balancing the sectors of 
the state and the market. He defined the third sector to consist of private 
organizations that are efficient, societally effective, hold an entrepreneurial spirit 
of a business firm, and are able to combine all these with the common good 
orientation of the state and its public administration. 
Such a flexible view, in which the boundaries of civil society are stretched to 
incorporate a range of activities under auspices of the state and market, has 
recently gained more prominence. It became popular among scholars focusing 
on public policy and administration, and particularly among those interested in 
understanding the trajectory of the development of welfare states. Evers (1995) 
explains that the third sector forms a kind of tension field, where organizations 
are simultaneously influenced by state policies and legislations, the values and 
practices of private business, the culture of civil society and by needs and 
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contributions that come from informal family and community life. While the 
sectors at the corners of the societal welfare triangle are defined by the 
prevalence of profit (market), redistribution (state), or personal responsibility 
(family and community), the third sector holds a constantly developing 
intermediary space at the cutting point of the three by representing and 
balancing a plural bundle of norms and values (Figure 13).  
 
 
 
 
 
The institutions, organizations, and social spaces of the state, the economy and 
the community, respectively, constitute the borders and interfaces of the third 
sector (Jessop 2007). However, due to the extensive amount of convergence and 
blurring of sector boundaries, the sectoral arrangement has to, however, be 
understood as an artificial construct, not as an institutional reality (Kramer 
2004). The shifts from government to governance, from national to sub-national, 
and from welfare to workfare are increasingly enacted in multi-sectoral 
partnerships (Skelcher et al. 2005) for local policy development and 
implementation.  
Van Til (2000) rejects sectoral thinking and prefers the concept of ‘third 
space.’ Nevertheless, also he agrees that this social arena for networking and 
communication is not separate from society's major institutions but exists in 
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dynamic interdependence with them, linking individuals in their home bases of 
family and community to the larger governmental and economic structures 
within which all citizens, workers, and consumers learn to find their way in 
modern society. This requires an individual to have motivation for working 
together and the ability to interact and tolerate cultural diversities. He further 
underlines that the nature of the work and its results are more important than its 
form or structure; if an activity is based on voluntary spirit, it can occur in or 
between any types of organizations. (Ibid.)  
 
3.2.3 Social Economy 
Social economy (SE) has become a major institution of civil society, contributing 
to the organization of its associative fabric and the development of participative 
democracy but also of a potent economic and societal actor. In Finland, the 
terms ‘social economy’ and ‘social enterprise’ have, however, remained fairly 
unknown and unused, even though the basic principles, as well as the range of 
organizations and activities associated with them are older than the Finnish 
nation itself.  
Immonen (2006) has explained that in Finland the social economy is 
recognized mostly only by well-informed experts. Nevertheless, the 
phenomenon is real and it affects many people by offering alternative ways of 
enterprise and employment, generating social and economic welfare, and 
providing counterweight to the globalizing market economy. In the Finnish 
context, social economy is defined as economic activity carried out by 
cooperatives, mutual societies, associations or foundations in an effort to 
enhance socially and financially sustainable welfare among their members and 
the surrounding society through democratic cooperation. The problem with this 
definition, however, is that on conceptual terms, associations are more closely 
linked to the third sector and cooperatives to the private sector. (Ibid.) 
Poutiainen (2009) argues that until recently Finnish academia has been more 
tightly connected to sociology and other social sciences than to economics – 
largely due to the reforms of the welfare state aimed at increasing cost efficiency 
of managing public resources. Unlike in other European countries where SE is 
defined as citizen-based economy, in Finland it has been long seen as economics 
of social policy (economics of the welfare state). This in turn has not only created 
discrepancies and delayed activities to develop social economic research at 
universities, but it has also had a negative impact on the development of the 
social economy as an area of social policy in practice. Be it as it may, it is clear 
that during the last 15 years, the position of all juridical forms of social economy 
have been strengthened and the economic activity carried on by associations, in 
particular, has increased (Immonen 2006). The Act on Social Enterprises that 
came into force on January 1, 2004 was, nevertheless, somewhat unclear in 
relation to the position of a social enterprise. Consequently, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy renewed the Act in May 2007. 
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The concept of social enterprise is new and relatively few companies have 
been registered so far. According to the statistics of the Employment and the 
Economy, there were 168 registered Social Enterprises in Finland in year 2012 
(July). Recognition as a social enterprise is open to any company in the company 
register that can show that 30 per cent or more of its employees are 
disadvantaged and/or long-term unemployed. Generally at least 50 per cent of 
their revenue comes from business (Helanen 2003; Pättiniemi 2004; 2006). 
As an activity, the SE is historically linked to grassroots associations and 
cooperatives, which make up its backbone (see European Economic and Social 
Committee 2007, 7). In general, the social economy refers to the part of the 
economy proper that is neither private nor public but consists of constituted 
organizations, with voluntary members, undertaking activities for the greater 
good of local communities and marginalized groups, a possible surplus of 
which is used for the good of the community of members or for society. (Social 
Economy Lisburn 2012.) It can be further broken down into three sub-sectors: 
 
1) Community sector (usually small, local, modestly funded, dependent on 
voluntary effort) 
2) Voluntary sector (formal, independent, not-for-profit and strong 
volunteer input), 
3) Social enterprise sector (businesses with primarily social objectives, 
surpluses principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in 
the community) 
 
In this view, the SE is interpreted in the broader sense of civil economy and 
constitutes a key component of the broader economy and not a parallel or niche 
market or a dependent sector (Restakis 2006, 10). According to the prominent 
definition of SE, it includes those organizations that are animated by the 
principle of reciprocity for the pursuit of mutual economic or social goals, often 
through social control of capital (ibid., 12).  
What is noteworthy is that this definition includes also those for-profit 
businesses that share their surpluses and benefits with their members (and/or 
the wider community) in a collectively owned structure. However, the 
definition would exclude those non-profit and voluntary organizations that are 
entirely dependent on grants or donations (Restakis 2006, 12). Its applicability 
stems from the fact that it recognizes the central role of reciprocal (non-
commercial and non-monetary) transactions as economic activities in their own 
right (Ninacs & Toye 2002). The various organization of the social economy can 
thus be seen as a sort of hybrid enterprises that perform a blend of commercial 
activities (sale of goods and services), non-commercial but monetary activities 
(public funding, donations), and non-monetary activities (volunteer work) to 
achieve their goals (Restakis 2006, 9). 
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The conceptual delimitation of SE has been presented in the Charter of 
Principles of the Social Economy promoted by the European Standing 
Conference of Co-operatives, Mutual Societies, Associations and Foundations 
(CEP-CMAF). The principles in question are 1) the primacy of the individual 
and the social objective over capital, 2) voluntary and open membership, 3) 
democratic control by the membership, 4) the combination of interests of 
members/users and/or the general interest, 5) the defense and application of the 
principle of solidarity and responsibility, 6) autonomous management and 
independence from public authorities, and 7) most of the surpluses have to be 
used in pursuit of sustainable development objectives, services of interest to 
members or the general interest. 
In its review on the evolution of Social Economy in Europe, the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC)26, which interesting proclaims itself as a 
“bridge between Europe and organized civil society” [emphasis added], 
acknowledges that the concept of the SE is closely linked to the concepts of 
social cohesion, local and regional development, innovation, and employment, 
but also with the project of building Europe (European Economic and Social 
Committee 2007, 29–33). SE has demonstrated its capacity to increase the levels 
of social cohesion by complementing and, above all, paving the way for public 
action. The SE has contributed to the social and work integration of clearly 
disadvantaged people and geographical areas, but it has also increased the 
entire society’s democratic culture, boosted its degree of social participation, and 
managed to give a voice and negotiating capability to social groups previously 
excluded from the economic process and from the process of drafting and 
applying public policies. 
The SE also constitutes a strategic motor for local and regional development 
by contributing to endogenous economic development, restoring 
competitiveness to extensive areas and facilitating their integration at the 
national and international level as well as rectifying significant spatial 
imbalances. The SE's capacity for innovation stems from its direct contact with 
the broader society, which endows it with a special capacity for detecting new 
needs, channeling them into the public administration and traditional profit-
making private enterprises, and, where appropriate, coming up with creative 
innovatory responses. Furthermore, as expressly recognized in the EU’s Lisbon 
Strategy itself the SE has a crucial role play in its employment policy. 
“To reach the levels of welfare and progress that the ‘Western’ countries of 
the European Union enjoy,” the EESC (2007, 33) explains, “the European social 
and economic model has needed the contribution of the SE, which has proved 
capable of occupying a space that balances economic and social aspects, 
mediates between public institutions and civil society and evens out social and 
                                                          
26 The European Economic and Social Committee is a consultative body of the European Union. The 
report is available at: http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.publications.83 
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economic imbalances in a plural society and economy.” High hopes are also 
placed upon the development in the neighborhood counties, the economies and 
societies of which are going through lengthy processes of transition from 
Communist planning systems to regulated market economies. It is perceived 
that the institutions of SE are “experiencing a gradual rediscovery and 
expansion in tandem with the development of civil society, social movements 
and trade unions in these countries.” Developing this ‘third pillar’ is deemed as 
important for the post-socialist societies, “if they wish to follow the European 
model of development and achieve fast, adequate integration into the European 
social model” (European Economic and Social Committee 2007, 3). 
These days, social economy enterprises and organizations are interlinked 
with the various bodies of the EU. At the European level, Social Economy 
Europe, the EU-level representative institution for the social economy, 
represents and promotes social economy in Europe since 200027. The European 
Parliament’s ‘Social Economy Intergroup’ provides a forum for a dialogue 
between all social economy players and members of the European Parliament. 
The social economy is also represented in the European Economic and Social 
Committee through the ‘Social Economy Category’ that brings together 
members from cooperatives, mutual societies, associations, foundations, and 
NGOs with social aims. (Social Economy Europe 2012) 
As Restakis (2006, 5) notes, there are two broad currents of thought in the 
debate on the defining elements of the social economy. The first is commonly 
traced back to the French sociologist Frédéric Le Play, who saw the social 
economy as functioning apart from the market, which he interpreted to mean the 
economic sector that was populated by capitalist firms and the state (Figure 14). 
For him, the social economy was a niche, a sort of a parallel market that was also 
dependent on the state for its survival. It was needed in order to create an 
institutional order to correct the undesired effects of the market. The objective 
that Le Play was pursuing was not welfare or wealth, but social peace, that is the 
reconciliation of morality and economics through the moralization of individual 
behavior (see Azam 2003). In practice, Le Play’s idea thus was not to guarantee 
welfare (top-down) but arrive to that by enforcing the fulfillment of employers’ 
obligations. 
According to Restakis (2006, 6), the second current reaches back to the idea of 
the civil economy, which is conceptualized as a dimension of the market. In this 
view, the market is not identified exclusively with private enterprise but rather 
as an open domain in which the state, the commercial sector, and the social 
economy all play a role. Within this current, the recent neo-liberal attitudes that 
direct and restrict the social economy to utilitarian and economic purposes have 
brought the term into closer association with the operations of the conventional 
                                                          
27 Until January 2008, Social Economy Europe was called the European Standing Conference of 
Cooperatives, Mutual societies, Associations and Foundations. 
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market. The apparent outcome of this has been the equation of the social 
economy with ‘social enterprises’ understood as revenue generating, non-profit 
activities that are meant to serve social or community purposes. (Ibid., 8.) 
 
 
 
 
 
As Restakis (2006, 12) and Lewis (2006, 3) emphasize, the three sectors of the 
overall market are distinct above all in that the institutions within them operate 
on different economic principles (Figure 15). The first sector is the domain of 
governments (local, regional, national, and bodies such as the EU and the UN) 
and as such its central economic goal of is greater equality. The economic 
principle central to the private sector is, in turn, efficiency, while social economists 
are working towards the reinsertion of social goals, reciprocity/solidarity into 
economic thinking and decision-making. Even though distinct, these sectors are 
not hermetically sealed off from each other; there are incalculable transfers and 
borrowings from one to the other. Moreover, certain organizations operate at the 
boundaries of these distinctions. (Restakis 2006, 12; Lewis 2006, 3.) 
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Pearce (2003) prefers to use the word ‘system’ instead of a ‘sector,’ as the latter 
implies to him a homogeneous economy that can be divided in to three parts. 
Otherwise his vision parallels closely with Restakis’ ideas. He argues there to be 
three main ways of thinking about how to manage our economic life, each sector 
essentially stemming from a different way of managing the economy, from a 
different mode of production (Figure 16).  
 
 
 
 
 
The first sector/system is about redistribution and planning, whereby it has 
come to be viewed by many as bureaucratic, paternalistic, centralized, and 
inefficient, and as such counterproductive to profit-driven and competitive 
private sector seeking to maximize financial returns to individual owners. The 
third sector/system is about citizens taking action to meet and satisfy needs 
themselves and working together in some collaborative way to do this (Pearce 
2003, 26). The values of mutuality, self-help, caring for people and the 
environment, are given higher priority than maximizing profits (Lewis 2006, 4). 
 
3.2.4 Who’s Making Who? 
It is hard to define civil society without defining its relationship with state. The 
expansion of the EU into the East and the formulation of the new European 
Neighborhood Policy and the EU-Russia strategic partnership, has brought into 
focus a centuries-old interface between western notions of the autonomy of civil 
society from the state and Eastern traditions of absolutist states where ‘civil 
society’ is extremely weak and dominated by an all-powerful state (O’Dowd & 
Dimitrovova 2006). The EU’s borderland between Finland and Russia provides a 
fascinating context in which to study how the ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ 
understandings of state and civil society meet, overlap, and fuse. Chambers and 
Kopstein (2008) have made an important move beyond the binary traditional 
division by suggesting that civil society does not have to be either against or in 
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support of the state, but depending on the context it may also be apart, in 
dialogue or partnership with, or even beyond the state. As a result, civil 
societies, Miller et al. (2009) propose, can be depicted as being contentious, 
manipulated, disciplined, competitive and interest-oriented, repressed, or 
normative. 
All that is certain is that civil society is not a stand-alone concept. As the 
discussion above shows, it is paired historically with the concept of the state – 
they are not just linked but help define each other. Bobbio (1989, 42) presents 
that the two processes of the state-making-society and society-making-state are 
contradictory. The completion of the former would lead to a state without 
society, i.e., the totalitarian state and the accomplishment of the latter to society 
without the state, i.e., the extinction of the state. As they are indeed 
contradictory, the two processed are unattainable. Society and state act as two 
necessary moments that are separate but contiguous, distinct but 
interdependent, internal articulations of the social system as a whole (Bobbio 
1989, 44). 
The weaker the layer of civic association, the stronger the vertical 
relationship of the individual and the state becomes – a relationship 
characterized not by voluntary action and cooperation but by power, authority, 
and dependence (Eberly & Streeter 2002, 8). The reciprocal, interdependent, and 
constantly realigning nature civil society-state interaction is well explained by 
Putnam’s (1993) two-level game theory. It admits a reciprocal interaction 
between the domestic and the international arenas affecting the foreign policy 
construction in a given country. At the national level, the domestic groups 
pressure the government to adopt politics favorable to their interest and the 
politicians seek for power while constructing these coalitions. At the 
international level, the national government seeks to maximize its own ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of the 
actions developed abroad. (Ibid., 436.)  
Increased transnationalism on the one hand and international agreements 
and coalitions on the other can make the game more complex. In the EU context, 
for instance, the two-level game model can be inserted in the relation between 
the member states and their domestically organized civil society. As an example, 
when the Council of the EU discusses, say, environmental issues, the Finnish 
Minister for the Environment has to decide over certain issues on the behalf of 
the entire government of Finland. Because he is answerable to his national 
parliament, the decision he makes cannot be based only on high politics and has 
to be accepted internally by the Finnish Parliament. As the Parliament 
represents the citizens, it is under direct pressure from an organized civil 
society, which in turn must be empowered by knowledge and public support; 
the greater the public support, so too is the influence of CSOs (Eigen 1999, 5; 
Demidov & Panfilova 2001, 4). On the other hand, Putnam’s (1993) model can be 
applied in the relation between the European level organized civil society and 
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the EU. Civil society no longer acts only at the national level but has become 
more transnational and asserted its role as an independent actor in the world 
society. As the EU increases its supranational mechanisms, it also increases the 
importance of organized civil society in the EU multi-level governance system.  
The term ‘civil society organization’ is here used to refer to a wide range of 
citizens’ associations or organizations that exists to provide benefits, services, or 
political influence to specific groups within society. Voluntary associations are 
the basic building blocks of the Western notions of civil society. As a 
consequence, civil society is a sphere of free public debate (Setianto 2007). 
Voluntary associations are a “special kind of social institution,” Newton (2001, 
206) sums up, “because they are neither family, nor work, nor state: we are born 
to families; we cannot avoid the state; and most of us have to work.” NGOs are 
the most institutionalized, and thus hierarchical, groups of civil society (Costoya 
2007, 15), but they are only one element among many that fall under the 
umbrella of civil society (Ghaus-Pasha 2004). In addition of constituting a vast 
array of associations, including trade unions, professional associations, religious 
groups, cultural and sports groups, and traditional associations, some of which 
are informal and not registered (Clayton, Oakley & Taylor 2000, 2), CSOs 
include, inter alia, also social movements, networks, and plateaus (Costoya 
2007). The strength of the label ‘civil society organization’ is that it positions the 
sector as its own entity, without relying on language used for the government or 
business sectors (Zaleski 2006). 
 
3.2.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of Civil Society 
CSO encompass a number of qualities, which emphasize their aptitude for CBC. 
In relative terms, CSOs are flexible, people-led, participatory, inherently 
cooperative, innovative, reformist, but nevertheless realist and, as a result, able 
to react local issues quickly and effectively. Ghaus-Pasha (2004, 3) as well as 
Batliwala and Brown (2006, 7) underline that CSOs play an important role filling 
the gaps and deficit created by inefficient governance and a market economy. 
They further good governance by ways of policy analysis and advocacy, by 
responding to new challenges through social innovation and as vehicles for 
identifying issues and articulating their value implications. The ‘softer,’ human 
capital related activities many CSOs are involved with are the least costly and 
are the easiest to launch in the beginning, and at the same time, these activities 
are the most suitable to open minds up, to increase intercultural competencies 
and defeat mental barriers – which are among the major obstacles for CBC in the 
Finnish-Russian case (Németh et al. 2012, 216). 
CSOs’ ability to organize into sprawling multi-organizational collaborative 
networks, Ronfeldt and Arquilla (2001, 1) suggest, is the main reason behind the 
migration of power from the traditional, hierarchical state actors to non-state 
actors. They have a capability to contribute to balancing power differences by 
mobilizing their constituencies and other concerned citizens, some of which 
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otherwise marginal, to participate in public affairs and enable them to identify 
and articulate their values, beliefs, civic norms, and democratic practices, 
improving, in so doing, the wellbeing of their own communities. Furthermore, 
CSOs use expertise and information to catalyze the setting of new standards and 
norms for powerful actors, the regulation and monitoring of state performance 
and the action, and the behavior and compliance of public officials, as well as 
the building of transnational social capital – in the form of bonds of trust and 
collaboration that can be used for subsequent initiatives. (Ghaus-Pasha 2004, 3; 
Batliwala & Brown 2006, 7.)  
Especially their ability to work directly with their constituents, operate on 
and foster the grassroots level has been recognized. Given that many are locally 
based, they are better in tune with local needs than more formal, state-led 
entities. In their work with local communities, CSOs often utilize innovative 
strategies in identifying solutions that require fewer funds than state programs 
(Ghaus-Pasha 2004). Apart from being less costly, CSOs tend also to be less 
bureaucratic as well as less constrained by long-term strategies than are official 
governmental programs. Lastly, while the statist approach gives power to a few, 
CSOs empower and assign various tasks to great many (He 1999).  
Due to these abilities, CSOs have taken up issues that have fallen off the 
public radar, from the delivery of social services and relief and rehabilitation 
work to education, training, and capacity building that empower community 
members to become active participants of their growth (Ghaus-Pasha 2004). 
Backer (2003) adds data collection and monitoring, representation and advocacy, 
facilitation and consultation, and acknowledgment and compensation, as well 
as, quite frankly, the formation of parallel or substitute authority to the primary 
roles taken by civil societies. 
The EU provides a good example of how the questions of representational 
legitimacy have persistently challenged the authority of the global governance 
process. In this context, CSOs operating in multilateral arenas are often held up 
as the only legitimate institutional actors capable of representing and managing 
distributional inequalities of a highly fractured information society 
(Chakravartty 2007, 297–298). CSOs produce solutions where both markets and 
governments have failed (Hansmann 1987; Weisbrod 1988) and, in so doing, fill 
the gap in representational legitimacy left both by state actors and their 
corporate counterparts, both in theory and practice (Kaldor 2003, O’Brien et al. 
2000). As the ideal of democratic participation and accountability in decision 
making proceeds, civil society will continue to increase their roles (Kim 2007, 
68). 
There are also a number of weaknesses that the civil society sector continues 
to share. Not all CSOs live up to democratic standards; competition for limited 
funds and other resources can generate a lack of openness, unhealthy 
competition or even conflict, and prevent coalitions. In some cases, 
organizations have been forced to expand their work outside of their mandate in 
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order to sustain themselves or modify their agenda to better fit with the funding 
priorities of the donors instead of answering to the local needs (Ghaus-Pasha 
2004). As many organizations live from project to project, their sustainability can 
be weak, and their capacity to execute long-tem projects compromised. 
In addition of being poorly funded or over-dependent on (foreign) donors, at 
least the largest, and thus also the most influential, are often concentrated in the 
large centers of population and, in some cases, may become elitist and thus 
distant from the population. This is the most apparent in the ex-socialist 
countries where civil society is still, in particular through a Western prism, 
relatively weak. As Raik (2006, 11; see Henderson 2002, 142) argues, it is 
common in these cases that the membership base of the CSOs remains narrow, 
the general attitude towards them skeptical, and their ability to communicate 
with the public and to lobby and influence decision-making remains ineffective. 
The constant lack of resources refers not just to funds but skilled activists as 
well. Cooperation between the state and civil society is hampered by mutual 
distrust and by the lack of tradition and skills on both sides to work together 
(Raik 2006, 12). 
 
 
3.3 GEOGRAPHY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
The conceptualizations of civil society do not vary only historically but also 
geographically. The often used, yet oversimplified, binary division between the 
Western ‘liberal’ model and the Easter ‘statist’ understandings of civil society 
may easily obscure more than it illuminates. It overlooks the undeniable fact 
that stark differences exist between different countries even within these 
traditions. Indeed, civil society is not one but many. It is a normative, loaded 
concept, which has to be understood in a context specific manner. Recognizing 
this provides us with the keys to move forward for it moves us beyond false 
universals and entrenched thinking (Edwards 2004).  
The role of nationalism must also be addressed here. It is interesting to notice 
how different models of nationalism have led to very different outcomes. While 
nationalism tends to be particularly potent and problematic where diverse 
institutions of civil society are lacking (Calhoun 1993a), nationalism and civil 
society are not always mutually antagonistic. The post-Soviet countries provide 
an illuminating case in point. Here, the varying historical trajectories of state and 
nation-building have had a major impact on civil society development as some 
have supported the establishment of democratic regimes and civic mobilization, 
while others have fed the institutionalization of authoritarian systems and the 
regression of free civic action. 
But nationalism relates to this study also more broadly. As was already 
mentioned, a failure to acknowledge the historical perspective on state and 
nation formation leads to a disfigured perspective on the present and to the 
   121 
 
incapacity to recognize the distinctiveness and context specificity of 
contemporary state borders. There is, however, no single grand theorist of 
nationalism nor is it possible to create a single comprehensive theory of 
nationalism. Certainly, different understandings of nationalism lead to different 
understandings of not just what is a nation, and hence what is trans-, inter/ or 
supranational, but also question what, then, is a border and how, and by whom, 
can it be de- or reconstructed. Borders, and cross-border – transnational – 
interaction and integration for that matter, can be seen in very different lights 
depending on whether the premise is based on the traditional idea of an ethnic 
bond, the modernist vision of a state and a nation, or through the prism of either 
Western civic nationalism or Eastern ethnic nationalism (see Calhoun 2007). It is 
at the border where these different conceptions as well as actors who hail from 
them meet. In the following, I first discuss the different understandings of 
nationalism and then provide some examples on how the different 
understandings have allowed the formation of different civil society models. 
 
3.3.1 State, Nation and Nationalisms 
 
A nation is a society united by a delusion about its ancestry and by common hatred of 
its neighbours. (William Ralph Inge, English author & Anglican prelate (1860–1954)) 
 
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the subsequent system of sovereign states 
gave rise to a new type of a political ideology that dovetailed a group of 
individuals with a nation. These sovereign states formed the basis for nation-
states, which soon became the principal way to divide the Earth’s surface. The 
American and French Revolutions in the late eighteenth century fueled 
nationalistic thought further. Thus, the emergence of nation-states was 
associated with the breakthrough of democracy and the victory of popular 
sovereignty, grounded in the principle that the legitimacy of the state is created 
and sustained by the will or consent of its people. Borders were then needed to 
mark a particular nation separate from other nations (Edensor 2002, 37). The 
resultant bounded space became to be regarded as to enclose not just a definable 
population subject to a hegemonic administration, but also a particular and 
separate culture (ibid.), contributing thus to the overly popular supposition that 
‘nation’ would be equivalent to ‘society’ (see Billig 1995, 53; Urry 2000, 6). 
As an ideology, nationalism has been and remains controversial. Impartial 
accounts are rare as strong emotions are aroused when it is discussed. Most 
definitions are broad. Simply put, they purport that a particular national culture 
and interests are superior to any other. Even so, no single, universal theory can 
explain it all. As Calhoun (1997a, 123) notes, much of the contents and specific 
orientation of various nationalisms is determined by historically distinct cultural 
traditions, the creative actions of leaders, and contingent situations within the 
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international world order. As the historical record is diverse, Hall (1999, 1) 
argues, so too must our concepts be. 
Early theories of nationalism were based on the “myth of national 
brotherhood and ethnic unity” (McNeill 1986, 56). The existence and boundaries 
of a nation were regarded as the natural derivative of ethnicity and geography. 
The ethnic nationalist ideal was, however, smeared in the course of two world 
wars, in particular due to Nazi totalitarianism (Smith 2001, 131). Instead of 
accepting that the nation has always been there, the theorists began to see the 
concept a nation as a socially constructed phenomenon.  
In 1944, Hans Kohn (1944; see 1955) pioneered an influential articulation of 
the distinction between more “liberal, civic Western” and “illiberal, ethnic 
Eastern” nationalism. Kohn’s reference to geography has proven to be overly 
black-and-white; different conceptions of nationalism have competed for 
influence within particular countries in both the East and the West (Kymlicka 
1996; Auer 1997; Smith 2000, 25; Kuzio 2002, 20). Yet, the other half of it – 
distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism – has remained present and 
been built upon within academic, governmental, and journalistic discourses 
(Plamenatz 1973; Ignatief 1993; Brubaker 1995; 2004; Hutchinson 2004).  
Civic nationalism was built on the self-government traditions of city 
bourgeoisie, the Enlightenment liberal values of reason, and universalist 
humanism. It aimed at liberating the individual and creating a more open, 
pluralistic, democratic, outward-looking society, whereby nationhood became 
defined by common citizenship. A nation consists of those subscribing to its 
political creed regardless of their ethnicity, race, color, religion, gender, or 
language; i.e., who feels they belong to the same community. In principle, a civic 
nation is a self-governing and democratic community of equal, rights-bearing 
citizens united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and 
values. (Plamenatz 1973, Ignatief 1993, 6.) In civic nationalism, the government 
respects the law, rather than exists above it. It derives political legitimacy from 
the active participation of its citizenry, the ‘will of the people,’ as theorized 
originally by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century. Simply put, 
“[t]he idea is that civic nationalism is exercised in those areas where there exists 
a civil society” (Nikolas 1999, 1).  
Ethnic nationalism in turn has been commonly deemed to be an obstacle to 
genuinely democratic and civil society. It creates a more authoritarian, closed, 
inward-looking, particularistic, and xenophobic society, with more inclusive 
communal views of the self (Vincent 1997, 15). According to the ethnic 
nationalist reading, nationhood is defined by pre-existing ethnic characteristics: 
“an individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen,” because “it is 
the nationalist community that defines the individual; not the individual who 
defines the national community” (Ignatieff 1993, 7–8). It is thus not the state that 
creates the nation but the nation that creates the state.  
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It is crucial to keep in mind, as Nikolas (1999, 10) has justly pointed out, that 
even though a ‘definitional antithesis’ does exist, it should not lead to the “set of 
analytical cliches [sic]," which deny ‘civic’ nations of ethnic virtues and vice 
versa. Some reject the rationale of the dichotomy in the first place. According to 
Kuzio’s (2002, 20) understanding, also “[a]ll civic states, whether in the West or 
East, are based on ethno-cultural core(s)” (see also Smith 1986; Brown 1999; 
Nieguth 1999). Others, in turn, purport that there has been a development from 
earlier forms of ethnic nationalism towards civic forms of nationalism (Kymlicka 
2001, 282–283). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the discussion focused increasingly on nation-
building and carried a strong conceptual link to modernization theories of 
development (Hippler 2004). In the context of the East-West conflict and the 
Cold War competition, nation-building constituted a western strategy for 
containing socialism and helping the newly independent countries acquire the 
institutions, infrastructure, economy, and social cohesion of more advanced 
nations (Atwood 1994, 11). As suggested by Ardrey’s (1966) widely popularized 
thesis, humans were deemed as ‘territorial animals’ with an inherent tendency 
to form social groups28. With the aim of nation-building, social cohesion became 
increasingly associated with territoriality. 
In his critical reaction to nation-building literature, Tilly (1975) came to 
develop a theory of state formation, which rejected the assumptions encoded in 
the teleological idea of nation-building and in the term ‘nation’ per se. Instead, 
he shifted the focus of analysis from nation to state, which for him was the 
primary reality, whereas the nation was a mere mystification (ibid.; Brubaker 
2010, 375). It was not, however, until the early 1990s that Tilly created his actual 
theory of nationalism. He centered on the link between war-making and state-
making and put forth that the resource-intensive warfare gave central rulers 
incentives to develop more intensive and direct forms of rule. This, in turn, 
caused the regional power-holders to feel threatened and gave them incentives 
to demand a state of their own. As a consequence, Tilly identified two forms of 
nationalism: the top-down, nation-shaping nationalism of central rulers and the 
bottom-up, state-seeking nationalism of threatened peripheral elites (Tilly 1991; 
1996, 303–304). What remains unanswered is that why central rulers and those 
threatened by increasingly direct rule claim to speak and act in the name of a 
nation and why such claims-making elicited broad popular support (see 
Brubaker 2010). 
Also other theorists have developed their own modernist visions of nation 
and state-building. In one of the most treasured books in the field, Gellner (1983) 
argues that nationalism is a thoroughly modern phenomenon. It appeared as 
societies became increasingly industrial and the rulers regarded the congruence 
                                                          
28 In his widely popularized book, Ardrey (1966) argues that only a minority of species maintains 
territories with well-defined boundaries, within which they live and find all the resources they need. 
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between the state and culture as needed for maintaining a grip on resources on a 
territorial level. Thus, nationalisminvents nations where they do not exist. Both 
nations and states are not a universal necessity but a contingency. Even if the 
two were destined for each other, Gellner stresses, they emerged independently: 
“[t]he state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some nations 
have certainly emerged without the blessings of their own state” (ibid. 6–7).  
Anderson (1983) underlines that various varieties of nationalism cannot be 
understood without reflecting on the older political forms (kingdoms, empires, 
etc.) out of which they emerged. He terms the concept of nation an ‘imagined 
community’ for unlike an actual community, the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. Along 
similar lines, Eric Hobsbawm (1983, 1) argues that many of the traditions which 
we consider to be of ancient origins, have in fact been invented by national elites 
comparatively recently in an attempt to establish continuity with a suitable 
historic past and justify the existence and importance of their respective nation 
states (Hobsbawm 1990).  
As a result, Billig (1995; cf. Edensor 2002) suggests, nations are reproduced 
on a daily basis “in a banally mundane way.” Building upon Gellner and 
Anderson, he argues that the complex set of beliefs, assumptions, habits, 
representations, and practices are enacted daily to reproduce the nation-state, its 
citizenry as nationals, and its external face as a sovereign state in the 
international system. Nations continually ‘flag’ and remind their populations of 
nationhood in a fashion that is “so familiar, so continual, that it is not 
consciously registered as reminding.” “The metonymic image of banal 
nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent 
passion,” Billig (1995, 8) asserts, “it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public 
building.”  
While these theorists suggest such national-culture building and the resultant 
national identity being politically driven and state-led, Habermas’ (1989) 
concept of ‘public sphere’ brings in the domain of debate that exists outside of 
the state by engaging all who are concerned with matters of public interest. The 
public sphere forms the space whereby civil society may intervene in the 
political process. Being centered on the state's activities, while locating outside 
of the state, the public sphere presupposes a nation-state in relation to which 
civil society can act. Habermas (2001) suggests that the EU in itself constitutes a 
complex supranational public sphere, where the historic nation-states articulate 
with an emergent federal state. Even though Habermas’ vision of the 
enlargement of the public sphere is still far from being realized, it assumes an 
interesting corollary that a European civil society must eventually emerge, the 
nucleus of which already exists in the policy communities clustered around the 
EU's executive and legislative institutions (Schlesinger 1998). 
   125 
 
Anthony Smith (1995; 1998; 2000) criticizes the modernist perspectives for 
overlooking the enduring passions generated by nationalism. According to his 
reading, nationalism cannot be regarded just as a mere tool used by the elites for 
the purpose of economic gain and cohesion. Instead, Smith takes the ever 
enduring will of the people to fight and die for their nations as a clear sign that 
nations are formed through the inclusion of the whole populace. Smith’s (1986, 
ch. 2; 2009, cf. Hutchinson 2000) anthropological approach, which he calls 
ethnosymbolism, proposes a synthesis of modernist and traditional views on the 
subject. He argues that nationalism draws on the pre-existing historical accounts 
– whether true or flawed – of a particular group of people, which are fashioned 
into something common and shared. It is thus the bond of solidarity – socially 
constructed rather than natural – to the nation and other members of their 
nation that creates a sense of nationalism regardless of the dominant ideology 
that exists in a given locale (Smith 1998, 191).  
Smith (2009, 28) uses the term ‘ethno-history’ to refer to the ethnic members’ 
memories and understanding of their communal past(s) as opposed to any more 
objective and dispassionate historical analysis. From a comparative standpoint, 
Smith (2009, 19) clarifies, the incidence of ethno-history is, however, distinctly 
uneven; some communities have a rich and eventful past while some ethno-
histories and cultural resources are sketchier and more poorly recorded. The 
unevenness often leads to competition, if not conflict, as the less well-endowed 
communities seek cultural parity with the better endowed. This, Smith suggests, 
explains for example the appeal of the Finnish national epic, Kalevala, for Finns 
as they sought emancipation from Russian political and Swedish cultural 
dominations. Smith (2009, 95) further clarifies that ‘our history’ tends to be 
remembered by later generations through moments of heroism and glory, the 
‘golden ages’ of the community. These moments, recorded in an epic such as 
Kalevala and/or represented in other forms of art, do not form a mere source of 
collective pride and confidence but inspire action and emulation as well. History 
is painted selectively, its high points writ large, and used as the image of exempla 
virtutis, as set of moral lessons or examples of virtue invited to be emulated.  
The various movements of Romanticism, Smith (2009, 96) argues, ‘returned’ 
the European educated classes back to the ‘primeval origins’ of their nations to 
discover therein their ultimate ‘essence’ and their unique attributes; by seeking 
in the golden age of its heroes and geniuses the character and virtues of their 
community, the ‘true’ nature of the nation in its original state would be 
revealed. In Smith’s panorama of a nation’s ethno-history, such a distant golden 
age began to represent that period, or moment of pristine glory, when the 
creative energies of the nation were at their most vigorous and their virtues 
most apparent. This was, for example, very much the purpose and spirit in 
which Elias Lönnrot edited Kalevala (first edition published in 1835) thereby 
revealing to modern Finns who they had been and, as a result, who they ‘really’ 
were. (Ibid.)  
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Calhoun (1993b; 1997a/b) shares the idea of a nation with ethnic roots, yet 
finds the relationship between the two more complex. “While it is impossible to 
dissociate nationalism entirely from ethnicity,” Calhoun (1993c, 235) notes, “it is 
equally impossible to explain it simply as a continuation of ethnicity.” 
Nationalism remains the preeminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political 
communities and claim rights of self-determination by reference to ‘the people’ 
of a country. Ethnic solidarities and identities, in turn, are claimed most often 
where groups do not seek ‘national’ autonomy but rather recognition internal to 
or crosscutting national or state borders (ibid.) 
Even though building on the classics, Calhoun (1993b; 1997a) provides an 
original contribution to the topic. Like Gellner, Calhoun stresses that 
nationalism is produced by central features of the modern world, but specifies 
that it has become only more important because of globalization (Calhoun 
1993b). He rejects Hobsbawm’s allegation that nationality is an invented 
illusion. Instead, he falls in with Anderson in emphasizing the constructedness 
of national identity. Calhoun (1997b) argues that the centrality of nationalism 
derives first of all from the need to identify the ‘self’ implied by the notion of 
political self-determination, which in turn ties nationalism to democracy and 
civil society. 
As argued by Calhoun (1993c, 275–276), nationalism poses challenges to the 
basic theories of democracy and civil society, as it threatens not only bellicosity 
toward rivals but repression of internal difference. The most common discourses 
of nationalism treat the nation as unitary, in so doing denying the plurality 
crucial to the idea of democratic self-government through the public sphere of 
civil society. In his study about post-communist European transitions, Kuzio 
(2010, 285–286) has, however, discovered that different types of nationalism 
have different impacts. He argues that in post-communist societies four different 
models on nationalism can be found. While ethnic, Soviet, and great power-
imperial nationalisms have fuelled ethnic conflict, chauvinistic xenophobia, the 
establishment of authoritarian regimes, and anti-European/Western attitudes, 
civic nationalism has in turn played a positive role in mobilizing societies and 
democratization.  
Civic nationalism has been given credit for, most famously, the success of the 
civil society mobilization during the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004 
(Stepanenko 2006; Kuzio 2010). In Russia, however, the frail progression of civic 
nationalism has, since Putin came to power for the first time, been upstaged by 
democratic regression, an authoritarian regime, and related great power-
imperial nationalism integrating Soviet, Tsarist, and Eurasian symbolism 
(Tsygankov 2005; Dimitrov 2009). This has narrowed the space for free civic 
action domestically and also routed many international actors out from the 
country.  
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3.3.2 European Civil Society? 
The emergence of civil society in Western Europe is commonly traced back to 
the notion of autonomy. The autonomous legal system as well as the level of 
autonomy given to cities and the church formed a favorable environment for 
free thinking and pluralism to exist. Individuals were conceived as ‘articulated 
wholes’ rather than ‘undifferentiated mass,’ which led to the development of 
individual rights and representative institutions (Seligman 1992, 157). These 
significant autonomies limited the capacity of any monarchical authority to 
impose autocratic structures and control the development of society. Later on, 
the development of civil society was largely based on the emergence of a market 
economy as well as increased wealth, civil freedom, and private ownership, 
which together steered the formation of the moral infrastructure of Western 
political thought (Black 1984, 42). 
This study proceeds on the fundamental postulation that there is no single 
European civil society but that civil society occupies various forms in different 
European counties; there are remarkable differences between the Anglo-Saxon, 
Romance, Slavic, Nordic, and Germanic civic cultures (Meyer 2009, 205). Civil 
activities do not occur in the same way and to the same levels across Europe 
(Anheier 2002, 6–7). The French economie sociale emphasizes economic aspects, 
mutualism, and the communal economy (Archambault 1996). Italian 
associationalism is seen as a countervailing force against both the church and 
state powers at the local level (Barbetta 1997). The German tradition of 
subsidiarity provides a comprehensive framework for the relationship between 
the state and third sector in the provision of social services (Anheier & Seibel 
2001; Zimmer 2001) while the nationalized health care system with a 
decentralized systems of charities in social service provision is characteristic of 
the British model (Kendall & Knapp 1996). The Finnish model remains, for 
historical reasons, close to the Swedish model of democratic membership 
organizations in the form of broadly based social movements whose demands 
are picked up by the state and incorporated into social legislature (Lundström & 
Wijkström 1997). 
Certainly, Crook (2002) notes, the civil society sphere is present in all 
European nations, but the characteristics of civil society vary from country to 
country. However, just as there are certain typical features of the general 
Western tradition of civil society, there are also a number of relevant features, 
which can be seen as quintessentially ‘European’ and thus also as the main 
footings of civil societies in Europe. According to Crook (2002), these include: 1) 
a belief in, and the practice of, democratic forms of government and governance, 
2) an adherence to the rule of law, 3) a respect for human rights, including free 
communication and exchange of ideas, and 4) the separation of powers – most 
importantly, of the executive and the judiciary. Acknowledging the risk of 
controversy, Crook adds that ‘European’ is also 5) characteristically Christian, 6) 
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marked by a clear preference for free markets in economic matters, and 7) 
marked by a concern with human (social) ‘solidarity’ (ibid.). 
Even if broad and normative, writing down these key characteristics helps to 
understand the perspective from which the EU views civil society and its role in 
CBC. Instead of meant as an all-encompassing description, the epithet 
‘European’ is used to make a distinction to the US model characterized by a 
strong and positive link between social capital and civil society with minimalist 
state interference. In the ‘European’ model, the two are also linked but require 
more active state and ‘good governance’ to function for the greater public good. 
Anheier (2008a/b) has provided four scenarios, which are certainly 
caricatures but also quite indicative in that they do build on the recent 
development trends in the field of civil society in Europe. According to 
Anheier’s NPM-scenario, CSOs – especially NGOs – are developing into a set of 
well-organized, corporate entities that take on tasks and functions that 
previously belonged to national states and/or the EU and deliver them through 
competitive contractual arrangements that try to maximize the competitive 
advantages of non-profit providers under some form of EU oversight. The neo-
Tocquevillian social capital scenario, in turn, paints CSOs as the self-organizing, 
Europeanized ‘quasi-state’ apparatus of the 21st century. As part of a benign 
global civil society, this scenario relies on high levels of individualism, 
participation, and ‘connectivity’ and aims to detect and prevent or correct social 
ills before they become ‘social problems’ with and by a technocratic EU regime 
of minimalist national states. 
The social accountability scenario posits CSOs as a reflection of the diversity, 
pluralism, and dynamism of modern, European, even global, society. As such, 
CSOs are seen as sources of dissent, challenge, and innovation, whereby they 
play a social, cultural, and political watchdog function in keeping both global 
market and state powers in check; i.e., form a counter-veiling force to some form 
of European government (‘super state’) and to TNCs. Lastly, Anheier’s (2008a/b) 
corporate scenario is marked by a closer association between CSOs and 
businesses; corporations use an extended social responsibility program to 
provide, jointly with CSOs, services previously in the realm of government, such 
as health care, child care, pensions, and community services.  
 
3.3.3 The Nordic Frame 
The Nordic countries provide the most illustrative frame for understanding the 
Finnish variation of civil society. In the Nordic countries, the civil society vis-à-
vis state arrangement is exceptionally close (see Kettunen & Petersen 2011). The 
notion of society has been fixed to that of the nation-state and seen to form an 
integrated entity with its own subjectivity (Kettunen 2009, 1–2). A clear-cut 
distinction does not adequately catch the nature of civic activity in this part of 
the world for there is an “institutional balance between state and society” 
(Hernes 1988, 208) in which a strong state and a strong civil society play the 
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same game, supporting each other (Rainio-Niemi 2010, 243). Thus, in the 
‘Nordic model,’ society can be conceived at the same time both as the national 
agent and a target of its politics (Kettunen 2009, 5). 
While there are significant differences between the Nordic countries, 
different countries have assumed different national(istic) strategies for 
competitiveness (Kettunen 2011a/b); the welfare state has become an integral 
part of the national identities in all of them and the related policies have formed 
one of the most successful fields of Nordic cooperation (Petersen 2011, 41). This 
has tied these countries together institutionally.  
It is also noteworthy that the typically Nordic practices of a government-
funded welfare state, wide public sector, and corporatism (thought the strong 
role of the labor unions and employers' organizations) have created major links 
between state and society (Knudsen & Rothstein 1994, 218) As Kettunen (2009, 7) 
argues, the Nordic political languages have conserved elements of political 
philosophy from when society was not yet separated conceptually from the 
state. The societas civilis was a way of conceptualizing the state, a sort of a civil 
state achieved on a contractual basis (Bobbio 1989). Hegel’s ideas have thus been 
turned upside down: in terms of its “supposedly ethical essence,” the state is 
called ‘society’; i.e., the concept of ‘state’ is applied to those formal institutions 
which Hegel included in his bürgerliche Gesellschaft (Kettunen 2009, 8). 
In his attempt to put the Nordic countries in an internationally comparative 
perspective, Alapuro (2010a/b) builds on Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas’ 
(2001) study of variations in voluntary association membership29. In their two 
dimensional diagram based on Jepperson’s (2002) typology of four polity forms, 
Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas introduce a typology based on the 
organizational structures of the states (Figure 17). The degree of ‘statism’ seeks 
to capture variations in the organization of collective authority vis-à-vis the 
society. On this axis, the Nordic countries and the Anglo-Saxon countries rank 
low: civic engagement is actively promoted, associations often work in 
symbiosis with administrative institutions (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 
2001, 812), and the government is envisioned as intermediating the organized 
interests of society (Jepperson 2002, 73). In addition to a low degree of statism, 
the Nordic countries exemplify a high degree of ‘corporateness’; i.e., a higher 
moral purpose is assigned to organized groups, as members of which 
individuals are empowered and obtain specific ‘rights and functions’ (Jepperson 
2002, 73), which tends to foster high levels of associational membership (Schofer 
& Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001, 813). This means that, “[i]ndividual citizens are 
thought to interact with the political system in the role of association members, not 
as individuals” (Siisiäinen 2009, 274, italics by the author). 
                                                          
29 See Alapuro and Stenius (eds) 2010 for a detailed examples of the Nordic Associational culture in a 
European Perspective. 
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The Nordic social-corporate model gets portrayed as a rational-functional 
form of social organization that is coordinated by the state, yet in which the 
associational organization of society has become ‘naturalized.’ The authority 
that dominates is not an imperative but rather relies on rule-based coordination. 
(Jepperson 2002, 73–74.) The associations play a central role in the representation 
of society or particular group-based interests, but that is done largely through 
broad, passive membership (Dekker & van der Broek 1998, 27–30; 2005; Alapuro 
2010b) – church or trade union membership being prime examples. Even though 
mere membership does not by design equal engagement, the Nordic situation, 
in which passive ‘checkbook members’ consider their belonging and 
‘participation by proxy’ important seems to contradict Putnam’s (1993) cry for 
active face-to-face engagement. 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlike in most other European countries where social inequality is mirrored in 
civil society, in Finland and in the Scandinavian countries education and 
socioeconomic status play a minor role in explaining differences in participation 
(Siisiäinen & Blom 2009). The combination of high corporateness and low 
statism translates to CSOs holding a strong position and being trusted while 
political participation remains relatively minimal. In corporate countries passive 
membership matters, Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001, 822) assert, as 
representation can be left more easily to organizations for they possess a strong 
and legitimate role in society. In this way, the role of association as mediating 
institutions between individuals and the state (Alapuro 2010b; Luhtakallio 2010; 
   131 
 
Stenius 2010) gets emphasized. In the end, the representative function applies to 
both active and passive members alike (Wollebæk & Strømsnes 2008). 
Associations are representatives of their members, but they may also seek to 
represent their putative members, their constituency; i.e., those who are not 
even passive members, but rather members of a larger Jeppersonian ‘functional 
community’ (Alapuro 2010b, 313–314). 
 
3.3.4 Civil Society in Finland 
In Finland the history of civil society is closely connected with the history of the 
Finnish nation. All the major events and the important stages of development in 
the nation’s history are visible in the history of civil society. (Harju 2006) In 
order to understand what is taking place today, it is useful to look back and see 
how a series of punctuated events have all played a role in shaping the civil 
society development and left their own respective marks, some of which are 
clearly discernible still today. Taken together, they have created a civil society 
model that is not Western or Eastern but more of a hybrid. 
 
Roots and development  
As in the rest of Europe, the roots of established civic activity in what today is 
Finland goes back to the end of the eighteenth century. Inspired by the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the bourgeoisie and the middle 
classes began to demand a redistribution of social rights and responsibilities 
more equally (Alapuro & Stenius 1987, 20–21; Tammilehto 1989, 21). While in 
the mid-eighteenth century, engagement in the association remained limited to a 
narrow circle of people of high social rank, around the turn of the century 
discussion concerning common issues became possible in less segregated 
forums (Stenius 1988, 347–348). 
The year 1809 when Sweden lost its Eastern Province of Finland to Russia 
was significant also for the civil society formation. Even though Finland was 
granted a privileged autonomous status that enabled it to continue its Swedish 
constitutional heritage, Finland was nevertheless a part of the Russian Empire 
and, hence, the development of civic activities was no longer only linked to the 
overall political situation in Europe but also dependent on the Russian 
emperor’s decisions. This restricted the development of civic activism and 
forestalled potential revolutionary movements. However, although the 
associational activities were still modest in their scope and form, their activities 
became increasingly autonomous (Finnish), whilst previously they had been a 
part of or a continuation of the Swedish system (Liikanen 1995, 87).  
A new spirit of nationalistic patriotism and unification sprang to life in 
Finland between 1831 and 1860 (Alapuro & Stenius 1987, 26–27). It was fuelled 
by the pan-European wave of mobilization of the 1830s, which only increased in 
power in the 1840s. Instead of informal movements or societies, this time the 
principle of association assumed its definite form, broke through, and was put it 
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practice for the first time in Finland (Stenius 1980; Eliassen 1981, 613–614). While 
the rest of Europe was defeating bloody revolutionary revolts during the ‘crazy 
year’ of 1848, in the Grand Duchy of Finland radical tendencies were channeled 
for the positive glorification of the fatherland. The freer conditions, which 
followed Alexander II’s accession to the throne, enabled determined Finnish 
national awaking first in the 1860s and 1870s in the sphere of liberal 
intelligentsia and then in the 1880s among the masses. (Stenius 1988, 353; 
Alapuro & Stenius 1987, 30–31; Liikanen 1995, 77–78.)  
The February Manifesto of 1899 by Emperor Nicholas II, which asserted the 
imperial government's right to rule Finland without the consent of local 
legislative bodies, marked the beginning of the policy of Russification of 
Finland. Various political factions opposing the autocratic Russian Empire soon 
joined the passive resistance movement led by the Young Finns. As a result, the 
entire wave of mass mobilization, which followed, became shaped by a 
ferocious aspiration to accentuate national unity. Ability to form associations, to 
organize on formally equal terms to promote a common purpose, irrespective of 
the social status of an individual, became crucial for the Finnish nation-building 
process.  
As Alapuro and Stenius (1989, 18) have observed, a society separate from the 
state apparatus was in the making and it became manifested as its own sphere of 
action, as a civil society. On the other hand, as the non-governmental 
organizations and movements created new kinds of societal practices, they also 
expanded the operational space of the state, building simultaneously a new kind 
of state (ibid.). Powerful central leadership and a close relationship to the state 
became key characteristics of the Finnish civil society; the intermediate and 
intermediary organization in Finland was not set up in opposition to the state 
but rather in connection with the state-building and state-bearing intelligentsia 
(Stenius 1983, 112). Both civil servants and ordinary people participated jointly 
in the activities of these associations, which in turn were directly related to the 
official decision-making. 
As analyzed by Apunen (1987, see also Tikka 2009) the Great Strike of 1905, 
which spread to Finland from Russia, can be deemed as a spiritual turning 
point, which served to question the previous power structures in society. It was 
partly a result of the common national revolt against Russian autocracy but also 
of the domestic power struggles among Finns. During this era, the concept of 
democracy was defined at the collective (in contrast to individual) level in 
reference to the emancipation of the Finnish nation (Arola 2003, 15–16). The 
unrests ended the first Russification period and compelled Nikolai II to comply 
with the November Manifesto, which overruled the oppressive February 
Manifesto and led to the abolition of the Estate-based Diet of Finland and, 
consequently, to the creation of the modern Parliament of Finland. In the societal 
sense, as Alapuro and Stenius (1989) suggest, the Finnish nation was largely 
created by civic popular movements, which played a crucial role in educating 
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Finns and provided the emerging nation with an intellectual or material 
maturity to declare independence in 1917.  
 
Civic or Civil Society? 
The civil war between the socialist Red Guards and the non-socialist White 
Guards (or Civil Guards) in the spring of 1918 had also a major influence on the 
development of Finnish civil society. The civic, educational, cultural, and sports 
organizations, as well as the cooperative system polarized according to political 
lines hand in hand with rest of the nation (Harju 2006, 18). This was followed by 
the wave of right-wing radicalism experienced in Europe in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, which radiated also into the civic milieu of Finland. Numerous new 
associations were created, some of which – the Lapua movement being a prime 
example – were extremely rightist (Siisiäinen 1992, 28), while altogether over 
3,000 leftist organizations were closed down (Bergholm 2001; Siisiäinen 1996, 
40). 
After the two wars between Finland and the Soviet Union, a great nationalist 
spirit set the rebuilding of the nation in motion. According to Harju (2006, 20–
21), the enthusiasm to take action had a lucid impact also on civic organizations; 
they offered a change from daily work and momentarily helped people take 
their minds of the traumatic experiences of those wars. The Karelians, who were 
forced to evacuate from the lost territory, joined actively the existing 
organizations but also brought their own associations with them. In the absence 
of competing activities, an exceptional amount of time and energy was put into 
associational activities.  
On the other hand, the Moscow peace treaty of 1944 dictated severe 
restrictions on the freedom of association. Almost 3,000 associations, braded as 
rightists or otherwise antagonistic towards the Soviet Union, had to be closed 
down (Kokko & Rantatupa 2000, 13). Even then, the number of new associations 
multiplied almost fivefold in one year from 1944 to 1945 (Siisiäinen 1996, 40). A 
major share of the increase consisted of socialist and communist organizations; 
fuelled by the rise of the communist movement and the establishment of the 
Communist Party, a total of 2,500 organizations were established in 1944–1948. 
Another important faction consisted of numerous cooperative and international 
organizations, such as the Finland-Soviet Union Society and the Finnish Peace 
Committee. Even though short-lived, the left wing cycle of protest movements, 
supported by the presence of the Soviet Control Commission in Finland, 
managed to develop a network of voluntary associations to capitalize their 
people’s front strategy (Siisiäinen 1991, 2; 1992, 23, 28; 1996, 40–41; Kokko & 
Rantatupa 2000, 13.) 
Kokko and Rantatupa (2000, 13) put forward that associational foundation of 
the modern Finnish civil society was created at the turn of 1950s and 1960s, 
when both the social life and the democratic system strengthened as Finland 
managed to normalize its domestic situation and establish itself as a part of the 
 134   
 
international community. Also numerous so-called new social movements were 
founded from the 1960s onwards. At this stage, Finland moved permanently 
from the epoch of popular movements to that of civic organization (Harju 2006, 
23) – for instead of mobilizing the masses the foci of the new social movements 
were narrower. They created an alternate publicity in order to set up a discourse 
and an opportunity structure, which would allow previously ignored groups, 
such as youth, women, and minorities, to enter the political arena as collective 
actors (Siisiäinen 1996, 45–46; Ilmonen 1998). 
The associational networks that had once been created to support the nation-
building project became differentiated into a party-political associational culture 
during the decades that followed (Ylä-Anttila 2007, 46). Memberships in political 
parties rose to their highest and the competition between the political lines led to 
the establishment of hundreds of party-political associations (Harju 2006, 23). 
Organization replaced movements, verticality took over horizontality, and 
systematic planning replaced spontaneous creativity (ibid.). Also, the share and 
status of welfare organizations gained more strength as great many 
organizations were founded on the premise of dialogue between the welfare 
state and civil society. The civil society sector became integrated closely with 
public institutions through systematic cooperation, which in turn led to the 
increase in number of operational sectors and widening of the entire 
organizational domain.  
The share of party-political associations began to implode during the 1980s. 
As many of the traditional, large organizations began to lose members, civic 
activities became more disintegrated. More and more small culture, sport, and 
other recreational or lifestyle associations with very specific agendas were 
formed (Siisiäinen 1996, 42; Itkonen 2000, 16–17). As a result, the already high 
level of social trust grew even higher, while the confidence in government and 
state authorities fell deeply (see Newton 2001, 209–210).  
Increased apoliticalness did not, however, mean that active citizenship 
would have disappeared; it merely changed its shape and channeled differently 
than before. Instead of political action, civic activity became centered on 
individual development and the feeling of togetherness (Ylä-Anttila 2007, 46). 
This is in the core of what Stranius (2008a/b) calls light activism. The term is not 
meant to be belittling but refers to the everyday choices of an individual and 
action that does not fuse or commit to traditional structures. Light activism does 
not require associations or their leaders, and it is not interested in changing 
social structures, or public moral protest. As a result, civic activism becomes 
more about individuals’ ability to act and to politicize of new issues to the public 
and less dependent of a particular association’s resources. (Ibid.) 
Siisiäinen & Kankainen (2009) have observed that specialization has meant 
that instead of devoting one’s life to a certain cause on a daily basis, in many 
cases being a member of an association requires a much smaller investment. 
Unlike with the great popular movements of the past, to which many devoted 
   135 
 
much of their daily life, more specialized association requires smaller 
investments of one’s time and identity. This also makes it possible to belong to a 
number of associations simultaneously. As the average Finn belongs to 
approximately four different associations, there are around 20 million ‘members’ 
in the country. Even more importantly, new associations tend to interact less 
with the municipal and state authorities and institutions. Detachment from the 
large-scale popular movements, state-oriented activity and political life in 
general, breaks the traditional communicative channel to political decision-
making. (Ibid.; Itkonen 2000, 16–17.) 
 
Development of the State-Civil Society Relations 
When Finland finally emancipated firstly from the subordination of the Swedish 
monarchy and then from the Russian imperial rule, a conscious effort was made 
to create a strong state Hegelian-Snellmanian spirit in order to safeguard the 
security of the nation. Snellman adopted the Hegelian conception of societal 
order that made a distinction between state and civil society, but he did not see 
them as separate sectors of a society but rather as being different in their ethical 
orientations. For Snellman, civil society (medborgerligt samhälle) was a particular 
mode of moral action that comprised a “necessary moment in the state” (stat); 
i.e., in a particular society constituted by the state. An individual citizen 
(medborgare) was a member of civil society insofar as he tried to promote his own 
private interest as far as it did not hamper the freedom of the others, while a 
member of the state (stateborgare) oriented his actions to the common good and 
to the preservation of the state itself. (Snellman 1993, 333–335; Kettunen 2000, 
173.) Whereas civil medborgare acted law-abidingly, a statsborgare’s actions were 
based on deeper ethical values expressed in the national spirits (Pulkkinen 1989, 
128–131). The action in the state was thus conceived as the higher mode and 
value than the action in the civil society.  
For the Fennomans, in turn, there was more explicit identification of society 
with the state. They saw it was the will of the people that had legitimated the 
political power in the first place; the people had created the state, the powers of 
which were vested in the people. Accordingly, the society could not be defined 
through state-society distinctions but was rather seen as a sociological entity 
being self-evidently limited by the borders of the nation-state and the 
population within (Kettunen 2000, 163–164). However, for the very reason that 
the people were indeed free and so was their will, they needed governance and 
order that was established by the state (cf. Kettunen 2000, 173). A clearer 
controversy in the late nineteenth century could actually be found in the 
relations between the Fennomans and the Swedish-speaking Liberals, which 
may be seen to an extent as having concerned the relationship between the state 
and civil society (Pulkkinen 1989).  
By turning the nation into the highest source of power, Liikanen (1995) 
explains, the Fennomans gave rise to the modern democratic idea of a 
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hegemonic struggle for the right to represent the nation. In this process, the 
modern conception of a nation-state provided the frame for democracy (in 
Finnish: kansanvalta, literally: ‘nation’s power’) to be acted out based on the idea 
of ‘Finnishness’ as a bottom-up identity. The will of the people was not a mere 
celebration of ethno-cultural unity, but above all it gave an important impetus 
for the development of civil society and a political notion of citizenship. Civil 
society and the system of representation thus became the main stages of the 
political and cultural demarcation of an independent Finland; in building 
Finland as political and cultural entity, the popular movements of the era did 
not only build a nation but in so doing defined also its borders. (Ibid.) 
Perhaps the notion of a ‘civic state’ put forth by Götz and Hackmann (2003) 
could be appropriate to characterize the Finnish context, in which the synergy 
between the state and civil society is quite profound. Because civil society was 
seen to complement rather than challenge the state, it was understood early on 
that it provided a useful means to channel the state interest. This was the most 
apparent in terms of the friendship policy that was largely put in practice 
through paradiplomatic links across the border. A particularly peculiar role in 
the highly regulated CBC was played by the Finnish voluntary associations, 
which cooperated with official Soviet organizations despite considerable state 
control. Both sides must have experienced the obvious mismatch and 
asymmetries implied by the setting, which revealed both the privileged status of 
CSOs in Finland and the weakness of Soviet civil society, handicapped by the 
authoritarian structures of the Soviet regime (Liikanen 2004a). It was primarily 
the Finnish organizations linked to the project of building Nordic-type welfare 
states that became an important driver of paradiplomatic CBC. 
The relationship between CSOs and the state grew closer in the mid-1990s, 
when the state needed help in fighting against unemployment. Towards the end 
of the decade, civil society was invited to help in safeguarding the welfare 
services that the state had no resources to provide. In the beginning of the new 
millennium, civil society began to be seen in terms of consolidation of 
democracy and as a part of the broader European whole. The role of CSOs in 
CBC has reflected these trends. They were also trusted to deliver most of the aid 
work of the early 1990s. However, the opening of the border and the 
subsequently increased interaction revealed further differences between the two 
sides. Interaction exposed that there were major differences between the two 
countries not just in terms of the scales of problems to be tacked but also in the 
interpretative frames as well as in the assessment of problems and needs, in the 
leverage of civil society to have a say, and in the very operational spaces 
through which the work had to be carried out. All this made the basis for 
interaction asymmetrical and questioned the possibility for such different 
neighbors to have a compatible interpretative frame towards issues of common 
concern. 
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Finnish Peculiarities  
As a group, the Nordic countries rank high when it comes to social capital 
(Rothstein 2002), organizational participation (Dekker & van der Broek 1998), 
and civil society’s vitality (Salamon et al., 2004). There are, however, 
discrepancies also within the Nordic tradition. Wollebæk, Ibsen, and Siisiäinen 
(2010) observe that these differences can be traced to disparities in the socio-
political context during the early period of voluntary organization described 
above. In Finland, the first modern associations emerged at the end of the 
eighteenth century and towards the end of the nineteenth century, when wide 
social and political mobilization linked to the Finnish nation-building and state 
formation processes reached a significant segment of peasantry and the 
emerging rural and industrial working class (Stenius 1980; 1987; Alapuro 1988; 
Liikanen 1999).  
The process was influenced greatly by popular movements, from labor 
groups, religious organizations, consumers associations, cooperative societies, 
temperance groups to adult education societies, whose ambitious agendas 
riveted large shares of the population to action, the endeavors and objectives of 
which mirrored largely the societal challenges of each respective era (Siisiäinen 
1999a/b). Unlike the rest of the Nordic countries, Stenius (2010, 72) notes that 
Finland had a particular incentive to be obedient when under Russian rule, yet it 
is misleading to claim that the dutifulness of the Finnish voluntary associations 
would have been posed by tsarist rule. Quite the contrary, it was the Pax Russica 
of the nineteenth-century Grand Duchy of Finland that created a framework for 
the popular mobilization and organization (Alapuro 2010b, 309). 
The strong and long-lasting social movements coupled with the strong role 
of the state as a provider and financier of social welfare services has led to 
distinctive patterns of civil society development in Finland. A great many new 
organizations were founded in close cooperation with the government in the 
building of the Nordic-type welfare state; consequently, the civil society sector 
became closely integrated to the public institutions through systematic 
cooperation. The economic crisis of the 1990s and the related problems in 
employment and financing of the welfare state highlighted the potential of 
voluntary and civic associations (Pättiniemi 2008, 15). The cause of these 
problems was not social or strongly related to a decay in social capital or a 
decline in social trust (Newton 2001, 210). On the contrary, the economic and 
social restructuring of the early 1990s, as well as Finland’s eventual entry into 
the EU in 1995, paved the road to the civil society boom of the late 1990s. There 
were more associations established in Finland in the 1990s than ever before; 
more than 2000 per year (Siisiäinen 1999b, 139). Unlike Putnam’s (1995) thesis 
would suggest, thanks to its unusually vibrant association life, civil society in 
Finland has continued to function soundly – at least if understood in terms of 
social capital.  
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In order to safeguard the future of welfare services, from early 1990s 
onwards the Finnish state contracted more and more CSOs to provide a 
significant share of these services (see Möttönen & Niemelä 2005, 3–5, 131–148; 
Matthies 2006, 82–88, 185). Such cooperation is typically centered on established 
activities of large-scale associations (Pättiniemi 2008) and predominant in the 
areas where private entrepreneurship did not proved profitable. Maukkonen 
(2005, 1) puts forward that this has made the CSOs more important socio-
political actors but concurrently hauled them also closer to becoming a part of 
the public hand, as instruments to implicate state politics under contracts and 
deepened thus the discrepancy between the organizations’ own interests and the 
expectations from the environment, where the government functions as the 
regulator of activities. In addition, through its economic modernization and 
increased competition with the other actors, the third sector has become 
incorporated also more closely into markets (Matthies 1999, 40–45.), which has 
put its underlying ethical aspect to the test (Pättiniemi 2008, 16–17). 
The third sector in Finland is commonly understood by terms best describing 
the sector (general interest, ethical, social, voluntary, and non–profit) and the 
main principles of its organizations: solidarity, individual, freedom of choice, 
and flexibility (Harju 2000, 11–14.). Siisiäinen (2005, 244) notes that Finland may 
well be the only country in the world that has a comprehensive, virtually wall-
to-wall, official register of associations. Registration allows the associations to 
manifest themselves as formal (well-established and well-organized), but it also 
makes them legal entities with full standing under the law; upon registering, 
associations become legal entities. As, added to this, many associations are 
portrayed as dovish, loyal, obedient, and legalistic (i.e., having a strong faith in 
power of edification and law), as well as by their acquiesce to cater to state 
and/or municipalities when directing their activities (ibid.; Stenius 2010, 51), it 
comes as no surprise that the registered associations, given the weakness of 
alternative form of collective action, have become preferred partners for the 
public sector in all subfields of civil society (Siisiäinen & Blom 2009).  
As such, the CSOs have a good channel to get their voice heard in the 
decision-making bodies where the official agendas are developed. The state, in 
turn, trusts that the CSOs have the best knowledge of the local and regional 
level conditions and is therefore willing to hear what the CSOs have to say. 
Since the international relations are discussed and developed on the national 
level, CSOs need special lobbing structures to be able to influence national 
authorities. The coalitional structures allow CSOs to work on the Finnish 
national level and intermediate the opinions of the local level CSOs.  
The Finnish civic culture is also characterized by its considerable high-level 
of volunteer input (Figure 18), while the share of the paid workforce is clearly 
lower than many other Western countries. This has been explained by the 
sector’s general orientation in policy advocacy rather than direct service delivery 
(Helander et al. 1999, 65–66), or more profoundly, by a commonly felt 
   139 
 
responsibility for contributing to the necessary division of labor (Stenius 2010, 
51). Siisiäinen and Blom (2009) assert that in addition to a combination of active 
voluntary associations, Finnish civil society is characterized by individual actors 
with many association memberships as well as citizens who, on average, are 
unconcerned about political citizenship and disinterested in using alternative, 
less conventional repertoires of acting collectively (ibid.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the 2012 statistics of the National Board of Patents and Registration 
of Finland, the Finnish third sector totals some 133,000 organizations, of which 
associations represent by far the largest group at close to more than 15 million 
members31 and 181,500 employees (Pättiniemi 2008; National Board of Patents 
and Registration of Finland 2012). The major source of income of third sector 
organizations is private donations (57.9 per cent of the total income), followed 
by public sector funding (36.2 per cent) (Kari & Markwort 2004). Thanks to the 
prevalence of the hierarchical associational model consisting of a three, four, or 
even five-tier model of the associational activity (consisting of village, 
municipal, district, national, and potentially international associations), the 
                                                          
30 The membership figures in church or other religious organizations is misleading as according to 
the official statistics, 87.9 per cent of the Finnish population belong to the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in 1990, and the same figure in year 200 was 85.1 per cent. In addition, 1.1 per cent of the 
population belonged to the Finnish Orthodox Church on both occasions. The Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of has a special legal position as a national church in the country alongside with the Finnish 
Orthodox Church. All the other denominations operate either as registered religious communities or 
associations. 
31 Many Finns, or persons residing in Finland, belong to more than one association during their lives. 
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decisions, ideas, and priorities, as well as funding tend to link even the most 
peripheral areas to the center (Siisiäinen & Kankainen 2009; Wollebæk, Ibsen & 
Siisiäinen 2010, 139–142). At its best, this hierarchical model functions in two 
directions, providing on the one hand the center with an opportunity to steer the 
provinces and the periphery but on the other hand creating a channel for the 
periphery to communicate with and have an impact on the center. (Ibid.) 
 
3.3.5 Civil Society in Russia  
 
Trust is good, control better. (Vladimir Lenin) 
 
The history of civil society development in Russia differs greatly from that in 
Finland. The state-civil society relations have been incessantly tense due to such 
traditional Russian/Soviet political practices as the centralization of power, low 
levels of political representation and participation, and weak local government. 
The Soviet epoch was the most oppressive period for civil society and the civic 
culture demanded by it. Totalitarianism shoved its manifestations on the 
outskirts or outside of the public space; all forms of citizens’ cooperation were 
under severe ideological control of the state, which exercised its power through 
local party organizations. However, this pseudo public sphere of action never 
genuinely attracted Soviet people. Dissatisfaction with the state manifested itself 
in the most positive cases as the emergence of alternative subcultures but more 
often as an increased cynicism, apathy, suicide, and alcoholism (Pursiainen 
1998). 
When access to public space was blocked, all self-motivated activities and 
expressions of opinion of the people took place instead within the family and 
among friends rather than at the societal level. Dense social networks and 
interpersonal relations were the primary form of social bonds among people. It 
has been suggested that these informal blat32 networks did actually influence the 
civil society development negatively by contributing to the growth of 
conformism and political indifference due to their horizontal character and 
density (see McIntosh Sundstrom & Henry 2005). Network’s clientelistic 
character and profusion of small-scale do-it-yourself services reflect the Soviet 
society’s ‘negative social capital’ (Taylor & Wrenn 2003, 6–7), which largely 
barred informal networks from transforming into a ‘genuine’ civil society (cf. 
Ledeneva 1998; 1999; Alapuro & Lonkila 2000). 
Not until the economic reforms of perestroika, introduced in 1985 by Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev, did the civil society begin come out from cellars and 
kitchens and began to obtain more public forms. The perestroika period 
                                                          
32 The concept of blat (блат) appeared during the Soviet era to denote the use of informal 
agreements, exchange of services, personal connections, Party contacts, or black market deals to 
advance one’s own cause.  
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witnessed a mushrooming of grassroots movements – from about 30 registered 
organizations in 1987 (Struyk 2003, 11) to some 650,000 in 2000 (Rodriguez 2008) 
– and a sudden sense of euphoria and the belief that the transition to a market 
economy and democratic society would be simple and short (Skvortsova 2000). 
The upsurge was largely fuelled by the availability of Western funding, which 
was enthusiastically used to kick-start numerous CSOs, many of which then 
failed to maintain their activities much further. Despite that, in the midst of 
severe societal changes, the developing civil society played a crucial role as a 
social shock absorber and fostered much needed communal spirit. However, it 
played also a political role as the mobilization was fuelled by the need to seek 
representation of the people and to challenge Soviet authority. 
The transition, which resulted in dramatic changes in all spheres of social, 
economic, and political life, took an enormous toll on the nation. As the public 
sector had not been able to tackle social problems and provide adequate basic 
services, a burgeoning civil society had to face the daunting task of addressing a 
multitude of issues, many which are typically sheltered under the umbrella of 
the state, the private sector, or political parties (Dzhibladze 2006). The more 
ideological and political aspirations were overshadow by more practical work as 
the basic needs had to be secured before further political claims could be made. 
Also, involvement in old trade unions, sport associations, youth clubs, and 
political party organizations, all of which played crucial roles in the Soviet 
system, collapsed hand in hand with the Soviet state as a whole. 
Proliferation and popularization of associational activities was visibly 
propped up by the hundreds of millions of dollars of Western assistance 
provided most notably by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Open Society Institute (OSI)33 but also by the EU, 
most notably through Tacis funds. This massive financial support was directed 
towards the incipient civil society, which was seen as a potential vehicle for 
political change and consolidation of democracy. A number of writers (e.g., 
Sperling 1999; Mendelson & Glenn 2000; Henderson 2002; Bae 2005) have voiced 
opinions that Western assistance failed to contribute to the appearance of a 
strong civil society – at least not in the Western sense of the concept, but on the 
contrary, the funding resulted in an isolated community of civic activists who 
failed to build a dialogue with the authorities let alone establish effective 
networks amongst themselves. Whatever assessments of Western assistance are, 
the massive amount of money that was transferred to Russian CSOs played an 
important role in the proliferation of their number and in their 
professionalization as well as their institutional development. For many, 
accepting Western assistance was certainly a better option than accepting 
funding from the Russian authorities – if available – as in all likelihood the latter 
would have jeopardized their independence. 
                                                          
33 Since 2011, the network of Open Society Foundations (OSF). 
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The ideological control exercised by the communist party during the Soviet 
era discredited voluntary action in the eyes of many. The ghost of the Soviet 
Union is very real and apparent in the Russian imagination and the legacy of the 
bygone structures surrounding the church, social policy, kolkhoz, domestic ethos, 
and informal networks are in still strong in contemporary Russia. In contrast to 
many Western countries, particularly to Finland, the level of social trust within 
Russia is very low; according to a public survey carried out by the Leveda-
Center in 2008, only 22 per cent of the Russian population thinks that it is 
possible to trust other people (Public Chamber 2007, 61). The absence of social 
trust is alarming as it is probably the main component of social capital, which in 
turn is a crucial condition of social integration, economic efficiency, and 
democratic stability (Newton 2001, 202). The statist conception of state-society 
relations has gained a firm foothold amongst the population largely due to its 
promise of stability and claim of reducing the risk of anarchy (Hale 2002). The 
general public is still fairly uninformed and suspicious of non-state actors or 
simply does not believe in the ability of CSOs to make a difference.  
Only a fraction of Russians participate in civic activities (Figure 19). Many 
believe that by participating one has to give more than one gains and, given that 
the income level of most Russians is still relatively low and daily life 
demanding, ‘extra’ collective action and solidarity sounds unappealing. At the 
other end, the most highly paid members of Russian society seem detached from 
the “problems of others” as long as issues relevant to them are being actively 
solved (Public Chamber 2007, 77). It is thus individualism rather than solidarity 
that acts as the dominant modus operandi for many.  
 
 
 
 
 
As Nikolai Berdyaev (1915), a Russian early twentieth-century philosopher, 
stated in his psychological assessment of the soul of Russia, the Russian people 
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”desires not so much a free state, freedom within a state, as rather freedom from 
the state, freedom from concerns about worldly arrangements.” Different public 
opinion surveys have revealed that material wellbeing often ranks high on 
people’s perception of the most important features of democracy. Borodkina and 
Smirnova (2007) argue that the same applies to CSOs, as many Russian 
organizations are “mainly interested only in their own problems and do not pay 
enough attention to the interests of different social groups.” The situations is, 
however, getting better as the Russian middle class is becoming wealthier and 
also more and more concerned about the functioning of the society as a whole. 
In 2006, 10–15 per cent of Russian citizens were involved in civil initiatives, but 
according to the Public Chamber’s (2007, 42) estimates the figure could reach to 
somewhere between 25 to 50 per cent by 2016.  
The political system is manifested in particular in the relation between the 
state and society. Many of Russia's current difficulties arise out of the 
problematic nature of this very relationship. The state-civil society relations in 
contemporary Russia are far from true dialogue and cooperation. The 
relationship is far from a simple dichotomy of two opposed blocks, and it is only 
through a complicated network of mediating structures that the level of local 
voluntary association encounters federal-level state politics (Liikanen 2008, 9). 
The activities of CSOs are regulated by several ground laws and acts, which 
describe the legal types of associations and define what is meant by 
philanthropy and voluntary action. Although CSOs’ sphere of action, according 
to the basic legal acts, is quite broad, there are, in fact, no legally fixed 
mechanisms for CSOs’ participation in policy formulation or implementation. 
Corruption and the unavailability of an effective court system to be used by 
the civil society in situations of unfair government actions or spending, posses 
serious impediments for the success of any influential civil society and the 
implementation of the rule of law. What also stands out is that the civil society’s 
relations with the State and the authorities vary depending on the area and the 
nature of the activity in question. While Russia is often referred to in the 
singular, it is important not to forget its regional and local dimensions, as 
political and social development as well as the influence of CSOs on political 
processes or public policy can vary essentially from one region to another, from 
one locality to the next. These regional differences, Belokurova et al. (2004) 
assert, are mainly caused by variations in such factors as institutional design, 
electoral situation, or intensity of elite competition. All in all, whether or not 
public authorities see CSOs as a source of additional legitimacy or assistants in 
social problem solving makes a crucial difference in this process. 
The Putin’s presidency, particularly its last years, were marked by a 
considerable change in federal rhetoric regarding CSOs and their action towards 
civil society. Initiated in 2001, all-Russian Civic Forum can be considered as the 
first attempt of federal authorities to accept the existence of CSOs, yet it can 
simultaneously be taken to symbolize the return of the state as the main 
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constructor of civil society. In his State of the Nation Address to the Federal 
Assembly at the Kremlin on May 16, 2003, Putin spelled out his vision on what 
Russia should become: 
 
Russia should be and will be a country with a developed civil society and sustainable 
democracy, where human rights, civil and political rights will be fully ensured. 
Russia should and will be a country with a competitive market economy, a country 
where property rights are securely protected, and economic freedoms allow people to 
work honestly and earn without fear or limit. 
 
Following President Putin’s suggestion in September 2004, the Russian State 
Duma approved the creation of a new institution, the Public Chamber (or Civic 
Chamber, in Russian: Общественная палата) according to the federal law on 
the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation # 32. Its creation was officially 
marketed as an additional opportunity for the development of civil society and 
strengthening democracy in the country. In practice, the Chamber was given the 
task of analyzing draft legislation and the activities of the parliament and the 
federal and regional administrative bodies. It received heavy criticism from the 
start for most of its members were selected by President Putin, who reserved the 
position of some sort of a collective ombudsman for himself. 
Later on, federal authorities nonetheless displayed their suspicious attitude 
towards different forms of citizens’ associational activity claiming that certain 
CSOs were purposefully undermining the Russian state with the help of 
Western funds. The federal center declared that the variety of citizens’ efforts 
aimed at solving serious social problems would no longer remain unnoticed and 
unsupported and that the Russian state will not allow foreign political forces to 
use CSOs for their own narrow purposes. 
The 2005 amendments to existing federal law regulating CSOs’ operations 
provoked major public debate on whether the state was trying to restrict the 
freedom of civil society in the country. According to the new Federal Law # 18-
FZ On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, 
all Russian NGOs, as well as all foreign NGOs operating in Russia, were 
required to undergo an additional procedure of re-registering with the 
authorities and to submit detailed reports on financial and other aspects of their 
routine work. The Law was signed by President Putin in January 2006 and came 
into effect in April that year. This development sparked, particularly in the 
West, an intense debate over President Putin’s model of ‘managed democracy.’ 
A number of civil society activists feared that the authorities would use the new 
requirements as an instrument for getting rid of the organizations that criticize 
federal or regional policies. 
Volk (2006), for example, immediately labeled the new law as an “attack on 
freedom and civil society” and argued that it embodies the ruling elite fears of 
the ‘color revolutions’ on post-Soviet space, where NGOs took the center stage. 
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The new requirements also restrict who may form an organization within 
Russia, which activities a particular organization may engage in, where it can 
operate, and threatens to impose severe penalties and sanctions on those failing 
to re-register and submit the required information. Furthermore, all foreign 
NGOs now have to notify the Federal Registration Service of their incoming 
funds as well as the way in which these funds are spent.  
Even if intense for a period of time, the debate faded away surprisingly fast, 
as voices stressing the repressive character of the law indicated that the panic 
was, for the most part, exaggerated. Re-registration did not entail serious 
consequences apart from the closure of those CSOs that had been long inactive34. 
For many well-established CSOs, providing the requested information was not a 
major predicament. However, for the thousands of small grassroots 
organizations operating on shoestring budgets in the small villages and towns in 
the peripheral parts of the country already the mere imperative to travel to a 
major city in order to register not to mention the need to hire professional help 
to rewrite their charters to better comply with the new mandates, resulted in 
extra expenditures that left many organizations struggling to meet. This in turn 
widened the already existing gap between the well-organized CSOs in the large 
cities and the less proficient organizations located in smaller towns and more 
remote regions. Furthermore, as Struyk (2003, 11) notes, there are also sharp 
variations in sector development across Russia’s 83 federal subjects. 
Judging by the mere numbers, the transformation since Putin came to power 
(for the first time) has been quite drastic. Even though the number varies 
depending on the source, it seems to be safe to estimate that in year 2000 the 
number of registered Russian CSOs was upwards of half a million, while in 2012 
there only about 220,000 registered organizations (ICNL 2012). While some this 
reduction is due to the removal of those numerous CSOs that existed only on 
paper, the rest is certainly a result of the 2006 law that allowed authorities to 
shut down CSOs perceived to be a threat to Russia's “sovereignty, political 
independence, territorial integrity, unity, cultural heritage, or national interests.” 
As the formulation of the law was very ambiguous, it allowed the authorities to 
interpret and implement it arbitrary and close down organizations wantonly. If 
an organization could not be banned directly, the red tape in the form of all-out 
control, endless check-ups, and a stepped-up financial burden could be used to 
smother it (Volk 2006). Furthermore, simply the threat imposed by the law 
forced many organizations to self-sensor their own activities in order to avoid 
becoming a subject to excessive control or inspection by the authorities. 
On the one hand, many have failed to acknowledge that the new law has in 
fact created also more and, above all, better structured cooperation at least 
among certain CSOs, as well as making federal funding more available for civil 
                                                          
34 It has been estimated that only about 15 to 20 per cent of the Russian CSOs before the 2006 law was 
actually active. 
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society – even if on very selective basis. Authorities do especially welcome 
organizations dedicated to social issues that take on the traditional welfare 
functions of the state, while those even remotely critical towards the state have 
had to endure the force of the state's repressive machine. Nevertheless, the law 
led to several important initiatives in the sphere of state-civil society relations, 
most notably the establishment of the Public Chamber (the initiative which was 
copied in the regions afterwards) and the launch of the program of president 
grants that are distributed every year to financially support the most effective 
and hard-working CSOs – again according to state definition.  
The election of Dmitry Medvedev as President in 2008 gave hope that the 
legal framework for civil society would be improved. Indeed, the antagonistic 
rhetoric was toned down and some state grants became available also for critical 
organizations (such as the Moscow Helsinki group). President Medvedev also 
strengthened the role of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human 
Rights, an advisory panel established to assist the president in fulfilling his 
constitutional responsibilities and to help the development of civil society 
institutions in Russia, in so doing sidelining the Public Chamber. In June 2009, 
the State Duma adopted amendments to Russian Federal Law No. 7-FZ “On 
Non-Commercial Organizations” from 1996. These amendments made a number 
of changes, including easier reporting, audit, and registration procedures for 
small organizations (ICNL 2012).  
Nevertheless, a new and concerning example about Russia's disregard for it 
international law commitments and attempts to restrict civil actions in that 
country was witnessed first in early June 2012, shortly after Vladimir Putin had 
regained the presidency. The bill "On Introducing Amendments to Certain 
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of the 
Activities of Non-commercial Organizations Performing the Function of Foreign 
Agents" was passed in the Russian Duma with overwhelming support – and 
with minimal public debate. According to the Duma website35, out of the 378 
deputies who voted on the bill in the 450-seat lower house of parliament, only 
three voted against it and one abstained. The opposition boycotted the voting. 
The upper house of the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council, approved 
the bill one week later.  
The law came into effect in November 2012 and now obligates civil society 
advocacy groups that receive foreign funding to register with the Justice 
Ministry as "foreign agents" or risk heavy fines and imprisonment. In rhetoric, 
such a label undoubtedly fuels suspicion and brings back the Cold War-era spy 
game. In practice, the new law is feared to increase the administrative burden 
for CSOs, to open CSOs up to excessive government oversight, to curtail 
citizens’ rights to peaceful association and assembly, and impact negatively the 
broader international solidarity activities in the future. In their statement on the 
                                                          
35 www.duma.gov.ru 
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new law, the Steering Committee of the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum stated 
that the “[i]nternational donor community has channeled billions of Euros into 
Russia over the past decade, much of it directly to the Russian government” and 
asked that “[d]oes this mean that the government are foreign agents?” The 
statement on the amendments to the Russian NGO law by spokesperson of the 
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, in turn, noted that the adoption of 
the NGO law came “amidst several developments that limit the space for a 
vibrant civil society in Russia.” It further stated that the EU follows also closely 
the initiative to limit certain types of the content on the internet, which risks 
infringing upon the freedom of expression. 
In addition to the new law, a number of other restrictions have been enacted 
since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency. These included 150-fold and 
300-fold increases to existing fines for violating the rules on the participation in 
and organization of public protests for individuals and organizations 
respectively and the reintroduction of libel as a criminal offence in Russia, as 
well as increased Internet censorship and curbed freedom of expression. 
Moreover, in September 2012, Russia ordered the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to halt its work in Russia, alleging that it had been 
meddling in domestic politics by providing grants for election monitoring and 
other programs. (ICNL 2012.)  
 
Post-Soviet Transformation and Civil Society36 
As described above, civil society is a social construct often invoked in debates on 
democracy, governance, and intercultural understanding. As Mokre and 
Riekmann (2006) explain, in the West European context, the idea of civil society 
gives expression to the expectations of European citizens of more direct 
participation in Europe’s future and the collective choices it entails. With fiscal 
retrenchment, reduced redistributive outlays and the privatization of public 
services, the debate on civil society has increasingly focused on its role in 
economic life and in the support of social welfare policies. This debate suggests 
that as a political and increasingly economic force, CSOs are often seen as a 
mirror image of an increasing lack of confidence in the capacity of traditional 
governance modes to address problems of modern societies.  
Within the context of post-socialist transformation, civil society is understood 
not only as a democratizing force but also as an actor that can compensate for 
state ‘dysfunctionality’ (Fritz 2004). Particularly in Russia, reforms have 
dismantled much of the state’s public social welfare systems, shifting the onus of 
responsibility to the local level and to families. At the same time, many aspects 
of care have been privatized, but as the market mechanisms in Russia are far 
from perfect they have been largely incapable to fill the myriad gaps left by the 
withdrawal of the Soviet state (Walker 2010, 647). As a result, CSOs have 
                                                          
36 This chapter is partly based on Scott and Laine (2012).  
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become deeply invested in providing basic services to those who have suffered 
the most  from economic change. Since 1991,  thousands of CSOs have emerged 
as  self‐help  groups,  support  groups  for  disadvantaged  and  disabled  persons, 
and  partners  of  local  governments  in  the management  and delivery  of  social 
services  (see Salmenniemi 2005; 2007).  In addition  to  these vital services, CSOs 
have also been engaged in areas of local development that encompass cultural, 
educational,  training,  and  business  development  activities  –  areas where  the 
state has shown little presence, either for ideological or practical reasons.  
Processes  of  political,  social,  and  economic  transformation  have  been  the 
focus of considerable research activity since the collapse of state socialism. The 
apparent problem has, however, been that in most cases progress in Russia has 
been measured with  a Western  yardstick  and  according  to  criteria  based  on 
‘international  norms.’  As  Salmenniemi  (2008,  115)  notes,  the  Western  civil 
society  theory and post‐socialist  reality  tend not  to match up. Caution  should 
thus  be  exercised  when  applying  ‘Western’  generalizations  of  case‐specific 
empirical  findings  influenced  by  theories  of  democracy  –  and  based  on 
evolutionary  transatlantic experience –  rather  than on abrupt  systemic  change 
(Alapuro  2008;  Kocka  2004).  Such  ‘transformation  studies’  have  taken  civil 
society  as  a  democratizing  and  empowering  force  that  is  contributing  to 
institutional  change  and  the  redefinition  of  state‐society  relations  (Götz  & 
Hackmann 2003; Raik 2006), yet  its  social welfare and  economic  roles are  less 
well understood (see Chagin & Struyk 2004).  
The  assumption  that  post‐Soviet  transformation  is,  in  effect,  a  process  of 
transition  to  (Western)  democracy  in  the  sense  evoked  by  Przeworski  (2000) 
have been challenged by Alapuro’s (2008, 74) accurate observation that in post‐
socialist  societies CSOs had  to be  created or  revived more or  less at  the  same 
time  as  the  actors  in  state  institutions  were  redefined  and  as  the  relations 
between  the  two were  constituted;  that  is, both  the  rules of  the game and  the 
players who play the game had to be defined simultaneously. Thus, in order to 
comprehend Russian  civil  society’s  role  as  an  agent  of  social  innovation  and 
change, it is essential to understand the logics that inform its agendas as well as 
its embeddedness within more general societal contexts. After all, what matters 
is that civil society actors detect common social and political problems and are 
thereby  of  service  to  the  citizens  in  their  efforts  to  find  common  solutions 
(Stenius 2003, 17). 
Struyk  (2002),  Chagin  and  Struyk  (2004),  and  Anders  (2010)  have 
investigated  the  emergence of  social  economies within  the  context of Russia’s 
post‐Soviet  transformation.  Their  work  confirms  the  increasing  role  of  civil 
society involvement in the delivery of public goods and social welfare services. 
One  of  the  specificities  of  the  post‐Soviet  experience  is  the  need  to  find  new 
survival strategies based on  informal networks, the grey economy, and/or new 
forms of group solidarity given  the  lack of state support  (Round 2008; Walker 
2010). At the same time, there are serious constraints that affect the participation 
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of CSO  in Russia’s developing social economy. Among  the most significant of 
these is a frequent lack of local support and, at times, competition with local and 
regional  authorities.  Perhaps  more  important,  however,  is  the  question  of 
organizational  capacity  to  deliver  public  goods  to  large  sections  of  the 
population.  
Muñoz  (2010)  suggests  that  geographical  research  on  social  enterprise  can 
uncover  how  the  social  economy  creates  local  spaces  of  solidarity  under 
conditions of state retrenchment but also reflects the social conditions that affect 
local  development.  In  similar  fashion,  Ridley‐Duff  (2008)  puts  forward  that 
behavioral  aspects  play  a  central  role  in  understanding  how  legitimacy  and 
social capital are generated for social enterprise activities. In his view, CSOs can 
be seen as “complex centres of community‐building replete with economic and 
social  goals”  and  that  “social  rationality”  helps  understand  the  legitimacy  of 
social entrepreneurial activity and management practice (ibid., 301).  
 
 
3.4 SYNOPSIS: WHICH CIVIL SOCIETY? 
 
Recognizing  that  civil  society  does  indeed mean  different  things  to  different 
people is one of the keys to moving forward, because it moves us beyond false 
universals and entrenched thinking (Edwards 2004). This chapter has attempted 
to  clarify  this plurality. While  it  is  impossible  to  arrive  to  a universally valid 
definition  on what  civil  society  is,  the  review  presented  above  has  sought  to 
show  it  can  be.  The  division  between  ‘Western’  and  ‘Eastern’  conceptions 
obscures more  than  it  illuminates. There are great variations with  the  ‘West’ – 
the French model  is different  from  the English one  and  the German  tradition 
differs  from  the American  one. The  Finnish model  can  be  seen  as  a  sort  of  a 
hybrid borrowing from various traditions. 
Different  conceptions  are  based  on  different  interpretations  of  classical 
traditions. These  interpretations  lead  to different outcomes and expectation on 
what can be expected  from civil society. They provide a different  framing also 
for  this  analysis,  as  the potential  role of  civil  society  in CBC  is dependent on 
whether we are  talking about a civil society as a community of virtues or as a 
sphere of particular interests. What also stands out is that the current use of civil 
society has been moving away from the field of politics and state building. It has 
become a  sphere, an arena operating beyond  the confines of national societies 
polities and economies. What hold  it  together are not  the borders of a nation‐
state but rather ideas, values, networks, and social capital. 
 
3.4.1 State vis‐à‐vis Society  
An  independent civil society  forms  the basis  for  the state, yet civil society also 
requires  supportive,  enabling  legal  environment  to  sustain  itself  and develop. 
The modern nation‐state  can be  seen  as  a platform upon which  citizenship  is 
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expressed and where democracy is acted out from the bottom up. The political 
freedoms  together with  the  system of  representation, guarantees,  in principle, 
that the state represents the will of the people – the government consists of the 
people, is elected by the people, and works for the people. Active civil society, in 
turn,  is  seen  to have  a modernizing  and democratizing  function within  state‐
society relations (see Scott & Liikanen 2010, 424), though there is not necessarily 
causal relationship found between the two.  
Despite  in  the  increased  cross‐border and  transnational  links among CSOs, 
the  respective  Finnish  and  Russian  state  policies  seem  to  be  developing  in 
opposite directions. As long as the concept of civil society remains dependent on 
the concept of state, this will have an enormous impact on the leverage of civil 
society.  It  is hard  to  influence  the system  from outside, whereas  the closer  the 
linkage between  the  state and  civil  society,  the more government officials  can 
have  a  say  in  the  preconditions  of  civil  society  operations  by  way  of  state 
policies, regulations, and funding mechanisms. The state’s influence may either 
encourage or hinder civil society development. As Weber (1978) once suggested, 
the first step towards civil society is a civil state; i.e., a state that creates a setting 
in which a person wants  to become an active  citizen. Civil  society  is different 
from a society of citizens. The mere number of associations mean little if they are 
not run by active citizens.  
In  Finland,  a  strong  civil  society  has  become  an  inherent  part  of  Finnish 
participatory  democracy.  The  fundamental  provision  on  representative 
democracy is confirmed by the Constitution of Finland (1919/2000), section 2.1 of 
which states, “[t]he powers of the state in Finland are vested in the people, who 
are represented by the Parliament.” This is to say that the central government in 
itself does not have its own power but that political power in Finland is held by 
the  people.  As  J.  V.  Snellman  once  said,  no  independent  nation  deserves  a 
government  other  than  the  one  it  has,  or  in  other words,  that  the  quality  of 
government of every state corresponds to the level of civilization of that nation 
(OE 12.5.2006). Consequently, even if the link between the state and civil society 
in Finland is unusually close, at least according to the liberal understanding, in 
this sense, at least in principle, it is civil society that steers the state and not vice 
versa. 
Many  Members  of  the  Parliament  are  also  active  in  civil  society 
organizations, and there are legal means for interest and pressure groups to seek 
to  influence  and  shape  the  legislation  and  budgetary decisions. The media  in 
general,  and  the  press  in  particular,  plays  a  key  role within  civil  society  by 
providing an arena for political debate and representation and voice to citizens 
as well as by serving as a watchdog. This of course necessitates that there to be 
an enabling environment that allows them to do so; i.e., state power is not used 
to limit or control the media. 
While  in Finland CSOs are seen as serious partners  for  the public sector,  in 
reality, there are also small hitches. While the decision in principle approved by 
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the Council of State in March on improving the operational preconditions of the 
civil society37 must be taken as a positive signal, its application has been slow in 
practice.  The  first  report  on  the  realization  of  the  decision  in  principle  was 
provided to the Advisory Board on Civil Society Policy (KANE) in June 201038. It 
was  pointed  out  in  the  report  that  although  various  ministries  have  been 
developing processes and measures related to providing support in recent years, 
few  concrete measures  to  improve  the  financial  capacity  of  CSOs  have  been 
made. Similarly, the practices of consultation with CSOs have developed slowly 
or even worsened. 
Very few Ministries have a valid strategy or action plan for consulting with 
CSOs,  even  though  the  first  decision  and  related  governmental  policy 
definitions  were  made  already  a  decade  ago.  It  is  important  that  the 
involvement  civil  society  is  taken  into  account  in  the  ministries  in  strategy 
preparations and action planning, and this ought to be done already in the early 
phases of  the preparatory work as  to promote  the participation of citizens and 
CSOs and to allow extensive and broad ranging consultation between them and 
the state structures.  
As many CSOs interviewed for the purposes of this study confirmed, during 
the last few years the operating environment has actually changed for the worse 
and  their  prerequisites  to  operate  have  weakened.  The  economic  recession 
certainly played a role here, yet on the other hand there has even stronger need 
for work  carried  out  by  CSOs  during  tough  times.  For  non‐profits,  the  line 
between working  for  the public good  and  encouraging business  activities has 
become  ever  fuzzier. While  this has had  clear benefits,  it has  also meant  that 
CSOs need to follow the at times the rules of the public sector and at times the 
rules of the business world. 
In its 2010 report, the Advisory Board on Civil Society Policy evaluated itself 
in very positive  terms by stating  that  it has provided a  forum  for government 
and  civil  society  interaction  and  for  the  common  preparation  of  the  themes 
brought  up  in  the  2007  decision  in  principle.  It  was  stated  that  the 
implementation  of  the  decision  has  been  made  largely  with  the  KANEʹs 
framework,  whereas  the  ministries  have  launched  only  a  few  measures  by 
themselves.  In  related  further preparations,  the Advisory Board has suggested 
ways to strengthen participation, to clarify the role of civil society, and improve 
their economic preconditions. On June 20, 2012, the Council of State nominated a 
new Civil Society Policy Advisory Board, the aim of which is to encourage inter‐
agency cooperation. 
Even  if  one might  argue  that  the  respective  state  of  Finland  and  Russia 
aspires  to  sway  civil  society,  at  least  to  a  certain  extent,  based  on  its  own 
                                                          
37 Government Decree on the Advisory Board on Civil Society Policy 269/2007. 
38 Report available online (in Finnish) at http://www.kansanvalta.fi/Etusivu/Jarjestotjayhteisot/
Neuvottelukunta.  
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respective  interests  the  logic behind this desire to  influence civil society differs 
greatly. In Finland, it is understood that a vigorous civil society has to arise from 
the people and cannot be built by the state, yet the state can act in different ways 
in  steer  its  development.  State‐civil  society  relations  are  described  by  close 
cooperation, open dialogue, and consultation. This confirms  the  idealist vision 
according  to which  the  interests of  the state and  the citizen should be more or 
less the same; hence they should both be working towards the same end. Finnish 
civil society actors that affirm close connections to the state do not bear the risk 
of deepening the discrepancy between the expectations of state agencies as the 
sponsor,  organizer,  or  regulator  of  activities  and  the  organizations’  own 
interests: 
 
The support is given because the state thinks the work that has been done is so great, 
even  though  it  is  sometimes  critical  and more  radical  but  develops...  but  having 
radical views it develops a society, you need these kinds of organizations that’s why 
the money  is  given…  and we  can  continue  to  be  critical  even  though we  get  the 
money. (F #22) 
 
Nevertheless,  state  agencies  have  a  strong  impact  on  the  development  and 
promotion of  cooperation, and  it  is  clear  that  the more CSOs have alternative 
sources  of  funding  for  CBC  activities,  the  more  they  can  define  their  own 
strategies.  
The situation  is obviously more complex  in contemporary Russia, a context 
within which  state‐civil  society  relations  remain highly  contested. The  federal 
discourse  has  always  dominated  the  state  of  affairs  of  state‐civil  society 
relations. Russian leadership has repeatedly stated that its aim is modernization, 
not Europeanization, and thus CSOs working on the former but not on the latter 
stand a better chance in the eyes of state authorities. The absence of strong CSOs 
coalitions and associations does not allow local CSOs to advocate their interests 
on the national level. As a consequence, they have little influence on CBC state 
strategies  and  the  corresponding  bilateral  relationships.  Both  bottom‐up  and 
top‐down  processes  exits,  yet  while  the  former  process  has  not  necessarily 
meant  that  the CSOs  are actually being heard,  the  latter process  can be  taken 
merely a channel to tell the selected organization what to think.  
 
3.4.2 Civil Society as an Arena 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from what is described above. From civil 
dialogue  come  great  ideas  that  can  lead  to  important  solutions. While not  all 
civil  society organizations  are necessarily  civil nor do  they necessarily pursue 
the common good, the democratizing role of civil society as a whole cannot be 
denied. By virtue of their mere existence as autonomous actors, the various types 
of CSOs  have  pluralizing  effect  and  consequently  strengthen  the  institutional 
arena  and  the  entire  society. As Mercer  (2002,  8)  explains,  “more  civic  actors 
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means more opportunities for a wider range of interest groups to have a ‘voice,’ 
more autonomous organizations  to act  in a  ‘watchdog’  role vis‐à‐vis  the state, 
and more opportunities for networking and creating alliances of civic actors to 
place pressure on the state.” Given that many CSOs work at the grassroots level 
and  include  marginalized  groups,  they  not  only  widen  (in  social  and 
geographical  terms)  but  also deepen  (in  terms  of personal  and organizational 
capacity) possibilities for citizen participation (ibid.).  
This  being  said,  civil  society  remains  one  of  the most misunderstood  and 
misused  concepts  there  is. The  reason  for  this  is, however, obvious. What has 
been meant by the term has fluctuated considerably through time. In addition, 
the  concept  continues  to mean very different  things  in different countries and 
languages. Using it in a global, transnational, or even cross‐border context easily 
obscures more than  is  illuminated. As a concept,  it remains normative,  loaded, 
complex, and context dependent. The liberal democratic assumptions that often 
shine through Anglophone literature on civil society only restrict the exploration 
of  this  complexity  and  limit  the  extent  to which  these  studies may  actually 
engage with broader debates  about  the politics of development. A  less value‐
laden and a more contextualized approach  is needed  to better understand  the 
role, both political and societal, that various civil society organizations (not just 
NGOs) play in different contexts. 
Looking back to the very beginning and going back to the basics, the concept 
of civil society is very revealing in this respect. The largely undisputed linkage 
to the concept of the state, which has formed the very basis of the Western (post‐
Hegelian)  though  should  be  rethought  or,  at  least,  broadened  as  to  allow  for 
more  innovative  solutions  to  issues  commonly  restricted within  the  national 
frame. After all, civil society is a social construct invoked not just in debates on 
democracy and governance but also with respect to intercultural understanding, 
progress, and social cohesion. 
Civil  society  preceded  the  state. Aristotle  knew  no  concept  of  state  as we 
know it today. His koinonía politiké, just as civil society today, was a coercion‐free 
association  that channeled  the collective pursuits  to serve  the common goal of 
attaining  a  good  society. Not  until, most  notably,  the  Scottish  Enlightenment 
thinkers, was a clearer distinction developed between a nonpolitical civil society 
and  the  state. No matter what  the  linkage  – be  it  juxtaposition,  symbiosis,  or 
something in between – it restricts the concept of civil society within the frame 
of a particular nation state.  In so doing,  this  limits civil society’s characteristic 
intent of building an association of free, equal, and like‐minded persons united 
not by a citizenship but by ethos. 
Is  society  really  comprised  of  sectors? The  commonly used  concept  of  the 
third  sector  is misleading  in  two  crucial  respects;  it  is not  the  third,  and  it  is 
really not even a sector. Through recent years, the borders between the public, 
private,  and  the  community  sectors  have  become  increasingly  blurred.  A 
substantial amount of practices and new organizational arrangements that blend 
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their own missions either with business practices or public service production 
have emerged, creating something that is now referred to as a ‘fourth sector.’ 
While the three‐sector model presented above surely helps us to make sense 
of society,  the borders  it  implies remain arbitrary. Civil society  is not so much 
embedded  in  the  third sector as  it  is  linked  to  the processes  that  that produce 
social capital and common action. As Gilbert  (2004, 116)  rightly suggests, “[i]f 
state‐supported nonprofit groups enlarge the social capital of civil society, then 
why  not  for‐profit,  company  sponsored  bowling  teams.”  The  economist  term 
‘non‐profit sector’ is misleading, as civil society has been and remains a political 
concept.  
Inspired by the model put forth by CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen 
Participation, this study aims to conceptualize civil society rather as an arena, a 
public space or  realm where diverse societal values and  interests  interact. The 
borders  of  this  space  are  complex,  fuzzy,  blurred,  negotiated  and  yet  easily 
penetrable as people come together to discuss and seek to influence the broader 
society. As such, it does not belong to the distinct arenas of the market, state or 
family but exists where these amalgamate (Figure 20). There are clear overlaps 
and incalculable transfers between the different arenas. For some organizations 
located  at  or  near  the  border,  these  distinctions  form  the  very  core  of  their 
existence. Social economy organizations  that have both value and profit‐based 
goals are good examples of this. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Civil society as an arena with fuzzy borders 
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Civil society is thus the arena that occupies the space where the other arenas of 
the  society, namely  the  family,  the  state, and  the market,  interact and overlap 
and where people associate to advance common interests. To associate refers to 
uncoerced  and  self‐generating  collective  action  that  is  not  part  of  the  formal 
political  decision‐making  process,  controlled  directly  by  state  institutions,  or 
dependent  from  the  state  interests. While  it  is  true  that voluntary associations 
form  the  basic  building  blocks  of  Western  notions  of  civil  society  and  the 
Putnamian idea of their ability to foster social capital is by now well established, 
one  cannot  but  ponder  whether  participation  in  associations  really  makes 
individuals more  ‘civic’ and active. Could it simply be that active citizens tend 
to  join  associations more  often  their  less  engaged  counterparts?  The  verb  ‘to 
associate’ is used here to refer to the ability and the desire of people to bond and 
relate  to  one  another,  whether  under  the  umbrella  of  a  registered,  formal 
organization or in the form of more spontaneous demonstration. 
The  civil  society  arena more generally  is part of  a  complex dual  transition 
from industrial to postindustrial society and from national state to transnational 
policy regimes (Anheier 2008a). The further  it develops, the further  it comes to 
comprise not  just an  increased number and range of groups and organizations 
but also increased linkages in between. This only amplifies the corrective voices 
of civil society as a partner  in governance and  the market  (Connor 1999). Civil 
society should not be seen only passively, as a network of institutions, but also 
actively, as the context and product of self‐constituting collective actors (Cohen 
& Arato 1992, xviii). It occupies the space reserved for the formation of demands 
(input) for the political system and to which the political system has the task of 
supplying  answers  (output)  (Bobbio  1989,  25).  In  this  context,  individuals  act 
collectively  in a public sphere and  form  the public opinion, understood as  the 
public  expression  or  agreement  or  dissent  concerning  institutions,  which 
circulates  through  the media. As  Bobbio  (1989,  26)  exemplifies,  a  totalitarian 
state  absorbs  civil  society  in  its  entirety  and  is  thus  a  state  devoid  of  public 
opinion.  
While  the  concept  of  civil  society  is  heavily  NGOalized,  civil  society  is 
comprised also of various other types of organizational forms. These include but 
are  not  restricted  to,  activist  groups,  charities,  clubs,  community  foundations 
and  organizations,  consumer  organizations,  cooperatives,  free  media, 
foundations,  non‐profit  organizations  (NPOs),  policy  institutions,  political 
parties,  private  voluntary  organizations  (PVOs),  professional  associations, 
religious  organizations,  social  enterprises,  support  groups,  trade  unions,  and 
other voluntary associations. The term civil society organization (CSO) is used in 
this study to refer all of these forms.  
A  framework  that places  less emphasis on organizational  forms and allows 
for  a  broader  focus  on  the  functions  and  roles  of  informal  associations, 
movements, and  instances of collective citizen action makes it more difficult to 
dictate strictly who is in and who is out. However, only such an action/function‐
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oriented definition  is able  to  take  into account  the entire  range of civil society 
actors.  As  Wollebæk  and  Strømsnes  (2008)  suggest,  organizations 
institutionalize  rather  than generate  social  capital. The  representation of one’s 
interest may  thus no  longer need  to  take an associational  form as  the “specific 
activity  is more  important  than  the  framework within which  it  is carried out” 
(Wollebæk & Selle 2005, 214). It is thus more important for civil society actors to 
detect common social and political problems and “thereby, perhaps be of service 
to the citizens in their efforts to find common solutions” (Stenius 2003, 17). 
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4 Europeanization of 
Cooperation 
The  two  main  concepts  of  this  study,  border  and  civil  society,  which  are 
discussed  above  have  become  coupled  in  exemplary  fashion  within  the 
European neighborhood‐building project. The role of CSOs is crucial in bridging 
the gaps created by borders and bordering. They provide a powerful driver for 
building  neighborly  relations  in  terms  of  people‐to‐people  contacts  across 
borders even when under a tense political climate. The civic neighborhood they 
fashion  challenges  grand  scale  policy  proposals  by  creating  an  alternative 
avenue  for  cooperation. Hence, by  engaging  the  civil  society, EU policies and 
programs  acquire  concrete  and  real‐life  content,  helping  to  bring  the  ‘ring  of 
friends’  closer  to  the EU also  in mental  terms. As  it  is  commonly  stated  these 
days,  the  EU  needs  civil  society  in  order  for  its  own  ambitious  visions  to 
succeed. With  its Neighborhood  Policy,  the  EU  has  put  forth  an  attempt  to 
extend its influence beyond its own borders and manage this transnational space 
under construction. What  is  less clear  is  to what extent CSOs are able  to grasp 
the opportunities provided by the EU or to what extent they even need the EU 
to begin with.  
This  chapter  focuses  on  this  paradigm  in  the  case  of  the  Finnish‐Russian 
border.  It  explains  what  is  meant  by  Europeanization,  how  the  frame  of 
cooperation has actually changed since Finland joined the Union, and how civil 
society has been  incorporated  into EU structures and policies. As discussed  in 
chapter two, the role that CSOs can be expected to play in cooperation across the 
external borders of  the EU depends on how  these borders  are viewed  and  to 
what European  integration and neighborhood‐building  is expected  to  lead. All 
this may appear in a very different light depending on what the EU and Europe 
are understood to be by nature. This is explored next.  
 
 
4.1 UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION 
 
In order to discuss the actual and potential roles of civil society in the European 
Union, one is first required to understand the very unique nature of the Union 
per se; i.e., how the process of European integration has affected its borders and 
cooperation across them. Henry Kissinger famously asked whom he had to call 
to call Europe. Madeleine Albright proclaimed that to understand Europe, you 
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had  to  be  a  genius  –  or  French.  Jacques  Delors  used  to  call  the  EU  an 
“unidentified political object”. It was not until July 2007 that the President of the 
European Commission José Manuel Barroso gave a more specific answer to the 
age‐old  question  by  characterizing  the  EU  as  the  “first  non‐Imperial  empire” 
(Barroso 2007a/b). But what does that mean? 
 
4.1.1 Are We Rome Yet? 
Europe not synonymous with the European Union, but it is undeniable that all 
countries generally considered to be ‘European’ are still influenced by the EU no 
matter what their particular membership status might be (Walby 1999). The EU 
is the most developed and successful form of continental integration seen today. 
It  provides  a  new  cooperative  framework, which  transcends  the  nation  state, 
and  thus  it  can  be  regarded  as  the  “most  radical  step  since  the  Treaty  of 
Westphalia,” which ushered in a world of modern nation‐states (Jhappan 2008, 
41).  Even  though  various  interpretations  exist,  few  deny  that  the  EU  is  a  sui 
generis entity, a “unique experiment embedding  the national  in European, and 
the  European  in  the  national”  (Laffan, O’Donnel &  Smith  2000,  74).  It  is  an 
economic  and  political  union  of,  at  present,  27  member  states.  This 
unquestionably  translates  to 27 different national  interests and different points 
of view on how  to  run  the Union, but on  the other hand  the diversity  is also 
bound  up  by  a  certain  consensus  about  the  key  values  guiding  its  actions, 
European values. 
If  the  primary  purpose  of  the  European  project  was  to  avoid  war,  then 
should it not be regarded as already completed? As NAFTA’s development – or 
lack of it – suggests, neoliberalism is also an inadequate impetus for continental 
integration. Neofunctionalism  is more valid but  also  insufficient. Whereas  the 
EU has  (too) many supranational  institutions, NAFTA, which has never set  its 
sights  on  governance,  has  none.  The  difference  in  the  success  of  these  two 
regimes suggests that integration cannot be based only upon spillover but needs 
to  be  managed  by  institutions;  deliberate  action  is  needed  for  encouraging 
integration. And, most of all,  there must be a vision, a grand  idea,  like  that of 
Hugo  and  Monnet,  of  what  is  to  be.  The  idea  of  Europe,  the  primary 
manifestation  of which  is  the  EU,  and what  it means  today  cannot  be  fully 
understood without looking back to history.  
The EU straddles the accepted categories of a political organization. It is not 
an  ordinary  international  organization  and  certainly  not  a  state  nor  a 
confederation;  it  is more  than merely  a  regime  or  a  club  but  clearly  far  from 
being  a  Gemeinshaft  (Peterson &  Shacketon  2002,  2).  Even  its  territory  is  not 
fixed;  its geographical, administrative, economic, and  cultural borders diverge 
(Zielonka 2008, 473). The EU  is a  supranational body, not a de  jure  federation. 
Even  though  it  possesses  some  attributes  of  a  federal  state,  its  central 
government is far weaker and more distant from the populace than that of most 
federations (say, Russia or the United States). The individual members of the EU 
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are  sovereign  states  under  international  law  and  retain  thus  the  right  to  act 
independently  in,  for  instance,  foreign policy related matters. Accordingly, EU 
institutions  are  designed  to  concurrently  both  overcome  national  interest  in 
favor  of  common  European  action  and  protect  national  sovereignty  (Kuus 
2011b, 1144).  
The EU  imbricates  the national  alongside  the  transnational  and vice versa, 
thereby illustrating bureaucratic processes on scales and contexts other than the 
nation‐state  (Kuus  2011b,  1141).  It  presents  a  new  form  of  multi‐level 
governance within which sovereignty is pooled, loyalties mingle, civil society is 
scattered  along  the  lines of  the nation‐states  and  regions,  the  common public 
sphere  is  largely  absent,  and  political  processes  are  characterized  by  peculiar 
temporality (Moisio 2007a, 538). It is a polity without a coherent demos, a power 
without  identifiable  purpose,  a  geopolitical  entity without  defined  territorial 
limits  (Zielonka 2008, 473–474). But as Kuus  (2011b, 1144) notes,  it  is precisely 
the  fact  that  the EU  is a complex polycentric and  transnational  institution  that 
does not fully fit into any of the models that makes it an illuminating example of 
transnational  governmentalized  geopolitics  –  it  is  exceptional  not  because  it 
illustrates existing models but because it defies them. 
The EU is discussed on daily basis, and many criticize its policies and actions, 
at times with little or no knowledge of what they really are. The EU, it is said, is 
a process, a project yet  to be completed, not a  ready‐made product.  It evolves 
with each passing day making  the analysis of  it a problematic  task. However, 
many researchers have taken on this challenge. The EU has been and  is one of 
the most  elusive  subjects  to  study  and,  hence,  a  topic  of  countless  academic 
writings. Particularly the scholars of International Relations but also of regional 
planning and political geography have competed in analyzing the EU’s potential 
geopolitical strategies and the developing spatial structure by providing diverse 
conceptualizations  of  the EU,  both  as  a political  space  and  as  an  actor  in  the 
world system (see, e.g., Browning & Joenniemi 2008; Bialasiewicz et al. 2009). 
Garton Ash  (2004) appropriately argues  that  for  the  reason  that “the EU  is 
called  the European Union”  emphasis added and not “the Freedom Union or 
the Peace Union or the democracy Union” the answer to questions on Europe’s 
territory must be, in the first place, geographical. Granted that its borders to the 
North, West  and South  are  relatively  fixed,  the question  concerns  the Eastern 
limits of Europe. This brings  the  role of Russia  to  the heart of  the debate. The 
other dimension of  the question  is not geographical but political: What  is  the 
end point of the European project? That is to say, Garton Ash (2004) clarifies, the 
kind of political community one envisions  for Europe determines how  far one 
wants  to  go  and  how  far  one  goes  clearly  determines  the  kind  of  political 
community Europe can aspire to.  
Zielonka  (2001)  distinguishes  two  contrasting  models  for  the  course  of 
European  integration. The  first – a  ‘Westphalian Super‐state’ encircled by hard 
and  fixed  external  borders  –  entails  the  concentration  of  power  (Brussels), 
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hierarchy, sovereignty, and clear‐cut identity. The second and more likely model 
– a “Neo‐medieval Empire, inspired by Wæver (1997) if not Bull (1977) with soft 
border  zones  in  constant  flux  –  involves  overlapping  authorities,  divided 
sovereignty,  diversified  institutional  arrangements,  and  multiple  identities 
(ibid., 509–510).  
In  2001,  Zielonka  deliberated  that  if  the  EU  indeed  wished  to  develop 
towards  a modern  state,  the  existing disjunction  between  the EU’s  functional 
(administrative  borders,  military  frontiers,  cultural  traits,  market  transaction 
fringes, etc.) and  territorial boundaries ought  to be  fixed. Otherwise, following 
Weberian reasoning,  it would perish  (Zielonka 2001, 511). While super statism 
has been widely  rejected,  the neo‐Westphalian  fantasy has been visible  in  the 
debates concerning the future of the EU’s external borders as the modern image 
of  territory  seems  to be a  taken  for granted as part of understanding on how 
politics should be organized spatially (Moisio 2007b, 90). 
The mere border aside, Zielonka (2006; 2008) has later come to the conclusion 
that  the Union  looks  and  acts  like  an  empire  thanks  to  is  attempts  to  assert 
political  and  economic  control  over  peripheral  actors  through  formal 
annexations  or  economic  and  political  domination.  The  EU’s  ‘imperial’ 
instruments,  Zielonka  (2008,  475)  specifies,  are  predominantly  economic  and 
bureaucratic  rather  than military  and  political.  Its  territorial  acquisitions  take 
place “by  invitation  rather  than  conquest”;  its main  strategy of  influence  is  to 
show by example and hope that its magnetism and assertiveness are enough to 
motivate  others  to  follow.  Accordingly,  with  their  concept  of  ‘cosmopolitan 
empire’  Beck  and Grande  (2007,  53)  underline  that  this  process  is  not  about 
national  demarcation  and  conquest  but  rather  about  overcoming  national 
borders,  voluntarism,  consensus,  transnational  interdependence,  and  the 
political added value accruing from cooperation. 
Browning (2005; Browning & Joenniemi 2008) builds on Zielonka but adds a 
third option, which he calls ‘Imperial Europe.’ Unlike the Westphalian metaphor 
that  depicts  EU  power  and  governance  as  relatively  uniform  throughout  the 
entire area,  the  Imperial model depicts a series of concentric circles emanating 
out  from  Brussels  and  representing  different  ‘degrees’  of  Europeanness  (see, 
e.g.,  Moisio  2003a,  83–84;  Aalto  2006;  Kuus  2007).  Power  and  subjectivity 
decrease with physical distance  from  the center,  in consequence relegating  the 
non‐candidate  countries  to  the  very  outer  circles.  Such  logic,  Browning  & 
Joenniemi (2008, 524) explain, has been evident most notable in the EU’s ‘peace 
mission’  that has not been  limited  to bringing stability  throughout Europe but 
extended beyond its external border in an attempt to spread  ‘European values’ 
to those on the outside.  
The idea of concentric circles is similar to what had been proposed earlier by 
Agnew (2001), who foresaw a threefold division emerging  in Europe. Agnew’s 
‘first  Europe’  consisted  of  the  core  (old  member  states)  seeking  to  deepen 
integration.  ‘Second  Europe’  included  peripheral  Europe  (the  then  EU 
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applicants),  and  ‘third  Europe’ was  formed  by  the  external  Europe;  i.e.,  the 
states excluded from the membership but serving both as a resource periphery 
and  as  an  emerging market  for  the  EU.  It  is  important  to  notice,  as Moisio 
(2007b,  91) has done,  that  the  three‐tier  structure  led  to  the  formation  of  two 
different  kinds  of  borders  within  Europe:  the  loose  yet  significant  border 
demarking the core from second Europe and a strict border setting apart the EU 
from third Europe. 
The metaphor of a neomedieval mosaic of different territorial units, in turn, 
resonates well with  Scott’s  (2005,  444)  geopolitics  of  ‘dimensionality,’ which 
suggests  that  instead  of  the  power  being  based  on  one  dominant  ‘core’  it  is 
scattered among several different  ‘centers’. Such a regional organization of  the 
European  political  space  (‘Europe  of  regions’)  has  been  conceptualized  and 
visualized  in  terms of a  ‘Europe of Olympic Rings’  (Emerson 1999;  Joenniemi 
2000, 129–131; Medvedev 2000, 100). Being ‘regionalized,’ governance, authority, 
and decision‐making get dispersed and brought closer to the people, and  in so 
doing  better  corresponding  to  the  more  issue‐based  rather  than  territorially 
oriented  logic  of  transnationalism  and  network  governance  (Joenniemi  2000 
129–31; Browning 2005; Browning & Joenniemi 2008, 525).  
In northern Europe the model of neomedieval Europe has been in vogue and 
put  actively  in  practice  by  the  northern  regional  councils  and  the  Northern 
Dimension  Initiative  (NDI). The metaphor of Olympic  rings  is presented  as  a 
way  to  integrate Russia  into Europe  irreversibly. Within northern Europe,  the 
Olympic  rings metaphor would  reflect  the  dissolution  of  the  stubborn  ‘East‐
West’ and ‘we‐them’ divisions ingrained in people’s minds during the Cold War 
era (Browning & Joenniemi 2008, 525; Laine 2011, 181). Whereas the concentric 
order  of  European  integration,  advocated  inter  alia  by  Aalto  (2006,  36–37), 
grants Russia a position best described as a close outsider or semi‐outsider, i.e., 
close  enough  to  be  affected  by  EU  integration  but  not  ‘in’  in  any  clearly 
conceivable  manner.  The  Olympic  ring  approach  “reaches  out  to  Russia, 
engaging her  in a non‐discriminating manner, not as a periphery but as a  full‐
fledged  partner”  (Medvedev  2000,  100).  In  such  a  vision  Russia  is  seen  to 
possess regulating and constituting power to engage in equal terms in defining 
new northernness as a neutral framework to which Russia itself could ultimately 
choose whether or not it wishes to become involved (Browning 2003, 51). 
The  different  accounts  derive  from  different  integration  theories,  ranging 
from Coudenhove‐Kalergi’s  constitutional  federalist, Churchill’s  unionist,  and 
Monnet’s  functionalist‐federalist  bases  to Mitrany’s  functionalist, Haas’ Neo‐
functionalist,  Moravcsik’s  (liberal)  intergovernmentalist,  and  lastly  to  the 
dysfunctionalist  (securitization  leading  to  disintegration)  logic.  These 
discussions  could undoubtedly  form  topics of  inquiry of  their own. However, 
comprehending their multiplicity is crucial here as the conceptions of European 
borders are dependent on the perception of what the European integration is all 
about. Borders appear in very a different light depending on whether the EU is 
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expected  to  be,  inter  alia,  a  federalist  project,  an  economic  functionalistic 
necessity, a European state, or a community of values. Then again, the opposite 
is also true. As I aim to show in this study, the process of European integration, 
and  even more  so  that of neighborhood building,  is dependent on how  these 
borders are defined – or perceived.  
In  order  to  conceptualize  this, Walters  (2004)  has  proposed  a  number  of 
border  discourses,  ‘geostrategies,’  that  correspond  with  a  particular  way  of 
organizing the space of the border. A geostrategy, Walters (2004, 679) clarifies, is 
not intended to be a totalizing description of a particular reality but as a frame 
built  on  a  particular  logic  and  to  be  understood  at  the  level  of  political 
aspirations,  objectives,  and  ambitions.  Understanding  the  multiplicity  of 
geostrategies allows us  to move away  from seeing borders as expressions of a 
state  power  and  analyze  power  from  the  ground  up:  “geostrategies  are 
irreducible;  they are  the conditions of possibility  for  the exercise of power, not 
merely its local manifestation” (ibid.). 
Walters  (2004,  697)  calls  his  first  geostrategy  the  networked  (non)border.  It 
resonates  with  ideas  of  deterritorialization,  post‐modernist  debates  about  a 
borderless world, and the EU as an avant‐garde network‐state. This geostrategy, 
he  notes,  is driven  by  the  imperative  “to  eliminate  the  barriers which  divide 
Europe,”  as  once  suggested  by  the  Treaty  of  Rome;  i.e.,  the  neo‐liberal 
imperative  to  remove  obstacles  to  the  ‘free movement’  of  people,  goods,  and 
services.  This  geostrategy  downplays  the  relevance  of  the  spatial  border  and 
geographical borderlines, dispersing policing and systems of control throughout 
the  territory.  Instead  of  ‘us’  verses  ‘them’  divides,  it  envisages  sharing 
responsibility  with  outsiders  through  cooperation  between  state  agencies  on 
both  sides  of  the  border,  and,  in  so  doing,  transcending  traditional  views  of 
borders: “rather than the edge or the wall, the border becomes a strategic node 
within a transnational network of control” (Walters 2004, 679–680). 
The second geostrategy is named the march. According to Walters (2004, 683–
694), a march can be understood as a neutral strip between entities, as a (inter‐) 
zone of  interaction  and  assimilation between peoples of different  cultures. As 
elaborated  by  Browning  and  Joenniemi  (2008,  528),  the  march  may  also  be 
understood as a buffer zone, as a protective belt or a security zone keeping the 
disorder at a distance, separating the cosmos inside from the chaos outside.  
Walters’  third  geostrategy,  the  colonial  frontier,  is  rooted  in Turner’s  (1920) 
famous  frontier  thesis.  It conceives  the border as “a dynamic space, a meeting 
point  between  a  power,  a  culture  and  its  outside”  (Walters  2004,  687).  The 
border gets thus represented as a mobile, expandable zone where an organized 
power meets its outside in a relationship of transformation and assimilation. It is 
the  setting  of  an  asymmetrical  relationship  in  which  the  expanding  power 
assumes  the  right  to  define  what  is  appropriate  and  just  and  organize  the 
political space according what it considers to be proper (ibid., 688). As a result, 
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the outside becomes transformed in line with the preferences of the inside, if not 
gradually incorporated by the inside (Browning & Joenniemi 2008, 529). 
Lastly, Walters  (2004, 690)  introduces  the geostrategy of  the  limes, which  is 
like  the  colonial  frontier,  taking  shape  between  a  power  and  its  outside:  “un 
monde  et  son  contraire”  (Rufin  2001,  149),  between  the  Empire  and  the 
barbarians,  or  cosmos  and  chaos  (Tunander  1997)  but more  permanent.  The 
limes  are  an  edge,  fringe,  or  limit. The  strategy  of  limes does  not  envisage  a 
progressive or eventual subsumption of the exterior territory and its inhabitants 
but draws a  limit of expansion in an attempt to consolidate and preserve what 
the  empire  has  achieved  and  incorporated.  This  has  to  be  done  to maintain 
peace and stability on the Empire fringes, “to insulate; to maintain a distinction 
between  the  stability  and  order  within,  and  disorder,  nomadism,  barbarism 
outside”  (Walters 2004, 691). A depiction well  represented  in  the metaphor of 
‘Fortress  Europe’  or  the  gated  community  with  selectively  closed  borders 
described by van Houtum and Pijpers (2007). 
While  it  is  crucial  to  understand  is  that  the  way  in  which  the  EU  is 
understood  also  defines  how  its  borders  ought  to  be  viewed,  Browning  and 
Joenniemi  (2008, 528) make an  important  remark by noting  that Walters’  four 
geostrategies  ought  not  be  associated  directly with  the  particular  geopolitical 
models (Westphalian, Imperial, and Neomedieval) noted above. Even though in 
some  cases  resonation  is  clear  (e.g.,  the  geostrategy  of  the  colonial  frontier 
matched  well  with  the  model  of  Imperial  Europe),  linking  the  models  and 
geostrategies  too  closely  precludes,  first,  that  the  different  models  and 
geostrategies  will  be  present  in  different  strengths  at  the  same  time  and  in 
different locations and, second, that the geostrategies and models might actually 
meld together over time (see Browning & Joenniemi 2008 for detailed examples). 
 
4.1.2 A Non‐EU Europe? 
The fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union reopened the age‐
old geographical question about the eastern border of Europe (Moisio 2007b, 82). 
The  slogan of “returning  to Europe” was used  in Eastern Europe both during 
the anti‐communist  insurgency  in 1989  (Sakwa 2006, 21) and again during  the 
EU  accession  negotiation  leading  to  the  2004–2007  double  enlargement 
(O’Loughlin  2000).  The  post‐Communist  candidates wished  to  distance  their 
territories  from  the domination of Moscow and proclaimed  that they belonged 
to  the heart of Europe both culturally and geographically. According  to  them, 
the expansion was simply a matter of returning the borders of “natural Europe” 
(Moisio 2007b, 85). 
As Moisio  (2007b,  82–83)  reminds  us,  Europe  is  “an  ambiguous  political 
geographical category the content of which reflects changing social, political and 
economic processes and contexts.” There has never been nor will there ever be a 
consensus  on where Europe  ‘begins’  or  ‘ends’  or  on what  is  and what  is  not 
European  ‘identity’  (see  Boedeltje &  van Houtum  2008). Historically,  its  ‘real 
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content’  has  been  constantly  renegotiated  and  bound  to  multiple  political 
discourses and practices (Murphy 2005). Thus the EU is nothing but the current 
phase of its development (Moisio 2007b, 83).  
Sakwa (2006, 22) argues that there remain fundamental tensions between the 
dynamics of official European integration, processes of pan‐European unity, and 
forms  of  cultural  coherence  that  reflect  continent‐wide  European  civilization. 
Accordingly, he defines three competing concepts of “European solidarity, if not 
unity”  which  seek  to  challenge  the  post‐Cold  War  order.  Sakwa’s  ‘Official 
Europe’  refers  to  the  integration  of  the  EU.  According  to  this  frame,  the 
definition  of  ‘European‐ness’  became  grounded  in  the  Copenhagen  Criteria: 
democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights,  full  citizenship  rights  for  national 
minorities, and a  functioning market economy. Sakwa explains  that  it was  the 
process of EU enlargement itself that challenged the whole continent to rethink 
what it meant to be ‘European.’ As argued by Garton Ash (1996; see also 1999), 
the  ‘EU‐rope’ caught the wrong bus in the 1990s when deepening was allowed 
to take precedence over widening, leaving East Europeans in a lurch. While the 
official  EU‐based model  is  apparently  by  far  the most  important  and  visible 
form of European integration, it is not the only one.  
By  ‘Pan‐Europe’ Sakwa  (2006, 23–25) brings back  the already  longstanding 
intellectual  idea of Greater Europe, the establishment of a European federation 
based on  the principles of  inclusivity and  the universal applicability of human 
rights  and  democratic  aspirations.  Eloquently  advocated  most  famously  by 
Count Coudenhove‐Kalergi in 1923 and, more recently, by Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
espousal of  the  ‘Common European Home’  from  the Atlantic  to  the Pacific,  is 
founded  on  its  inter‐governmental  rather  than  supra‐national,  institutional 
structure  (Council  of  Europe,  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights, 
Organization  for  Security  and Cooperation  in Europe). However, while  some 
pan‐European institutions continue to develop, Sakwa notes, the ideal itself has 
been marginalized. 
Thirdly, Sakwa’s (2006, 24–25) ‘Civilizational Europe’ builds on the infamous 
Huntingtonian  logic  that  culture,  identity,  and  separateness  would  replace 
ideology  as  the  primary  source  of  conflict. Acknowledging  appropriately  the 
flaws of Huntington’s (1993) thesis, Sakwa agrees with the view that as one set 
of conflicts faded with end of the Cold War, allowing all peoples of the continent 
to  “argue  that  ‘we  are  all  Europeans  now,’”  a  new  set  emerged.  What 
Huntington  failed  to address, Sakwa argues, were  those  elements  that, on  the 
flipside, unite the peoples of Europe culturally as a single European people in a 
single cultural space. 
It takes, however, two to tango. Albeit often ignored, the Russian side has its 
own approaches as well. Fuelled by the obvious stagnation, even decline, in the 
EU‐Russia  integrative project proposals  have  been made  to  shift  the  terms  of 
discourse. An insufficiently reciprocal and overly EU‐imposed nature of the EU‐
Russian  ‘partnership’  on  the  one  hand  and  reaffirmation  of  state  sovereignty 
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that characterized the Putin presidency on the other have not lead to integration 
but  rather  to more  conflict  (Prozorov  2006, Chapters  3 & 6,  see also Morozov 
2009)  and  harmed  thus  also  the  overarching  potential  of  others  to  influence 
Russian  development  through  intergovernmental  cooperation.  The  best  way 
forward  for  the  two,  Prozorov  (ibid.)  suggests, would  be  to  stop  living  in  a 
constant state of conflict and “divorce”. This would allow Russia to self‐exclude 
itself from Europe –neither join nor confront Europe but to simply “get over” it 
(Remizov 2002 in Prozorov 2006, 67), which in turn could have made it possible 
for Russia  to  interact with  the  EU without  having  to  constantly  consider  the 
possibility of integration.  
Following this  logic, neo‐revisionist ideas about  ‘Greater Europe’ have been 
developed in Russia to challenge the West‐centric representations of Europe. As 
introduced by Sakwa (2010, 5), the idea has not been to deny the EU but rather 
to look at the question of Europe from less of an institutional perspective; i.e., to 
“devise  an  alternative  vision  of  the  European  idea…  that  has  not  been 
‘privatized’  by  the  EU.”  While  the  idea  of  Greater  Europe  comes  close  to 
Sakwa’s  Pan‐Europe,  there  is  a  crucial  difference  between  them.  While  the 
former  is  focused  on  the  expression  of  the  abstract  ideal  of  European 
commonality and unity, the latter is more of an institutions based project (Sakwa 
2010, 16). As a positive and mutually advantageous post‐enlargement agenda, 
the Greater Europe would provide Russia with “an escape  from  the burden of 
marginality”  (ibid.,  21)  yet  allow  the  EU  to  advance  its  interests  on  the 
international  stage  though  economical  and  political  interaction  with  Russia 
(Bordachev 2006). Building on Gorbachev’s vision of a common European home 
stretching  from  Limerick  to Vladivostok,  Bordachev  (2006)  proposes  that  one 
possible way  to proceed could be a creation of a grand  international regime, a 
‘Pan‐Eurasian  Union’  based  on  intergovernmental  cooperation  that  would 
provide Eurasia with structural stability. 
 
4.1.3 Historical Context: What Form for a Union? 
 
A day will come when your arms will  fall even  from your hands! A day will come 
when war will seem as absurd and  impossible…. A day will come when… you all, 
nations  of  the  continent, without  losing  your  distinct  qualities  and  your  glorious 
individuality, will be merged  closely within  a  superior unit  and you will  form  the 
European  brotherhood…. A  day will  come when  the  only  fields  of  battle will  be 
markets opening up to trade and minds opening up to ideas…. A day will come when 
we will display cannon in museums  just as we display instruments of torture today, 
and  are  amazed  that  such  things  could  ever  have  been  possible.  (Victor Hugo, 
Opening Address to the Peace Congress (Paris, August 21, 1849)) 
 
In  Finland,  the  story  of  the  EU  is  commonly  told  by  beginning  that  Finland 
joined  the Union  in  1995,  after which  a  number  of  developments  have  taken 
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place. While that cannot be denied, the alternative approach would be to argue 
that in 1995 Finland jumped aboard moving train and went for a ride. After all, 
the most crucial issue concerning Europe’s future had already been decided. The 
grand idea had been completed and wars had become practically unimaginable. 
The day that Victor Hugo once talked about had already come and gone. Many 
things had become taken for granted. It is, however, crucial to understand that 
things could have gone differently. 
When  did  the  European  integration  process  begin?  Surely,  the  Roman 
Empire  can be  seen as  the very  first effort  to  integrate a part of  the European 
continent together with the regions surrounding the Mediterranean Sea (Pagden 
2002).  Subsequently,  the  Middle  Ages  unified  Europe  under  the  banner  of 
Christendom and propped up the ideas about ‘eurocentrism’ and the supremacy 
of  the  European  civilization  (Jordan  2002).  The  Renaissance  as  well  as  the 
Enlightenment played  crucial  roles  in  shaping  the  ideas  seen  to  constitute  the 
ultimate  foundation  of  the  European  project:  tolerance,  freedom,  respect  of 
human rights, and democracy.  
For  centuries,  Europe  was  the  backdrop  of  numerous  bloody  wars.  The 
devastation elicited many philosophers and visionaries39 to dream of a creation 
of unified Europe, a sort of a United States of Europe. The ideas about a unified 
Europe grew more popular during the years following World War I, but it was 
not until the overwhelming horrors of World War II that actual progress began 
to take place. As pointed out by Della Sala (2008, 116), two camps both having 
their  own  visions  on  how  to  build  a more  closely‐knit Europe  emerged  right 
from  the  very  beginning.  The  first  group  often  referred  to  as  the  idealists, 
federalist, or supranationalists wished to create a new continental political union 
to supersede the nation‐state and overpower its grounding force, nationalism – a 
major  contributor  to  the  horrors  of  the WW  I  and  II.  This  camp  believed  in 
creating  strong  federal  political  institutions  and,  above  all,  a  supranational 
government directly responsible to the European citizens (Harryvan & van der 
Harst 1997, 4). 
The second group, which Della Sala  (2008, 116) calls  intergovernmentalists, 
voted  for  a  looser  form  of  integration,  driven  largely  by  economic  goals, 
between  independent nation‐states.  It soon emerged  that  the  former camp had 
only a few supporters among leading politicians and also the public at large was 
unwilling to resign its allegiance to a particular member state. The idealist vision 
took yet another blow as the Cold War began in 1947 dividing Europe into two 
spheres of influence dominated by the two superpowers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union.  
Ultimately, both of the camps came together in their shared desire to ensure 
that  such  devastation would  never  happen  again. After  the war was  over,  a 
                                                          
39 E.g., William Penn, Abbot Charles de Saint‐Pierre, Victor Hugo, Count Richard Coudenhove‐
Kalergi, and Giuseppe Mazzini. 
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number  of  European  statesmen  including  Schuman  of  France,  Adenauer  of 
Germany,  de  Gasperi  of  Italy,  and  Churchill  of  United  Kingdom  began  to 
persuade  public  opinion  towards  the  creation  of  new  European  structures, 
which  would  be  based  on  mutual  interests  and  founded  upon  treaties 
guaranteeing  the  rule  of  law  and  equality  between  all  countries.  In  1949,  the 
Council  of  Europe  was  established  as  the  first  international  organization 
working towards European  integration. To the disappointment of the  idealists‐
federalist  camp,  the  nation‐states  refused  to  give  up  their  ascendency  and 
rejected  the  idea  of  creating  a  purely  supranational  organization.  As  a 
consequence,  the  Committee  of  Ministers  was  established  as  an  inter‐
governmental counterweight to the potentially too pro‐European Parliamentary 
Assembly under the Statute of the Council of Europe (Harryvan & van der Harst 
1997, 5). 
The following year, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman took up an idea 
originally conceived by Commissioner Jean Monnet and proposed establishing a 
European Coal and Steel Community  (ECSC) with  the  idea of  turning  the raw 
materials of war into the instruments of reconciliation and peace. The ECSC was 
officially  created  in 1951, as France,  Italy,  the Benelux  countries  together with 
West Germany signed the Treaty of Paris. Even  if a fairly technical measure to 
begin with,  the ECSC had a clear political objective  in  initiating  the process of 
interdependence  that would make war  a  costly  option  (Della  Sala  2008,  116). 
Even  if alternate opinions exist,  it has been argued  that Monnet’s  idea was  to 
achieve the federalist goal of the political unification of Europe with functional 
means;  i.e., by a sectoral  integration web  from which  the national government 
could not escape (Harryvan & van der Harst 1997, 6). The ECSC also gave birth 
to  the  supranational  executive  called  a  ‘High Authority’  (now  the  European 
Commission,  formally  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities),  the 
parliamentary Common Assembly  (now  the European Parliament), a Court of 
Justice and  the Special Council of Ministers  (now  the Council of  the European 
Union). 
After  failed attempts at creating a European Defense Community  (EDC) as 
well  as  a  European  Political  Community  (EPC),  two  other  proposals  for 
European  integration were  introduced  in 1955. Monnet’s plan was to bring the 
European  nations  closer  to  each  other  functionally  by  focusing  on  atomic 
energy, where as Jan Willem Beyen, Dutch foreign minister at the time, wanted 
to  see  a  creation  of  a  common  market  in  Western  Europe.  After  arduous 
negotiations,  the  ‘original  six’  decided  to  embark  upon  cooperation  on  both 
atomic and economic matters. The conciliation  led eventually  to  the signing of 
the  Treaty  of Rome  on March  25,  1957.  The  treaty  created  both  the  common 
market,  i.e., European Economic Community  (EEC) and  the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom). Interestingly, the treaty also set up the European 
Social Fund (ESF), a financial instrument for supporting employment as well as 
promoting  economic  and  social  cohesion.  In  1960,  seven European  states  that 
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were either unable or unwilling to join the EEC founded an alternate trade bloc, 
the  European  Free  Trade Association  (EFTA) with  a  loose  intergovernmental 
structure.  
The  new  situation  forced  also  Finland  to  reassess  its  protectionist  foreign‐
trade  policies  to  safeguard  its  export  interests  (Paavonen  2001;  2008).  After 
technical  and,  in  particular,  political  barriers  had  been  removed  through 
negations with EFTA members, GATT signatories and the Soviet Union, Finland 
became  an  EFTA  associate  member  in  1961  with  the  Finn‐EFTA  agreement 
(becoming a full member in 1986). The agreement has been rightfully projected 
as a turning point  in Finnish foreign economic policy (Paavonen 1991), though 
since then its significance has been overshadowed by Finnish membership in the 
EU. 
Contrary  to  the earlier expectations,  the EEC,  fuelled by  the  late 1950s and 
1960s  economic  boom  as  well  as  its  unique  blend  of  supranationalism  and 
intergovernmentalism,  had  soon  overshadowed Euratom  as  the  engine  of  the 
European  integration  process  (Harryvan &  van  der Harst  1997,  90).  Still,  the 
supranational design of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) proposed by the 
EEC triggered a crisis as France regarded  it as an unacceptable renunciation of 
sovereignty.  In  protest,  France  began  its  ‘empty  chair’  policy  and  refused  to 
participate  in  the European  institutions until  its veto reinstated. The crisis was 
resolved by the Luxembourg compromise in 1966, which put forth a gentlemenʹs 
agreement  permitting members  to  use  a  veto  on  areas  of  national  interest  – 
paralyzing,  in  so doing,  the  supranational  side of  the EEC altogether.  In 1967, 
the Merger Treaty, which combined  the  institutions of  the ECSC and Euratom 
into  that of  the EEC,  came  into operation. From  there on,  the  combination of 
these  three  individual  communities became  to be  referred  to  as  the European 
Communities,  with  a  common  executive  organ,  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities,  which  now  replaced  its  predecessor,  the  High 
Authority. 
The  first  enlargement  in  1973, when  the United Kingdom, Denmark,  and 
Ireland entered the Community, was followed by an era of ‘Europessimism’ and 
‘Eurosclerosis.’ The British saw themselves as contributing disproportionately to 
the  Community’s  budget  and  the  public  at  large  saw  the  European  labor 
markets  stagnating  in  contrast  to  fast‐moving  markets  particularly  in  North 
America  (Armstrong,  Lloyd  &  Redmond  1996).  The  enlargement  gave  also 
impetus  for  a  creation  of  a Community‐wide  regional  policy, which  came  to 
fruition  in  1975  in  the  form  of  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund 
(ERDF) aiming to diminish regional disparities – an idea that had existed in the 
Community rhetoric since the preamble of the Treaty of Rome.  
As Greece joined the Community in 1981, as did Spain along with Portugal in 
1986,  the membership of  the European Community had already doubled  from 
the original  six  to 12. The Single European Act  (SEA),  signed  in 1986 was  the 
first major  revision  of  the  1957 Treaty  of Rome.  It  added  new momentum  to 
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European integration, set the European Community an objective of establishing 
a  Common Market,  reinforced  the  powers  of  the  European  Parliament,  and 
codified European Political Cooperation,  the predecessor of  the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  
The Parliament’s powers were further upgraded by the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU),  i.e.,  the Maastricht Treaty,  in 1992. The  treaty represented a new 
stage in European integration since it opened the way to political integration. It 
created the ‘three pillars’ of the EU; the Community pillar, 2) the pillar devoted 
to  the common  foreign and security policy, and 3)  the pillar devoted  to  justice 
and home affairs (JHA). It also gave rise to the Committee of the Regions (CoR), 
a consultative assembly providing regions direct representation in Brussels and 
act as a direct  link between  the EU and  its citizens,  introduced  the concept of 
European citizenship, and launched the economic and monetary union (EMU). 
 The European Economic Area  (EEA) was  established  in 1994  following an 
agreement between member  states of  the EFTA  and  the EU.  It  allowed EFTA 
countries  to participate  in  the European single market without  joining  the EU. 
The EEA Agreement is concerned principally with the four fundamental pillars 
of the Internal Market, ‘the four freedoms,’ i.e., freedom of movement of goods, 
persons, services, and capital. The  following year,  it was Finland’s  turn  to  join 
the  Union  together with  Austria  and  Sweden.  Consequently,  the  number  of 
external borders increased, and the EU got its first land border with Russia. The 
Schengen agreement, originally signed already in 1985, came  into effect during 
the same year and created a territory without internal borders. 
The  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  (1997),  amending  the  Maastricht  treaty, 
downplayed  intergovernmental cooperation and pushed  forward a model of a 
supranational  Union  by  incorporating  the  Schengen  convention  into  the  EU 
legal  framework,  increasing  the  role  of  the  EU  in  home  affairs,  and  by 
expanding  the  number  of  decisions  covered  by  Qualified  Majority  Voting 
(QMV). The  treaty projected  an  image of  a Europe united  across  the old  Iron 
Curtain  and  aimed  to make  the  EU more  democratic  in  preparation  for  the 
imminent eastwards enlargement. The European project took another step when 
the  idea of a single currency  finally materialized as  the Euro was  launched on 
January 1, 2002. 
In preparing for the Unions’ enlargement to 25 Member States, the Treaty of 
Nice (2001) reformed the institutional structure of the EU to withstand eastward 
expansion and safeguard  that  the Union could continue  to  function efficiently. 
The acceptance of ten new countries, in May 2004 finally ended “the division of 
Europe decided by the Great Powers 60 years earlier at Yalta” (Commission of 
the European Communities 2007). Later that same year, the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (TCE) was famously rejected. 
In  2007 Bulgaria  and Romania  joined  the Union,  after which  the Treaty of 
Lisbon was  created  to  replace  the Constitutional Treaty  and  to  end  the pillar 
system. It sought to make the EU more democratic, efficient, open, transparent, 
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and participative, but  it also expanded  the post of a EU Foreign Minister  (i.e., 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) with 
the purpose of making  the EU’s  external  actions more  effective  and  coherent. 
Since December  2011,  the High Representative has been  also  in  charge of  the 
European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS), which  has  been  intended  to  be  a 
common Foreign Office or Diplomatic Corps for the EU. 
Despite  its  increased  securitization  emphasis,  the CFSP must be  taken as a 
major  milestone  for  it  largely  sidelined  the  traditional  juxtaposition  of 
intergovernmentalism  and  supranationalism.  Instead  of  a  single  and  centrally 
designed  policy,  it  introduced  a  very  EUropean  form  of  foreign  policy 
governance  as  a  collective  enterprise  through which  national  actors  conduct 
partly common, partly separate  international actions (Diedrichs 2011, 149–150). 
It  thus operates  in a pragmatic and  flexible  though  sometimes a  rather mixed 
way by combining different  instruments and creating opportunities for  joint or 
common resources (ibid., 172) while at the same time making the EU look like a 
unitary actor – at least more than in most other cases. 
 
 
4.2 EUROPEANIZATION – THEORY OR PRACTICE? 
 
Though contributions to the Europeanization debate are abundant40, one cannot 
help  but  notice  that  the  differing  points  of  view  tend  not  to  add  up  and 
accumulate.  Each  of  the  writings  provides  rather  yet  another  definition  or 
standpoint with  little  effort  to  build  upon  earlier works. Accordingly, Olsen 
(2002)  has  suggested  that  despite  being  fashionable  buzzword,  the  concept 
remains  an  “attention‐directing  device”  with  limited  usability  in  capturing 
complex European dynamics.  It has often  failed  to  raise  interpretations above 
the  level  of  more  or  less  politically  inspired  rhetoric.  Even  though 
Europeanization  is  far  from  being  a  theory,  when  understood  properly  and 
defined  carefully,  the  concept  of  Europeanization  can,  however,  provide  an 
illuminating tool for analysis. 
A central aspect of the European re‐territorialization process is the definition 
of rules, norms, and practices that aim to ‘Europeanize’ national spaces in order 
to  create  a  ‘common’  set  of  discourses  in which  various  policy  issues  can  be 
negotiated  (Clark &  Jones 2008).  In  the Finnish context, such Europeanization, 
i.e.,  European  Unionization,  began  the  day  Finland  joined  the  Union,  if  not 
before.  Even  though  this  became  evident  in  the  national  and  regional  level 
administrative  discussion  concerning CBC  policies,  first  and  foremost,  in  the 
                                                          
40 See, e.g., Börzel (2002), Buller and Gamble (2002), Dyson (2002), Goetz and Hix (2000), Harmsen 
and Wilson (2000), Kendall (2005), Ladrech (2002), Olsen (2002; 2003), Radaelli (2000; 2003; 2004), 
Ruzza (2000; 2010), Warleigh (2001), Moisio et al. (2013). 
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rhetoric  used  and word  choices made,  the  turn  signaled  deeper  and  broader 
changes in political perspectives.  
As state controlled bilateral relations had come to an end, the border became 
more  open  on  a  regional  level  and  the  CBC  projects  became  streamlined  to 
match with  the policy  frames defined by  the EU  and  the new Europeanizing 
rhetoric  (Liikanen  et  al.  2007).  In  addition  to  a  diffusion  of  norms,  values, 
procedures,  and  agendas  (see,  e.g.,  Harmsen  &  Wilson  2000;  Diez, 
Agnantopoulos & Kaliber 2005) and  institutional convergence  (see Olsen 2002; 
Stone Sweet, Sandholtz & Fligstein 2001), Europeanization can be understood to 
take place  in  terms of new  forms of  ‘external governance’  (Lavenex 2004). The 
ENP, in particular, has been taken as an element through which the EU exercises 
political,  social,  and  economic  influence  in  the  neighborhood  (Bosse  2009; 
Gawrich, Melnykovska & Schweickert 2010; Lavenex & Wichmann 2009). This 
suggests  that Europeanization, originally associated with European  integration 
and  enlargement,  is  expanding  territorial  notions  of  the  political  community 
beyond the EU’s borders (Sasse 2008). 
The nature of the EU’s geopolitical influence has been captured, inter alia, in 
terms  of  ‘soft  power,’  ‘civilian  power,’  and  ‘conditionality’  (Bachmann  & 
Sidaway  2008;  2009;  Kochenov  2008;  Manners  2002;  Telo  2005).  This  debate 
paints  the EU  as a  ‘normative power’  (Tocci  et al. 2008) but  at  the  same  time 
recognizes  that  this  power  is  not  only  exercised  through  explicit  policy 
reformulations  (such  as  the  ENP)  but  that  the  EU  exerts  its  transformative 
power  beyond  its  external  borders  also  through  more  subtle  and  informal 
channels  (Scott &  Liikanen  2010,  424).  The  EU’s  ‘normative  power’  does  not 
depend on treaties, military presence, security doctrine, or even distinct policies 
(Bachmann & Sidaway 2009) but rather upon showing an example – influencing 
“…not by what  it says or does, but by what  it  is”  (Manners 2002, 252). Above 
and beyond ENP, the Europeanization of the Neighborhood is being promoted 
through other means,  such  as Euroregions,  regional development,  and  spatial 
planning policies, as well as research funding schemes. Thus the ‘idea’ of the EU 
in  itself has become a powerful force for change  in  interstate relations (Scott & 
van Houtum 2009). 
Filtenborg,  Gänzle  and  Johannson  (2002)  suggest  that  processes  of 
decentralized  horizontal  political  socialization  (‘network  governance‘)  are 
increasing  the overall societal significance of  the EU acquis beyond  its borders, 
while Raik  (2006)  argues  that  civil  society provides  an  increasingly  important 
alternative  channel  to  formal  institutions  through  which  these  cross‐border 
influences  are  transmitted  and  the  EU‐European  values,  norms,  and  policy 
concerns (e.g., the virtues of cooperation, social capital, democratic ‘ownership,’ 
sustainability,  solidarity, and  cohesion) are diffused.  In order  to bring Europe 
closer to the people and fight against the democratic deficit, the Commission has 
reached  out  to  the  national  and  sub‐national  levels  and  sought  ways  to 
incorporate them into policy formulation and implementation. Due to a lack of 
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success on the intergovernmental level, more emphasis was placed on the role of 
civil  society  and  the  people‐to‐people  dimension  also  in  building  the 
Neighborhood. The strengthening of civil society is considered both as an end in 
itself  and  as  a  device  to  bring  about  political  reform  (Kohler‐Koch  2008,  16). 
Nielsen,  Berg  and  Roll  (2009,  255)  note  that  the  CSOs  in  the  neighboring 
countries  may  function  as  effective  mediators  of  the  EU’s  external  policies. 
While  the EU  forms an attractive  external  stimulus  for organizations working 
for change, the CSOs in turn function as agents of ‘bottom‐up’ Europeanization 
working as they pursue visions of good governance, à la the EU, and in so doing 
contributing  to  the  sort  of milieu  shaping  that  the  EU  typically  favors  as  an 
external relations strategy. 
Europeanization is a complex and misused concept. It is separate from plain 
internationalization. It is, originally, an adaptive process in relation to European 
integration, yet today it is better taken as a process of its own as there needs not 
to  be  a  causal  relationship  between  the  two.  It  refers  to  patterns  of  change 
whereby,  inter alia, rules, norms, values, and resources are denationalized and 
become directed towards and/or increasingly influenced by the European (more 
precisely,  European  Union)  model.  The  dissemination  and  assimilation  of 
‘European’  administrative  and  institutional  structures  and  policy  practices 
contribute to the emergence of geopolitical, perhaps even identity political space 
of action, which is dominated by the EU (Radaelli 2004, 3). As Cram (2008, 116; 
2009; cf. Billig 1995) asserts, instead of being a result from a “teaching exercise” 
or  a  corollary  of  the  functionalistic  logic  of  shifting  loyalties,  it  rather  comes 
about  as  a  ‘banal  Europeanism’  caused  by  the  ‘enhabitation’  of  the  EU  at  an 
everyday level. It is the taken for granted rhetoric and practices that create and 
repeatedly reinforce not  just the concept of Europe as a legitimate actor and an 
authority structure but also the notion of the European public and European as a 
legitimate category of identity (Cram 2001; 2006).  
 
 
4.3 RUSSIA AS PARTNER AND GLOBAL PLAYER  
 
4.3.1 A Neighbor, a Partner or on its Own? 
The political, social, and economic development of Russia has a crucial  impact 
on the manner in which it interacts with the outside world and on the stability of 
the entire  international  system.  Its apparent and yet again  increasing, political 
weight is felt abroad as well. Accordingly, it is in the interest of these countries 
to  try  to  influence  the  course of Russian development. The problem has been 
that  in many of these policies and  instruments Russia has been regarded as an 
object rather than an equal partner. A number of studies have focused on what 
Russia  lacks  rather  than  on what  it  has  to  offer.  The  turmoil  of  the  1990s  in 
Russia allowed the EU, in particular, to insist on building the relations based on 
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the  principle  of  conditionality  with  an  underlying  objective  to  steer  Russia 
gently yet forcefully on its path to a ‘better,’ i.e., European, future.  
Russia  of  the  1990s  and Russia  of  the  2000s were,  however,  two  different 
places. Unlike with all other EU’s  immediate neighbors, which were willing  to 
play  the game and give  integration with  the EU a paramount priority on  their 
national political agenda, Russia regarded the EU’s offer of integration without 
joining (see Marin 2006) as insufficient for legitimizing the given conditions. The 
Russian view on the issue has been insightfully analyzed by Prozorov (2006) and 
more  recently Morozov  (2009), who  both  see  that  the  logic  of  the  interaction 
between  the EU  and Russia does  not  lead  to  integration  but  rather  results  in 
more conflict due to a lopsided, EU‐imposed disposition. Prozorov (2006, 11–20) 
argues  that  this  continuous  conflict  essentially  derives  from  the  two  existing 
Western strands of theorizing, ‘traditionalism’ and ‘transitionalism.’  
Whereas  the  traditionalist approach regards Russia as  forever bound  to  the 
different, Eastern heritage of authoritarian rule and  thus posits Russia as  the a 
priori  ‘other’ of Europe,  the  transitionalist approach,  in  turn, espouses a  linear 
teleology  of  liberal‐democratic  transformation,  projecting  that  Russia  would 
ascribe  to Western norms and values on  its way  towards becoming a modern 
democratic society. The insufficiently reciprocal and intersubjective nature of the 
EU‐Russian ‘partnership’ on the one hand and reaffirmation of state sovereignty 
that  characterized  the  Putin  presidency  on  the  other  increased  the  tendency 
towards Russia’s  ‘self‐exclusion’ from integrative processes (Prozorov 2006, 67) 
and harmed  thus also  the overarching potential of others  to  influence Russian 
development through intergovernmental cooperation. 
In contrast to a period of Russian weakness during the 1990’s deconstruction 
of the Cold War  international order, the pre‐1990s great power era and related 
world model  is  often viewed  as  the  good  and  thriving period  in  the Russian 
history. As the great power politics, and in particular the Cold War realism, was 
of course based on the on dominance of the modern state and the expectation of 
international anarchy, the EU preferred world order of a democratic community 
of  states  failed  to  resonate  with  the  Russian  reading.  Based  on  such  an 
understanding, it was hardly a surprise that Russia’s political elite continued to 
perceive the EU not as what  it had proclaimed to be but either as a neo‐liberal 
institutionalist international regime or as a neo‐realist international actor.  
In  order  to  re‐gain  Russia’s  great  power  status,  President  Putin  worked 
vigorously  to  restore  the country’s unity, strengthen  the authority of  the state, 
and  to bring  the  federal power  closer  to  the  regions. Fuelled by Russia’s vast 
energy sources and the related economic growth, Putin’s Russia grew ever more 
self‐confident,  assertive,  and  aware  of  its  strategic  global  importance. 
Accordingly, Russia became  evidently  less willing  to  take  advice on domestic 
issues  from  abroad, which  created  tensions  in  the  EU‐Russia  relationship,  as 
well as in Russia’s relations with the United States.  
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Russia’s energy and foreign policy developed largely hand in hand as energy 
security  formed  the  core  of  Russia’s  increasingly  charged  relations  with  its 
neighbors.  As  Russian  energy  policy  became  increasingly  securitized  and 
simultaneously  highly  politicized  –  albeit  according  to  the  official  Russian 
stance,  its  actions  were  and  are  dictated  strictly  by  technical  concerns  and 
economic rationales. Motives aside,  the Russian assertion suggested  that  it did 
not require any facilitators  in its dialogue with Europe, which came as a major 
blow to its neighbors, who had been investing in their potential role as bridges 
between  Russia  and  the major  European  powers  (Makarychev  2006,  2).  The 
development was  greeted with  particular  alarm  in  Finland,  as  good  relations 
with Russia had been strongest card Finland had had vis‐à‐vis the EU since  its 
accession to the Union. 
When Mr. Medvedev  assumed  the  presidential  office  in May  2008,  only  a 
couple of months prior to the onset of the economic crisis  in Russia, few knew 
what to expect. The guessing game came to an end in November 2008 when Mr. 
Medvedev  held  his  first  state‐of‐the‐nation  address  and  presented  the  key 
principles he would follow in carrying out Russia’s foreign policy. His agenda, 
described  fittingly  by Matthews  and Nemtsova  (2008)  as  being  “surprisingly 
liberal at home, and increasingly hawkish abroad” aimed both at fixing Russiaʹs 
broken society and restoring Russia’s place in the world. In his first address to 
the  Federal Assembly,  President Medvedev  (2008)  continued  his  defiance  by 
painting  a  picture  of  a  nationalistic  Russia with  its  spheres  of  influence  and 
special, privileged relations, looking out for its own interests, and protecting the 
lives  and  dignity  of  Russian  citizens,  wherever  they  may  be.  While  it  was 
understood  that  President  Medvedev  was  referring,  first  and  foremost,  to 
Russian  conflicts  in Chechnya, Georgia,  to  some  extent  in  the  Baltic  counties 
and, in terms of gas, to the conflict with Ukraine, there were increasing fears that 
a  tougher  time  lay  ahead  of  Finland  as  well.  Direct  parallels  were  drawn 
especially  between  the  situation  in  South Ossetia  and Abkhazia  and  the  co‐
called Karelian question between Finland and Russia. 
The  address,  along with  the general  rhetoric  evident  in  a number of other 
statements by Russian foreign policy makers, most notably by Foreign Minister 
Sergei  Lavrov,  revealed  an  unmistakable  yearning  for  the  nineteenth‐century 
world mode  in which  international order was based on  the  role of  states and, 
above all, on the balance of power between the great powers. What was essential 
in  the Russian  great  power  status was  the  aspiration  to  try  to  be  one  of  the 
countries  that  could make  decisions  on  behalf  of  others,  to  interfere  in  other 
countries’ conflicts, and to maintain the international system, in particular, as a 
system  of  nation  states  (as  opposed  to  initiatives  that would  challenge  state 
sovereignty, such as integration à la the EU). Accordingly, if the Russian idea of 
its great power status was based on any historical period, this must be the era of 
the Concert of Europe, i.e., from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak 
of World War I.  
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Sometimes things have to get worse before they could get better. While prior 
to  the  recent  financial  crisis,  the  EU  and  Russia  had,  despite  the  rhetoric  of 
strategic  partnership,  been  growing  apart;  during  2009–2010  remarkable 
changes  had  been  occurring  in  Russia’s  self‐perception.  The  economic  crisis 
shook Russia  profoundly  and  revealed  how  deeply  interconnected  the  global 
economy actually was. For both the EU and Russia, the crisis was a moment of 
realization that any nation is no longer self‐sufficient. Bringing one’s own house 
in  order was  no  longer  enough,  but  crises  could  only  be  overcome  through 
coordinated, cooperative effort. Realization of this prodded Russia to reset and 
redefine its relations most notably with the United States, but the tone towards 
the new partnership agreement with  the EU warmed up as well. Russia’s new 
foreign  policy  guidelines,  leaked  to  the  media  in  May  2010,  suggested  that 
relations with the West would become friendlier and more cooperative in order 
to attract more foreign investment.  
While these guidelines have not been fully implemented, there is no denying 
that the EU and Russia need each other. The EU needs Russia’s oil, gas, and raw 
materials  while  Russia  needs  the  EU  to  help  with  its  own  economic  and 
technological modernization. The EU was a strong supporter of Russiaʹs WTO 
membership,  which  finally  materialized  on  August  22,  2012.  While  this  is 
indisputable evidence of deeper  integration, at  the same  time  there has been a 
general lack of progress in areas beyond mere technical nature. The PCA, which 
came  into  force  in  1997  for  an  initial  duration  of  ten  years,  has  been 
automatically  renewed  annually  since  2007  because  a new  agreement has not 
been  agreed  upon.  In  terms  of  foreign  policy  and  global  issues,  the  EU  and 
Russia find themselves on very divergent trajectories. The cause of the glitches 
lay not only in the different perceptions of the ‘strategic partnership,’ but also in 
a number  of Russian domestic  issues,  such  as  the  restrictions put  on Russian 
civil society and the freedom of speech, which have been condemned by the EU. 
There are a number of lessons that can be learned from this past. In order to 
be successful, a mutual understanding has to be found regarding the basic rules 
of the game; cooperation with Russia has to be based on the principle of equality 
and project ownership has  to be bestowed on  the Russian side as well.  In  this 
manner,  the  role  of  Russia  transforms  from  being  an  object  in  cooperation 
initiatives  to  that  of  an  actor,  allowing  relations  to  become  shaped  by  dialog 
rather  than confrontation. But  that  is not enough.  In order  to engage Russia  in 
further  cooperation,  the  EU  has  to  renounce  its  attempts  to  change  Russia 
politically. The way forward lies in more practical forms of cooperation. Mutual 
interests  include,  but  are  not  limited  to,  energy  security,  financial  stability, 
climate  change,  terrorism,  migration,  environmental  issues,  education,  and 
social and health‐related topics. 
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4.3.2 Framework for Engagement with Russia  
Cross‐border cooperation with Russian regions is a major foreign policy priority 
for  those  EU  Member  States  that  border  Russia.  After  joining  the  EU,  the 
connotation  of  the  Finnish  ‘long‐common‐border‐syndrome’  vis‐à‐vis  Russia 
became  actively  transformed  from  burden  to  a possibility.  Suffering  from  the 
trauma of being  left alone, Finland did not settle for mere EU membership but 
aspired for a position among the key EU players by claiming to possess Russian 
expertise, or rather experience, that others did not or could not have that the EU 
as well as its Member States would benefit from. 
Up  until  now,  it  has  already  become  common  practice  to  kick‐off  any 
meeting devoted  to  the  topic by  stating  that  it  is  in  the EU’s  and  its Member 
States’  as  well  as  Russia’s  common  interest  to  work  towards  increasing  the 
stability  and  prosperity  of  the  border  region.  External  border  cooperation 
through the creation of a positive atmosphere for rapprochement, improvement 
of the general relations, increasing people‐to‐people contacts, and promotion of 
shared political and economic values are commonly put  forth as  the means  to 
acquire this (see, e.g., Torstila 2011). While there  is nothing new in these goals, 
the means to achieve them have broadened considerably.  
In addition  to Finland’s cooperation with  its neighboring areas,  there are a 
variety  of  bilateral  and  multilateral  programs  and  initiatives  focusing  on 
particularly Northwest  Russia.  These  include  the  ENPI  and  its  regional CBC 
programs, the Northern Dimension and its Partnerships, projects funded by the 
European Commission (such as infrastructure development), the Nordic Council 
of Ministers  (civil  service,  education,  entrepreneurship,  civil  society),  and  by 
international  financing  institutions,  most  notably  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development,  the  European  Investment  Bank,  and  the 
Nordic  Investment  Bank  (environment  and  energy  efficiency  related 
investments).  Also  the  Arctic  Council  (climate  change,  sustainable  develop‐
ment),  the  Barents  Euro‐Arctic  Council  (increasing  stability,  prosperity  and 
security),  and  the  Council  of  the  Baltic  Sea  States  (environment,  economic 
development,  education,  culture),  all  now  under  the  Northern  Dimension 
umbrella, have established  their  roles as cooperative  forums  in  the  regions.  In 
addition, other countries, such as Sweden and Norway, have their own bilateral 
programs focusing primarily on nuclear safety in Northwest Russia.  
The Organization  for  Security  and Cooperation  in Europe  (OSCE)  offers  a 
forum for political negotiations and decision‐making in the field of security and 
has been long favored by Russia. The Finnish Committee for European Security 
(STETE) was established in 1970 in support of the OSCE. Its members consist of 
all  leading Finnish political parties and other political organizations,  the  trade 
union movement, womenʹs, youth, student, and peace organizations, as well as 
other NGOs. The underlying design  of  STETE  is  to  facilitate  networking  and 
cooperation between politicians, officials, and civic society actors of all the Baltic 
Sea  countries  in order  to  create  a  fruitful base  for  addressing  common  future 
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challenges. STETE’s idea is “to include decision makers in the dialogue, but still 
offer  an  unofficial  platform  for  discussion  and  open  the  door  for  sensitive 
matters.”  As  an  example,  STETE  together  with  its  Finnish  NGO  partners 
organized an international NGO‐based forum in Helsinki December 2–3, 2008 in 
connection with the 16th OSCE Ministerial Council hosted by the Finnish OSCE 
Chairmanship.  The  OSCE  Civil  Society  Forum  concentrated  on  the  OSCE’s 
human  dimension  issues  and  gave  the  participating  civil  society  actors  the 
possibility to bring their recommendations for the high‐level discussions of the 
Ministerial Council.  
 
 
4.4 RECONTEXTUALIZING CIVIC CROSS-BORDER 
COOPERATION41 
 
When  Finland  joined  the  EU  in  1995,  conditions  governing  CBC  faced  a 
significant  transformation. Finland’s accession  to  the EU meant  that  the Union 
now  extended  physically  all  the  way  to  the  Russian  border.  Appropriately, 
previously  bilaterally  governed  cooperation  across  the  border  became  part  of 
the broader dynamics of  international politics and EU‐Russia  relations, but on 
the other hand, regional and local actors were offered completely new avenues 
for  an  active  role  in  international  affairs  by  cooperating  directly  across  the 
previously closed border (Liikanen 2004b).  
The  new  millennium  brought  along  profound  conceptual  changes  in  the 
language  of  the EU documents  addressing CBC  (Liikanen  2010,  25). The new 
policy frames picturing a ‘Wider Europe’ and European ‘Neighborhood’ shifted 
the  focus  of  CBC  from  the  perspective  of  internal  cohesion,  regional 
development, and  integration of border  regions  typical of  the  first  INTERREG 
programs towards external relations and the political projects of preparing and 
accomplishing  the enlargement of  the Union and fostering  interaction between 
the EU and its neighbors. Instead of, or alongside, the language and approaches 
typical of regional development and regional studies, the rhetoric of new policy 
documents  tended  to  make  use  of  the  concepts  and  approaches  of  political 
science,  especially  the  analyses of  recent  large  changes  in  the global  economy 
and politics, the end of the Cold War, the European integration, and ultimately 
globalization.  (Ibid.,  25–26.)  Interestingly,  this  turn  seems  to  have  followed 
much the same patterns as discussions in the study of borders and international 
relations  which  likewise  questioned  the  traditional  geopolitical  notions  of 
borders  as  the  clear‐cut  territorial  lines  and  arenas  of  confrontation  between 
national states (van Houtum 2005). 
                                                          
41 I am grateful to Prof. Ilkka Liikanen who has advised me greatly in developing this chapter. Many 
of the ideas presented here stem from our earlier work together. 
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As part  of  this  conceptual  sea  change,  the  question of  the  role  of  regional 
actors  and  cross‐border  region  building  became  key  themes  of  discussion 
concerning  the EU borders  and border  regions  (Kolossov  2005). Similarly,  the 
new  CBC  program  documents  outlined  border‐spanning  activities  that  were 
targeted to lay ground for a new type of cross‐border regionalization – even at 
the external borders of  the Union. Particularly  in  the European Neighborhood 
policy document  (Commission of  the European Communities 2004a),  there are 
clear  traces  of  a  new  political  language  seeking  to  overcome  the  traditional 
nation‐state  perspective  to  borders, which  can  be  seen  to  promote  a  gradual 
Europeanization  of  the  institutional  and  discursive  practices  connected  to 
borders.  
The  question  of  the  Europeanization  of  cross‐border  cooperation  policies 
cannot,  however,  be  analyzed  strictly  on  the  level  of  specific  policy 
reformulations  (such  as  the  ENP)  but  ought  to  be  examined  by  monitoring 
broader  political,  cultural,  and  socio‐economic  space where  the  EU  exerts  its 
transformative power beyond  its external borders (Scott & Liikanen 2010, 424). 
In  the  academic  discussion  of  the  time,  changes  in  CBC  policies were  often 
linked  to  broader  visions  of  a  historical  turn  towards  a  new  Europe  of  post‐
national borders (Berezin & Schain 2003). In this process, state sovereignty was 
seen to be weakened not just upwards (by the EU, supranational organizations, 
globalization)  or  downwards  (by  subnational  units,  regionalization)  but  also 
sideways by transnational actors such as CSOs (see Rosenau 2004; 2005). 
The notion of a new emerging  ‘post‐national’ concept of European  identity 
and citizenship has, however, been severely questioned. It has been pointed out 
that  in a broader European perspective  it  is both  theoretically and empirically 
problematic  to  conceptualize  European  integration  as  a  shift  from  nationally 
motivated  identification  and  bordering  towards  a  new  supra‐national 
understanding of Europe and  its borders (Calhoun 2007). In order to approach 
this question in more concrete terms there is an obvious need to study in specific 
historical contexts  the extent  to which borders and cross‐border  interaction are 
perceived in new post‐national terms. 
 
4.4.1 Technical Aid and Regional Cohesion  
During its first phase, the EU led CBC with Russia was developed chiefly along 
two tracks: as technical assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(Tacis)  and  according  to  the  Community  initiative  INTERREG.  The  Tacis 
program was launched in 1991 to provide grant‐financed technical assistance to 
13 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in their transition to democratic 
market‐oriented economies. Being originally an aid program, encouraging cross‐
border  and  cross‐regional  cooperation  appeared  later  as  a  priority  of  the 
program.  In  1996,  a  year  after  Finnish membership  in  the  EU,  the  European 
Parliament proposed the need for the coordination of the Tacis and INTERREG 
programs as a cross‐border instrument on the Finnish‐Russian border (European 
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Parliament 1996). Consequently,  the Tacis  funds began  to be allocated  through 
the Tacis Cross‐border cooperation Small Project Facility initiative to Northwest 
Russia  (and  later  to Western Belarus and parts of Ukraine and Moldova) as a 
counterpart to the INTERREG funds that were used to carry out projects in the 
Finnish/EU side of the border (see Rouge‐Oikarinen 2009). 
Through this framework, Finnish‐Russian civil society projects continued to 
target  the  improvement of public health and  social welfare  in  the Republic of 
Karelia.  The  development  of  joint  programs  was  based  on  joint  workshops 
dealing  with  different  development  issues.  These  formed  the  basis  for  the 
formulation  of  joint  projects  that  received  funding  from  a  variety  of  Finnish, 
European,  and  other  international  sources.  The  city  of  Sortavala  was,  for 
example, chosen as a pilot region for financial aid to supply local hospitals with 
modern equipment. The project also aimed at the elaboration of a strategic plan 
for  the general  improvement of  the health system and supporting experiments 
with new models of public health institutions.  
In  January 2000,  the European Council adopted a new Regulation, opening 
yet  another  phase  of  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  the  Tacis  countries 
(Council of  the European Union 2000).  It was based on an understanding  that 
cooperation  is  a  reciprocal  process  and  encouraged  a move  from    ‘demand‐
driven’ towards  ‘dialogue‐driven’ programming (Frenz 2008, 6). The regulation 
formed the legal basis for the actual ‘Tacis CBC program,’ which hereby became 
a constitutive element in the formulation of European Union CBC policies with 
Russia (Prozorov 2004, 17–21). 
From  the  perspective  of  border  regions,  by  far  the  more  important 
institutional  origin  for  EU‐Russia  cooperation  has  been  the  regional 
development  program  INTERREG,  which  is  financed  under  the  European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), one of the so‐called EU Structural Funds. 
The  program was  launched  by  the Commission  in  1990 with  the  objective  of 
safeguarding  harmonious  and  balanced  development  within  the  EU  by 
diminishing  the  influence  of  internal  national  borders  and  strengthening 
economic  and  social  cohesion  along  them. This  emphasis  changed during  the 
years  following  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet Union,  and  INTERREG  become  an 
important financial instrument even on the external borders of the EU. 
Whereas  the  first  INTERREG  period  (1990–1994)  had  a  clear  emphasis  on 
integration  and  cohesion  along  its  internal  borders,  the  INTERREG  II  period 
(1994–1999)  and particularly  the  INTERREG  III period  (2000–2006)  signaled  a 
clear  shift  towards  the politics of pre‐enlargement and promoting CBC on  the 
external  borders  of  the  union42.  INTERREG  III  placed  a  special  emphasis  on 
                                                          
42 The INTERREG IV period (2007–2013) program is officially known as the European Territorial 
Cooperation Objective. The budget for the objective includes the allocation for Member States to 
participate in EU external border cooperation programs supported by other instruments, The 
Instrument for Pre‐Accession Assistance (IPA) and the ENPI. (Commission of the European 
Communities 2009). 
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integrating remote regions and those that share external borders with candidate 
countries. As  the  EU  now  shared  a  land  border with  Russia  in  the wake  of 
Finland’s membership, even Russia and Russian border regions were addressed 
in  the  frame  of  the  pre‐enlargement  discourse  of  promoting  integration  and 
overcoming  the old dividing  lines within Europe. This meant  that on  the most 
general program level CBC with Russia was conceptualized as part of the same 
rhetoric of Europeanization and promotion of European values that was applied 
to candidate countries. 
However,  although  INTERREG  now  involved  also  neighboring  countries 
directly, Structural Funds of the EU could, in principle, be used only inside the 
Union.  Thus,  INTERREG  programs  at  the  EU’s  external  border,  e.g.,  at  the 
Finnish‐Russian border,  required also an additional  source of  finance,  such as 
Tacis,  for  activities  taking  place  in  the  neighboring  country.  This  formed  a 
serious  obstacle  for  successful  execution  of  joint  projects.  Still,  financing  for 
networking,  the  exchange  of  delegations,  and  other  means  of  supporting 
regional  level  interaction  (excluding direct  salaries) made  INTERREG  funding 
an  important  constitutive  element  in  the  search  for  new modes  for  Finnish‐
Russian CBC, and  the  cooperation  rhetoric of  the  INTERREG program gave a 
major  ideological  boost  for  regional  level  actors  involved  in  the  process  (see 
Cronberg 1999, 323–327).  
While  internally  the EU attempted  to manage heterogeneity with unity and 
erase borders  –  the products of past  conflicts  –  in order  to  stimulate  regional 
development  in  the often‐peripheral border  regions,  this model did not  fit  the 
Finnish  context  in  which  the  border  was  still  seen  to  possess  an  important 
filtering  function.  Even  though  it  was  widely  understood  that  cooperation 
between  the  regions  of  the  EU  and  those  on  the  other  side  of  the  Union’s 
external  borders  was  becoming  increasingly  important  as  well  as  more 
intensive, the EU framework for the relations with the CIS remained unchanged 
for several years. As neither of  the programs had originally been designed  for 
this  particular  context,  the  practical  implementation  of  twofold  programming 
proved  to be problematic and arduous43. The drive  to overcome  it became  an 
important  goal  for  Finnish  regional  actors  involved  in  CBC,  which  can  be 
recognized  as  one  of  the  background  factors  in  the  formulation  of  EU’s  new 
policy frame for CBC. (Cronberg 2000, 179–183.) 
 
4.4.2 European Neighborhood and Partnership 
In 2001 the European Commission finally made the first step towards easing the 
situation  by  issuing  a  Guide  to  Bringing  INTERREG  and  Tacis  Funding 
Together to facilitate CBC at the external borders of the EU (Commission of the 
                                                          
43 For an evaluation of Tacis, see European Court of Auditorsʹ Special Report No. 2/2006 concerning 
the performance of projects financed under Tacis in the Russian Federation 2006/C 119/01 and the 
evaluation of Council Regulation 99/2000 (Tacis) and its implementation – ref. 728 of January 2006. 
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European Communities 2001a). Two years later, the new basic principles of EU 
policies  for  cooperation with  its  neighbors were  introduced  in  the  European 
Commission  Communication  “Wider  Europe  —  Neighborhood:  A  New 
Framework  for  Relations  with  our  Eastern  and  Southern  Neighbors” 
(Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2003a).  More  pronounced  than 
before,  the  new  policy  framework  included  also  those  neighboring  countries 
that currently did not have the prospect of EU membership. The Union set as its 
task to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and 
prosperity  within  and  beyond  its  new  borders.  Secondly,  the  EU  aimed  to 
develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – 
with whom  it  enjoys  close,  peaceful,  and  cooperative  relations  (ibid.).  In  this 
connection, Russia, most  of  the  countries  comprising  the Newly  Independent 
States (NIS) as well as the southern Mediterranean were offered the prospect of 
a stake  in  the EU’s  internal market and  further  integration  to promote  the  free 
movement  of  people,  goods,  services,  and  capital;  i.e.,  the  ‘four  freedoms’ 
(Commission of the European Communities 2003a, 4, 12). 
In  the subsequent European Commission Communication “Paving  the Way 
for  a  New  Neighborhood  Instrument”  (Commission  of  the  European 
Communities  2003b),  the  Commission  acknowledged  that  progress  had  been 
made  in  coordinating  INTERREG  and  Tacis  CBC,  notably  on  the  Finnish‐
Russian  border,  yet  the  impact  of  such  coordination  measures  was  still 
considered  to be constrained by  the existence of different  legal and budgetary 
frameworks.  Thus,  the  concept  of  a  new Neighborhood  Instrument was  now 
envisioned  to  resolve  the  existing  problems  by  offering  an  opportunity  to 
develop  a  single  approach  to  cooperation  across  the  external  borders  of  the 
Union  in  order  to  improve  the  implementation  and delivery  of CBC projects. 
Such an Instrument was envisioned to be “capable of operating on an identical 
footing on both sides of  the EU’s external border” and would,  in view of  that, 
provide  “a more  complete  approach,  allowing  for  a mix  of  cross‐border  and 
regional cooperation activity to be developed around the external border” (ibid., 
12). 
As a consequence of these decisions, the European Neighborhood Policy was 
developed  in 2004 with the official objective of avoiding the emergence of new 
dividing  lines  between  the  enlarged  EU  and  its  neighbors  and  instead 
strengthening  the  prosperity,  stability,  and  security  of  all  concerned.  The 
rhetoric of the new policy documents followed much of the same patterns that 
had  been  used  in  borders  studies  and  international  relations  that  at  the  time 
questioned the traditional geopolitical notions of borders as clear‐cut territorial 
lines  and  arenas of  confrontation between national  states  (van Houtum  2005). 
Based  on  a  very  Kristofian  idea  of  the  frontier,  the  geopolitical  vision  of 
Europeanization promoted by  the ENP can be deemed as a manifestation of a 
de‐bordering discourse based on  ideational projection of power and the notion 
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that  principled  partnership  that  is  offered,  in  some  cases,  in  place  of  more 
concrete perspectives of EU membership. 
The initiation of the ENP was also the maximum expression of an emerging 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the principal aim of which is to establish 
a wider security community  in Europe. Illegal  immigration, human trafficking, 
terrorism,  and  cross‐border  organized  crime  remain  issues where  intensified 
coordination  between  the  EU  and  its  neighbors  is  envisaged.  However,  the 
ENP’s  scope  is  complex  and  multilayered;  it  encompasses  a  wide  range  of 
economic, political, and  socio‐economic  issues  (Scott 2005). This  is also due  to 
the  EU’s  broad  definition  of  security  as  being  environmental,  economic,  and 
social  (and  not  only military)  in  nature,  as well  as  a  realization  (not  always 
translated  in  to  practice)  that  security  concerns  must  be  shared  rather  than 
imposed externally. As a result, the EU suggests that cultural understanding and 
the recognition of mutual interdependence are means with which to establish a 
common  political  dialogue  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
2004a/b).  
As Russia opted out from joining the ENP and thus from assuming a position 
of being just another neighbor, it became considered as a “key partner in the EU 
immediate  neighborhood.”  The  EU  and  Russia  have  jointly  decided,  as 
recognized  repeatedly  even  in  the  original  ENP  strategy  (Commission  of  the 
European Communities 2004a, 4, 6, 7; see also: 2004b),  to further develop  their 
strategic partnership through the creation of four Common Spaces, which were 
defined at the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003. A set of more specific Road 
Maps  was  adopted  at  the  Moscow  summit  in  2005  to  act  as  the  short  and 
medium‐term instruments for the implementation of the Common Spaces. 
The EU’s vision of  ‘Neighborhood’  indicates a step “beyond cooperation  to 
involve a significant measure of integration.” Integration is expected to occur as 
a  result of  regional  interaction  and partnership, which  in  turn ought  to bring 
“enormous  gains  to  all  involved  in  terms  of  increased  stability,  security  and 
well‐being.”  In attempting  to strengthen  its  identity as a stabilizing element  in 
the world,  the  EU  has  sought  to  create  a  community  through  shared  values, 
common  goals,  and  intensive  cooperation  on  a  broad  range  of  EU  internal 
policies  (Emerson  2004).  The  ENP  document  (Commission  of  the  European 
Communities 2004a),  in particular, has clear  traces of a new political  language 
that  seeks  to  overcome  traditional  nation‐state  perspective  to  borders  by 
promoting a gradual Europeanization (Scott 2005). 
By  now,  it  seems  clear  that  the  EU  has  not  been  able  to  convince  its 
significant  other  that  it  takes  two  to  tango. Despite  the  important  contractual 
milestones, there are also signs of a lack of mutual understanding. The Common 
Spaces and the related Road Maps, even if valuable achievements as such, have 
accomplished  fairly  little  since  their  much‐acclaimed  introduction,  and  the 
‘strategic  partnership’  is  becoming  ever  more  distant  from  the  reality.  In 
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practice, the relations have arrived to a stalemate – and the longer it endures, the 
more difficult it will be to resolve. 
A  good  example  of  this  is  the  foundation  and  legal  base  of  the Common 
Spaces,  the  now‐expired  1997  EU‐Russian  Partnership  and  Cooperation 
Agreement  (PCA), which has  remained  automatically  in  force pending  a new 
accord. The crux of the matter seems to be that the conditionality of promoting 
European  values  present  in  EU  documents  has  collided  with  new  Russian 
political  discourse  emphasizing  sovereignty  (Liikanen  2008,  3).  Makarychev 
(2012),  among  others,  has  suggested  that  the  main  reason  behind  Russia’s 
unwillingness  to  engage  with  the  EU  is  due  to  the  EU’s  tendency  to  seek 
apolitical management  of  the  relations  by means  of  externally  projecting  its 
norms and principles. The normative  foundation of EU  identity, he continues, 
actually prevents the EU from accepting Russia as a ‘normal’ great power. While 
this may be true, it cannot be interpreted to mean that Russia’s action would not 
be  grounded  in  values  as  well.  This,  of  course,  depends  on  how  ‘value’  is 
defined, but, objectively, self‐respect  is not  less of a value  than  the respect  for, 
say, human rights. 
CBC  is an  integral component of both  the ENP and  the EU‐Russia strategic 
partnership. In order to develop an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, 
financial  support  for  the  cooperation with  all  the neighboring  countries  –  the 
partner  countries  covered  by  the  ENP  and  the  Four Common  Spaces  agreed 
with Russia –  is now provided  through a  single European Neighborhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI)44. ENPI, which was set up to replace the existing 
geographical  and  thematic  programs  covering  the  countries  concerned,  is  the 
most  important  tool  for  accomplishing  the  goals  set  out  in  the Wider Europe 
document  (Commission  of  the European Communities  2004b,  2). The EU  has 
also  insisted  that  its  regional  cooperation  agendas  are  not  only  about  ‘high 
politics’  in  the  traditional  sense but  also  encompass  social  and  cultural  issues 
(Scott & Liikanen 2010, 242). This is due to the EU’s broad definition of security 
as  being  not  only  military  but  also  environmental,  economic,  and  social  in 
nature,  as well  as  the  realization  that  security  concerns must,  in principle,  be 
shared rather than imposed externally (ibid., 427). Another indication of this are 
the  roles attributed  to civil society and cross‐border cooperation.  In particular, 
the strengthening of a  ‘civil society dimension’ within the ENP is promulgated 
by  the  Commission,  the  Council  of  Europe,  and  the  Parliament  (European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2006, 4–5; Commission of the 
European Communities 2007, 11).  
                                                          
44 The words “and Partnership” in the title of the instrument reflects that the instrument will also 
fund the implementation of the Strategic Partnership with Russia (previously funded through the 
Tacis program). See Commission of the European Communities (2006d). From 2014, the ENPI will be 
replaced by the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI), an increasingly policy‐driven 
instrument, which will provide for increased differentiation, more flexibility, stricter conditionality, 
and incentives for best performers. 
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ENPI does, inter alia, seek to support cross‐border contacts and cooperation 
between  local and regional actors and civil society actors and aims  to enhance 
democratization and  the  role of CSOs  in  the neighboring countries.  It seeks  to 
support  democratization  by  fostering  the  development  of  civil  society  in  the 
neighboring  countries  and  promoting  a  dialogue  in  the  partner  countries 
between governments and the local civil society. In order to do so, ENPI seeks to 
support cross‐border contacts and cooperation between local and regional actors 
and civil society actors, which is now understood as vital in order for the EU’s 
policies  to  boost  links  with  its  ‘ring  of  friends’  and  thus  to  deepen  the 
integration between the Union and its neighbors. As set down in the Regulation 
No  1638/2006  of  the European Parliament  and  of  the Council45 of October  24, 
2006, which lays down general provisions establishing ENPI, the following non‐
state  actors  are  eligible  for  funding  for  the  purposes  of  implementing  action 
programs, joint CBC programs, and special measures: 
 
 Non‐governmental organizations;  
 Organizations representing national and/or ethnic minorities;  
 Local citizens’ groups and traders’ associations;  
 Cooperatives, trade unions, organizations representing economic and 
social interests;  
 Local organizations involved in decentralized regional cooperation and 
integration;  
 Consumer organizations, women’s and youth organizations, teaching, 
cultural research and scientific organizations;  
 Universities;  
 Churches and religious associations and communities;  
 The media;  
 Cross‐border associations, non‐governmental associations, and 
independent foundations. 
 
According to the regulation, non‐state actors are financed for projects aimed at 
promoting  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  and  supporting 
democratization. The  requirement of co‐financing can be waived  if adequately 
justified, which gives the EU the flexibility to contribute to the development of 
civil society without being tied down by the authorities of the receiving country 
(Cameron 2006). 
Paradoxically,  the  logic  of  democracy  clashes with  the  logic  of  spreading 
democracy  (Garton Ash 2004), which  set  limitations  to  the EU’s direct actions 
with regards to its Eastern enlargement. Civil society is understood not just as a 
political forum for the articulation of social agendas but also as a political force 
central to the development of a wider community of values and societal goals; it 
                                                          
45 OJ L 310, 9.11.2006, p. 9. 
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is seen  to have a modernizing and democratizing  function within state‐society 
relations. While  the ENP  is a policy  framework  that  is based on  jointly agreed 
criteria and co‐ownership,  the  requirement of co‐financing can nevertheless be 
waived if adequately justified. 
According  to  the Commissions  original  timetable,  the  development  of  the 
ENPI was  a  two‐phased process. During  the  first period  (2004–2006),  the  key 
objective was the coordination of the various existing instruments and fulfilling 
commitments and obligations regarding the programming period up to the end 
of  2006  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2003b,  8).  The  first 
transitional  period  was  expected  to  improve  cooperation  between  various 
financing  instruments  as well  as  legislative  and  financial  frameworks  on  the 
external borders of the EU. From the beginning of 2007, the ENPI was to replace 
the current Tacis and Meda programs and evolve into a CBC programs covering 
both  sides  of  the EU  external  border,  even  in  the  case  of  the Finnish‐Russian 
border. 
Regulation 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe 
of October 24, 2006 provided  the  legal basis  for establishing  Joint Operational 
Programs  (JOPs)  for  CBC,  covering  border  regions  of  the  EU  and  of  the 
neighboring  countries.  The  ENPI  CBC  Strategy  Paper  2007–2013,  adopted  in 
March 2007, outlined  the strategic  framework  for  these programs. Building on 
the response strategy defined in the Strategy Paper, the CBC Indicative Program 
for  2007–2010  proposed  the  establishment  of  15  regionally  governed  CBC 
programs  covering  the  EU  land  borders  and  sea  crossings  of  significant 
importance with  neighboring  countries.  So  far,  13  of  these  programs  (9  land 
borders, 1 sea crossing, and 3 sea basin programs) have materialized. 
Even though cross‐border cooperation has been defined as a key priority of 
the ENPI, only  some  five per cent of  the  total ENPI budget  for 2007–2013 has 
been  specifically  targeted at CBC programs. On a more positive note, a major 
new element of ENPI  is that Russia provides  its own financial contributions to 
the  program  to  reflect  the  ‘equal  partnership.’  The  total  budget  of  these 
programs  is  approx. EUR  437 million:  €  267M  by  the Commission,  €  67M  by 
Member States and € 103.7M by Russia. To guarantee equal representation in the 
decision‐making,  most  programs  have  established  their  own  common 
management structures consisting of a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), Joint 
Management Authority  (JMA),  and  a  Joint  Technical  Secretariat  (JTS).  In  all, 
Russia  participates  in  five  land  border  programs,  three  of  which  (Kolarctic, 
Karelia,  and  South‐East  Finland‐Russia  programs)  extend  across  the  Finnish‐
Russian  border. The  total  budget  for  these programs  for  the  current  financial 
period is about EUR 189 million, of which EUR 87 million is EC funding. 
In  practice,  relations  between  the  EU  and  Russia  have  not,  however, 
developed as expected during the time following the adoption of the EU’s new 
policy  frames.  Negotiations  over  the  renewal  of  the  EU‐Russia  partnership 
agreement  has  been unsuccessful due  to deteriorating  relations  and  a  lack  of 
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mutual understanding between the EU and Russia concerning the substance of 
the agreement and  the  future of cooperation  in general.  It has been noted  that 
today’s Russia is increasingly more self‐confident and less cooperative than the 
Russia  of  the  1990s.  The  EU‐Russia  relationship  is  tenser,  and  Russia  is  less 
willing to take advice on domestic issues from abroad. Russia is also well aware 
of  its  strategic  global  importance.  Based  on  its  vast  energy  sources  and  the 
related  economic  growth,  Russia  is  re‐gaining  its  strength  as  a  great  power. 
Especially  in  the aftermath of  the Georgian crises,  it has become clear  that  the 
conditionality of promoting European values present  in  the EU documents of 
CBC has collided with new Russian political discourse emphasizing sovereignty 
and Russia’s  own way  of  building  ‘sovereign democracy’  (Rytövuori‐Apunen 
2007, 56–58, 78–81). 
As  a  result,  the  time  to  begin  a  Mid  Term  Review  (MTR)  of  the  ENPI 
program documents, as required by the article 7.1 of the ENPI Regulation, came 
before the ENPI regional  level program frames were actually put  into practice. 
The MTR’s were carried out between December 2008 and October 2009, whereas 
the real implementation of the project commenced two years behind schedule in 
the latter half of 2009 – in some cases even later. In the case of the Karelia ENPI 
CBC,  the  first  call  for  proposals was  opened  on  February  1,  2010  under  the 
theme  cross‐border  solutions  for  sustainable  spatial,  economic,  and 
environmental  development 46 .  The  JMC  confirmed  the  project  selection  in 
November 2010 and the first grant contracts were signed in February 2011. 
In  retrospect,  it  is  evident  that  the  2004  and  2007  rounds  of  enlargement 
changed the nature of CBC over the external EU borders profoundly. Because of 
geographical  proximity,  long‐standing  economic,  social  and  political 
interrelationships,  and  the  deepening  of  mutual  interdependencies,  the  EU 
sought to assume a stabilizing role in Post‐Soviet, Eurasian, and Mediterranean 
regional  contexts  (Browning &  Joenniemi  2008).  The  pre‐integration  aims  no 
longer exist but rather, as Scott & Liikanen (2010, 426) put forth, the geopolitical 
vision  that underlies  such an  ideational projection of power  is grounded on a 
multifaceted  and  mutually  beneficial  ‘privileged  partnership’.  Instead  of 
lowering  fences,  the goal  is  to  establish new  cooperation  forms across a more 
stable  eastern  border  managed  according  to  the  regulations  of  Schengen 
(Commission of the European Communities 2004a, 20–21). Thus, the EU policy 
formulation seems rather contradictory for it seeks to promote cooperation and 
cross‐border regionalization but it is done by means of conditional cooperation 
that  reinforces  European  values  and  underlines  security  and  more  strictly 
controlled borders (van Houtum & Pijpers 2006, 59–61). 
The post‐Treaty of Lisbon development of the Common Security and Defense 
Policy illuminates this well. The treaty merged the post of High Representative 
for  the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Commissioner  for 
                                                          
46 Altogether 59 concept notes were submitted, 51 of which passed the administrative check. 
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External  Relations  and  European  Neighborhood  Policy  (creating  the  post  of 
High Representative of  the Union  for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and 
consolidated  the  former pillar under  the newly  formed Common Foreign  and 
Security Policy. The fact that the policy focuses mainly on security and defense 
diplomacy and actions – the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is a 
major component of CFSP – indicates that the role of CBC at the external border 
has been downgraded from a core activity to a sidetrack for securitization.  
The ENPI CBC programs at  the Finnish‐Russian border  largely underscore 
the  general  ENPI‐CBC  objectives  in  the  areas  of  economic  development, 
sustainability,  and  social  development  issues.  It  is,  however,  also  clear  that 
projecting  the  EU’s  geopolitical  objectives  of  securitization  and  social 
modernization  onto  the  local  and  regional  level  of  cooperation  could  be  a 
considerable  constraint.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  not  all  ENPI  CBC 
programs  with  Finnish  prioritize  border  security.  Generally  speaking,  ENPI 
CBC, as a new support program, is as yet not suitably equipped to deal with the 
overall context within which Finnish‐Russian cooperation takes place.  
 
 
4.5 INITIATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT 
 
Civil  society  organizations  are  key players  in  the  area  of  social development, 
intercultural  dialogue,  social  welfare  policy,  capacity‐building,  and  in  the 
strengthening of  community  institutions  (Laine & Demidov  2013).  In order  to 
understand how the current situation came to be, it is necessary to look back to 
how it all began. In the following, I explain how the former friendship policies 
and paradiplomatic city‐twinnings  turned  into Neighboring Area Cooperation, 
which  then  formed  the  foundation  for  the  initiation  of  the  Interreg/TACIS 
project and, most recently, the ENPI programs. 
 
4.5.1 Civil Society Actors in Bilateral Cooperation 
The establishment of  the Finnish‐Russian civil society  interaction dates back  to 
the era when Finland was still, as an Autonomous Grand Duchy, a part of  the 
Russian  Empire.  Science  had  reached  a  high  level  in  Russia  specifically  in 
archeology, history, geography, and ethnographic and linguistic sciences, which 
opened  up  new  possibilities  also  for  Finnish  scientists.  The  linguistic, 
ethnological,  and  archaeological  research  work  of  academics  such  as  Elias 
Lönnrot and M.A. Castrén laid the foundation for modern research (Saksa 2010). 
Interaction diversified as Finland became  increasingly familiar for a number of 
Russian  officials,  soldiers,  and  artists, whereas many  Finns moved  to Russia, 
particularly its capital at the time, Saint Petersburg, in search of not  just higher 
education but also permanent work. 
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The  heavily  guarded  military  border,  put  up  following  the  peace  treaty 
between an  independent Republic of Finland and Soviet Russia  in 1920, halted 
all  forms of  interaction. Not until after World War  II was  the  time ripe  for  the 
two countries  to start building  their neighborly relations and  for  interaction  to 
begin to revive – even if somewhat compulsorily.  
Dictated by  the YYA  treaty, post‐WW  II Finnish  foreign policy  towards  the 
Soviet Union was based on the principle of  ‘official friendship.’ The friendship 
was  not  limited  to  intergovernmental  relations  but was  put  in  practice  also 
through  paradiplomatic  links  across  the  border.  The  task  was  taken  up  by 
various more or less official delegations consisting of politicians but also artists, 
teachers,  athletes,  various  kinds  of  experts,  trade  union  representatives,  and 
friendship groups  (Kostiainen 1998, 46–50). Many of  the delegations were sent 
by  Finnish  state  agencies,  particularly  the  Ministry  of  Education,  and  they 
received  special  treatment  in  the Soviet Union  (Kostiainen  1998). These  cross‐
border trips, Kostiainen (1999) points out, have to be understood in the context 
of  the  Finnish‐Soviet  special  relationships. Whereas  the  relationships  between 
the  two countries had been exceedingly  tense prior  to WW  II,  in  the post‐war 
world  many  regarded  a  closer  relationship  and  increased  cross‐border 
interaction as needed.  
Most of these trips were organized by the Finland‐Soviet Union Society (now 
Finland‐Russia Society), which had been established on October 15, 1944 –  less 
than a month after the armistice ending the Continuation War had been signed. 
The  society  had  been  preceded  by  the  Finnish‐Soviet  Peace  and  Friendship 
Society, a more radical and anti‐governmental organization established already 
during  the  interim peace  in May 1940 mainly by  the  supporters of  the  former 
Finnish Communist Party.  In  a  few months  the Peace  and Friendship  Society 
had gained some 35,000 members and established 115  local chapters. From the 
Finnish  government’s  perspective,  the  society  was,  however,  deemed  as 
dangerous as it was believed to engaged in revolutionary activities and working 
in  favor  of  the  enemy. As  a  consequence,  the  society was  eventually  closed 
down  by  a  court  decision  in October  1944  and  immediately  replaced  by  the 
Finland‐Soviet Union Society. 
The new society enjoyed strong state support and had considerably broader 
party‐political basis than its predecessor had had as a number of key figures of 
the  Finnish politics, Paasikivi  and Kekkonen  in  the  lead,  among  its  founding 
members (Merivirta 1998, 29). Even  though  the society was established as non‐
governmental  organization,  it  was  a  rather  top‐down  project  aiming  to 
encourage the general public to support the government’s new friendship policy 
in the making and function along its lines. Its membership figures soared right 
after its establishment to 170,000 (Kinnunen 1998, 232, 249–150). However, as the 
initial excitement had worn off, many gave up  their membership  to  the extent 
that there were only 85,000 registered members in 1946 (ibid.). Even though the 
society managed to raise its membership base again to over 100,000 by the 1970s, 
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it never gained acceptance  from  the majority of  the public as  it was  seen as a 
stooge of communism, symbolizing thus their utmost fear rather than something 
they wished to be a part of (Merivirta 1998, 129–130). 
Despite its non‐non‐governmental features, the creation and activities of the 
society did contribute remarkably to the formations of cross‐border civil society 
ties.  The  society  helped  in  organizing  cross‐border  trips  and  provided 
information  and  services  for  those  interested  in  seeing  and  experiencing how 
things  actually were  on  the  other  side.  In doing  so,  it provided  thousands of 
ordinary  Finns  and  Soviets  with  an  opportunity  to  meet  up  and  forge 
friendships (Kekkonen 1974). The society also had a great number of active local 
chapters  in  a  number  of  towns  all  around  Finland.  It was  largely  these  local 
chapters and particularly  the municipal politicians active  in  the  local  chapters 
who  initiated  the  friendship‐towns  system  between  Finland  and  the  Soviet 
Union  in  the  1950s, which was  to become  the next phase of  civic  cooperation 
across the border.  
After decades of trial and crisis, the situation began to return to normal in the 
1970s. Particularly after the OSCE meeting in Helsinki in 1975, major economic 
projects materialized and connections between  the  twin cities were developed. 
Scientific cooperation recovered especially due to the Finnish‐Soviet Committee 
for Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The twinning schemes formed a sizable 
part  of  the  cross‐border  trips  of  the  time,  and  despite  their  fundamentally 
politically driven agenda  they did,  in practice, provide Finns with a means  to 
visit  and  become  acquainted  with  the  unfamiliar  giant  to  the  east,  which 
remained  otherwise  relatively  closed  off  to  foreigners.  The  twin  city  concept 
serves as an example of how  the principle of official  friendship at  the  level of 
intergovernmental  relations  spread  to  the  city,  municipal,  and  eventually 
individual  levels.  The  twinning  activities  grew  more  intensive,  spread 
geographically,  and  expanded  to  cover  various  ceremonial  events  during  the 
following decades.  
The Soviet Union attracted also thousands of Finnish students. The first Finns 
went off  to study  in  the Soviet Union soon after  the death of Stalin  in  the mid 
1950s, and the number increased steadily until the early 1970s. Finnish medical 
students  studying  in  then  Leningrad  were  the  first  to  establish  their  own 
association, Medisiinariseura Cortex (later Chiasma), in 1970. The following year 
the  association  proposed  that  the  Finnish‐Soviet  student  exchange  should  be 
expanded by establishing independent and registered youth sections under the 
Finland‐Soviet Society in the main Finnish cities. The proposal, however, failed 
strike  a  chord  as  only  one  youth  section  in  the  Finnish  city  of  Kuopio was 
established – only to be suspended in 1980 for organizing a rock concert deemed 
by  the  society  leadership  to  have  pilloried  the  friendship  society’s  decorous 
name.  
NOY  ry, an association  for  students who had  studied  in  the Soviet Union, 
was  founded  in Helsinki  in 1979. Particularly  in  its beginning,  the association 
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cooperated  intensively with  the  Finland‐Soviet Union  society  and  the  Finnish 
Ministry of Education in preparing and guiding new students heading to Soviet 
Universities. NOY participated also in law‐drafting; a key achievement being the 
1986 act concerning the equivalence of the higher education completed abroad, 
which improved the opportunities of the students who had studied in the Soviet 
Union to find jobs in Finland. 
The  Institute  for  Cultural  Relations  between  Finland  and  the  USSR 
(Neuvostoliittoinstituutti) was established after World War II for the purpose of 
coordinating  and  undertaking  research  related  to  the  Soviet  Union  and 
advancing the Finno‐Soviet scientific and educational cooperation in the spirit of 
good‐neighborly  relations.  Authentic  Sovietology  was  never  in  vogue  in 
Finland, at  least  formally, as  the Finlandʹs official  foreign policy stance was  to 
not  to  irritate  its  eastern  neighbor  (Vihavainen  1991; Pernaa  2002). While  not 
everyone settled for the official line, Pernaa (2002) maintains that research on the 
Soviet Union consisted mainly of forwarding and interpreting information from 
Soviets sources. The Institute’s most important interest groups were the Finland‐
Soviet Union  Society  and,  particularly  during  the  first  years,  the Ministry  of 
Education in Finland and in the Soviet Union the Ministry of Education and the 
Ministry of Culture together with several libraries. (Pernaa 2002.) Joint seminars 
were organized  together with Soviet academics but such  ‘scientific  tourism’  (L 
13.2.1997), provided little academic results. 
The  Finnish  delegations  to  the  Soviet  Union  included  a  number  of what 
Kostiainen  (1998)  has  called  ‘Soviet  sympathizers,’  but  the  share  of  people 
crossing  the border  for  the sake of simple curiosity  increased steadily  towards 
the 1970s and 1980s. Increased efforts to boost cross‐border interaction reflected, 
essentially, Kekkonen’s proclamation of an  ‘active’ relationship with the Soviet 
Union  and  encouraged  reciprocally people  from  the Soviet Union  to  travel  to 
Finland. It has to be understood that all forms of cross‐border interaction of the 
time,  from  trade  to  tourism, were organized as a kind of  ‘exchange’ based on 
bilateral, centralized reciprocal agreements (ibid.). 
The  YYA  treaty  formed  also  the  basis  of  a  variety  of  complementary 
agreements, such as the agreement on scientific and technological cooperation in 
1955 and a decree on economic cooperation in 1967 – both the first of their kind 
between  a  socialist  and  a  capitalist  country.  An  agreement  on  economic, 
technical, and industrial cooperation (the so‐called TTT agreement) followed in 
1971, and in 1973 Finland became the first capitalist country to cooperate closely 
with  the Council  for Mutual  Economic Assistance,  an  economic  organization 
comprised of the countries of the Eastern Bloc and other communist states. 
The more profound contractual basis fuelled the links between the twin cities 
and  scientific  cooperation.  A  good  example  of  this  is  nature  conservation 
cooperation,  which  began  in  the  1970s.  One  of  the  main  impetus  for  the 
cooperation, now possible due  to  the 1971 agreement, was  to work  together  in 
order  to  conserve  the dark  green  belt of  old‐growth  forest  along  the  Finnish‐
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Russian border, which had endured due to the highly restricted access to the 
border zone. Joint activities were organized on both sides of the border, and the 
work brought together ministries, civil service departments, research 
institutions, universities, and environmental NGOs. This initial cooperation 
eventually led Finland and the Soviet Union to conclude an agreement on 
environmental protection in 1985, on the basis of which a joint Finno-Soviet 
Working Group on Nature Conservation was established. 
The great changes that began to shake the Soviet Union in the 1980s 
coagulated also the bilateral, concerted cooperation structures (Pernaa 2002). On 
the Finnish side, a clear shift away from bilateralism was taken by president 
Koivisto, who abandoned predecessor Kekkonen’s logic by moving the Finnish 
Foreign Policy towards multilateral politics for the first time since the wars. The 
change of the border regime following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
termination of policies of official delegations and joint communiqués was 
greeted with positive anticipation (Liikanen 2008). After 1991, the border has 
gradually become more permeable, enabling more direct and local interaction 
between new emerging Russian voluntary associations and Finnish CSOs.  
The Russian model of federalism was being tested as sharp political 
competition and institutional instability shook the country. The regions were 
provided with unprecedented room to maneuver, not only in exercising their 
internal politics but also regarding their external activities. Albeit still strictly 
guarded, the border was becoming more permeable, which actuated the 
development of paradiplomatic cross-border activities.  
The dramatic changes in all spheres of social, economic, and political life took 
an enormous toll on the nation but had the greatest negative impact on those 
who occupied the most precarious positions in terms of social welfare and 
health. The burgeoning civil society in Russia played an important role as a 
shock absorber but was handicapped by the Soviet legacy, largely toothless 
when confronted with a multitude of issues previously sheltered under the 
Communist doctrine. Accordingly, the social welfare and public health sector 
began to dominate Finnish-Russian CBC, which in turn helped to alleviate the 
consequences of political transformation.  
The easier border crossing procedures urged also the former residents, their 
descendants, and relatives to feed their curiosity and visit the areas that had 
been lost in war and that had since been practically inaccessible. Such ‘nostalgic 
tourism’ (see Izotov & Laine 2012) stimulated CBC and supported also the local 
economy on the Russian side. The increased openness also allowed the 
restoration of the Finnish-Karelian (and other kindred nations) ethno-cultural 
ties, providing simultaneously a further common ground and purpose for CBC 
(Németh et al., 248–249) 
Given the nature of the situation, particularly in the early 1990s, interaction 
across the border was certainly closer to humanitarian work based on goodwill 
rather than cooperation between equal partners to the advance of both. At this 
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point in time, many Finnish CSOs focused their efforts on pragmatic problem 
solving, offering diverse financial and material assistance. The idea was to be 
present in the areas that once belonged to Finland, and this work took place 
largely heedless from what one thought about Russia and its actions. In practice, 
for the actors on the Russian side, CBC with Finland translated into an 
opportunity to get additional funding, which was certainly needed as other 
funding options were practically non-existent. However, as Russian civil society 
developed towards more institutional forms, Finnish CSOs began to engage also 
in the practical training of Russian actors that would help them develop their 
own organizational skills and increase their effectiveness in the new, 
internationalizing environment.  
 
4.5.2 Neighboring Area Cooperation and Civil Society 
In addition to the pure forms of humanitarian aid and relief work, the Finnish 
government initiated its ‘neighboring area cooperation’ program, which then 
became an integral part of Finland’s foreign policy and served as a practical 
manifestation of the 1992 treaty on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation. The 
cooperation is founded on the neighboring area cooperation strategy, adopted 
by the Government of Finland in 1993, 1996, 1999, 2000, and 2004 respectively. It 
is participated in by all Finnish government ministries and several government 
departments and agencies, yet the activities are coordinated and supervised by 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which is also is in charge of elaborating, 
updating and implementing the strategy and prioritizing support. 
A new, updated version of the strategy has been under preparation for years, 
but its release has been delayed. Instead, in 2008 an NAC Action Plan for 2009–
2011 was adopted, which shifted the focus of cooperation more towards wide-
ranging economic cooperation (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2008). 
The previously strong social and health sector, which allowed strong 
participation by NGOs, is now only one priority sector among nine others47. 
However, civil society has been brought up in connection with education as a 
priority sector of its own. The Action Plan also acknowledges that bilateral 
cooperation is now increasingly linked with a wider platform of cooperation 
within the framework of the ENP, the Northern Dimension in the external and 
cross-border policies of the EU, and the EU’s policy on Russia. An 
intergovernmental neighboring area cooperation development group has been 
established to coordinate cooperation. The regional groups operate as 
permanent working bodies of the development group and are assigned with 
drawing up regional programs based on the Action Plan. An attempt is made to 
                                                          
47 The Action Plan priorities are: 1) Economic matters, 2) transportation and communications, 3) 
energy (including nuclear plant security), 4) agriculture and forestry, 5) environment, 6) social and 
health care, 7) education and civil society, 8) local government, 9) rescue services, and 10) matter of 
law and law enforcement (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2008).  
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avoid duplication of projects and to seek their coordination to achieve synergy 
benefits. (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2008.) 
From 1990 to 2012, a total of EUR 326 million has been allocated to 
cooperation with Russia (Figure 21). In 2011, a total of EUR 17.2 million, a clear 
reduction from the EUR 26.3 million in 2007, has been reserved for this 
purpose.48 In the budget for 2012, the sum had been reduced already to EUR 6 
million under the main title of expenditure of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs (item 24.20.66; Neighboring area cooperation). Given the EUR 3.7 million 
allocated to NAC in other ministries’ main titles of expenditure, the total 
amount of funds for NAC in 2012 amounts to EUR 9.7 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Five per cent or EUR 320,000 was reserved of project carried out by NGOs: EUR 
1.5 million in 2010 and EUR 1.2 million in 2012 (Figure 22). In addition to the 
diminished budget, the fact that there had been a wide spectrum of targets to be 
funded through the various spheres of authority of sectoral ministries, the 
budgets of individual projects had often been modest. By comparison, it is 
illustrative to point out that more than one billion euro had been reserved for 
development cooperation in 2011 alone; i.e., the NAC funds were only slightly 
over one per cent of that used for the development work.  
 
                                                          
48 In 2007 approximately 70 per cent of the funds were targeted to projects carried out in Russia. In 
2008, Russia’s share was already 95 per cent and in 2011 practically 100 per cent. 
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The descending trend has been going on for years. At the Ministry of Finance, 
NAC has been regarded already for some time as an outmoded phenomenon, 
whereas the increased opportunities provided by the EU-Russia cross-border 
cooperation programs (now ENPI CBC) has been put forth as an alternative 
funding mechanism. For example, in the 2009 rules of procedure for the NAC 
clear efforts were made to connect EU funding and NAC to each other. Forms of 
CBC with Russia have been updated and developed towards more equal 
partnership. Granted that the present form of neighboring area cooperation was 
designed for a period of transition, it was also jointly agreed that the bilateral 
neighboring area cooperation would be terminated by the end of 2012. As of 
2013, the Foreign Ministry's neighboring area cooperation funds will be targeted 
primarily to multilateral regional cooperation, such as the Northern Dimension, 
Arctic, Baltic Sea, and the Barents cooperation, that supports the objectives of the 
government program. The main source of financing for regional cross-border 
projects in the future will be the EU-Russia CBC programs. 
While the ‘neighboring areas’ included earlier Russia and the Baltic countries 
as well as other CIS and CEE countries deemed important from the Finnish 
perspective, since the 2004 enlargement of the EU49 it has gradually shifted to 
refer only to the northwestern region of the Russian Federation, particularly the 
Republic of Karelia, the Leningrad Oblast, the Murmansk Region, and the City 
of St Petersburg. The 2004 strategy acknowledges that the multiple social, 
health-related, administrative, and environmental problems of Russia make it a 
                                                          
49 As the Baltic countries joined the EU in 2004, Finland’s bilateral cooperation with them was 
concluded and the cooperation continued as normal relations among fellow EU members or as 
regional cooperation.  
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challenging partner for cooperation, which cannot be assessed using economic 
criteria only. However, northwest Russia is perceived as an important target 
region as its stable economic and social development contributes also to the 
attainment of Finland’s national objectives and interests. 
Since its initiation, the main objective of the neighboring area cooperation has 
been the promotion socio-economic development of the neighboring regions 
Russia and the strengthening of Russian civil society. The one-way nature of the 
premise has been prone to criticism. As the funding comes from Finnish sources 
and almost all the work is done on the Russian side of the border, for many the 
NAC is reminiscent a typical development work rather than cooperation. In 
2000, the acknowledgement of the asymmetrical setting led then minister for 
external relations of the Republic of Karelia Valery Shlyamin (2000) to urge 
Finns to introduce more “genuine cooperation projects” as he envisioned that 
otherwise, after the approaching 2004 EU enlargement, it would become 
“difficult for us to reaffirm the others that the Finnish-Russian border would be 
somehow unique.” 
The benefits for Finland are explained in various ways. For neighboring area, 
cooperation is essentially a foreign policy strategy, the cooperation can be, to put 
it bluntly, seen as an attempt to solve some of the problems before they cross the 
border to Finland. While the short-term benefits are easier to see on the Russian 
side, the assumption is that this work will eventually pay off and be beneficial 
for Finland in the longer run. It is believed that the objectives of the social and 
economic reforms under way in Russia and the progress made in the national 
economy will gradually enable the country’s participation in the development 
and implementation of cooperation based on an equal partnership. The idea is 
that the present forms of NAC will be developed step-by-step into ordinary 
collaboration between various authorities, organizations, and regional actors. 
An alternative way of seeing the situation is that the heavy raw material flow 
from Russia should be considered as off-setting Finland’s efforts across the 
border (Shlyamin 2000). 
The a recent NAC evaluation report ordered by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and conducted by independent Impact Consulting Oy Ltd concluded 
that neighboring area cooperation has been “exceptionally successful and 
effective” and “fulfilled the requirements set for it” by bright about “significant 
benefits with a relatively small investment.” It has involved “a combination of 
promoting of [sic] good relations between neighboring countries on the one 
hand, and projects of a developmental nature on the other,” most notably by 
fuelling the emergence of “well-functioning collaboration networks in almost all 
sectors.” (Aarva 2011; cf. Venäläinen 2011) 
Non-governmental organizations and other civil society organizations have 
played an instrumental role in the neighboring area cooperation from the onset. 
While businesses have had difficulties adapting to the unpredictable and 
continuously changing conditions in Russia and as the jurisdiction of 
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governments stops at the political border, CSOs have been less restricted from 
moving back and forth across the border and entering into cooperative 
relationships. In practice, the cooperation developed through joint workshops 
focusing of specific issues. The workshops brought together different actors 
from both sides of the border and in so doing allowing organizations to create 
new contacts and networks crucial for CBC’s success. 
The NAC Funds have been crucial for the CSOs that engage in CBC with 
Russia as they are seen as easier and lighter in terms of applying procedures, 
reporting, and bureaucracy, as well as more flexible and less competitive than 
any other funding mechanisms that are available, most notably those provided 
by the EU. Projects carried out by Finnish NGOs have been allocated some EUR 
1.5 million annually (6–8 per cent of total funds). In addition to NGO support, 
the Finnish embassies in St. Petersburg and Moscow have since 1997 been 
granted allowances for small cooperation projects, a large share of which has 
been carried out by Russian NGOs (Venäläinen 2011, 5). The Foreign Ministry, 
which has coordinated the program since 1997, receives on average 45 
applications per year. The refusal rate has been around 20 per cent. Generally 
projects last 2–5 years, while the annual support has recently been 
approximately EUR 10,000–60,000. (Venäläinen 2011, 11.)  
In selecting which projects to support, attention is paid to the scope of the 
organizations. The activities must be concrete measures, the results of which 
have to be visible at the grassroots level. Projects that span several years are 
encouraged yet remain project-based; long-term, enduring cooperation is not 
funded by NAC funds. According to the lists of past funded projects, NGOs’ 
projects focus primarily on social welfare and health care and the strengthening 
of the civil society. They aim, as an example, to promote equality and improve of 
the position of women, children, and those with disabilities. Projects are also 
carried out to promote environmental education, to develop trade union 
activities, and to train persons active in NGOs. 
The priorities of CBC are largely informed by this opportunity structure. 
Funding is available, first and foremost, for CSOs and projects that deal with 
issues brought up in the current strategy and the Action Plan. Thus, the national 
state agencies have a strong impact on the development and direction of 
cooperation. The more alternative sources of funding that CSOs have for CBC 
activities, the more they can define their own strategies. Having said that, the 
NAC funding is also given credit for following exceptionally well what is 
considered as acute and necessary by many CSOs themselves.  
In her evaluation of the NGOs role in the neighboring area cooperation, 
Venäläinen (2011, 30) come to the conclusion that cooperation among NGOs is 
needed for it provides a channel to support civic and associational activity is 
Russia. Furthermore, the CBC actors indicate strongly that cooperation has 
increased the acquaintance between the countries and the development of good 
neighborly relations. While NAC as a whole was deemed to be “exceptionally 
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successful,” Venäläinen (ibid.) asserts that the NGOs projects have produced 
only “moderately good results.” While the result of this study support her main 
findings, it has to be borne in mind that the judgment of the usefulness of 
cooperation is always relative to the goals targeted by a certain activity. While 
the results may be moderate for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ expectations, 
keeping in mind the proclaimed goals of NAC as a foreign policy instrument, 
placing the cooperation in a wider frame – geographically, contextually, and 
contentually – opens a different perspective which allows also a different 
evaluation.  
Particularly the social and health CSOs, closely tied the Finnish welfare state 
institution, have been well represented in the formation of transnational civil 
society links since the early 1990s. Cooperation in these areas began immediately 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 in response to grave social 
problems. As a result of the social disorder that plagued post-Soviet Russia 
during the 1990s, a funding crisis in health and public services emerged. 
Schools, hospitals, and all manner of social institutions, especially those located 
in more peripheral regions of the Russian Federation faced collapse. The 
situation in Russian Karelia was dramatic. For example, after 1991 the Russian 
Karelian city of Sortavala (located about 60 kilometers from the Finnish border) 
was faced with a dramatically increased incidence of drug addiction and 
persons with HIV infections.50 Here, CSO cooperation centered on joint projects 
which targeted drug abuse, AIDS treatment, and combating the traffic of illegal 
drugs (Izotov 2013). Much of the expertise was supplied by Finnish partners, 
and with their help a center for rehabilitation of drug addicts was opened and a 
series of public awareness campaigns inaugurated.  
The cooperation in areas of social welfare and development has aimed at 
improving the quality of life of people on both sides of the border and the 
support for these activities has been informed by the notion that development in 
both border regions increases stability and security for both countries. In the 
short-term, CBC has done much to alleviate social problems and connect citizens 
groups across a border that was once hermetically sealed. CBC has also played a 
role in constructing a social economy in Russia under very difficult conditions of 
economic, political, and social change. As Venäläinen (2011) indicates, social 
sector projects have developed services, whereby NGOs have gained new skills 
and experience in project implementation as well as created cooperative 
networks both among themselves and with the authorities. Due to the 
acquirement of skills, the work has been continued beyond the individual 
project frames and has become more self-sustaining.  
In retrospect, it appears evident that during the first half of the 1990s much of 
the civil society cooperation between Finland and Russia could be characterized 
as humanitarian aid and charity work. Help arrived to Russian Karelian towns 
                                                          
50 According to experts these official statistics should be increased 10 or even 25 times. 
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such as Sortavala on a regular basis. However, through the development of local 
civil society institutions and mechanisms of self-help, such as the Social 
Assistance Centre in Sortavala, joint projects through CSO networks emerged as 
an important driver of local development. By 1997, the Sortavala Center and 
other social security institutions in Sortavala had developed numerous projects 
with Finnish partners. So extensive was the aid provided by CSO networks 
during the 1990s that cross-border cooperation was seen to a certain extent to 
replace social programs and other services provided by the state during the 
Soviet era (Izotov 2013). Thanks to jobs exchanges organized by a training center 
located in the Finnish city of Joensuu in cooperation with the Sortavala’s 
Employment Center, many Russian students found seasonal employment in 
Finland. CBC replaced to a certain extent educational state institutions of the 
Soviet era and provided young people with technical, informational, and 
practical assistance. 
The 2004 strategy brought up a rhetorical shift “from support to 
partnership,” i.e., from one-way aid work towards more balanced cooperation 
by directing more attention than had been previously made towards finding 
ways of integrating the Russian side into the cooperation as a more equal 
partner:  
 
The time has changed. It goes without saying that nowadays we work with Finns 
differently. It’s like in pedagogics, you know, subject-subject relations instead of 
subject-object ones. We are very thankful to our partners because we remember the 
time when we were immature, but nowadays they also can learn something and this 
is definitely good and CBC must develop in this direction. (R #66) 
 
Even if the rhetoric has been transformed into practice slowly and at times with 
downright hesitation, the mentality among Finnish civil society actors seems to 
be changing as more and more Finns claim to reap benefits also for themselves. 
According to the Finnish CSOs, the Russian side has recently become more and 
more active in initiating cooperation. 
Not all possibilities of cooperation have, however, been utilized effectively. 
Due to their strong role in the Finnish welfare working order, many social 
NGOs “are not really voluntary organizations but closer to having an 
authoritative status” (F #29). Becoming a part of the public hand has 
overshadowed their own areas of expertise and strengths deriving from their 
non-governmental nature. In the Republic of Karelia, many expert organizations 
are run by social sector and municipal officials. Several interviewees also 
brought up that the project-based NAC funding has not encouraged the CSOs to 
develop a more long-term cooperation strategy, which in principle is deemed as 
needed. The focus on service production and pragmatic problem solving has 
been the easiest way to get visible results, but it has done little to improve the 
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capability of Russia’s developing civil society to have an impact and to make a 
difference in Russian society.  
From the CSO actors’ perspective, the neighboring area’s cooperation funds 
are fairly easily accessible and, particularly in the past, there has been little 
competition among the CSOs for funding. In addition to the refusal rate being 
very low, this underlines also the fact the number of organizations applying for 
funding is quite low and that Finnish-Russian cooperation is largely upheld by a 
very limited number of key network actors while others may join in on an on-
and-off basis.  
On the other hand, the accessibility to NAC funding has, however, also its 
downsides for it discourages NGOs to seek more permanent funding and move 
beyond project-based activities. The Finnish-Russian Network of Social and 
Health NGOs, established in 1997, provides an illuminating example of being 
“too successful”. The network received funding from the neighboring area 
cooperation of appropriations, but funding was discontinued in October 2007 
for the Foreign Ministry considered the operation of the network to be no longer 
project-based and the upkeep of its daily operations out of the scope of the NAC 
funding scheme. Despite its apparent success, the network failed to acquire 
external funding. Prior to its termination, the network consisted of 
approximately 50 Finnish and almost 100 Russian NGOs, and it had offices in 
Helsinki, St. Petersburg, and Petrozavodsk. The termination of state funding to 
the network drew the operations of the entire network to a close, which meant 
that many of the participating NGOs lost the only key network actor through 
which they had had any contacts to Russia. 
Many CSO actors are concerned about the general trend apparent in Finland 
that previously bilateral cooperation with Russia is becoming overly dependent 
on the EU as an actor. More responsibility, for good and for bad, is given to the 
EU, whereas as national funding has been simultaneously decreasing. This is not 
to say that the EU would not be seen as a positive force, on the contrary, but the 
nearby Russian regions are still seen primarily as Finland’s neighbor and 
“backyard” due to physical proximity. “’If Finland wishes to see regional and 
local cooperation to take place, the EU funding is hardly the only solution to 
this” (F #48). 
In addition to the amount of available national funding being reduced, the 
themes or areas of cooperation that are being funded are also perceived to be 
narrowing and inching away from the typical NGOs strongholds, most notably 
towards economic matters. This, in turn, causes ever-heavier competition and 
enforces higher quality requirements, excluding as a consequence a number of 
small CSO that have been formerly very active in CBC. The current trend is 
viewed as alarming and unwise. For many, decreasing national funding and 
commitment were seen as indicators that the solid groundwork established 
during the 1990s to build up the basis for cooperation was for nothing as the 
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Finnish actors can no longer be active in Russia to reap the harvest of this work. 
It is understood that the idea behind the decision to cut state funding…  
 
has, of course, been to direct people towards the EU funding sources and to give the 
EU more responsibility of the cooperation… but we should not resort only to this as 
the question is, after all, about Finnish interests, because the question is about our 
neighbors and about our... (F #48) 
 
However, many CSOs pointed out that, at the moment, it is not the availability 
of state funding for CBC but the lack of personnel and financial assets for the 
running of the organization itself that restricts their involvement in CBC: 
 
[T]he problem is that we get, in a way, earmarked money… the money cannot usually 
be used for maintaining our basic organization which we often have problems with… 
Broader, unmarked funding should be more available. (F #25) 
 
Venäläinen (2011) rightly points out that Russian know-how and strengths have 
also not always been used effectively. However, her follow-up suggestion that 
“in the future, every NGO project should include a capacity-development 
component, and the projects must provide models of good practices in 
organizational activities, such as democratic decision-making [translation by 
author],” is more cumbersome. Certainly, a part of project management 
responsibilities and reporting should and must be shared with the Russian 
partners, but the fundamental yet tacit Western understanding that a strong civil 
society not only promotes public interests but serves as a crucial aspect of the 
transition to and consolidation of democracy come with a enormous ideological 
load.  
Venäläinen’s (2011, 31) proposition to consider ways to better apply Finnish 
know-how, inter alia, of democratic decision-making, communications, financial 
management, and fundraising to Russian conditions ignores the thin line 
between capacity building and the importation of the Western model. While the 
former is needed, experience has show that the latter is doomed to fail. From the 
CSO actors’ perspective, the key to success has been that instead of focusing 
directly on the big goals of civil society building and enhancing democracy 
Finnish CSOs have worked on channeling their efforts and funds into 
strengthening the prerequisites for individual citizens in Russia in order for 
them to build better preconditions for their own well-being. Civil society cannot 
be imported, but capacity building through CBC can foster homegrown civic 
activism in Russia and in so doing building a model of civil society that works in 
Russia’s particular context. In order to do this efficiently, Finnish organizations’ 
cultural awareness of Russia should be strengthened. Lastly, Venäläinen’s (ibid.) 
suggestion that more mid-term evaluations, performance audits, and inspections 
ought to be used in guiding these projects is grounded in the apparent fact that 
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strategic project planning has to be improved. However, it is precisely the 
moderation of these types of oversight that makes NAC feasible for CSOs, many 
of which cannot shoulder the bureaucracy necessitated, most famously, by the 
EU projects. 
 
4.5.3 Euregio Karelia – a Tool for What? 
The Euregio Karelia (EK) was founded in 2000 to in order to facilitate CBC 
between Finland and Russia and to provide a more coordinated financing 
mechanism. It was the first Euregio established along the land border between 
Russia and the EU. As proclaimed in the joint CBC program, signed by the 
Finnish and Russian authorities involved in the establishment of Euregio 
Karelia, the logic behind the initiative was to build a present-day cross-border 
region on the foundation of the historical experience (Euregio Karelia 2000). The 
development of a civil and information society was officially declared as an 
umbrella objective, which casted EK as a “tool of civil society”51.  
As a consequence of the twists and turns in EU-Russia relations, EK later 
became a part of a manifold of identity politics – the construction and 
reconstruction of European, national, and regional identities. From its 
beginning, the key figures behind the initiative on both sides of the border 
promoted a new institutional structure specifically as a new European model. 
The idea was that as the EU enlarged eastwards, joint administrative structures 
with Russian regional authorities would gain broader European significance 
(Cronberg 2000; Cronberg & Shlyamin 1999, 326.) The argument was, however, 
not limited to the establishment of a new kind of border regime, but it was 
rather introduced in terms of a new kind of cross-border region building. In the 
planning phase of Euregio Karelia, Tarja Cronberg, the head of the Regional 
Council of Finnish North Karelia, anticipated that, “Common decision-making 
procedures and common funds [will] create a foundation for establishing new 
border region identities” (Cronberg & Shlyamin 1999, 325–326).  
In their joint article, Ms. Cronberg and Mr. Shlyamin, the Minister for the 
External Relations of the Karelian Republic (a post subsequently closed down), 
marketed EK as a “model for cooperation at the EU external borders” and set the 
goals of the project in concrete terms. The coordination of INTERREG and Tacis 
programs on the regional level was presented as the core focus of the new 
administrative model. Furthermore, the need to ease the border crossing 
procedures and to increase economic, social, and cultural cooperation were put 
forward in connection with the questions of promoting security and lowering 
mental borders (Cronberg & Shlyamin 1999, 28–29). According to Shlyamin’s 
(2001) assessment, the establishment of Euregio Karelia gave “an impulse to 
develop joint social projects in the field of Health Care, Social Defense, 
Education, support to Finnish and Karelian culture in the Republic of Karelia” 
                                                          
51 See Bulletin no. 1 of the Tacis project “Euregio Karelia as a Tool of Civil Society.”  
 202   
 
and provided also “an opportunity to study energetically European experience 
in the field of Regional Administration, Local Self-Government, Civil Society 
Building and to use this experience in carrying out reforms in the Republic.” 
For the initiators of the Euregio model, the refashioning of mental borders in 
a common European frame was obviously a major aim behind the initiative – at 
least on the level of public declarations. In this respect, the obstacles have 
probably proven to be larger than initially expected. Even so, regional level CBC 
has developed rapidly, contributing, in fact, to a notion of Finnish-Russian 
borderlands in terms of economic, social, and cultural interaction (Kolossov & 
Scott 2011). The political climate has in turn been strongly affected by the 
consolidation of the Russian nation-state. From the perspective of Russian 
nationalism, cross-border region building – in its ability to pose a “post-modern 
challenge to a nation-state” Cronberg (2003, 235–236) – has at times been seen in 
Russia as a source of discord or even as a threat to sovereignty and territorial 
integrity (Prozorov 2006, 128–136). This has consequently led to the paradox that 
while in Finland the concept of Euregio Karelia was promoted as an alternative 
to the marginal militant Karelia activism, in the Russian discussion, regional 
CBC has sometimes been connected precisely to revanchist ideas in regard to 
areas ceded to the Soviet Union after World War II (Rytövuori-Apunen 2007, 56–
58). 
Presently, the area of Euregio Karelia forms an ENPI CBC neighborhood 
program area, one of the three under the ENPI CBC between Finland and 
Russia. It provides a framework for continuing CBC, which in the past was 
pursued through the INTERREG II and III A Karelia Program and the Euregio 
Karelia Neighborhood Program52. The program is divided into four priorities; 
the first three fund project activities and the fourth priority, Technical 
Assistance, covers for instance the costs generated by the program’s 
administration and implementation. The Karelia ENPI CBC Program 
complements national cross-border activities, focusing on bilateral cooperation 
between Finland and Russia, which since 1991 has been predominantly funded 
by Finnish NAC funds.  
 
                                                          
52 The legal framework for the Program is set by the: Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2007 of 9 
August 2007 laying down implementing rules for cross-border cooperation program (CBC IR), 
Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general 
provisions establishing a European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI Regulation), 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 
general budget of the European Communities, Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 
laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities. 
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4.5.4 Northern Dimension 
The Northern Dimension (ND), a regional expression of the EU-Russia 
cooperative framework, constitutes a broader conceptual frame for both the 
ENPI CBC programs and bilateral cooperation. As a concept, the Northern 
Dimension is not new. The term surfaced already before the 1995 EU 
enlargement when the Union encountered post-Soviet Russia in the North along 
the Finnish-Russian border. The situation led Finland, the most directly affected 
EU member state, to introduce and initiate the Northern Dimension in order to 
strengthen the EU’s standing in the North and, more importantly, to ensure that 
the interests of the North would be taken into account at the European core as 
well (Lipponen 1997; Henriksson 2006, 118–119). As a new EU member state, 
Finland was especially interested in providing the EU with a special agenda 
towards its Russian border, i.e., towards the “challenges and possibilities 
presented by having Russia as a neighbor” (Stubb 2009) and the entire wider 
European North. 
The initiative was officially launched by then Finnish Prime Minister, Mr. 
Lipponen, in his 1997 speech in Rovaniemi, Finnish Lapland. The ultimate goal 
of the Northern Dimension, Mr. Lipponen ambitiously proclaimed, is “peace 
and stability, with prosperity and security shared by all nations [in the region]” 
(Lipponen 1997). The initiative was then readily accepted as a part of the EU’s 
common policy framework, and it became gradually a part of the EU agenda 
(Heininen & Langlais 1997; Heininen 2001, 29–30; Haglund-Morrisey 2008, 205). 
The decisive process towards the actual materialization of the ND came in 1999 
when Finland held the EU Presidency; in December of the same year the 
initiative became officially a part of the EU’s external and cross-border policies. 
Within the EU there existed clear skepticism towards the relevance of the 
ND, not only by certain southern member states but also by the Commission. 
Also, other EU Northerners, namely Sweden and Denmark, were to a certain 
extent critical of Finland for taking the lead (Heurlin 1999; Haukkala 2001; 
Novack 2001). The Russian government, in turn, was fairly cautious of the 
initiative. It took nearly two years for Moscow to formulate its official strategy 
towards the initiative and to produce academic analyses of the issue (Leshukov 
1999, 30–31; see also 2000). The crux of the matter was that the initiative’s sub-
regional approach challenged the traditional Russian ‘hard’ security policy, 
where all regions constitute an integral part of the federation and thereby 
possess equal status. Even though finally accepted, Russia’s involvement and 
interest in the initiative was short-lived. As a result, the entire initiative came 
close to stalling as the Russian side began to feel that the ND was, after all, all 
about addressing the EU’s concerns about Russia, i.e., as an effort to avoid the 
negative effects caused by Russia’s geographical proximity rather than engaging 
Russia in a mutually beneficial cooperation in which the Russian side would 
also exert control.  
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In order to revitalize the ND, the policy became intergovernmentalized; i.e., 
transformed from being a part of EU external policy into a common regional 
policy of its partners: EU, Russia, Norway, and Iceland. The new basic 
documents of the Northern Dimension – namely the Policy Framework 
Document (Commission of the European Communities 2006a) stating the 
general objectives and the Northern Dimension Political Declaration 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006b) identifying the necessary 
structures for achieving them – were accepted at the EU-Russia Summit in 
Helsinki in November 2006. In the Policy Framework Document the partners 
recognize that in order to be successful their cooperation framework can only be 
driven by the spirit of equal partnership based on shared confidence. The ND 
has now become a dynamic framework for coordinating various cooperative 
structures in the region and a “key forum to discuss ways to get more synergy 
from cooperation between all the actors” (Barroso 2010).  
The jointly negotiated documents transformed the status of Russia from an 
object to an actor, making the entire project considerably more attractive for 
Russia to engage in. Subsequently, the ND became increasingly identified with 
the EU’s Russia policy, as a regional aspect of the EU-Russia relations managed 
by the External Relations DG RELEX (Airoldi 2008, 22). However, in addition to 
the macro-level the Northern Dimension as a political concept and policy also 
exists on the micro-level, the concrete level, and on a practical level (Henriksson 
2006, 118–119). The other main characteristic of the renewed policy was its 
strong linkage to the four EU-Russia Common Spaces and Road Maps 
(Commission of the European Communities 2007). As already mentioned in 
subsection 4.4.2, the current ENPI CBC programs cover all the Union’s external 
borders in the East and the South. Eight of these programs are being realized in 
the ND region. As the ND has several synergies with the ENPI CBC Programs, 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland has proposed that the five ENPI CBC 
programs should actually be called “the Northern Dimension CBC Programs” 
(Torstila 2011). 
In light of the high level political tensions between Russia and the EU, and 
the West more generally, apparent during the renegotiations of the ND policy, 
their success cannot but be taken as an indication that something quite special is 
indeed underway in the North. As Busygina and Filippov (2008, 209) have 
noted, the development of the ND provides an excellent illustration of how the 
deteriorating relations and conflicts in the sphere of high politics do not 
automatically diminish the opportunities for practical cooperation on issues of 
low(-er) politics. As an example, whereas Russia rejected joining the ENP, albeit 
accepting the funds available through its funding instrument (ENPI), it has 
welcomed what the new ND policy has to offer.  
Whether Russia’s interests in the ND are grounded in a “counter-intuitive 
trade-off” by which Russia “compensates” for the growing political tensions 
with the EU at large by cooperating on other institutional levels, as suggested by 
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Busygina & Filippov (2008, 205), or by more sincere motives is debatable. Still, 
there are signs that the new ND’s promise of equality is indeed leading to more 
practical cooperation. For example, the Joint Statement of the first ministerial 
meeting of the renewed ND, held interestingly in St. Petersburg immediately 
after the Russia-Georgia war, recognizes that since its launch the ND policy has 
“witnessed considerable intensification” and “growing interest towards it” 
(Ministerial meeting 2008, 1). The Ministers also underlined the growing 
importance of the Arctic Region and the impact of sub-regional and sub-state 
cooperation, and concluded that the successful re-launching of the ND policy 
has shown that “through co-ownership constructive cooperation is possible in a 
range of projects producing benefit to the citizens of the Partners and that the 
ND retains much potential for future development” (ibid., 3).  
The concrete and practical content of the ND has also been recognized in 
Russia. When evaluating the situation in the fall of 2010, Russian Prime Minister 
Lavrov recognized that the ND has reached impressive results in the fields of 
environmental protection, transportation, business, and culture over a brief 
period of time. In addition to providing a less EU-centric and more pragmatic 
yet flexible framework, the new ND does not operate on the basis of 
conditionality otherwise typical of the EU neighborhood and external policies 
(Aalto, Blakkisrud & Smith 2008, 9–10). 
Its strength lies also in its multilevel and holistic approach; ND comprises not 
only cooperation at the governmental level but includes also regional and sub-
regional organizations and commissions and sub-national and local authorities 
as well as non-governmental organizations, universities, research institutions, 
and business and trade union communities. While the ND remains generally 
unknown by the CSOs (see chapter 6) and few organizations have taken part 
directly in programs and projects related to it, its role as an administrative 
umbrella structure, especially through the synergies with the ENPI CBC 
Programs, must be recognized. Compared with the broader EU-Russia relations, 
the ND has created a more positive cooperative frame, which grants local and 
regional CBC more room and leverage than is the case elsewhere. Civil society is 
thus an important Northern Dimension actor as the role of CSOs in the 
implementation of the different projects that falls under its frame is essential.  
As announced by Staffan Nilsson (2013), President of the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC) 2010–2013, the European Union’s only non-
political advisory body, a special Action Plan for civil society involvement in the 
ND has been planned to stimulate civil society participation in more concrete 
terms. This action plan would, for example, create more direct, two-way 
linkages between the Northern Dimension Partnerships’ Secretariats and CSOs. 
The motive behind the idea is based on the understanding that the people-to-
people contacts form an important part of the success of the entire ND policy, 
creating new avenues to discuss different traditions, cultures, business practices, 
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labor relations, mobility, and employment that are important for the partners' 
action in the policy. (Ibid.) 
The northern regional councils, the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM, est. 
1971), the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS, est. 1992), the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council (BEAC, est. 1993), and the Arctic Council (AC, est. 1996) play a 
particularly crucial role in the ND policy. These councils are now full 
participants and carry out highly important work by identifying the needs for 
development and cooperation in their respective areas and by supporting 
practical project implementation in various ways. Even though they are not 
subordinate to the ND, a strong and rational connection does exist between 
them. This, in turn, may do wonders in tackling and illuminating what has been 
called the ‘institutional overkill’ afflicted the region. The engagement of the 
regional councils of the North to the ND policy can be seen as an important 
contributor to the ND’s perceived success. The councils’ work broadens both the 
content and scope of the ND significantly by incorporating, for instance, 
indigenous peoples, provincial-level operations, and cooperation between 
northern universities in overall activities (Heikkilä 2006, 47). In fact, both ND 
Action Plans included several topics that originated in the regional councils. 
Therefore, the valuable work carried out by the councils, especially in the field 
of environmental protection and social welfare, has provided the ND with a 
longed-for element of pragmatism. 
The ND, being a part of the broader EU-Russia cooperation framework, has 
its managerial role in providing the overall leverage, promoting and facilitating 
council-initiated projects, and engaging different actors in various fields, as well 
as in promoting networking, interregional cooperation, and the coherence of 
different sectoral policies. The regional councils, in turn, are in their element in 
identifying the needs for development and cooperation, bringing in practical 
experience and a strong people-to-people dimension, supporting practical 
project implementation and in fulfilling the important objectives and priorities 
of the ND.  
The ND focuses on areas of cooperation for which a regional and sub-
regional emphasis brings added value. The core activities are being coordinated 
around the model of ‘partnerships’ based on the defined priority sectors. 
Currently, there are four existing ND partnerships in place: the Northern 
Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP; est. 2001), which is by far the 
most important EU intervention in the actual Arctic; the Partnership in Public 
Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS; est. 2003); the Partnership on Culture 
(NDPC; est. 2009); and the Partnership on Transport and Logistics (NDPTL; est. 
2009). In addition the ND Senior Officials’ Meeting held in autumn 2009 gave its 
support to the establishment of the Northern Dimension Institute (NDI), whose 
purpose is to act as a university network open to all interested higher-level 
educational institutions, researchers, and research institutes. The Northern 
Dimension Business Council (NDBC), a platform for dialogue between 
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companies and the public authorities, was also established later that year as a 
result of an initiative made by the corporate world. (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland 2010.) 
These partnerships provide frameworks that in many instances build upon 
previously existing extensive collaboration with Russia within the northern 
regional councils and regional governments. Their strength lies in their capacity 
to bridge the region’s actors, to organize the practical implementation of projects 
in an effective way, and thus they can be seen as a yet another expedient to 
strengthen the practical dimension of ND policy. Even if Henriksson’s (2006, 
119) claim that the “Northern Dimension covers all the practical activities in the 
region [emphasis added]” is an overstatement, the fact that the national funding 
mechanisms of the ND member countries are closely linked with the ND 
partnerships implies that many of them do result from it either directly or 
indirectly. Notwithstanding the myriad of other initiatives in the North, the 
prospects for the ND depend on finding a clear-cut niche in this complex 
picture. In order for the ND to be successful, it needs to avoid stepping on the 
toes of the other bodies dealing with Arctic matters and to build upon its ability 
to function as a coordination mechanism across all the regional councils.  
The Northern Dimension can be seen as an example of pushing aside the 
hackneyed Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations” and in rejecting the age-old 
forms of ordering (Laine 2011). Despite the apparent challenges, it seems 
reasonable to argue that focus on the North (as opposed to the Arctic), instead of 
on the division between the East and the West may represent the best means to 
incorporate Russia into multilateral cooperation and fix the deteriorated EU-
Russia relations. As the new ND represents a common regional policy of its 
partners rather than an EU tool to influence Russia, Russian engagement in it 
might no longer be seen as a ‘backdoor approach’ to Europe as opposed to 
directly addressing Brussels, a perception described by Joenniemi and 
Sergounin (2003, 110) before ND’s renewal and before the recent decline of EU-
Russian relations.  
The bordering between East and West has left a very little room for 
northernness to be tapped into especially in Russia, yet it is exactly there where 
the common goals crucial for successful cooperation might just be the easiest to 
identify (Joenniemi & Sergounin 2003, 108). This comes precisely down to 
Medvedev’s (1998, 8) proposal that, if utilized properly, northernness could 
stand out as “a post-modern solution in the form of a third”; i.e., it could 
function as a common element that both parties can recognize themselves in and 
thus transcend the binary division between the East and the West. Northernness 
could be favored because of its openness, the elements of partnership, and the 
fact that the representation has a rather apolitical, innocent, and more 
collaborative approach than other ‘Western’ initiatives (Joenniemi & Sergounin 
2003, 107; Heininen 2004). The European North is a good example of 
debordering and region building, whereby peripheral thinking has become 
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replaced by a focus on local identity narratives’ across national borders 
(Koivumaa 2009). 
As a policy, the ND has certainly had its challenges, but more importantly it 
has been able to react to criticism and concerns and has actually aimed to 
implement the ideas that many others are only just discussing in principle 
(Laine 2011). As elaborated by Aalto, Blakkisrud & Smith (2008, 11–13), when 
mutual understanding has been ensured given Russia’s re-emerging strength 
and ability to contribute to on an equal basis the potential and possibilities of the 
cooperation are greater than ever. It is, however, in the end up to Russia itself to 
decide to what extent to make use of its northernness in order to qualify the 
North. As of yet, Russian northernness still differs greatly from, e.g., Nordic 
northernness (see Joenniemi & Lehti 2003), which harms bridging relations to 
other northern states (Joenniemi & Sergounin 2003, 106). Northern cooperation 
has to adhere to the principle of equality and testify to the possibility of truly 
mutually beneficial cooperation. Otherwise, the North may still remain too 
marginal for this re-emerging great power and thus fail to resonate with the way 
Russia perceives itself and comprehends its location and position in today’s 
world.  
 
 
4.6 ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EU 
 
Today, European policy-makers commonly turn to civil society organizations 
when seeking to identify, manage, or resolve a plethora of economic, social, and 
political problems (Kendall 2009). This is, however, a rather recent phenomenon. 
Even though few deny the role of CSOs in the safeguarding of democracy, their 
role in the legitimization of European governance has long remained vague. By 
the end of the 1990s, the discourse on the role of CSOs broadened, not just by 
content and visibility but also in terms of the variety of policy actors making 
recourse to it (Smismans 2003, 4, 6–7). As a result, CSOs became increasingly 
included, or at least consulted, in the drafting and implementation of initiatives 
particularly in the social policy field as social issues became prominent agenda 
items.  
This led to the so-called discovery of civil society by the EU around the turn 
of the millennium. What had started out as more or less an ad hoc meetings 
between particular Directorate Generals and specific CSOs gradually developed 
into a more structured dialogue. The Commission’s first clear response to the 
increased demand for the institutionalization of civil dialogue was the 
discussion paper “The Commission and non-governmental organizations: 
building a stronger partnership” of January 2000 (Commission of the European 
Communities 2000), which can be seen as the Commission’s attempt to enhance 
the visibility of the civil society and move the dialogue from the DGs’ sphere of 
operations under the auspices of Commission in order to fight the worsening 
   209 
 
legitimacy crisis and to improve the Commission’s overall reputation. It paved 
the road for the White Paper on European Governance, in which the 
Commission makes a comprehensive commitment to “involving civil society” 
and promises to “open up policy-making to make it more inclusive and 
accountable” (Commission of the European Communities 2001b).  
The White Paper broadened the Commission’s definition of civil society from 
voluntary organizations or NGOs to cover also trade unions and employers’ 
organizations (‘social partners’), professional associations, charities, grassroots 
organizations – organizations that involve citizens in local and municipal life 
with a particular contribution from churches and religious communities.53 The 
Commission definition has continued to broaden even since. In its attempt to 
establish a coherent framework for consulting external interested parties, the 
Commission clarified that civil society forms the “principal structures of society 
outside of government and public administration” and that it includes also 
“economic operators not generally considered to be ‘third sector’ or NGOs” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2002). Given the legitimacy capital 
that the civil dialogue provides and the ‘problem’ that “there is no commonly 
accepted – let alone legal – definition of the term ‘civil society organization’” 
(ibid.), the Commission has been eager to use civil society as a legitimizing 
discourse for all of its interactions outside government and public 
administration (ibid.) 
The talks regarding the involvement of CSOs have not been only empty 
rhetoric (Kendall 2009). Despite missing the constitutional opportunity, the 
Treaty of Lisbon retained references to civil society and associations, which 
emerged as a result of the Constitutional Convention Treaty process that 
preceded it (Will & Kendall 2009). By stating that “[t]he [EU] institutions shall, 
by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the 
opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of 
Union action” and that they also “shall maintain an open, transparent and 
regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society,” the treaty54 
provided civil society with a ‘hard law’ hook, which builds on a range of ‘soft’ 
precedents already represented in the EU process since the Treaty of Nice 
(Kendall 2009). 
Also the European Parliament has been enthusiastic in promoting its pro-
civil society stance. In 2008, the Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs Committee 
adopted a Report on the perspectives for developing civil dialogue under the 
Treaty of Lisbon (2008/2067) calling for the establishment of a structured civil 
dialogue between the EU institutions and civil society. It stresses that civil 
                                                          
53 For “a more precise definition of organised civil society” the White Paper refers to the Opinion of 
the Economic and Social Committee on “The role and contribution of civil society organisations in 
the building of Europe,” OJ C329, 17 Nov 1999, 30. 
54 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 8 B. 
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society “plays an important role in the European integration process since it 
communicates the positions and demands expressed by EU citizens to the 
European institutions. This “highlights the importance of the expertise that civil 
society makes available to the institutions.” It further underlines the importance 
of “providing information on and raising awareness about civil dialogue, in 
particular in connection with promoting the activities and objectives of the EU, 
building European cooperation networks and strengthening the European 
identity and identification with Europe within civil society.”  
Even though the improvements are undeniable, a number of issues to be 
tacked remain. The number of CSOs that have managed to break in to EU circles 
is startlingly small. The policy community in Brussels has not been able to come 
to terms with the very different national civil society cultures, laws, and policies. 
Being institutionally incapable of acknowledging local nuances, the EU prefers 
to deal with “organized civil society,” which often translates to large, 
professional, and commonly Brussels-based CSO platforms, at least some of 
which may be regarded as somewhat elitist and therefore unrepresentative and 
detached from their constituents at local and regional levels. 
The EU’s new rhetorical commitment to facilitating transnational civil society 
networks is certainly subordinated to the dictates of geopolitical realism but also 
clearly downplayed by the apparent gap between Brussels and the grassroots. 
The undeniable fact is that the EU is very selective regarding whom it talks and 
listens to. It is the EU who has the power to shape the discussion and dictate 
what kinds of CSOs are needed. This makes one ponder to what extent does the 
involvement of civil society, as it is today, really strengthen democracy? Who 
gets selected and on what basis? And, consequently, who in reality is 
represented? 
It is apparent that the EU seems to have lost some of its faith in its ability to 
influence the transformation process in Russia, and to some extent also in 
capacity of CBC to serve as a means to this end. This tendency has only been 
fostered by the Eurozone crisis, which has the EU more introspective at the 
expense of the external relations. As a result, the EU has begun to retreat 
precisely where it should not be – at the level of sociology-cultural 
communication – and assumed a new realist stance in its EU foreign policy vis-
à-vis Russia.  
 
4.6.1 Civil Society Organizations as Agents of Change 
The EU logic and involvement of civil society is grounded in a tacit Western 
understanding that a strong civil society not only promotes public interests but 
that it is a crucial aspect of the transition to and consolidation of democracy. 
Accordingly, Western governments, non-profit organizations, and various 
international organizations have provided funding for the support of civil 
society in Russia with the assumption that this is a crucial aspect of the 
transition to and consolidation of democracy. It has been estimated that 
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approximately half of Russian CSOs have received funding from international 
donors (Henderson 2003; Henry 2004; Sperling 2006). Given that, the impact of 
Soviet legacies and the nationalized political discourse surrounding Russian 
civil society have, however, narrowed the influence of international cooperation; 
the good intentions behind such straight-forward model-planting have often 
resulted in unintended outcomes; i.e., not in the broader outcomes that the 
Western donors intended – which were largely unrealistic to begin with 
(McIntosh Sundstrom 2006).  
The ENP can then be seen as tool needed to extend the EU’s transformative 
power beyond its external borders. It facilitates an ideational projection of 
power, marking – at least in theory – a decisive departure from traditional state-
centered geopolitics. Strengthening civil society provides a means of spreading 
‘western’ values of democracy, the rule of law, and the free market. CSOs are 
therefore needed not only for the enhancement of the EU’s international 
influence but also for the strengthening of its identity as a stabilizing element in 
the world system with ‘exportable’ (i.e., universal) democratic values (see 
Emerson 2004; Guterres 2001). Thus, the EU clearly pursues the objective of 
achieving community through ‘shared values,’ common goals, and intensive 
cooperation on a broad range of internal EU policies.55  
In this respect, civil society is seen as a tool for deeper European integration, 
democratization, and the promotion of liberal economic markets. CSOs are 
considered key actors in the promotion of good governance. In the ENP strategy 
paper, the role of civil society is noted with reference to a number of different 
spheres: youth work, science and education, culture and cross-border 
cooperation, the environment, the fight against corruption, and local 
administration. The Commission (2006c) has suggested that civil society 
participation should go beyond exchanges and cooperation programs:  
 
We must encourage partner governments to allow appropriate participation by civil 
society representatives as stakeholders in the reform process, whether in preparation 
of legislation, the monitoring of its implementation or in developing national or 
regional initiatives related to the ENP (Commission of the European Communities 
2006c, 7). 
 
This aim is reiterated in the Commission’s (2007, 11) attempts to strengthen the 
ENP:  
 
The Commission will encourage a wide range of stakeholders to engage in 
monitoring the implementation of the ENP Action Plans, will promote dialogue in the 
partner countries between governments and local civil society and seek to bring more 
stakeholders into the reform process. 
                                                          
55 As defined in Commission of the European Communities (2004a, 11–12).    
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4.6.2 New Institutional and Discursive Practices in a Multi-level 
European Frame 
The relationship between Finnish CSOs and the EU is twofold. On the one hand, 
the EU and its initiatives and policies are fairly well known and evaluated, in 
general terms, positively. On the other hand, the EU is seen as a distant and 
unapproachable actor. This is not to say that the EU would not be an important 
actor but that its interest and focus was seen to be somewhere else than in the 
civil society dimension. The basic idea that the EU is advocating is seen as 
relevant and worthwhile, yet for many the role of CSOs in this work is vague. 
The EU is seen primarily as a political and economic force and, as a result, its 
programs tend to focus on these fields also regarding CBC.  
In many successful cases, cooperation across the Finnish-Russian border 
commenced long before Finland joined the EU and in some cases already during 
the Soviet era and has been continued after that fairly, if not completely, 
separated from the policy frames and programs. That being said, it cannot go 
unnoticed that national level CSOs – in Finland but also increasingly in Russia – 
are often part of a larger European body through which the ‘European’ agenda, 
ideas, information, and also instruction gets transferred to the national level. In 
Finland, the information and knowledge gained in this manner is then often 
channeled to the regional and local levels. This multi-tier model of associational 
activity and the consequential information flow is seen as allowing 
communication to also travel upstream so that the voice of regional actors is 
audible at the decision-making level.  
Instead to traditional bilateral links, more and more Finnish CSOs are 
connected with Russian CSOs through transnational networks. Being a part of 
the same network does not, however, necessary mean that the two cooperate 
directly with each other – or even if they do, cooperation does not always take 
place across the border physically but rather via an EU level, umbrella-type 
organizational structure. The transnational social space created by the networks 
must be, first and foremost, understood as a virtual space rather than 
geographically bound. Electronic communication enabled by the Internet 
connects different actors without regard to international borders and allows 
ideas to spread rapidly far and wide.  
Even though now part of the broader EU frame, the practical work and its 
priorities at the Finnish-Russian border have changed only slightly. Social, 
especially health-related, CSOs continue to dominate Finnish-Russian CBC. The 
EU’s role in promoting cooperation agendas that address social needs and local 
development is viewed by Finnish CSOs as weak, especially in relation to the 
role of the Finnish state. The border is crossed more easily and frequently, yet 
the transnational space is still very much shaped by the nation-states and their 
rules. In Finland, the embeddedness in welfare state arrangements – in 
structural, normative, and financial terms – tone down the influence of 
Europeanization. However, as Conrad (2011, 218) notes, one cannot help but 
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notice that, in ‘real life’ the attention paid to border-crossing and international 
and global processes, which interact with nationally construed social problems, 
and their regulation has become more and more pronounced. 
Civil society actors are glad that the EU has finally acknowledged the vitality 
of the civil society dimension for its policies to boost links with its ‘ring of 
friends’ and thus to deepen integration between the Union and its neighbors. 
However, from the perspective of CSO actors, top-down prepared proposals for 
deeper integration should pay more attention to the dynamics from below, as 
ignoring these dynamics would prove to be short-sighted and hardly socially 
sustainable. In the view of civil society actors, instead of trying to change 
Russian society or merely import EU-European values and hope for the best, 
emphasis should be placed on people-to-people contacts and on a more 
constructive dialogue between neighbors, which in turn is likely to result in 
more ground-level support for deeper integration. CSO actors are of the opinion 
that cooperation should focus more on providing help and support to local and 
regional organizations in Russia as they themselves build better preconditions to 
confront the specific conditions that have emerged as a result of Russia's own 
historical development. 
The role of CBC in building social cohesion and convergence is also 
emphasized by many. Regardless of the public benefits to be realized by cross-
border civil society cooperation, the most successful and enduring examples can 
be found when individual actors themselves feel that they benefit from 
cooperation. In this sense, it seems to be the positive experience of civil society 
actors rather than EU policies that have made cooperation worthwhile and 
beneficial. 
Not all EU influence or links with the EU can, however, be simply lumped 
together under the title of Europeanization. In many cases, the question is rather 
about a continuation of European integration in terms of greater unity between 
countries and peoples. It is unclear for many whether or not a coherent 
European civil society really exists. More often than not, Russian CSOs had joint 
activities or other types of links with individual EU member states though not 
with the EU per se. Policy frameworks that endeavor to capture the entire 
picture are seen as destined to overlook country-specific issues and 
circumstances. Accordingly, it is often expressed that for CBC to be effective, 
projects receiving EU funds should be derived from practical issues that emerge 
locally. A majority of Finnish CSOs that have already managed to establish 
contacts with Russian CSOs work rather independently from EU initiatives and 
polices. According to many, cooperation has arisen from a general awareness of 
a common interest or problem, which has functioned as an impetus for 
cooperative initiatives. It is these bottom-up initiatives that have mobilized the 
people to take the first step across the border and engage in pragmatic and 
constructive forms of cooperation.  
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The common concern that the Russian side continues to be regarded as an 
object rather than an active subject is partly a result of the logic of EU programs, 
but also partly a result of the lack of capacity on the Russian side to act as an 
equal partner. Cooperation has so far been possible largely thanks to European 
or Finnish funds and as such it has, directly or not, been based on a European 
agenda and upon European values. Even if the enhancement of democracy, 
human rights, rule of law, and so on are certainly worthwhile goals, experience 
has shown that simply transplanting these goals from their ‘original’ setting to a 
rather different context is likely to create problems. Instead of focusing on the 
democratization of Russia or on building a Western-type civil society, the 
dynamics across the Finnish-Russian border can be characterized as more 
pragmatic. Indeed, the utmost aim of cooperation has been to solve practical 
problems, provide help, and support Russians as they confront the specific 
conditions that have emerged as a result of Russia's own historical development 
in a dynamic global context.  
 
 
4.7 SYNOPSIS 
 
4.7.1 EUrope?  
Conceptions of European borders are dependent on the perception of what the 
European integration is all about, but they also affect the visions of what is 
Europe and where the process of European integration is expected to lead us. 
The Finnish-Russian border is not an exception as its role today is very much 
depended on the EU policies beyond it. Borders appear in a very different light 
depending on what the EU expected to be. Then again, also the opposite is true; 
the process of European integration, and even more so that of neighborhood 
building, is dependent on the perception of what the borders are – or are 
perceived to be. To form the big picture, we need to understand the nature of 
Europe and geopolitics, the enlargement of the European Union, and its 
relations with neighboring states, geopolitical discourses on the ground, social 
representations about border, the perceptions and images of the other, border-
crossing processes, particularly across the external border, and the cast of CBC 
actors and their motives.  
The EU is commonly criticized for lacking the capacity to understand how 
civil society works and act accordingly but also the opposite is true: few civil 
society actors understand how the EU works and what can be expected from it – 
but, then again, who does? A holistic perspective sheds some light on the 
matter. The EU should be studied not as one international regime but as a series 
of regimes (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1997). It looks different from different 
angles. The EU is a complicated organization, a mixture of the supranational 
and the intergovernmental, far from becoming a superstate even if at times it 
acts like one. Room is needed for various different definitions, interpretations, 
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and conceptualizations because different countires need to be able to project 
themselves through the EU for the European project to succeed; the EU must be 
one thing and another at the same time. 
 The EU of today seems federalist in that the supranational system of EU 
governance has taken its institutions further from simple intergovernmentalism 
towards a sort of a European Superstate. At the same time, the Mitranian 
functionalistic vision is valid in the sense that the collective governance between 
states has develops hand-on-hand with increased cooperation. The EU of today 
seems to be intergovernmental in that the states have maintained their central 
role in defining the speed of European integration. What we draw from the 
works of Putnam and Moravscik is that states are rational actors in the sense 
that national interests are determined first of all at the domestic level and are 
then used as the basis for intergovernmental negotiations, while the role of 
supranational institutions is to fuel cooperation by reducing the negotiation 
transaction costs. 
The EU of today is neofunctional insofar that the spillover effects are obvious 
and political integration has indeed followed economic integration. It is 
neofunctional not only because, in contrast to the state-centered and static 
intergovernmentalism theory, it takes integration as a dynamic process of 
constructive development but also because it recognizes the relevance of non-
state and sub-state actors within intra-institutional decision-making processes 
and sees that this induces positive reactions to further integration and brings the 
citizens of the different nations closer to each other. Along with federalists, 
neofunctionalists reject the Tönnian Gemeinschaft model and replace it with the 
more pluralist Gesellschaft model within which cooperation and integration can 
be reached through a convergence of interests (Taylor 1983, 3–5). The 
neofunctionalist take is, however, inadequate in its assertion that integration 
would be a chain reaction of things occurring without active leadership. 
The EU of today is neoinstitutionalist in that particular relevance is attributed 
to institutions, which now act with a certain level autonomy. As such, the 
institutions have became the central mechanisms of providing context for 
positive sum bargains, transforming in so doing a set of individuals into a 
community with the sense of the common good (March & Olsen 1984; 2006, 4). 
But the EU of today is also transactionalist in the sense that it is a ‘political 
community’ consisting of nation states interlinked by a high level of 
communications and transactions across borders. It is transactionalist also in 
that it does not see states merely as integrated entities but considers also the 
underlying social fabric of non-state actors and interest groups. As Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz (1997), following Deutsch’s logic, once envisaged, a 
supranational society of relevant actors has emerged as transactions across 
national borders have increased. Transnational transactions are hindered by 
deviating nationally based rules and thus require the creation of rules that are 
applied supranationally at the EU level.  
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We have witnessed a change from hierarchical and centralized government 
structures towards more fragmented and collective governance arrangements, 
sharing of public power and increased reliance on partnerships, networks, and 
the new forms of consultation and dialogue that they imply. Thus, rather than a 
collection of states, in whichever arrangement, the EU can be approached as a 
complex web of interdependencies. Its territoriality is clearly more modern than 
that of a nation-state, whereby the distinction between internal and external 
becomes fuzzier. Focusing on the interdependencies would allow cooperation 
when and where it is necessary and sensible as opposed to being based on one 
status or mere location.  
The devolution of power can be seen to foster democratization as it allows 
broader forms of participation and includes a wider share of the population into 
decision-making than the traditional voting process of the command and control 
model could ever manage. As the esteemed qualities of civic life get co-opted in 
the decision-making process, they build a better basis for good governance. 
While in the principle this sound doable enough, the practice is likely to be 
complicated. Achieving desired outcomes depends a lot on the quality and 
ability of civil society and of civic participation. Not all civil society 
organizations are necessarily civil and others lack the ‘civic-ness.’  
It is clear that the EU does not illustrate readily any of the proposed models. 
Rather it defines them or rather defies them (Kuus 2011b, 1144). It is a complex 
polycentric and transnational institution, a sort of avant-garde network-state 
that imbricates the national inside the transnational and vice versa in its attempt 
to overcome national interests without jeopardizing national sovereignty. It is 
equally important to understand that EUrope is still a work in progress rather 
than a finished product.  
At present, it is hard not to see the EU, first and foremost, as regulatory state, 
which functions very differently from, say, the Nordic welfare state model into 
which many CSOs in this context are embedded. Some have taken this to 
indicate that due to its limited functional-regulatory mandate the EU should not 
even be judged in terms of democracy. On these grounds, Moravcik (2004), for 
example, questions the entire call for more democratic bottom-up involvement, 
and Føllesdal (2006) proposes that the EU as a sui generis project is not bound to 
the normative expectations of popular participation and accountability that have 
been established for member state governments. 
While the European Union has certainly been very successful in its political 
making of space, i.e., monopolizing Europe, the meaning of ‘Europe’ remains 
heavily contested. The EU has been very successful not just in a political sense 
but also in territorializing all good things, from human rights to democracy, as 
‘European.’ In so doing, the EU has marketed itself not just as a ‘force for good 
in the world’ (Barbé & Johansson-Nogués 2008) but also fed the notions of 
Europe as ‘monotopia,’ as a ‘one space’ currently mastered by Union (Jensen & 
Richardson 2004). 
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Sakwa’s (2006) different Europes provide an illuminating illustration of how 
different the situation looks when based on different conceptions of Europe. In 
particular, the different conceptions diverge in their take on the role and 
position of Russia. Whereas the mainstream EUropean story situates it within 
the Wider Europe, in the margins as a semi- or close outsider to use Aalto’s 
(2006) categorization, the Pan-European dimension provides a ‘half-way house’ 
approach for integrating Russia by providing some sort of institutional 
framework but failing short of a fully-fledged supranational transformative 
agenda (Sakwa 2010, 18). Regarding the former in particular, the further away 
from Russia one is, the more likely one is to consider Russia to be European. 
Alternatively, those who share the common border with Russia tend to be more 
eager to evoke distinctions between themselves and Russia (cf. Kuus 2011b, 
1150). If, in turn, the Civilizational approach is used, Russia must be counted in. 
As explained by Sakwa (2006, 24), “there can be no doubt that Russia, for 
example, is part of a broader European civilization” and that this “cultural unity 
transcends political divisions and geographical barriers.”  
In addition to the internal consolidation of a political community, EU 
geopolitics focuses on the development of regional partnerships with external 
states, i.e., the creation of a ‘New Neighborhood.’ Both of these processes are 
examples of ‘bordering’ whereby borders are constructed through geopolitical 
discourses and practices. The bordering practices establish and reinforce the 
rules, objectives, and attitudes that further promote a sense of community, but 
they also distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them.’  
Within the EU frame, the dual movement of integration and securitization 
has made the situation increasingly complex. The apparent juggle between 
cooperation and security-oriented agendas has led to contradictory bordering 
practices whereby a considerable gap exists between the projected geopolitical 
vision and its translation into action. A telling indicator of this is the obvious 
imbalance in resources allotted to CBC. While the EU’s Cohesion and Regional 
Policy for 2007–2013 has an operating budget of EUR 347 billion (35.7% of the 
total EU budget for that period), the budget for the ENPI for the same period 
amounts to some EUR 11 billion, the vast majority of which is for national and 
multi-country programs and only some five per cent for CBC programs. 
Ironically, this is less than what the EU is investing in security research under its 
wider R&D budget for 2007–2013. Accordingly, the EU’s promise of a 
‘privileged partnership’ is downplayed by the fact that while the ENPI does 
provide limited co-funding also for non-EU members, the sums are much less 
than what was available than through previously programs. 
Acknowledging the undefined nature of the concept of Europeanization or 
rather the lack of uniformed definition, this study approaches Europeanization 
without any intention to paint it as an all-encompassing grand theory of the 
complexity of European transformation. Firstly, it is employed here in rather 
practical terms as a characterization of the phase in the development of Finnish-
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Russian relations during which new supra-national administrative structures, 
policy frames, and instruments were put in place and influenced the public 
policies in both countries. Secondly, emphasis is put on its subtle yet resolute 
identity political aspect targeted to promote European values, common identity, 
and models of European social and political organization (see Harmsen & 
Wilson 2000). Thirdly, Europeanization is analyzed as the adaptation to new 
institutional and discursive practices within a supranational, European frame of 
action (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz & Fligstein 2001). Taken together, 
Europeanization here is understood as a process away from state-centeredness 
and used as a context where border and civil society CBC is studied. 
 
4.7.1 EU as a New Frame for Cooperation 
In order to manage its transnational space, which the EU would like to see 
extend beyond its external borders, during the last decade a previously unseen 
premium was placed on the role of civil society cooperation across the external 
EU border. EU documents and position statements praised the role of CSOs one 
after another and the perceived value of civil society rose in the eyes of decision-
makers. In particular, CSOs were increasingly trusted in the EU’s attempts to 
bring its neighbors closer to the union by mitigating the effects of both the old 
and new dividing lines. As a result, CSOs have begun to play a key role in cross-
border relations also at the external EU border. 
Civil society fits well into a governance-beyond-the-state system. Instead of 
focusing on trying to change policies of the state, more energy has been put into 
making changes at the local level while continuing to think if not globally at 
least transnationally. In fact, one of the main reasons why the traditional, 
hierarchical government structures have been losing their power to various civil 
society actors lies in the aptitude of the latter to organize themselves into 
sprawling cooperative networks. Networked borders have given state borders 
spatial mobility; due to their multi-tier organizational structures and cross-
sectoral partnerships, CSOs have also been able navigate between EU, the state, 
and regional/local levels. The restructuring of the nation-state has now made it 
possible not just to disaggregate the state and the border but also to question the 
sacred link between civil society and the state. In other words, as the state has 
been redefined, and so too can be done to the civil society. 
The role CSOs can or could play is also utterly dependent on the 
understanding and future development of the EU itself. Different conceptions of 
the EU allow different roles for civil society. As both the EU and the civil society 
sector itself are undergoing far-reaching changes, the relationship between the 
two is hard to predict. Before we can even start talking about a European civil 
society, we need to have an idea of what the EU is. The role of civil society looks 
very different depending on whether the EU we talk about is understood as a 
society, a welfare regime, a political system, a mode of government, a state-like 
structure, or something else entirely.  
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By incorporating civil society into EU policy and decision-making, the EU 
has attempted to use its transformative power and EUropanize the various 
European civil societies closer to what may one day be a European civil society. 
Given that in many countries civil society structures remain embedded in their 
respective national frames, the goal sounds somewhat far-fetched, but on the 
other hand, to expect anything less would be even more ungrounded as in the 
other arenas of society, in the spheres of political institutions and the market, 
cooperation across borders and joint decision making have already become a 
reality. 
The EU’s motivation to engage with civil society organizations is not only 
based on the CSOs input (such as lobbying and providing information and 
knowledge) or on their throughput in the Parliament’s Committees, 
Commission’s consultations, or DG’s working groups but rather increasingly on 
the output channels they provide in terms of mediating all things EU to the local 
level, i.e., their ability to import Europeanness. Due to their transnational 
networks and multi-tier organizational structures, the CSOs are, at least in 
principle, suitable for transporting and even exporting ideas and practices from 
the EU level to their constituents at the local level and again further to their 
partners. 
The mediating role of CSOs has now been understood also in the cross-
border context in the European neighborhood, particularly regarding Russia. 
Due to Russia’s increased self-confidence and its restrictive influence on the 
EU’s attempts to street Russian development through conventional 
governmental relations, CSOs have become deemed as providing an alternate 
avenue to have a say and channel assistance to Russia. In so doing, the EU – 
furtively yet purposefully – bypasses the Russian state and acts in the absence of 
consent building on the underlying assumption that small non-political changes 
will eventually lead to larger political changes. The situation is certainly far from 
that simple; the Kremlin has made it more than clear that it is displeased also 
with foreign CSOs becoming excessively involved in the promotion of 
democracy and civil society in Russia, especially so after the so-called color 
revolutions of Ukraine and Georgia that caused much angst in Moscow.  
From the EU perspective, support to the CSOs engaged in CBC with Russia 
has commonly been, and for the most part still is, seen within the rubric of 
democracy promotion. In the Tacis instrument, EU support for the work of 
CSOs came under the priority sector for institutional, legal, and administrative 
reform (education and training and the development of civil society), whereas 
over 80 per cent of funds under the European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) were channeled through CSOs (Cameron 2006). In 
addition, the Link Inter-European NGOs (LIEN) program supported small 
projects, which aimed to stimulate citizens’ initiatives and strengthen the 
capacity of NGOs working in the social sector in favor of disadvantaged groups 
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of the population56. CSOs were also eligible to apply for funding in the Small 
Project Facility of the CBC aspect of Tacis regarding projects on the borders of 
NIS states and EU states.  
In order to succeed in democracy promotions, a more holistic approach was 
in order. As stated in the Non-Paper expanding on the proposals contained in 
the Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on 
‘Strengthening the ENP’: “[t]he civil society dimension is vital for the overall 
success of the ENP,” yet “[t]he role of the Commission and the Member States in 
the civil society dimension is primarily as facilitators, because public bodies 
cannot set the agenda for civil society” (European Parliament and the Council of 
the European Union 2006, 1). Moreover, from the Commission perspective, the 
most important dialogue is that between the government and civil society in the 
respective partner countries. The ENPI CBC Programs fund cooperation projects 
“for socio-economic development, to meet jointly defined common challenges, 
for border issues as well as people-to-people cooperation” and underline that 
the “involvement of locally-based actors is important to contribute to the 
establishment of good neighborly relations” (ibid.). 
Cross-border cooperation, a long-standing tradition within the EU, is a key 
priority both in the European Neighborhood Policy and in the EU’s Strategic 
Partnership with Russia. As the Commission’s (2006e, 8) Strategy Paper 2007–
2013 on CBC states: 
 
A key objective of the EU in general and of the ENP is to enhance the EU’s relations 
with its neighbours on the basis of shared values and provide opportunities to share 
the benefits of the EU enlargement, while help avoid any sense of exclusion which 
might have arisen from the latter. CBC is certainly an important means of addressing 
this, helping enhance economic and social links over borders as they now exist, by 
supporting cooperation and economic integration between regions. 
 
Regarding the EU relations specifically with Russia, for example in the 2005 EU-
Russia Common Economic Space Road Map 57  the partners promised to 
“[e]ncourage the involvement of local and regional key actors such as 
authorities and civil society, in all aspects of cross-border cooperation,” to 
“cooperate with relevant elements of civil society” to fight concerns such as 
corruption and trafficking and to “strengthen and enhance the European 
identity on the basis of common values… as a basis of vitality of civil society in 
Europe without dividing lines.” The idea was that these principles would be put 
into practice through the ENPI CBC programs, the priorities of which are 
established by local and regional actors on both sides of the borders 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006c, 5–6). 
                                                          
56 LIEN program was approved by the European Commission in 1997 and it was completed in 
December 2000. 
57 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/pdf/road_map_ces.pdf. 
   221 
 
A number of CSOs, nevertheless, soon raised concerns of the ENPI by calling 
for more meaningful and systematic involvement of civil society in the actual 
policymaking, programming, and implementation. As a practical example of 
this, already on October 8, 2007, 20 CSO leaders wrote an open letter 58  to 
European Commission President Barosso and External Relations Commissioner 
Ferrero-Waldner insisting on the need to involve civil society as a true partner in 
the ENP/ENPI. In their second letter in 2008 59 , the CSOs asked for the 
establishment of clear mechanisms for consultation with civil society and more 
open communication and transparency in the EU Neighborhood with an overall 
objective of ensuring that EU policies towards the neighborhood are reflective of 
people’s aspiration in the region; i.e., to work “towards a people’s partnership”.  
It seems that the CSO message touched a chord in the Commission as while 
identifying priorities for EC funding to neighboring countries for the next years, 
the Commission stated that CSOs “have a crucial role to play in providing input 
and ensuring that the final decisions that are made are the right ones for these 
countries” (EEPA 2009). In addition to consulting CSOs, the EC Delegations 
were required to post the initial concept note for the new indicative program on 
their websites in April 2009.  
Even though the ENPI Mid Term Review had little to review due to the fact 
that the implementation of the CBC program was severely delayed (see 
subsection 4.4.2), the process itself enabled the Commission to take into account 
the civil society perspective in preparing the new Indicative CBC Programs for 
the period 2011–2013. During the review, the consultation of external 
stakeholders was organized in the context of the programming missions of the 
desk officers to the partner country and via a web-based consultation. Interested 
organizations were invited to provide their suggestions on: 1) the cooperation 
priorities to be supported through the ENPI and 2) the role of CSOs in achieving 
the cooperation objectives. The CSOs were asked to be pragmatic and coordinate 
their input with their fellow organizations, taking the constraints of the 
Commission into account. These constraints included the given policy 
framework within which the programming documents had to be developed; the 
need to agree the cooperation priorities with the government of the partner 
countries; the need for focus/a limited number of intervention priorities in view 
of aid effectiveness; and the limited resources (both human and financial) at the 
Commission’s disposal.  
The actual review report provided by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the European Parliament called on the Commission, together with the partner 
governments, to further develop mechanisms for consultation with civil society 
and local authorities in order to better involve them in the design and 
monitoring of the implementation of the ENPI and of the national reform 
                                                          
58 The letter and Ferrero-Waldner’s reply available at: www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/ dmdocuments. 
59 Available at: www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/dmdocuments/Letter_Commissioner_260508a.pdf.  
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programs. It also acknowledged that despite the increased flexibility and 
simplicity of the Community assistance instruments the procedures and 
timeframes under the ENPI remain burdensome for CSOs and local authorities. 
(European Parliament 2009, 5.)  
The new ENPI Indicative Program for 2011–2013 built upon the key elements 
established in the basic reference documents, including the ENPI Regulation 
itself, the CBC Strategy Paper 2007–2013, and the Indicative Program 2007–2010, 
as well as the associated ENPI CBC Implementing Rules. It also made reference 
to the MTR outcomes, yet in practice the program offered nothing new. It 
confirmed that the CBC programs already adopted will be continued and that 
they will remain based upon the same the four key objectives already defined in 
the 2007 CBC Strategy Paper: 
 
 promote economic and social development in regions on both sides of 
common border; 
 work together to address common challenges, in fields such as 
environment, public health and the prevention of and the fight against 
organized crime;  
 ensure efficient and secure borders;  
 promote local cross border ‘people-to-people’ actions.     
 
In all, it seems that the gaps between rhetoric and practice as well as 
contradictory bordering practices have began to shake the Union as a whole. 
The EU is struggling with a severe identity crisis that not only reflects internal 
divisions and tensions but also an ambiguous geopolitical role vis-à-vis 
neighboring states. This is worrying, as the EU has promoted a regional space 
that could potentially intensify and improve relations with neighboring states 
such as Russia. Furthermore, through the process of enlargement and the 
development of new political relations with the neighboring states, the EU has 
exerted considerable influence on political institution building and socio-
cultural processes in the former ‘Soviet Bloc’ (Scott & Liikanen 2010). The 
uneven conditions and disjointed policy environments help, however, produce 
diverse patterns of inclusion and exclusion of cooperation partners in 
neighboring states.  
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5 Discursive Practices: 
Reconstructing the Image of 
a Neighbor 
While debates on Europeanization and post-national borders have become 
increasingly prominent at the rhetorical level, it is necessary to examine to what 
extent the change has been reflected on the practices of civil society cooperation. 
This chapter addresses this question by examining the discursive practices of 
civil society and tracing the development of the portrayed image of Russia in the 
context of cross-border cooperation. As the media is an integral force of civil 
society and civil society plays a vital role as a field of discursive practices, the 
analysis here focuses on the opinion writings featured in Helsingin Sanomat 
from 1990 to 2010. The opinion writings are taken here as an aspect of the public 
sphere within which the actors of civil society themselves construct the image of 
Russia as a neighbor. Public discussion also provides the context within which 
CBC has evolved.  
The opinion writings are, by definition, more opinionated than actual, some 
might say ‘factual,’ news articles. This study, however, rejects the traditional 
juxtaposition of the ‘real’ and the ‘imaged’ and instead proposes in a more 
Cartesian manner by which an image or a belief is considered to be real 
precisely because it is imagined. Newspapers not only provide a forum for 
public debate, but they also effectively transmit an imagined reality – even if the 
picture that emerges would work at cross-purposes to what might be deemed 
desirable froma more official point of view.  
Be it as it may, the communication channels that newspapers provide are 
vital to society. In many circles, the media has been acclaimed to act as the 
fourth power, pillar, estate, or branch of democracy – as society’s ‘watchdog.’ It 
has the ability to strengthen the civil society structure by helping to put civil 
society principles into action, reinforcing accountable behavior in society, 
providing timely information, and influencing, at times even creating, the 
direction of social change (e.g., Galaty 2003; Lemon 2007, 3). What is even more 
relevant for this study is that newspapers in particular provide a valuable arena 
for people to enter into the public debate. Enabling more effective participation 
is an important function of civil society and substantiates the stand that the 
concept of civil society should not only be viewed through associations but also 
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more broadly as a coercion-free arena for discussion and mutual learning, a 
‘public sphere’ as Habermas (1995) has suggested (see subsection 5.3.1). Such an 
arena is crucial for a healthy and vibrant civil society; it empowers people to 
participate in societal activities and creates a channel for people to connect with 
those with whom they work in decisions that affect their lives.  
What is also relevant for this study is that media has the ability to sway 
public opinion and drive public perception. This cannot be ignored even though 
this study focuses only on opinion writings. Particularly letters to the editors 
tend to be more emotional than factual, but earlier academic research has shown 
emotion can influence public opinion more than facts. The narratives and 
imagery (chosen to be) published can thus shape the broader public perceptions 
and thus either create or erode support for something and form a positive or 
negative image of something. After addressing these concerns and introducing 
the newspaper material and its use in this study, this chapter reviews the public 
perceptions and images acquired from the material in order to illuminate the 
discursive practices within which CBC has been enacted during the different 
time periods.  
 
 
5.1. ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The image of and attitudes toward the Eastern Neighbor has, of course, been 
studied on numerous occasions. Most of these studies have, however, been 
conducted by Finns, for Finns, and in the Finnish language. Most of these have 
also consisted of analyses of a written source or based on expert interviews (see 
Klinge 1972, Immonen 1987; 1990; Luostarinen 1986; Vihavainen 2004; Seppänen 
2010). While important as such, the downside of these has been that history 
seems quite clear when it is written or told afterwards. Newspapers, however, 
provide us with an exceptional historical record, which details everyday life on a 
day-to-day basis and in the context that the text was originally written. This 
allows us follow the development of particular topics and discussions through 
different time periods without losing sight of what Garton Ash (2009a) describes 
as the real alternatives that were there at the time but which get often 
disregarded in the later analysis due to the Bergisonian ‘retrospective 
determinism’ and the ‘hindsight bias’ (see Garton Ash 2009b). 
 
5.1.1 Temporal Changes in the Image of Russia 
The Finnish image of Russians during the Grand Duchy period was generally 
favorable (Paasi 1996, 159). The early Finnish identity was constructed primarily 
on the opposition to the dominant Swedish culture while at least the public 
attitudes towards Russia and Russians were controlled during the period of 
autonomy under Russia (Paasi 1992; 1996). It was not until the ‘years of 
oppression’ in the early twentieth century that the anti-Russian feelings were 
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raised largely as a response to the Russification policy aiming to restrict Finnish 
freedoms. Antagonistic attitudes turned into hatred after Finland had gained its 
independence  in  1917 when  the  former mother  country  (was)  turned  into  an 
enemy.  The  newly  formed  international  border  became  a  manifestation  of 
difference, crucial  to  the Finnish national  identity and pride and, as Hakovirta 
(1975)  and  Luostarinen  (1989)  have  argued,  strong  anti‐Russia  feelings were 
instilled into the Finns’ public consciousness in the form of a myth of an eternal 
struggle  between  Good  and  Evil.  In  practice,  this  manifested  itself  in 
disparaging  descriptions  written  openly  about  the  Soviet  system  and  its 
inhabitants (Paasi 1996, 162). 
Harle and Moisio  (2000, 64–72)  see a  clear  link between  the “hatred of  the 
Russkies” and Finnish  identity politics. The hatred was at  its peak during  the 
interwar  period  1918–1944  when  the  otherness  of  Russians  was  consciously 
overemphasized  for political  reasons. According  to  them,  the Finnish national 
identity project was based on  two underlying objectives: 1)  to  find  the correct 
place of Finland among other nations and 2) to unify a nation against a common 
threat  (ibid.,  82).  By  arriving  to  a  conclusion  that  Finland  was  located  and 
positioned  on  the  border  between  East  and West  and  that  the  Soviet Union 
could serve as the common enemy, both of the objectives were fulfilled.  
As a result, as Browning and Lehti (2007) have described, the eastern border 
came to dominate Finnish national imagination and was depicted not only as a 
state  border  but  also  as  a  border  separating  different  cultures  and  political 
systems and that even stood as the dividing line between Europe and Asia – the 
East from the West, pagans from Christians, progress from depression,  if not a 
civilization  from another  (Paasi 1996; Huntington 1993; 1996; Vihavainen 2004, 
8–14).  Given  its  bulked  up  position,  the  mental  border  became  etched  ever 
deeper and Finland was described as a ‘vanguard state’ and as an outpost of the 
West standing alone against the East (Immonen 1987; Harle & Moisio 2000, 10–
12).  Such  a  setting  allowed  for  the  juxtaposition  between  ‘us’  and  ‘them’ 
whereby ‘our’ own identity became perceived not simply as different but also in 
more  normative  terms  as  inherently  better.  Due  to  the  lack  of  personal 
experiences,  such  an  imaginary  on which  the  Finnish  identity was  build was 
largely based on myths and stereotypes (Vihavainen 2004, 8–14). 
The fear stemming from the apparently asymmetrical setting pitting a small 
Finland against the all‐powerful Soviet Union has been seen as the root cause of 
Finns attitude toward Russians (Vihavainen 2004, 435). This is well exemplified 
in Voionmaa’s (1919, 322–323) elaborate description:  
 
The  Finnish‐Russian  relationship  has  first  and  foremost  been  a  disproportion,  an 
uneven relationship between small and large, poor and rich, sparsely populated and 
mighty. …The  second main  feature  of  the  Finnish‐Russian  relations  has  been  the 
animosity,  the  geographical  and  historical  polarity,  general  and  stark  disparities 
between  everything  –  the  lands,  races,  religions,  civilizations,  habits,  the  state 
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agencies.  From  the  entire  Europe,  the  entire  world,  can  hardly  be  found  a  gap 
between  the  two neighbors  that has been dug deeper  that  the one which  separates 
Finland from Russia. If it is possible to talk about archenemies, it is here if anywhere. 
 
After the wars, the Finnish public image of Russia became more neutral – largely 
as  a  result  of  the  censoring  of  the  anti‐Soviet  content  (Raittila  1988).  School 
textbooks and newspapers alike had to comply with the Finnish security policy 
solution depicting  the  relations  between  the  former  enemies  now  as  friendly. 
This meant  that  the  Soviet Union was  not  treated  as  a  dictatorship,  but  the 
socialist  countries were described  as progressive welfare  states; Kekkonen‐era 
children got to know what “peaceful coexistence” meant and  in which country 
ʺthe grain grew the quickestʺ (Tuomisalo 2009).  
While  derogatory  stereotyping  with  reference  to  individual  nations  and 
peoples had largely vanished from textbooks by now (Paasi 1992), in relation to 
the Soviet Union and Russians as a people, the convention was continued due to 
lack  of  room  for more  objective  accounts.  As  an  example,  a  primary  school 
geography  textbook  (Aro, Rosberg &  Poijärvi  1947)  from  1947  described  that 
“Russians are good‐natured, happy and lively people, who love singing, playing 
and dancing. Their  favorite drink  is  tea and even  the poorest cottage has a  tea 
kettle (samovar).” Dictated by the YYA treaty, the peaceful co‐existence (Raittila 
1988,  Luostarinen  1989) maintained  by  the  forced  friendship  and  the  related 
censorship continued until the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
In  contrast  to  the  earlier  Finlandization  apparent  inter  alia  in  the 
schoolbooks, the portrayal of Russia  in the 1990s became not only  increasingly 
critical  (Holmén  2006)  but  emphasized  the  juxtaposition  and  depicted  it  in 
broader  terms  than  before  (Suutarinen  2000).  Such  a  critical  image  of Russia 
together  with  the  criticism  and  negative  reporting  presented  in  the  media 
largely explain why even  the younger generation with no personal experience 
steaming from tragic historical events, share the older generations’ conception of 
Russia in negative terms. Jukarainen’s (2001) study, for example, has shown that 
young  people  living  close  to  the  border  perceive  Russia  as  an  ‘other’  about 
whom they had very little positive to say. 
 
Image for What and for Whom?  
The  Finnish  image  of  Russia  has  been  commonly  tied  to  internal  political 
motives of the Finnish state and the political security decisions made by it. This 
was  the most obvious  in  terms  the Friendship policy  that was not restricted  to 
intergovernmental  relations  but  was  actively  put  in  practice  through  the 
citizenry  as  well.  Compared  to  relations  with  any  other  country,  Finnish‐
Soviet/Russian relations stood and still stand out clearly as more politically and 
ideologically oriented. What also stands out is that the image of Russia seems to 
have always been, at  least  to some extent, constructed  for certain purpose. On 
the one hand,  the  image had  to be built  to match with  the  restrictions of  the 
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post‐war  era  in  order  to  satisfy  the  all‐mighty  Eastern  Neighbor.  This  was 
particularly  obvious  in  the media,  as  newspapers,  in  particular,  under  heavy 
censorship had no other option  than  to portray a positive picture of  the Soviet 
Union and the Homo Sovieticus. 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  image  had  to  support  Finnish  decision‐
making  and  serve  to  convince  the public  about  the  rightness  of  the decisions 
made. As Limnéll (2009) aptly argues, the idea of security can be constructed in 
relation to the threats perceived. The threat perceptions presented in public are 
often  deliberately  constructed  in  specific,  politically  determined  ways  as  to 
allow  them  to be used  to gain backing  from  the populace  and  to  support  the 
national interest. As time went by and people found alternative channels to gain 
information,  the  gap  between  rhetoric  (the  constructed  image)  and  practice 
(personal experienced and perceptions) grew wider. 
When  the  forced  friendship policy  finally  faded away,  it was  revealed  that 
the  historical  hatred  had  been  simmering  underneath  the  surface  for  years. 
During the 1990s and 2000, various attitude studies and opinion polls suggested 
that Finns continue to be disapproving towards, or at least apprehensive about, 
Russia  and Russians  (e.g., Helakorpi,  Juuti & Niemi  1996). As  an  example,  in 
2004, Finns stood out from an international survey of 60 countries in by having 
very  negative  attitudes  towards  Russia  –  only  people  in  Kosovo were more 
negative (Aittokoski & Kovanen 2004.) In all fairness, there have also been other 
polls with quite contrasting results.  
According to Haikonen and Kiljunen (2003), negative attitudes stem from the 
negative characteristics, such as dangerousness and unpredictability, commonly 
attached  to Russians. Raittila  (2011)  in  turn argues  that  the ghost of  the Soviet 
Union  is  still  very  much  alive,  as  the  Finns’  image  of  Russia  is  labeled  by 
characterization  attached  to  the  former  Soviet  Union  and  communism  as 
mystery, peculiarity, and uncanniness. According  to Seppänen  (2010, 311–314), 
these  negative  attitudes  stem  from  historical  events  (e.g.,  the  Winter  and 
Continuation wars) and  the  instability of  the Russian  internal  situation. Other 
factors  influencing the  image of Russia are written sources, both academic and 
popular,  as well  as  the media. However,  these  days  the  image  is  influenced 
more directly by personal  travel  experiences, general  interest  in  the neighbor, 
business relations and the contacts made through them.  
Raittila  (2002)  notes  that  negative  attitude  towards  Russians  are  apparent 
also  in  the media; out of  all  the minority groups  in Finland, Russians  are  the 
most common nationality mentioned  in writings about crimes and criminality. 
Pietiläinen  (2011, 188) concurs  that  the peculiarity and exoticism of Russia get 
highlighted in Finnish articles on problems in Russia while its ordinariness gets 
downplayed. A scandal that takes place in Russia is generalized as a problem of 
the  entire Russian  society and  the way  it works while  it would be  seen as an 
isolated event had the same incident occurred in any other country. It has to also 
be kept in mind, however, that the situation also works the other way around; a 
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person with no personal experience may easily assume negative attitudes from 
the  media.  This  is  emphasized  by  the  tendency  that  newspaper  editors  in 
Finland  often  assume  that  their  audience  is  prejudiced,  if  not  hostile,  toward 
Russia and, as a  result, may  choose accordingly as  to what gets  reported and 
how  (Ojajärvi & Valtonen  2011,  49).  Lounasmeri  (2011b,  124)  sums  up  that  a 
relative consensus about what could be said and had to be left unsaid prevailed. 
Reporting on the Soviet Union remained pragmatic, and journalistic ideals were 
pushed to the background in the name of national interest. 
The image of Russia has also been analyzed from different angles and based 
on  different material  –  yet  the  conclusions  have  been  largely  the  same.  For 
instance, Hallikainen  (2003) has examined  the  image of Russia  in  the program 
documents of Regional Councils using newspapers as comparison material and 
arrives to the conclusion that the optimistic images of the mid‐1990s soon turned 
more cautious. Nokkala (2009) in turn has studied the perspective of the Finnish 
Defense Forces and the Ministry of Defense and learned that the establishment 
attaches a permanent uncertainly to Russia, which is seen as a different society 
and  a  great  power  that  a  much  smaller  Finland  has  only  limited  means  to 
influence.  
As Harle and Moisio (2000, 56–57) explain,  for  the Finnish national  identity 
Russia has been  something  that Finns have wished  to  step back  from. Finnish 
perceptions  of  Russia  and  Russians  are,  however,  going  through  times  of 
change. Russians are no longer mere neighbors but also cohabitants, colleagues, 
fellow students, customers, employees, and practioners in Finland (Lounasmeri 
2011a,  8).  Accordingly,  as  Ojajärvi  and  Valtonen  (2011)  sum  up,  there  is  no 
single way  to determine and understand Russia, but  the  impressions of  it are 
contradictory, competing, manifold, and local.  
 
5.1.2 Newspapers as a Source 
The  intrinsically  ephemeral  nature  of  newspapers  necessitates  caution  be 
exercised when  they  are  used  for  detailed  historical  research  (Reah  1998,  13; 
Jones  2006,  2).  Newspapers  are  good  in  generalities,  but  they  may  contain 
distortions  or  even  factual  errors.  They  are  also  cultural  artifacts;  i.e.,  a 
newspaper  is a product of  the culture  from which  it comes. As  the message  is 
transmitted  through  the medium of  language and printed on  the page, culture 
specific values are almost unavoidably encoded into the message (Reah 1998, 55; 
Fowler  1991,  10–12). As  a  consequence,  language becomes  ‘loaded’  in  a  sense 
that it carries with it more or less obvious connotations that makes the message 
either  limited or biased;  the  language used  in  the printed media  is not neutral 
but an exceedingly constructive mediator. Accordingly, newspapers, Bell (1991, 
147),  argues  are mainly  comprised  of  stories  rather  than  articles.  A  story,  he 
argues, has a structure, direction, point, and a viewpoint whereas an article may 
simply aim to report.  
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The load that a newspaper carries with it is the result of a screening process. 
It is reasonable to assume that every aspect of the content and every word used 
in  the  text  is  the  result  of  a  choice. As  a  consequence  of  this,  the  reader  of  a 
newspaper becomes a recipient of selected information (Reah 1998, 9; Richardson 
2007,  38).  Selection  is  obviously  needed  for  not  all  events  are  intrinsically 
newsworthy;  the  selection  process  enables  the  transformation  of  a  particular 
event into a piece of news. What is finally reported is not a reflection of the mere 
importance of the events in question but rather reveals a complex and artificial 
set of criteria for selection (Fowler 1991, 2). 
Being an industry with its own commercial self‐interests, an important factor 
that  influences  what  actually  appears  in  the  newspaper  is  its  ownership 
(Soderlund & Hildebrandt 2001; Miljan & Howorun 2003). The owners hold a 
theoretical power to influence not only what the public knows, but also what they 
consider  to be of  importance. However,  it cannot be  forgotten  that  the choices 
that are made, depends on the specific culture and context. There exist also two‐
way interplay between the society and the newspaper. Being a cultural artifact, a 
newspaper has its target audience to which the given newspaper has to cater, to 
a certain extent, in order to stay in business. Without a target audience in mind, 
the selection and composition of news becomes difficult. This  is mainly due  to 
the  fact  that  a  particular  culture  or  society  often  has  little  respect  for  certain 
issues and much more respect for others (Reah 1998, 55). When these issues are 
reported on or presented  in  the newspaper,  the  language  that  is used  tends  to 
reflect and thus reinforce these attitudes. Given its contextuality and the need to 
meet the needs of the target group, language, as an imposing semiotic code, can 
inhibit people from critically evaluating the opinions and views they hold.  
 
5.1.3 Opinion(‐ated) Journalism  
The opinion pages are  the only place  in  the newspaper where members of  the 
public can contribute as writers (Wahl‐Jorgensen 2004a, 60). The pages play an 
essential  role within  the  self‐understanding of  the quality of  journalism. Even 
though  editors need  their product  to  succeed within  a market driven  system, 
they are also obliged to allow democracy to do its work on the opinion pages in 
order to safeguard the newspaper’s credibility in the eyes of its readers and thus 
the  paper’s  circulation  success  (Wahl‐Jorgensen  1999,  56–57;  Page  1996,  21; 
Mayes  2001).  Through  the  features  of  opinion  journalism,  newspapers  can 
contribute to shaping and articulation public opinion (Wahl‐Jorgensen 2008, 70). 
Whereas most of a newspaper’s  content  is  reserved,  in principle,  for objective 
and unbiased  reporting,  the  clearly defined opinion pieces  (editorials, op‐eds, 
and  letters  to  the  editor) make no  claim of objectivity but  feature a  subjective 
viewpoint and is typically written for some social or political purpose. In these 
opinion pieces, personalized perspectives overshadow detailed facts. They are a 
newspaper’s means to have a say and listen to what its readers have to say. 
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Many opinion pieces develop a stark black‐and‐white dichotomy pitting ‘us’ 
against  ‘them’  (Mautner  2009,  134–137).  In  a  binational  context,  these  groups 
tend  to  collide  with  the  respective  national  groups,  in  so  doing  socially 
constructing  national  identities  into  much  more  mundane  settings  than  the 
conventional  accounts  of  national  identity  would  inculcate.  Edensor  (2004) 
reconceptualizes national  identity as being enmeshed within a complex matrix 
where signifying practices and cultural scraps are drawn together to consolidate 
belonging.  The  nation,  he  asserts,  thus  continues  to  act  as  a  force  field  for 
collective  and  subjective  experience.  These  collective  and  individual 
understandings,  as  well  as  the  practices  which  they  inform,  merge  in  the 
national to reproduce its obviousness, inscribing subjective experience onto the 
communality of the nation (ibid., 102). 
The  editorial  and  opposite‐editorial  (op‐ed)  pages  are  central  to  a 
newspaper’s identity (Wahl‐Jorgensen 2008, 70). They are the only the place in a 
paper where a  journalist  is allowed  to express opinion,  even  if guided by  the 
political  leanings of the newspaper  in question (Wahl‐Jorgensen 2004a, 59). An 
editorial is an opinion piece written by the senior editorial staff or publisher of a 
newspaper, but they habitually go unsigned as they are supposed to reflect the 
opinion  of  the paper.  In  an  editorial,  a  newspaper  speaks  both  for  and  to  its 
audience  creating  a  distinctive  voice  for  the  newspaper  by  evaluating which 
issues are  important  for  their  readership  to know  the newspaper’s opinion on 
(Fowler 1991, 209).  
Editorials  have  an  ideological  role  and  semantic  content  (van  Dijk  1995). 
They are often written with polarized vocabulary to describe political actors and 
events. Also specific rhetorical structures (imagery, over‐ and understatements, 
hyperbole, euphemism, and mitigation) of discourse are regularly used to write 
off  and downplay  information unfavorable  to  ‘us’  and  to  emphasize negative 
information  about  ‘them’  (van Dijk  1995,  148).  To what  extent  the  difference 
between  the groups  is emphasized, depends on  the political orientation of  the 
newspaper (van Dijk 1992, 245). The main function of editorials, van Dijk (1996, 
13)  notes,  is  “the  expression  and  persuasive  communication  of  opinions,”  for 
which  reason  they make  up  a  relevant  body  of  text  for  the  examination  of 
predominant  ideological assumptions  in a society (van Dijk 1992). An op‐ed  in 
turn is an article that expresses the opinions of a pundit or a named writer who 
is  usually  unaffiliated  with  the  newspaperʹs  actual  editorial  board.  Yet,  the 
selection  of  invited  and  accepted writers  is made  in  the  end  by  the  editorial 
board and must thus be taken as expedient course of action.  
A letter to the editor is a letter sent to a publication about issues of concern to 
its  readers  and  intended  for  publication.  The  letters  section  forms  one  of  the 
most popular and thus one of the most important sections in a newspaper. In the 
case  of  Helsingin  Sanomat,  approximately  80  per  cent  of  its  readers  read  the 
opinion pages on a daily basis. Inclusion of the letters from regular members of 
the public ensures that the discussion on the opinion pages is not limited to the 
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narrow  insider culture  (Wahl‐Jorgensen 2003, 11–12). The selection of accepted 
letters tells a great deal about the newspaper’s news values and its editorial and 
political  position  (Richardson  2007,  67).  As  space  is  limited,  the  letters  are 
usually short, yet their argumentation is straightforward, even if at times limited 
in scope. Letters are critical or praising, negative or positive, but seldom neutral.  
A review of the research from the last two decades suggests that face‐to‐face 
deliberation  and  participation  in  civic  affairs  has  been  declining  steadily. 
Putnam  (2000),  for  instance,  found  out  that  citizens  have  less  and  less 
connections  to communities and  to various civic organizations, while Eliasoph 
(1997),  Boltanski  (1999)  and  Moeller  (1999)  discovered  that  people  perceive 
issues  of  public  importance  as  being  increasingly  ‘distant’  and  beyond  their 
reach.  Perrin  (2006;  also  Perrin  &  Vaisey  2008,  782–783)  suggests  that  an 
important  reason  for  this decline  is  the absence of  fora  for political discourse; 
people  became more  active  in  civic  affairs when  they  have  access  to  vibrant, 
deliberative  public  spaces, where  they  encounter  and  are  forced  to  consider 
opposing viewpoints. 
The  letters to the editor section can be seen as one solution to this. In many 
papers  the  letters  section  continue  to  receive a  large number of  letters  (Wahl‐
Jorgensen  1999,  53). Reasons  for  this  remain  largely  unchanged;  the  public  is 
generally  more  interested  in  the  views  of  other  readers  than  in  what 
professionals have to say (Rosenthal 1969, 114). In addition to providing a good 
read,  Singletary  (1976,  37)  asserts,  readers  see  these  letters  as  “effective, 
influential expression of opinion,” which is why Romanow et al. (1981, 57) stress 
their ability to hold the attention of readers and stimulate debate.  
The  letters to the editor are a documentary byproduct of everyday civic  life 
and a forum in which citizens choose to participate (Hart 2001; Page 1996; Perrin 
&  Vaisey  2008).  The  section  is widely  celebrated  as  one  of  a  few  arenas  for 
voicing opinion and public discussion by regular citizens and, as a result, as a 
key  institution of a public sphere (Nagel 1974; Kapoor & Botan 1992, 5; Reader 
2001;  Wahl‐Jorgensen  2001,  47;  2004a).  The  line  of  thought  championed  by 
Habermas’  (1968a/b;  1989)  depicted  the  public  sphere  as  the  discursive, 
deliberative  space  wherein  individuals  from  various  backgrounds  engage  in 
rational  critical  debate  about  issues  of  common  concern  and made  valuable 
contributions  to  social  and political  thought. He  believed  that  all  “arguments 
deserve equal consideration regardless of their origin, hence, also regardless of 
who  voices  them”  (Habermas  1993,  33).  Such  a  just,  coercion‐free  and  civil 
discussion,  the  argument  goes,  is  essential  for  the  effective  operation  of  the 
democratic system (Habermas 1989; Hynds 1991, 124; Benhabib 1996, 68; Dryzek 
2000,  1);  in  the  public  sphere  individuals  come  together  to  form  a  public, 
compelling in doing so the holders of authority to legitimize themselves before 
the public opinion.  
Rather than being an aggregate of individual opinions, Habermas (1995) puts 
forth, public opinion  is something people arrive at  together.  It  is only  through 
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communicative  public  action  that  “it  is  possible…  for  civic  virtue  and  self‐
interest  to  intermesh”;  discussing  and  debating  in  public  “we  transcend  our 
individual  desires  and  interest”  and  “attain  the  rationality  that  comes  about 
when we have  to  submit, and make acceptable, our  reasons  to others”  (ibid.). 
Through deliberation, an intersubjective process of reaching understanding, the 
public  produce  an  agreement  based  on  which  an  articulation  of  a  shared 
conception of the common good, the public opinion, is possible (Habermas 1995, 
67).  Consistent  with  deliberative  democratic  theory,  getting  together  to 
rationally  discuss  matters  of  common  concern  is  not  merely  an  intrinsically 
valuable act but also improves the quality of decisions and outcomes (Christiano 
1997, 255). 
Perrin  and  Vaisey  (2008)  suggest  there  to  be  two  parallel  public  spheres 
“imagined” (cf. Warner 2002) through the letters section. They assert that letters 
addressing local issues tend to use more reasoned and conciliatory tones while 
issues  beyond  the  local  context  evoke more  emotional,  confrontational,  even 
inflammatory, tones and language. The so formed two public spheres both foster 
their  own  standards  for  engagement;  the  local  public  sphere  more  closely 
approximates  the  idealized,  Habermasian  deliberative  public  sphere  while 
larger  publics  promote more  polarized,  emotional  dialogue.  (Perrin & Vaisey 
2008.) 
Wahl‐Jorgensen  (2001, 304; 2004b) urges  that more attention be paid  to  the 
editors’  role  as  “gatekeepers  of  the  public  sphere”.  She  builds  on  Grey  and 
Brown’s (1970; cf. Renfro 1979) findings that the gatekeeping function of editors 
significantly  biases  the  contents  of  the  letters  published  and  thus  the 
composition  of  voices  in  the  public  debate.  The  letters  section  as  a  forum  is 
severely  limited  by  an  editorial  agenda  which  results  in  boosterish  letters 
dominating  small market  papers  and  conflict  letters  in  larger market  papers 
(Ciofalo  &  Traverso  1994,  53).  In  choosing  which  contributions  to  publish, 
editors  tend  to prefer  the emotionally charged, personal stories of  individuals, 
search  for an aesthetic authenticity  that  shows  the writer’s words “come  from 
the  heart”  and  invite  the  forging  of  emotional  bonds  between  readers  and 
writers (Wahl‐Jorgensen 2001, 304). The letters section ought to be considered as 
neither as a “public opinion barometer”  (Sigelman & Walkosz 1992, 938) nor a 
“microcosm of diverse society” (Wahl‐Jorgensen 2004b, 91) but rather as a “hazy 
reflection of public opinion”  (Grey & Brown 1970, 450)  for  the  reason  that  the 
letter  writers  are  demographically  and  politically  unrepresentative  of  the 
general public (Sigelman & Walkosz 1992, 944) – typically middle‐aged or older, 
male, well  educated, well  occupied,  and  conservative  (Singletary &  Cowling 
1979, 165).  
 
5.1.4 Helsingin Sanomat – Voice of truth within the Finnish society?  
Helsingin Sanomat (HS), owned by Sanoma Oyj (formerly SanomaWSOY), is the 
largest  subscription  newspaper  and  the  only  national  daily  broadsheet 
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newspaper  in  Finland.  The  paper  was  founded  as  Päivälehti  in  1889  when 
Finland was still a Grand Duchy under the Tsar of Russia to serve as an organ of 
the Young Finnish Party. Opposed the Russification policies and advocating for 
greater  Finnish  freedoms,  even  outright  independence,  the  paper  was  often 
forced  to  temporarily  suspend  publication  (Sanoma  News  2008).  Political 
censorship by the Russian authorities became tighter, particularly after ferocious 
Nikolay Bobrikov was appointed as the Governor‐General of Finland in 1898. In 
June  1904,  after  Päivälehti  had  referred  approvingly,  even  if  indirectly,  to  the 
Governor‐General Bobrikov’s assassination,  the paper was  finally closed down 
permanently. However,  its  proprietors  re‐opened  the  paper  under  its  current 
name already  the  following year (Perälä 2006) when  the preventive censorship 
was abolished.  
While  the  period  of  autonomy  was  characterized  by  struggle  against 
restriction of the freedom of speech, the enactment of the Act on the Freedom of 
the Press (1/1919 of January 4, 1919) was one of the first legislative actions of the 
newly  independent  Republic.  Thanks  to Anders Chydenius,  the world’s  first 
freedom  of  information  legislation 60  had  been  adopted  by  the  Swedish 
parliament already  in 1766 when Finland was a  fully  consolidated part of  the 
Swedish kingdom. Consequently, freedom of expression became a basic tenet in 
the Finnish Constitution (94/1919 of July 17, 1919). Since the 1930s, the paper has 
been politically independent and non‐aligned. The relationship between HS and 
the government of Finland has often been close. For instance, during the run‐up 
to the Winter War, Eljas Erkko was at the same time the paperʹs publisher and 
Finlandʹs foreign minister (Perälä 2006).  
A shadow to the freedom of press was cast by the penal code amendment of 
194861, which  in  the spirit of  the YYA  treaty criminalized  jeopardizing Finnish 
foreign relations and made journalistic defamation of foreign states punishable. 
President  Kekkonen  (1958)  saw  that  the  1948  Pact  had  initiated  “a  time  of 
trustful  collaboration”  between  Finland  and  the  Soviet  Union  and  that  this 
ought to be seen as “a good example to the rest of the world” about the “skill,” 
“wisdom and good nerves of Finland  in her Eastern policy.” While, officially, 
relations had begun  to  flourish and mutual  trust and understanding had been 
strengthened, Kekkonen admitted to following “with considerable disquiet” the 
“curious  and  most  unexpected  reaction”  that  had  emerged  in  Finland  and 
indicated that this tendency could harm the progress made elsewhere. Instead, 
he maintained, Finns should: 
 
                                                          
60 His Majesty’s Gracious Ordinance Relating to Freedom of Writing and of the Press. 
61 A corresponding code [kiihotuslaki] was in force 14.4.1934 – 31.12.1936. 
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take up a neutral, objective position in conflicts between great powers, or to abstain 
from adopting any attitude. Responsible leaders cannot pursue the foreign policy 
postulated by the 1948 agreement unless it is backed by public opinion….62 
 
Even though the penal code was never actually invoked, it functioned as an 
effective reminder of the delicate balance to be maintained with the USSR 
(Stoddard 1974, 94) and fed the practice of telling predominantly what was 
positive about the Soviet Union (Piper 1978) – though also news originating 
from international news agencies was published throughout the Cold War. This 
logic was further confirmed by a joint Soviet-Finnish declaration signed on April 
6, 1973, which stated pointblank that “the mass media should refrain from 
harming the friendly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union” (ibid.). 
The USSR’s proximate military might, led to a preconditioned prudence not 
to offend Moscow. In journalism such a Finlandization became manifested in 
conscious and unconscious self-censorship, excessively responsible journalism, 
which although not liked by most was undertaken to avoid unpleasant 
repercussions for, as Piper (1978) put it, “[t]here is no future in antagonizing the 
Soviet Union.” As a consequence, investigative and controversial reporting 
regarding the USSR was not done, and Finnish journalists assimilated with 
Kekkonen’s interpretation of neutrality and the style of the relationship to be 
maintained with the Soviet Union (Kaufmann & Broms 1988, 38). It was not until 
1992 that the treaty on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation, now with Russia, 
retired the 1948 pact and the special relations between the countries dictated by 
it. 
The late Aatos Erkko, who served as Editor-in-Chief of Helsingin Sanomat 
1961–1970 and then became the main owner of the Sanoma Corporation and the 
Helsingin Sanomat newspaper, considered relations with Russia and earlier with 
the Soviet Union to be of high importance. As Janne Virkkunen, who held the 
post of Editor-in-chief from 1991 until his retirement at the end of March 2010; 
i.e., almost the entire period of this study, wrote in Erkko’s obituary that he had 
understood the simple fact that neighborly relations were always more 
important for the smaller country. 
Aatos Erkko was of course the son of Eljas Erkko, who was Editor-in-chief 
1927–1938 and also the foreign minister of Finland and largely in charge of the 
negotiations with the Soviet Union before the Winter War started. Eljas Erkko’s 
father, in turn, was Eero Erkko, who is best remembered as the founder of 
Helsingin Sanomat (Päivälehti). From this background, Aatos Erkko also wished 
to look after the international position of Finland, towards which he worked 
particularly actively in the early 1990s when major decisions had to be made. As 
Virkkunen explains, Erkko cringed at the idea that Finland would lose the 
                                                          
62 The English language version of the Finnish original [Yöpakkasten alettua] provided by Doria, a 
multi-institutional repository maintained by National Library of Finland (www.doria.fi).  
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golden opportunity to adhere more strongly to the Western world and to accede 
to the EU. As result, Helsingin Sanomat diverted from its neutral stance and 
strategically proclaimed its support for EU membership just before for the 
decisive referendum took place. According to Virkkunen, this was “a project 
that was not appreciated among the editorial staff as it tested the integrity and 
reliability of the editorial board.” For Erkko, it had been “difficult to break away 
from his role as the main shareholder of Helsingin Sanomat, and in some 
inexplicable way, he [had] felt himself to be tied to the magazine's journalistic 
line.”  
Even so, Helsingin Sanomat has established itself as a significant factor in 
Finnish society during the years. It has been referred even to as a state authority, 
an institution with its own independent social and political will (Klemola 1981, 
13) and been seen to play a “role as an official, expert, and knowledge/truth 
voice within Finnish society” (Kaufmann & Broms 1988, 42). Due to its 
prominence, it has been even seen to possess a monopoly over the freedom of 
speech (Klemola 1981). Heikki Tikkanen was succeeded as Editor-in-Chief of 
Helsingin Sanomat by Janne Virkkunen in 1991, who was himself then succeeded 
by Mikael Pentikäinen in 2010. In his valedictory editorial column, Virkkunen 
clarified how the function of journalistic content had remained the same despite 
the fact that the world around us had gone through major changes:  
 
A good, high-quality journalism watches the ruling power and listens there where it 
is quiet. There is the power. We need to keep the power elite on their toes. We need to 
have a continuous discussion on relevant issues and to act as a gatekeeper. We need 
to be a critical voice in society and to provide space for other critical voices. We also 
need to take care of our core tasks: readers must be provided with enough 
information so that they realize what in kind of world they live. (OE 31.3.2010) 
 
Virkkunen also stressed that what quality journalism needed was the ability and 
skill to realize, to make connections, analyze, present well-reasoned opinions, to 
deepen, and to question. A good newspaper answered also to the questions that 
even the readers could not ask. In so doing, Virkkunen explained, journalism 
enabled the citizens to be up-to-date and become more critical, which was 
something that the paper had to accept (OE 31.3.2010). 
With a penetration of approximately 75 per cent of the households of the 
Greater Helsinki region, Helsingin Sanomat also functions as the local paper of 
the area. In addition to the capital region, it is mostly read in the other large 
Finnish cities. Unless the issue at stake happens to be clearly of national focus, 
residents from other parts of the country understandably direct their letter to the 
regional papers. Still, HS has been increasingly picking up reporting that it has 
considered as noteworthy from regional papers and publishes a review of them 
in its own printed version. While this broadens the scope of the newspaper, it 
also takes a particular piece of news from its original context and impedes the 
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interpretation of the coding used. This is particularly obvious in border and 
Russian-related reporting. Borderland dwellers know that a particular newspaper 
or other form of media is lopsided and caters, to an extent, to its well-defined 
audience; the wording and framing used in regional papers is clearly more 
colorful when compared to the more neutral and factual style of the national 
media. While borderlanders may thus understand that what is reported is not 
necessarily the whole truth, when the same report gets picked up by the national 
media and is read by people further away from the border who do not have the 
same personal knowledge, and its content may be interpreted differently. 
Helsingin Sanomat began to publish its opinion page on November 30, 1977. 
The share of published letters has fluctuated over the years. During its first year, 
the editor received 11,400 letters, of which 3,727 (or 32.7 per cent) were 
published (HS 10.1.1993). The number of letters received by the editor of 
Helsingin Sanomat increased noticeably when spurred by the upheavals of the 
early 1990s before stagnating at around 14,000 letters per year (Figure 23). The 
number of letters received began to rise again around the turn of the 
millennium, confirming that despite the general decline in participation in civic 
affairs the letters section remained as one the most popular and thus one of the 
most important sections in the newspaper. The all time record was broken in 
2010 with 24,317 letters to the editor. The publication/acceptance rate has 
recently hovered on average at around 25 per cent.  
 
 
 
 
 
Even though the editors of the HS opinion pages maintain that the main 
purpose of the opinion pages is to “reflect the entire spectrum of the Finnish 
opinion climate as closely as possible” and that efforts are made so that the 
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chosen sampling would reflect the variety of the received letters and the different 
angles on the topic at hand (HS 10.1.1993; 31.12.2010), it has to be acknowledged 
that this Habermasian vision is idealistic. In reality, editorial agenda impacts 
heavily what gets published. This is definitely the case also with Helsingin 
Sanomat, a paper that Finnish journalist and scholar Pertti Klemola (1981, 13) once 
called a state authority, an institution with its own independent social and 
political will. For example, Helsingin Sanomat strongly advocated for Finnish EU 
membership prior to the referendum in in 1994. In practice this meant that 
significantly more pro-EU letters were accepted for publication, despite the fact 
that a clear majority of the letters the paper received were actually against the EU 
membership. In 2006 it also, most notably, openly expressed its support for 
Finland's membership in NATO. Its stance towards Russia is less clear, although 
the Soviet-era self-censorship that kept on popping up well into the 1990s has 
changed to more critical voices. The share of Russia-related letters published in 
the paper reflects quite well the general trends described above.  
The opinion pages of Helsingin Sanomat consist of several different types of 
writings, the categorization and number of which has evolved during the years. 
In brief, the main types63 are:  
 
1. Editorial (pääkirjoitus): An opinion piece written by the senior editorial 
staff or publisher of the newspaper. Editorials are usually unsigned and 
are supposed to reflect the opinion of the paper. 
2. Column (kolumni): An opinion piece in which the author raises the issue 
/ problem and presents a viewpoint and gives reasoning from that 
viewpoint. The writing style is usually formal although may include 
sarcasm or be waspish. The author is affiliated with the paper. 
3. Notes (merkintöjä): A ‘light version’ of a column. The writer can be more 
humoristic, personal, lighter, and shorter. The author is affiliated with 
the paper. 
4. Viewpoint (näkökulma): Editorial columns about politics and other 
topical issues. The author is affiliated with the paper. 
5. Guest Column (vieraskynä): A piece by an unaffiliated expert. In principle 
not an opinion piece but rather an expert comment on a topical issue. 
6. Letter to Editor (mielipide): A letter (max. 4,000 characters) to the editor 
of the paper about issues of concern to its readers and intended for 
publication. Also short letters (max. 750 characters) are published with a 
special heading ‘Short Letter’ (mielipide – lyhyt). 
7. Other Papers (muut lehdet): Interesting writings from other newspapers 
selected by the editorial Staff. 
                                                          
63 Descriptions based on personal communications with Antti Blåfield, senior editorial writer and the 
head of Helsingin Sanomat editorial team, on November 17, 2010 and Reetta Meriläinen, Editor-in-
Chief of Helsingin Sanomat, on November 28, 2010. 
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8. Online discussion (keskustelua verkossa) and Said on the net (verkossa 
sanottua): Comment/viewpoints posted by readers to the HS web page 
that the editorial board has decided to print in the paper version of the 
paper as well. 
 
Using the categorization typical to the Anglo-American tradition, these may be 
regrouped into: 
 
 1: Editorials (E): The official opinion of the paper; 
 2–5: Op-Eds (OE); i.e., Columns, Notes, Viewpoints, and Guest 
Columns: Opinions/comments made by an individual expert – either 
affiliated or unaffiliated with the paper; 
 6: Letters (L): Opinions of the general public. 
 
Even though important and interesting as such, I have chosen to exclude 
categories 7 and 8 as including them would go beyond the scope and limitations 
of this study. 
 
5.1.5 Russia – a Neighbor among Many? 
The importance of Russia, not just at the governmental level but also in the 
worldview of the citizens, is well illustrated in its prominence in the leading 
Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat. During the two decades from 1990 to 2010, 
Russia, its actions and the lack thereof, has been one of the most popular topics in 
the newspaper. Certainly, its prominence has declined since the upheavals of the 
early 1990s, but a simple word frequency analysis suggest that even today Russia 
is referred to more often than, say, the European Union (Figure 24). During the 
last twenty years, it has only dropped one spot, from ranking number one in 1990 
to ranking number two in 2010. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world 
has become increasingly unilateral and the United States increasingly dominant 
on the world stage – receiving twice the number of entries than the EU. 
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In the opinion articles (editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editor), the 
prominence of Russia (or the Soviet Union) has remained more stable, around 
500 entries per year (Figure 25). However, while in the early 1990s the Soviet 
Union was clearly the foreign country people talked about, during the years that 
followed its successor, Russia, has been developing into just another country 
among many. It is still often talked and written about, but the motives for doing 
so have undoubtedly altered. Instead of its military might or overwhelming 
dominance, it is now the geographical proximity, the long common border, and 
the issues related and deriving from these that cause concern. The USA seems 
clearly more distant for the daily concerns of many, whereas the EU became the 
most prominent topic during the EU Referendum in 1994 – a status that it has 
been maintained ever since.  
 
 
 
 
 
When the letters to the editor are singled out, it becomes even clearer that the 
most common topics are those that impact the daily lives of the people the most. 
Both Russia and Sweden have remained their almost equal positions in the 
minds of Finns. In addition to the immediate neighbors, the EU and the USA 
rank high as they are seen as the dominant powers in the world (Figure 26).  
While the key word analysis was an illuminating exercise as it revealed the 
broad trends of the last two decades, the mere numbers fail to capture the entire 
picture. Merely reading of a text word for word is not enough to understand 
what is really meant by it or what or whom it is really about. While all other 
countries are in most cases referred to by their real names, in the Finnish lingo 
there are still various euphemisms that allow one to refer to Russia without 
mentioning the word ‘Russia’ at all. Such texts are coded in such a context 
specific manner that allows the reader to interpret the test appropriately (i.e., 
what is meant by the words used) by mobilizing his or her general socio-cultural 
knowledge. Most commonly, Russia is referred to as the ‘Eastern neighbor,’ 
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which of course leaves little rooms for interpretation. However, in some cases 
Russia was simply referred to as ‘our neighbor,’ at times ‘our beloved neighbor’ 
or the ‘bear,’ the understanding of which requires already some cultural 
understanding. Similarly, mentions of problems at or behind the border seldom 
suggested that something had gone wrong in Sweden or Norway. As 
understanding such codes and cues is part of what it means to be member of a 
particular culture, a more semiotic analysis was in order to delve deeper into 
what the text were actually about.  
 
 
 
 
 
A total of 4,708 articles were collected from the years 1990–2010 to analyze the 
context in which CBC has developed and how perceptions of Russia have been 
altered. The collected empirical material consists of opinion pieces: editorials, 
op-eds, and the letters to the editor (Figure 27). During the study period, the 
number of opinion articles devoted to Russia (or the Soviet Union) ranged from 
134 (in 2002) to 306 (in 1991) annually. Letters to the editor forms approximately 
half (2,383; 51 %) of the collected articles, while the rest consists of editorials 
(1,434; 30 %) and op-eds (891; 19 %). A large database was needed in order to see 
the full scope of topics at hand. For further scrutiny and semiotic analysis, the 
dataset was then compiled in two year intervals, whereby by total number of 
articles was reduced to 2,688.  
As the letters form the main part of the dataset, their role gets also 
emphasized in the analysis. Despite the fact that they cannot be taken as a public 
opinion barometer, they undoubtedly do form a coercion free, almost 
Habermasian, public sphere in which individual citizens choose to participate 
and in doing so compelling the public authority to legitimate itself before the 
public opinion. The existence of such an equal forum for discussion, a 
deliberative public space, allows people not only to voice their opinions but also 
encourage them to became more active in civic affairs and the operation of the 
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entire democratic system. Editorials and op-eds are included as many letters are 
written to comment on, correct, or criticize them, for which reason they have to 
be read and analyzed concomitantly. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.6 Semiotic Meaning-Making 
Social semiotics builds on the founding work of Ferdinand de Saussure but 
takes a step further by emphasizing the socially contextualized nature of signs 
and meaning-making (signifying) processes and practices. The approach is 
expected to provide a more in depth knowledge on border making (bordering) 
as well as on how the images of Russia and Russian as the ‘other’ are being 
produced and reproduced (othering). For Saussure, the term signification 
referred to the dyadic relationship between the signifier (signifiant) and the 
signified (signifié), which put together constitute a sign (Saussure 1983, 67; see 
Peirce 1931–58, 2.228 for an alternative triadic model and Kangas 2007 for its 
application). After all, it is not, Saussure (1983, 117) purports, the metal of which 
a coin is made that fixes its value. 
Signs are not stable, but constantly made afresh; the relationship between the 
signifier and signified is in a constant state of flux as people connect form and 
meaning in ways deemed apt to the particular need and occasion (Kress 1997). 
The same signifier can stand for a different signified (constituting a different 
sign) and, on the other hand, many signifiers can also stand for the signified 
(forming again a different sign). Furthermore, this relationship between the 
signified and signifier, i.e., between language and reality, Saussure (1983, 67–78) 
radically asserts, is arbitrary. The language thus does not ‘reflect’ reality but 
rather constructs it (Chandler 2002, 28). 
While understanding Saussure’s ideas provide a solid foundation for the 
purposes of this study, they are overly structural and too heavily based on 
linguistic concepts. Instead, this study seeks to explore the use of signs in this 
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specific the socio-cultural context. The writings of Charles S. Peirce provide a 
more pragmatist means for analyzing not the structure, as Saussure had done, 
but rather the process of resignification which proceeds on the basis of old 
knowledge and experience and remains always embedded in a real historical 
context. What we learn from Peirce (1931–58, 2.172) is that a sign can be 
anything as long as someone interprets it as signifying something; i.e., referring 
to or standing for something other than itself.  
Peirce asserted that all modes of thinking depend on the use of signs; every 
thought is a sign and every act of reasoning consists of the interpretation of 
signs. He highlighted the process of ‘semiosis’; suggesting that the meaning of a 
sign was not contained within the sign itself, but it arose in its interpretation. 
Signs function as mediators between the external world of objects and the 
internal world of ideas. They may be mental representations of objects, and 
objects may be known by means of perception of their signs. Semiosis is a 
process of cooperation between signs, their objects, and their ‘interpretants,’ i.e., 
their mental representations. (Peirce 1931–58; 1960, 79.)  
Focusing on the ‘grammar’ of narrative, Barthes utilizes Saussure’s 
structuralist logic, yet transforms it into a tool, which allows for the improved 
and more critical interpretation of the signs. Adopting largely from Hjelmslev’s 
(1961) work, Barthes (1987) formulated a theory based on two orders of 
signification. He called the first of these a denotation (the literal meaning and 
reference of a sign) and the second a connotation (the meanings that are 
suggested or implied by the sign). For instance, ‘Russia’ denotes the largest 
country in the world, covering North Eurasia and bordering on the Pacific and 
Arctic Oceans and the Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas, and so on. Meanwhile, 
Russia has various connotations, socio-cultural and personal (such as ideological 
and emotional) associations, which came to mind when the word is mentioned: 
big, interesting, rich in history, old, oil and gas, vodka, cold, communism – just 
to mention a few. 
When the two orders amalgamate, they produce an ideology in the form of 
myth – a process that Fiske and Hartley (1978, 43) have described as a third 
order of signification. A myth, Barthes explains, has a tri-dimensional pattern 
(signifier, signified, and sign), yet it is constructed from a semiological chain, 
which existed prior to it. It is thus a second-order semiological system by which 
a sign (the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system 
becomes a mere signifier in the second and an additional signifier to it. A myth 
is not an object, a concept, or an idea, but a mode of signification, a system of 
communication, a message (Barthers 1987).  
For Barthes, semiology is mythology, a “study of manmade (and thus 
manipulated) sensory cues presented to us for popular consumption” (Morine 
2009). While Saussure asserted that a signifier without signified has no meaning 
and that the relationship between the two is arbitrary, for Barthes the signifiers 
are not arbitrarily chosen but they are in themselves already loaded with 
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meaning. Sign and codes are produced by myths, but they also serve to maintain 
them. They express and serve to organize shared ways of conceptualizing 
something in a culture. They have an ideological function, which Barthes calls 
naturalization: their function is to convey ideological norms of a culture, 
naturalize the cultural, that is, to make the dominant cultural and historical 
values, attitudes, and beliefs seem entirely ‘natural,’ ‘normal,’ self-evident, 
timeless, obvious ‘commonsense’ and, as a result, objective and ‘true’ reflection 
of the ‘way things are.’ (Barthes 1977, 45–46.) 
While a linguistic analysis of newspaper material is clearly beyond the scope 
of this research, a semiotic take on the material is assumed in order to see 
beyond the mere words and numbers. The statistical figures serve a purpose in 
creating a general picture of the material and projecting trends in it, yet the 
analysis focuses primarily the distinction between communication and 
signification (see Saussure 1983; Peirce 1976, 8; Barthes 1988, 180). While 
communication is understood as a mere transfer of knowledge from sender to 
receiver, signification refers to communicative meaning-making, whereby a 
particular text evokes a process of interpretation in the receiver. In order for a 
sensible interpretation to be possible, both the sender and receiver of the text 
(the message) should share a common rule of interpretation, a code. 
Signification thus includes both interpretation and expression: figuring out the 
meanings made by others from the material signifiers they produce and 
selecting and combining semiotic (sign-making) resources from those made 
available socially and culturally in the realization of meaning (Mavers 2009). 
Newspapers are a form of communication, which evince a set of codes that 
are meant to provide the reader with information of the world. A ‘text’ in a 
newspaper is already in itself a complex sign containing other signs (Chandler 
2002). Following the Saussurean tradition and the example of Chandler (2002), 
the task here is to look beyond the specific texts to the systems of functional 
distinctions operating within them and to identify the underlying conventions 
and differences. The analytical task is to identify the signifiers within the text 
and the codes within which the signs they create have meaning as well as to 
explain what sort of reality the text constructs. 
The concept of the ‘code’ is fundamental in semiotics (Jakobson 1971, 
Chandler 2002, 147). Since the meaning of a sign depends on the code within 
which it is situated, codes provide a framework within which signs make sense; 
reading a text involves relating it to relevant codes (Chandler 2002, 147). 
Producers of text use codes to limit the range of possibilities of meaning they are 
likely to generate when read by others (Turner 1992, 17), while to interpret texts 
appropriately, the receiver has to read signs with reference to appropriate codes; 
i.e.,the ones used by the producer. As Hall (1980, 131) puts forth, there is no 
intelligible discourse without the operation of a code. The codes employed are 
usually obvious and ‘overdetermined’ by contextual cues: signs within texts can 
be seen as embodying cues to the codes that are appropriate for interpreting 
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them by contextual cues provided in the texts and the environment in which 
they operate (Chandler 2002, 158).  
Understanding codes is part of what it means to be member of a particular 
culture. We learn to read the world in terms of codes that are dominant within 
our specific socio-cultural context. In the process of adopting a way of seeing, 
we also adopt an ‘identity.’ (Chandler 2002, 148; 157–158.) Danesi has defined a 
culture as a kind of ‘macro-code’ consisting of the numerous codes which a 
group of individuals habitually use to interpret reality' (Danesi 1994, 18; see also 
Danesi 1999, 29). Mere reading a text a word for word is not enough to 
understand what is meant by it, but one needs to mobilize his or her general 
social knowledge in order to recognize that these words belong to a particular 
‘code of reference’ – that the text is written in reference to something (Eagleton 
1983, 78). 
Texts connote cultural meaning. A piece of text, such as a newspaper story, is 
an object that has been worked on, chosen, composed, constructed, treated 
according to professional, aesthetic or ideological norms, all of which are factors 
of connotation. The question in this respect is whether or not the reader is able 
to deconstruct what the author is trying to convey. A reader of a newspaper has 
its own set of codes with which to decode the text. As this may vary from 
individual to individual based on his or her social knowledge and ideological 
standpoint, for those unfamiliar with the newspaper and the codes it employs to 
deliver its message, the intended message may get lost; i.e., the reader interprets 
it ‘wrongly.’  
The most persuasive code in any society is its natural language (Eco 1979, 
263). However, because codes are not just socio-culturally but also historically 
situated, the interpretation of a text changes as interpretative codes evolve. This 
is to suggest, firstly, that a foreigner, even if able to read a Finnish newspaper, 
might interpret a particularly text differently than a Finn and, secondly, that a 
piece of text published, say, in 1991 might have been interpreted differently back 
then as the very same text is interpreted now two decades later. Thus the aim 
here is to seek to identify the codes within which the production and 
interpretation of meaning in any text is achieved; i.e., to situate what has been 
reported in the context in which it has occurred by describing the changes in the 
foci of the debates and interlinking them with the broader changes that have 
occurred at the border. 
 
 
5.2 IMAGES AND PERSPECTIVES OF COOPERATION 
 
During the study period significant changes occurred at the Finnish-Russian 
border – Finland changed; Russia changed; and Europe changed. In 1990, the 
world was still divided into two camps and the 1948 YYA pact between Finland 
and USSR was still effective. However, already in 1995, Finland became a EU 
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member and discussions concerning such previously unvoiced topics as the 
potential NATO membership as well as the restitution of the ceded territories 
were raised repeatedly in the media. As I aim to show below, these shifts are 
very clearly reflected in the newspaper writings. The shifts also influenced the 
way in which Russia was perceived as a neighbor and a partner in CBC. 
 
5.2.1 Post-Soviet Euphoria: Russia as a Neighbor in Need 
In 1990 the Soviet Union was already falling apart at its seams and great changes 
were already in the air. These admissions were not, however, talked about 
directly in the Finnish public debate. Many things went formally unsaid, but 
due to the inherently coded writing the intended message could be read 
between the lines. Three broad topics stood out. The first was related to 
developments in the Soviet Union, which some authors considered a threat 
while others had faith in peaceful development. The second subplot consisted 
more particularly of writings about the Karelian question and the future of the 
Baltic countries and pondered especially what the government of Finland 
should do in these respects. Thirdly, a subplot about Finnish-Soviet relations 
arouse with sharp opinions for and against Finland’s possible accession plans to 
the EU as well as to NATO.  
A more pointed debate was focused on the usefulness, or the lack thereof, of 
the YYA treaty, which was due to expire, or more likely to be renewed once 
again, in 1993. A Gallup poll suggested that Finns had gained the courage to 
diverge from the official political line, but in practice the official foreign policy 
and the general public opinion still went largely hand-in-hand. It revealed that 
80 per cent of Finns believed that the YYA treaty had been necessary over the 
last few decades (E 23.12.1990). According to another poll, no fewer than 75 per 
cent believed that the treaty would remain in force in 2000 (HS 10.12.1990). The 
alternative, even if less prominent, thread suggested that the treaty had become 
a burden for Finland’s international status. The concern was that Europe was 
undeniably amidst great political changes and Finland could be left behind 
should it continue to remain faithful to the treaty Stalin had created to protect 
the Soviet Union's western frontier following World War II while the rest of 
Europe moved on. 
Finland's political leadership rejected the need to jump aboard the European 
integration process and continued to swear by the YYA treaty as a way to 
continue. It was not until the unification of Germany provided concrete proof 
that something was indeed happening that the government was forced to 
reassess the situation and consider a new contract that would nullify the pact. 
Nevertheless, Finland’s official position that “the consolidation of EU 
membership and Finland’s neutrality policy is just as difficult as it is to square 
the circle” (E 23.12.1990) remained and fuelled a yearning for more open and 
broader discussion among the populace. It was seen as: 
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tragicomic that in a democratic country, politicians are criticizing people for 
criticizing the government. Equally unfortunate is that our common issues can only 
be discussed by the parties and politicians. A complete absurdism is approached, 
when in newspaper interviews the leading politicians scold citizens who take the EU 
question for open for discussion… The Finnish tradition of keeping one's mouth shut 
is stronger and more tenacious than the Berlin Wall. (L 3.12.1990.) 
 
Also the Finnish policy of neutrality was discussed. Because, it was argued, the 
policy had always been linked to the Finnish national interests, i.e., to the 
economic benefits (L 10.12.1990, E 23.12.1990), it could also be diverged from on 
the condition that these interests would not be jeopardized. The EU was taken in 
this sense as an alternative avenue that would lead Finland out from the Soviet 
Union’s shadow. Only eight per cent rejected the potential EU membership 
completely, and a third viewed it with skepticism (E 23.12.1990). A common 
reason for a critical stance was the argument that after being a part of Sweden 
and then Russia now would be a good time for Finland to try to manage on its 
own. It was feared that the EU would be yet another ‘kolkhoz,’ and that Brussels 
would become the ‘New Moskva,’ providing Finland with guidelines and 
regulations. (L 18.12.1990.) 
Regarding the Karelia question, nearly 70 per cent of Finns went along with 
the government stance that that question has been settled and it is better not to 
take any act in the matter (HS 10.12.1990). Some could not even comprehend 
why Finns were still volunteering to restore and repair “the cities raped by the 
conqueror” (L 4.10.1990). Surprisingly, given the emotionalism surrounding the 
issue, only one in four wished for the government to take the initiative to restore 
Karelia. The percentages can be deemed as strikingly high because in 1990 these 
answers could no longer be necessarily interpreted as a mere parallel of official 
liturgy.  
The ever-worsening situation in the Soviet Union also fuelled discussion over 
what Finland should do to ease the situation. A majority of Finns considered 
both the assistance to the Kola Peninsula to fight against pollutant emissions and 
actual development assistance as important, yet the former commonly ranked 
first among concerns as the pollution from Kola directly threatened the nature 
on the Finnish side as well (E 23.12.1990). On the other hand, concerns were also 
raised that the “value vacuum” created as the old ways of thinking were proven 
to be unsustainable was being “ruthlessly exploited” by offering Western 
alternatives as replacements (L 28.10.1990).  
The motivation behind the assistance was grounded both in practical 
considerations and compassion, yet the way it was requested raised anger. The 
Soviet telegrams requesting aid that were received by a number of Finnish cities 
were regarded as disgraceful as they were deemed to be as out of sync with 
Soviet spending levels – particularly in light of the fact that the Soviet army had 
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reportedly continued to spend heavily on new armament. As described in the 
op-ed of February 7, 1991: 
 
Meat, butter, margarine, milk powder, baby food and infant formula are needed in 
Murmansk. The request is official. It is similar to that request of FIM 300 million in 
medical aid, which Leningrad sent to its twin city Turku. Neither telegram seems to 
promise gifts in return, apart from the friendship already given. Murmansk is home 
to about 12 times more people than in Rovaniemi. Leningrad is 40 times Turku… 
Leningrad is amongst the largest military centers of the Soviet Union, whereas 
Murmansk is one of the world's largest military ports. Request for assistance 
telegrams evoke compassion for the sick and the hungry poor little mite. Only 
addresses of the telegrams seem incorrect. They should have been sent to Moscow… 
 
The increasing control vacuum in the Soviet Union and the assumed relaxation 
of travel restrictions and border control was seen as a direct threat but also 
necessitating cooperation. The fall of borders was seen to come with surprises, 
as “people oppressed one generation after another” could now behave more 
freely (E 22.5.1991). It was reported that there were tens of millions of people in 
the Soviet Union who wanted to see other countries and that this would spread 
Soviet criminality also to Finland (E 1.3.1991). It was seen that in order to fight 
back, the authorities in both countries should build a practical working 
relationship as soon as possible. (Ibid.) 
It was projected that a record breaking 300,000 trips from the Soviet Union to 
Finland would be made in 1991. The possibility of abandoning the visa practice 
completely, as was suggested by the  Soviets – albeit in very general terms, was 
rejected out of hand because “ f or Finns, such a vision of the future, in which 
fully unencumbered tourist flows… spill to Finland” was, “to put it mildly, 
terrible” (E 8.8.1991). The current events were described in rather scornful tone: 
 
…there are now more people willing to come than there is time to stamp visas… 
Authorities and ordinary citizens alike have raised their eyebrows when they see 
Soviet tourists shopping at Finnish town squares. … the rhetoric about people's free 
movement in Europe and the practice are still very different things. Soviets’ travels to 
Finland are not normal tourism, because usually they are far from having enough 
money to required to travel. (E 8.8.1991). 
 
The Soviet citizens were frankly held in contempt and put on a category of their 
own, while the proclamations about the superiority of Finland were not spared: 
 
The allure of prosperous Finland is irresistible. The old Soviet practice of tourism, 
which allowed only tightly controlled group tours to the west for the privileged few, 
has unfortunately now transformed almost to its opposite. The Soviets are pariah 
class tourists in Finland, for due to the shortage of foreign currency they have no 
opportunities for enjoyable tourism in the Western sense of the word. (E 8.8.1991) 
 248   
 
In the letters, the same concerns were often stated in an even more 
straightforward manner: 
 
Already now too much booze/drugs, and too many women, which are a burden to 
our society, even to our street scene, are pouring here. How is it possible that 
hundreds of thousands of Russians and Estonians have acquaintances willing to 
support them for weeks in here? It's weird. (L 15.5.1991)  
 
Despite the assumed detriment for Finland, the principle of open borders was 
deemed approvingly. It was seen as a “guarantee against the dictatorships” and 
to foster respect for human rights as had been required by the Western countries 
(E 22.5.1991). As a result, the West had no other option but to “prepare in time 
for a flood of Soviet citizens” and “get used to the idea of a million day tourist 
from Leningrad in the streets and shops of Hamina, Kotka, and Helsinki” (ibid.) 
The only way to constrain the depicted damage for Finland was seen as to 
trying to ease the situation on the Soviet side and diminish the urge to flee to 
Finland. If Finland was to send humanitarian aid to combat the shortages and 
the social collapse in the Soviet Union, “ t he national interest and humanitarian 
goals would merge in an exceptional manner” (E 8.12.1991). In this way, cross-
border interaction began, more than anything else, out of need – if not fear: “If 
there is any reason to fear that the alternative for delivering aid on-site is 
uncontrolled human flood to the Finnish borders, it is in everyone’s interest, of 
course, to hasten ahead of the flood” (E 8.12.1991).  
In the letters, first proposals for taking more of a paradiplomatic approach 
were posed. The positive experiences received from Nordic cooperation with 
free civic action enabled by successful links between the states was seen as 
model that could be used also with the Soviet Union (L 29.6.1991). The debate on 
the opinion pages intensified further following the announcement by the official 
Soviet news agency TASS that then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had 
became “ill” on August 19, 1991. The big upheavals that followed prompted 
many Finns to put pen to paper. A total of 108 letters related to the attempted 
coup in the Soviet Union was sent to the editor. The main motivation to write to 
the paper was to comment on the actions, or lack thereof, of Finnish politicians 
during the siege; 53 writers expressed their indignation at the acts of the 
government and the major parties. (HS 16.9.1991.) The government’s wishes for 
the return to “normal conditions” in the Soviet Union were, in particular, 
regarded as duplicitous tinkering. The statements of party representatives were 
criticized for kowtowing to the kidnappers and lack of courage (L 25.8.1991), 
while the political system at large was blamed for its incompetence and lack of 
knowledge: 
 
We have developed a foreign policy culture, the knowledge base of which is weak. 
Only the pro-Finnish fringe of the history of Finland has been learned. The modern 
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history of Russia and the Soviet Union is largely unknown. Publishers have not 
published any of the main foreign works dealing with the modern history… Cliquish 
cabinet policy seasoned with Soviet connections has produced a series of mentally 
down-and-out apparatchiks in our political leadership. Equally sad is the poor 
knowledge of Russian culture and the contemporary reality among our political 
leadership, which is a consequence of the lack of an effective Russian policy research. 
(L 6.9.1991)  
 
Attention was also drawn to the behavior and activities of ordinary citizens and 
civil society as no large demonstrations were organized in support of the 
democratic forces in the Soviet Union (L 11.9.1991). Out of all of the letters 
received, only four writers defended the Finnish leadership’s low profile (HS 
16.9.1991). A more common avenue was to ponder the new outlook opening up 
as a consequence of the collapse of Communist rule. Most notably, this was seen 
to allow a chance to bring up the Karelian question once again. It was proposed 
that the areas that Finland lost in the war should be recovered as only then true 
interaction between people could occur (L 6.9.1991). A number of these writings 
openly revealed strong resentment and somewhat normative thinking: 
 
The conquest of these areas was an integral part of the Bolsheviks' policy of 
violence… Peace treaties of Moscow and Paris were done at gunpoint. The Winter 
War and Continuation War were part of the one and the same Stalin's war of 
conquest. In Europe of cooperation and democracy, it is difficult to accept colonies in 
the middle of the continent… It is true that the questions about respect and friendship 
in the relations between nations and states are even more important than borders. But 
it is not possible to ignore reality. The Finnish-Russian spectacle of suffering, but also 
the cooperation modes of the future has to be approached with the clinician's skill and 
the ethos of the priest in order to achieve a solution that would be enduring and 
reasonable for both parties. (L 6.9.1991) 
 
Be the Eastern neighbor “a new kind of Soviet Union or Russia” (E 30.4.1991), 
the relations with it were seen to remain as crucial for the “destiny of Finland” 
(L 9.9.1991). There was no time or reason to wait and see which direction the 
development behind the border would take, but it was rather “necessary to act 
on the basis of the current situation and avoid falling into short-sighted 
solutions.” This meant that discussions had to be undertaken with “the strong 
men of our neighboring country,” Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. The 
geographical location of Finland and the long common border with the Soviet 
Union continued to necessitate good relations, for after all, “even though we 
would not feel fear at all, who would benefit from the rupture, or perhaps even 
complete severance, of the relations?” (L 1.9.1991). 
The discussion about Karelia turned into criticism directed towards the 
Finnish political elite when President Koivisto flattened the hopes of those 
yearning for the area to be returned back by reminding them that Finland had 
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lost Karelia in two wars (HS 23.9.1991). The editorial of September 30, 1991 
fanned the flames by stating that it to be “amusing and mind-broadening to 
calculate the economic strain that Finland would face as a consequence of the 
restitution of the Karelia.” Russians, in turn, were reported to be vexed about 
the entire issue and regard the related discussion as ill-founded (L 5.11.1991). 
The vox populi, to the extent it could be read from these letters, leaned more 
towards the opinion that continuing to live pursuant to the old and introverted 
political formulas of “sneaking around and lacking initiative” (L 9.10.1991) 
would help neither Finland nor its neighbor. The new situation rather required 
both an open mind and willingness to act fast now “that mending the old 
communist-era errors” was at its peak in the Soviet Union and all the problems 
had become revealed as they were (L 9.10.1991). 
Understanding that reclaiming Karelia may indeed be point-blank an 
unfeasible goal, it was suggested that “ w hen the time is ripe and we get an 
opportunity, let us create a normal neighborhood's through cooperation across 
the eastern border” for “ t his is certainly what the masses wish for (L 9.10.1991). 
Accordingly, the Finnish Karelian League (Karjalan Liitto) suggested by letter to 
President Koivisto that instead of making claims to the ceded area, when the 
time is ripe Finland should aim to broaden the negotiation contacts “with the 
Soviet Union and the Russian Federation in order to develop the ceded areas in 
a mutually satisfactory manner.” 
Politics were also blamed for the “non-existence of Finnish Sovietology”. 
Professor Tauno Tiusanen concluded in an HS interview that, “if we would have 
conducted the kind of critical research as was carried out elsewhere in the West, 
it would have attracted bothersome attention in the neighborhood” (HS 
1.11.1991). In the discussion that followed, it was clarified that “the 
‘neighborhood,’ of course, by no means referred here to the Nordic countries but 
to the Soviet Union, and we understand that the ‘bothersome attention’ equals 
‘quite a rumpus,’ if not more” (L 9.11.1991). The author of the letter drew 
attention to the continuation of deep-rooted and automated equivocate speech 
and used euphemisms when referring to the Soviet Union: “How long will it 
take before the Finlandized soul consents to realize that a bear has indeed 
already been defeated and things can certainly be spoken freely with their real 
names? It seems to be difficult to get used to” (L 9.11.1991). 
Even though the demise of the Soviet Union had been predicted, the speed at 
which the actual collapse occurred was largely unseen in Finland. In December, 
Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Republics signed the Declaration of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev was 
forced to resign from a post that no longer existed. The next day, the Soviet 
Union ceased to exist – and more direct opinions about it followed immediately: 
 
The Soviet Union was not a positive part of the international community; when active 
this ideological superpower generated fear, and even when amicable it generated, at 
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the very least, irritation. It was surrounded by distrust every time. …hardly anyone 
even within the country mourn for the Soviet Union apart from those, whose 
standard of living, career, or self-esteem was directly tied to its fates. (E 27.12.1991) 
 
On the other hand, it was assumed that many things would go unchanged: 
 
We now have a great power neighbor, who is at the same time new and very old. Our 
long border is the same as it has been in the past. And so is also the nationality, with 
whom the neighborly relations as a daily practice are managed. …the most noticeable 
new factor is not so much the replacement of the Soviet Union with Russia than the 
state of change, in which Russia in itself has already been for a few years, and still is. 
(E 31.12.1991) 
 
Also the benefits of having Russia as a neighbor were depicted as remaining 
“identical” to what they had been when Finland shared its border with the 
Soviet Union. The only major difference was seen to stem from the reasoning 
that, unlike its predecessor, Russia was not an ideological state. Thus, special 
factors such as the relationship between the Finnish and the Soviet Communist 
Parties no longer complicated cooperation (E 31.12.1991). 
While Finland’s ability to influence the development in Russia was 
underrated to be “of course limited and relate mainly to the nearby areas,” it 
was considered that there was an obvious need use these slender opportunities 
“in the name of good-neighborliness” as also Finland had strong interest in the 
fact that the circumstances remained calm and democracy took root in Russia (E 
31.12.1991). In contrast, others could not believe that a “small Finnish nation” 
grappling with recession was feeding “her predator,” the “great and mighty 
Russia” out of pocket (L 9.1.1992). 
In all, the year 1991 stood out in terms of the number of letters received. A 
record-breaking 17,409 letters were sent to the editor. Of these, 3,914 letters or 
about 22.5 per cent, were published. The previous record of 16,633 letters had 
been amassed in 1989 with an average publication rate of 26 per cent. The debate 
about the Karelia question in particular stood out due to its intensity. During the 
two-month period from mid-September to mid-November, no fewer than 225 
letters regarding the Karelia question were sent to the editor of Helsingin 
Sanomat (149 in favor of repatriation, 38 against it, and 38 with no clear stance). 
Fifty-three of these (23.6 per cent) were published in the paper. Out of those that 
were published, 31 were in favor of repatriation and 10 against.  
 
New Beginning with New Russia  
The collapse of the Soviet Union immediately sparked intense debate about the 
position of Finland. A post-war foreign political realism based on the teachings 
of history and hypothetical considerations on the alternative options assumed 
was put yet again into practice. HS Editor-in-Chief Erkki Pennanen argued that 
 252   
 
it was difficult to envision Finland as having an economically and politically 
natural role outside the EU. Should Finland not join, it would be exposed to an 
unflattering association with wrong types of countries, in a “B team of riffraff” 
consisting mainly of former Eastern European socialist states (OE 5.1.1992). The 
same idea resonated in the letters. The EU was seen as a necessity for Finland; 
Finland does not “belong to the CIS” and “does not want to be Albania” (L 
15.1.1992).  
Not everyone though was convinced that Russia had indeed been defeated. 
For some, the geopolitical U-turn implied by the potential for EU membership 
sounded overly precarious. Finland’s destiny, it was argued, remained strongly 
tied to the East and “the worst possible scenario for Finland” would be “if 
behind the eastern border – no matter who is in power over there – a conclusion 
is reached that we – as a result of the EU decision – have moved or are moving 
to "the wrong side" (L 11.1.1992). 
An alternative way of approaching the issue was to ponder whether EU 
membership would increase or reduce Finland’s dependence on other countries 
(L 15.1.1992) or have implications for its sovereignty. Most (published) writings 
considered the weakness of Russia and the CIS as a historical opportunity of 
limited duration to seek security from the EU. It was also hypothesized that the 
EU could lead to NATO membership. The development of Russia was deemed 
unpredictable, and, in the worst-case scenario, Finland might soon be at war 
against the great power on its own. Thus, many maintained “Finland must 
content itself with fostering peaceful, strong relationships with its neighbors and 
to maintain an adequate defense on its own” (E 15.10.1992). 
The ongoing preparations of the new treaty to be signed with a relatively 
weak Russia were also seen to provide an eleventh hour to bring the matter of 
Karelia back onto the table. It was seen that the new agreement would seal the 
Karelia question indefinitely, because this time it would be signed of our own 
free will (L 26.1.1992). It was suggested directly that Karelia should be returned 
to Finland as it had been “disposed by violence” through “barbarian injustice” 
and as the invasion had also been considered as illegal by the League of Nations 
(L 2.6.1992). A real friendship could hardly arise before the borders of the Tartu 
Peace Treaty, which were “supposed to form the ‘immovable foundation’ for the 
relations between our countries,” had been restored (L 12.1.1992). It was foretold 
that the return of Karelia would even “uplift the people out of spiritual 
recession” (L 28.6.1992) and thus become a part of “our spiritual, and perhaps 
eventually even financial, capital” (L 13.10.1993).  
Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev’s statement confirmed what many 
had feared: by signing the new treaty, the contracting states’ “ambiguous border 
issue has now been resolved” (L 9.4.1992). President Koivisto contented himself 
by stating that the wishes for mutually satisfactory development of Karelia, 
expressed earlier by the Finnish Karelian League, might indeed be possible if 
relations between the two countries will continue to develop in the spirit of 
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good-neighborliness and mutual trust as had been the hitherto the case (E 
5.3.1992). Russian ambassador to Finland Yuri Derjabin, also known in Finland 
by the belligerent pseudonym Yuri Komissarov, gave a similar assessment “the 
alteration of borders must not be treated as an end in itself” but should be 
approached “without getting emotional” (HS 4.3.1992). Instead to redrawing the 
border, the two countries “could talk about open borders, a fully free movement 
of people and the common uses of the border areas” (ibid.). 
On the other hand, the new treaty was believed to “grant Finland the inside 
tract at least for a short time” (E 21.1.1992). Even though things were no longer 
treated in a centralized manner, the steps needed to arrive at a market economy 
were nevertheless regarded as being too many to be taken all at once. First, as 
assured by Deputy Prime Minister Burbulis, Russia had to work hard “to regain 
the confidence the Soviet Union lost during the recent years” through economic 
relations with Finland. In between the western border of the former Soviet 
Union and the western border of Russia, a number of national borders had now 
been (re)drawn, and Russia now found itself located even further away from 
Western Europe on the map. Consequentially, the importance of Finland as 
Russia’s only Western neighbor (apart from the very northern part of Norway) 
was seen to only increase further. Burbulis stressed that Russia wished for 
Finland to serve as Russia’s bridge to the west, in which case Finland’s possible 
accession to the EU would be seen in Russia merely as an advantage (E 
21.1.1992.) 
The idea of Finland as a bridge was also supported in the West. It was 
suggested that Finland would take charge in brainstorming and coordinating 
Western aid to Russia and other CIS member countries, which was deemed in 
Finland to be a “rarely offered opportunity to provide leadership in the 
international community” (OE 16.1.1992). The goal was proclaimed to be the 
creation of an organization able to manage both the practical aspects and the 
political questions related to aid and, in so doing, to prevent the emergence of a 
new opposition based on economic factors between East and West. Such action, 
it was seen, would serve the interests of the whole of Europe but more clearly 
those of Finland, which would locate at the very border of the described 
opposition. The smaller the welfare gap was, the better it would be for Finland. 
(OE 16.1.1992.) 
The reasoning for offering Finland the possibility to act as a bridgehead of 
international assistance and reconstruction was seen to stem from the “fact that 
the Western world thinks that Finland knows the Russian situation particularly 
well.” Finns should not admit that they were “not as great experts as they think” 
but instead to take measures to “develop the necessary knowledge and skills” 
(OE 16.1.1992). Finland’s bridge position was deemed debatable for despite its 
geographical proximity, Finns possessed “a lot of fragmented knowledge of, 
disconnected experiences from, opinions about and prejudices towards the 
neighbor to the east,” but were seen not to form a clear, coherent picture of the 
 254   
 
complicated whole complex of issues (E 5.1.1992). The enormous proportions of 
the former Soviet Union, the peculiarity of the Soviet system, and the limited 
availability of well-balanced information about the local practices was put forth 
as reasons for the lack of applicable knowledge.  
Those with more personal experiences about the life and people behind the 
border blamed the “Finnish national, and almost genetic resentment against 
Russia and the Russians” for Finland having lost its position as a key trading 
partner of Russia. Paasikivi and Kekkonen, it was explained, had kept the 
resentment in control, Koivisto balanced somewhere in the middle yet leaned 
towards the West, but after Gorbachev had broken “all hell loose by scrapping 
the Soviet Union,” Finland had “wanted to see Russia on her knees” (L 
18.6.1992). A distinction was, however, made between the common people and 
particularly those who had at one time been forced to “give in to the geopolitical 
realism in the hard hands of the hard presidents,” i.e., the politicians and the 
media: 
 
Resentment by the ordinary people is dead and buried. People have travelled… 
friends and acquaintances have been made. The people no longer bear a grudge 
against the East. But the formers of public opinion and decision makers do. They have 
created for us an image of Russia, where people die of hunger, seniors are dying on 
the streets and there is a fight all against all… (L 18.6.1992) 
 
The reason for resentment was seen to derive from a way of thinking shaped in 
“the blue and white school system, in the aftermath of the war reparations, and 
the miracle of the Winter War….” Unlike “what the decision makers and 
opinion formers seem still to believe,” “ o ne Finn is not equivalent to ten 
Russkies [ryssä]... Not anymore.” Finns should thus open their eyes and see that 
“the private Russian trade partners are first of all reliable and, secondly, 
relentlessly eager to try.” (L 18.6.1992.) 
Given that “ w e need Russia and the Russians, Russia and the Russians do 
not need us,” the eagerness with which Finland had been diving towards the 
West was regarded as “downright grotesque.” This was firstly because during 
the Soviet era, Finns had learnt to get along by selling the Soviet Union 
“indefinitely size forty-five left foot shoes, very poorly made” and could thus 
not make it on extremely quality and cost aware Western markets (L 18.6.1992). 
Secondly, it was argued, Finland was geographically “clearly more like part of 
Russia, rather than a piece of Scandinavia or Western Europe.” Accordingly, the 
fact that the roots of Finns were understood to be far away in Russia was offered 
as the main reason for the national resentment in the first place. After all, “[w]ho 
would hate farmers more than the farm boy who moved to the city” (ibid.) 
Now that the Soviet Union had disintegrated, the FCA-treaty ceased to exist, 
and Finland had applied for membership in the European Union, the foreign 
policy of Finland had unavoidably run into a completely new situation. As a 
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consequence of Russia's economic plight, a deep gap in the standard of living 
was cleaving at the border. As stated by then Prime Minister of Finland Esko 
Aho, “ t he increase risk of chaos in Russia highlights in a new way the 
openness of the geographical location of Finland” (E 6.5.1992). He saw the leaks 
from the Sosnovy Bor nuclear power plant as a frightening warning about the 
dangers of the “front line”. The same cause for concern was riotous depicted 
also in the letters: 
 
If a power plant accident occurs... The only direction to which they can escape, is to 
Finland. First there will be gangs of robbers armed in paramilitary or military 
manner. They’ll have nothing to lose, so they behave totally ruthlessly…. They  are 
followed by a migration of peoples such as has been seen in the history before. (L 
24.4.1992) 
 
The editorial of May 6, 1992 suggested that Aho could have chosen to continue 
his front line theme even further. As Finland was joining the EU, its eastern 
border would also receive a new kind of political significance. It would become 
the EU’s and Russia’s lengthy and sole common border. The overall significance 
of the Finnish-Russian border was thus considered to ultimately depend on the 
development of the relationship between Europe, especially the EU, and Russia.  
An op-ed of April 23, 1992 built upon the statements of Defense Minister 
Elisabeth Rehn and Armed Forces Commander Jan Klenberg. According to 
them, threats to Finnish security had become much more dangerous since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Ms. Rehn was "extremely concerned" about 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s populist spouts on the return of the Grand Duchy and 
major armaments being located in the Finnish neighboring areas.  She 
considered it naïve to consider Zhirinovsky, who still dreamt of conquering 
Finland, as a “harmless nonsense speaker”. Finland's independence, she 
postulated, had not been threatened to this extent since 1939. Admiral Klenberg, 
in turn, saw the difficulties of the CIS as “insurmountable”. He depicted that as 
a consequence of Finnish EU membership the border between rich and poor 
Europe would move to Finland's eastern border. He further envisioned that the 
defense of the St. Petersburg area would once again become problematic from 
the Russian perspective, especially when coupled with the increased military 
equipment transferred from Central Europe close to the border with Finland. 
(OE 23.4.1992.) 
While ideally the Finnish-Russian border would “shrink to be in the same 
way European border as is the practice, for example, between the Nordic 
countries or within the EU,” for the moment there were no signs that this goal 
could one day be realized (HS 29.6.1992). President Yeltsin's proposal on making 
the border of ceded Karelia “transparent” was reacted upon for it was seen as a 
potential basis for solving the Karelia question (L 22.7.1992). According to the 
proposal, Karelia would continue to belong to Russia, but a transparent border 
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would allow more intense forms of interaction. In Finland, the proposal was 
interpreted to mean the facilitation of border crossings and even visa-free travel, 
the latter of which was rejected forthright by President Koivisto (L 22.7.1992). 
As it stood, many agreed that the “open border between Finland and 
Russia… would be roughly the same as the cession of Finnish territory” (L 
8.7.1992). Already so far, the opening had revealed also the very different scales 
of problems at stake and depicted St. Petersburg as a dangerous time bomb: 
 
The metropolitan area of St. Petersburg, four to five times greater than the Helsinki 
region, is an undeniable reality…. There is also an immeasurable demand for 
consumer goods and the people have… almost too good picture about the job 
opportunities in Finland… In international terms there is a record-breakingly sharp 
gap in living standards at Finnish-Russian border. Those aspiring to the better side of 
it cannot always be refused without problems piling up. (E 16.3.1992)  
 
Almost every evening television screens show images of the gigantic waste pipes of 
the metropolis of St. Petersburg spewing untreated crud directly to the water system. 
At the same time, the Finns – a few hundred kilometers away – try to choose the 
detergent to wash their carpets with so that the beaches and water of the very same 
Baltic Sea would not get polluted. (E 31.7.1992) 
 
Another more low profile storyline was told by a minority with faith in or at 
least patience towards Russia. It was acknowledged that Russia was now only 
beginning to build its economy and its policies again, and had expressed its 
intention to strive towards Western democracy and a market economy. 
Therefore, there was hope that Russia would start “moving away from 
unilateralism” that violated the self-determination of the peoples and begin a 
new era of cooperation. Thus, it was justified to “expect new types of behavior 
and a convergence to the Western European way of life” (L 17.5.1992).  
The major changes taking place in Russia and also throughout Europe were 
seen to “blow a whole new pan-European spirit” particularly into the 
cooperation and to incorporating Russia into the “Europe of regions”. It was 
seen that engaging Russia deeply into the European structures would open new 
opportunities, as the whole of Europe would benefit from a democratic, 
capitalist Russia. The North especially was seen to offer a good starting ground 
for cooperation in light of the fact that when the Soviet Union collapsed Russia 
was cut off from the southern harbors of Ukraine and or those of the Baltic 
states, something which emphasized the role of the Russian artic sea cities of 
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk for merchant shipping. While Norway had 
initiated the project, the security policy considerations attached to it were also 
seen to match with Finnish interests. (E 5.10.1992.) 
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5.2.2 EUphoria: Russia as our Neighbor 
The debate about Russia turned into a debate about the EU and what 
significance it would have for the Finnish-Russian relationship. Even though 
some kind of a conclusion had been reached as to where Finland was coming 
from, confusion over which way to proceed still remained. The entire nation was 
diagnosed as ailing from a severe type of stagnation. The editorial of January 3, 
1994 brought up the need look back in planning for the future and to take cue 
from the ideological heritage of the reformist Constitutional-Fennoman 
movement, then celebrating its centenary journey, in order to mobilize the 
Finnish society as was done 100 years ago. As the threatening Soviet Union had 
become an unpredictable Russia and Western Europe looked for a new thrust 
from integration, it was seen as important for Finland to take care of its 
neighborly relations in the west, east, and south (E 3.1.1994). 
Finland had begun its accession negotiations with the EU in February 1993 
and was preparing for the consultative referendum to be held in October 1994. 
Writings about the EU were not, however, anymore dominated by security 
questions but had become more diversified. The recession, which followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, fuelled in particular the debate on economic 
matters; 37 per cent of EU supporters and 34 per cent of its opponents argued 
their opinion primarily on economic factors (HS 14.10.1994). The most popular 
reason for supporting EU membership was simply the understanding that 
“Finland is a country in Western Europe and its natural place is in the own 
union of the Western European countries” (L 8.9.1994). It was also argued that 
the EU would fuel economic growth, increase employment, reduce debt (L 
22.9.1994), and provide work and study opportunities aboard. 
Out of the opponents, 34 per cent dreaded the loss of independence and 
supra-national, anti-democratic decision-making. The “unionists’ strange 
daydreams” were shot down by stating on the contrary that membership would 
“not open any new market areas” nor would it “create a single new job in this 
country” (L 1.10.1994). Instead, Finnish products and services would be 
discriminated against and Finland would have to wait in vain for EU 
investments (L 18.9.1994). The EU-pessimism was explained to derive from the 
perspective that the EEA treaty had already implemented the economic 
mechanisms that the EU membership would bring about (HS 28.9.1994). The 
discussion also surfaced about the fate of Finnish social security that the EU was 
seen to threaten. 
Only about 19 per cent of the supporters and 9 per cent of the opponents 
used security policy issues (fear of Russia) to back up their EU stance (HS 
14.10.1994). In particular, concerns were raised because Paasikivi’s old and often 
used advice that one must “look at the map” was seen to be totally forgotten in 
the debate on Finland's security political position as a potential member of the 
EU: “[c]onditions have now changed, but the map remains, and the crises are 
lurking. Is Finland now handing over its eastern border for common use and 
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exposing itself to solutions, to which it may only marginally influence? 
(L 9.1.1994).” 
The opponents saw that EU membership would also force Finland to join 
NATO before long (L 19.9.1992). NATO was seen in a negative light for it was 
believed to compromise the “key issue of our security,” i.e., a confidential 
relationship with Russia. On the other hand, the map card was also played by 
those in favor of EU membership. It was argued that because the geographical 
location of Finland was what it was and because its superpower neighbor was 
going through “times of great turmoil” Finns has should join the EU for the sake 
of its security (L 7.9.1994) 
From the perspective of the HS opinion pages’ editorial staff, the writings 
about the EU “were generally serious trumpeting and dryish quarrel about 
directives – joy and imagination was hard to find in them” (HS 14.10.1994). Be it 
as it may, in September and October alone, i.e., right before the referendum, the 
HS received 935 letters about the EU, of which 149 (16 per cent) were published, 
which in turn suggests the matter was deemed as important and/or emotive. A 
majority of 475 letters were against EU membership while 294 letters were in 
favor of it. (HS 14.10.1994.) Given that the HS Gallup published on October 6, 
1994 implied that 48 per cent of Finns were in favor and only 28 against 
membership, this suggests that the opponents of the EU were more eager to 
voice their opinions. The editorial board’s own take on the issue can be 
interpreted from the fact that the numbers of arguments for and against were 
reversed as the paper chose to publish only 48 letters against but no fewer than 
64 letters in favor of EU membership. Appropriately, the editorial policy of 
Helsingin Sanomat received its own fair share of criticism for force-feeding 
positive messages on EU-membership to the public. 
A letter on February 26, 1994 made an important suggestion by arguing that 
the East-West discussion should not be done at the expense of the North. It 
asserted that Finland had acted already for more than a decade determinedly in 
the Arctic in favor of increased cooperation. The author based his argument on 
Finland’s track record in the field. For example, the so-called Arctic Project had 
been founded with the then Soviet Union at Finland’s instigation in 1980 to 
create broad-based cooperation regarding the utilization of oil and gas resources 
in the Barents Sea. As the potential for international cooperation had opened up 
in the Arctic after the Cold War, it had been Finland to first propose in 1989 an 
initiative focusing on the protection of the Arctic environment. 
 
Bowing to the West 
In October 1994, Finland held a consultative referendum in which 56.9 per cent 
voted in favor of Finland's membership in the Union with a voter turnout of 74 
per cent. In the letters, it was postulated that the real reasons for voting 
favorably had to do with “irrational fear” preventing Finns from thinking 
straight, i.e., “the fact that we want to belong to the free and democratic Western 
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community” and the "frame of reference" as long as the alternative would have 
been the “identification with the Eastern bloc and Russia” (L 4.7.1995). 
Finland’s litigation role vis-à-vis Russia in all things Europe was heavily 
pushed by Russia who, in the words of Yeltsin, wished that Finland would 
conduct itself within the EU as a mediator understanding of Russian problems 
and interests as well as a proponent of closer cooperation and even Russia's 
membership in the EU. In his surprisingly straightforward statement to Finnish 
Prime Minister Esko Aho, President Yeltsin said he hoped “that henceforth our 
relations, especially trade relations, would develop trilaterally three-way 
medium – between the European Union, Finland, and Russia" and even more 
bluntly that Finland “would do its own part and advance Russia's accession to 
the European Union" (E 21.1.1995). Finland was seen to obtain a twofold role. 
For Russia, it would offer a window to the West by facilitating its prerequisites 
for closer economic cooperation with the EU. For the West, it would function as 
a “gate to the Russian markets” (L 13.4.1995). Finland had great interest in 
cooperation with Russia, and EU membership was seen to kick-start the 
possibilities that the close proximity to Russia offered. Certainly, the editorial of 
January 21, 1995 admitted that Finland's EU membership was bound to bring 
about some new problems, but they were judged to be “undoubtedly 
outweighed by advantages and new opportunities.”  
The problems referred to in the editorial were named to be the “continuous 
instability in Russia’s conditions with all of its side effects” and the seven billion 
Finnish mark debt that Russia owed to Finland. The letters paid particular 
attention to Russia’s belligerent actions, especially in Chechnya (L 6.1.1995, 
15.1.1995, 19.1.1995, 28.1.1995, 30.1.1995). Some went as far as to depict the 
situation as “another Winter War” (E 6.1.1995). Should Russia one day direct its 
aggressions towards Finland, the EU was taken to be of little use as “at the 
border we stand alone” (L 15.3.1995). 
“Diplomacy, not fighter jets” was put forth as plan A for maintaining 
peaceful neighborly relations, for “ e ven if we were to obtain a multifold 
number of these machines, even if we were to arm ourselves to the teeth, a 
Russia-Finland match fought with weapons would always end in Finland’s 
defeat” (L 25.3.1995). Instead, good diplomatic ties seasoned with incomparable 
expertise and EU backing was recommended as a recipe for success. For “we 
Finns know Russia and Russians better than other nations” and now that 
Finland had become a plenipotentiary member of the EU it should take 
determined and result-seeking action to fully exploit its membership (L 
9.4.1995). 
The EU was seen to offer its members many advantages, possibilities, and 
perspectives of which Finland too could benefit significantly. However, these 
opportunities were understood as something Finns would not get for free but 
would have to themselves uncover and make use. Accordingly, a particular East 
Institute of the EU was proposed to be established in Finland to secure the 
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Finnish primacy vis-à-vis Russia (L 9.4.1995, L 11.4.1995). Finland was deemed 
to benefit from freer forms of cross-border traffic (L 11.5.1995) to the extent that 
the need for better and faster cross-border connections would become obvious 
(L 31.7.1995). Without the necessary infrastructure, interaction was doomed to 
fizzle out even before it could get up and running. 
The first five years of the bilateral neighboring area cooperation received a 
mixed review. While many collaborative projects, such as those focusing on 
infectious diseases or maternal and child health reform, were considered as 
“sensible and practical” in many respects the various aid projects had been 
“overlapping, poorly engineered, and even against the wishes of the recipients” 
(E 18.12.1995). In order to fix the situation, it was incited that more attention 
should be paid to the follow-up phase. It was understood that instead of 
providing material aid, it would be more effective to educate employees and 
support structural reforms in cooperation with the local residents. Given that the 
neighboring area cooperation program was not a pure humanitarian program 
and more a kin to an investment for the future, the demand for increased 
effectiveness translated into a desire to get one’s money’s worth. After all, “in 
addition to the human and ethical reasons” Finland was seen to support its 
neighborhood also for its own sake (E 18.12.1995). The more efficiently the work 
was done, the better chances there were for the threats to stand aside.  
The debate about Karelia resurfaced yet again but provided little new to the 
arguments already presented before. Prime Minister Lipponen’s “inadvertently 
cynical” announcement that Finland would not be interested to take back the 
ceded areas even if they were offered because Finland could not afford them 
was taken as an “unfortunate example of our ever-secularizing world” (L 
27.8.1995). It was seen that the economic factors overshadowed everything else 
to the extent that “the concept of a sacred fatherland” could only be seen “in the 
old movies or in some extremist movements’ pamphlets.” Even though trade 
flowed well across the border and provided opportunities for economic growth, 
other forms of interaction remained impeded by the attitudes of the ordinary 
people. The grudge against Russia and Russians was often depicted almost as a 
national, if not ethnic, characteristic that held Finns together but could neither 
“be encountered anywhere else” nor “explained to an outsider” (L 27.8.1995). 
It was viewed that such a national grudge could only be tackled by erasing 
its root cause. Sustainable interaction between the countries was regarded as 
unattainable until the injustice felt by the Finns had been corrected: 
 
As long as infants in Finland receive their first drops of Russophobia already from 
breast milk, and as long as our politicians refuse to publicly acknowledge the 
commonly known and felt mistrust towards the Russian people, without even 
attempting to rectify the situation, the foundation of our good-neighborliness and 
entire security policy is as if built on a swamp… Distrust between the Finns and our 
neighbor in the east should be permanently removed by rectifying, in together, the 
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wrongdoings of history. This must be done, it is a necessity, even if would be painful. 
(L 27.8.1995) 
 
The Finnish political elite had, however, already decided that it is better to look 
ahead and prepare for the future rather than look back and regret. The EU was 
now the new frame of reference for Finland, and it was felt that actions had to be 
taken immediately to safeguard Finland’s position in the Union. The resentment 
became thus repressed and covered up with a rhetoric that fitted better the 
European integrative spirit and allowed Finland to pursue its proclaimed bridge 
function and thus enhance its standing in the Union. 
In the wake of Finland’s membership, the EU now encountered post-Soviet 
Russia in the North. Finland was likewise keen to ensure that the interests of the 
North, especially vis-à-vis Russia, would be taken into consideration at the 
European level. The Northern Dimension was preferred over the narrower 
Baltic Sea strategy for showcasing Finnish know-how. To promote solely the 
Baltic Sea was seen to mean that Finland would “remain permanently as the 
EU's remote fringe.” If, however, the North would earn a significant position 
within EU policy, Finland could become a member of key importance in the EU. 
In order to tap into “the real Finnish geographical special status in the EU, and 
the opportunities brought by it,” Finland should acknowledge what it had to 
offer the EU: “ w e have a northern location close to the Northwest Russia’s 
great natural wealth, we have Russia, we have the expertise about the Arctic. 
These combine into the EU's northern policy.” (L 19.10.1995.) 
 
5.2.3 Tables Turned: Crisis and the Redefinition of Relations 
Under the leadership of president Ahtisaari, Finland learned to look at Russia 
more and more from a EU perspective. With EU backing, Finland became also 
more confident in assessing the situation in Russia more critically. Russian 
society, Ahtisaari stated, was in deep crisis, which could only be escaped 
through long-term work (E 26.9.1998). The areas behind the border were 
deemed to possess “all the development opportunities,” but it was also 
understood that the development would “call for both peace and time” (L 
1.8.1998).  
Peaceful developments necessitated the border to be gradually demystified 
and freed from its historical burden. The editorial board of Helsingin Sanomat 
agreed with the official Finnish stance that a new EU-era had begun at the 
"border of peace" (E 12.7.1998) and that the image of Russia ought to be 
readjusted accordingly. While in the past an exciting visit to the almost 
impenetrable border with the intimidating Soviet Union formed one of the main 
tourist attractions Finland had to offer, now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
editorial described, “whisk spontaneously foreign journalists and dignitaries to 
the eastern border in order to showcase exemplary cooperation of border 
guards.” 
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However, it was warned that everything had its limits. This has been 
experienced, to give an example, by Finnish nature activists, who had in large 
numbers mapped and made inventories of the natural forests of Karelia during 
that year. Even though the times had indeed changed, it was considered “naïve 
to imagine that the Russian authorities would regard such activity benevolently, 
unless it is mutually agreed upon with them.” The fact that Finnish government 
money was used to fund the mapping was deemed “even more embarrassing.” 
(E 12.7.1998.) 
A particularly fitting example of this was an old-growth forest inventory 
project carried out by the Finnish Nature League (Luonto-liitto) and various 
Russian environmental organizations. The Nature League had organized joint 
seminars with Russian NGOs in order to develop and integrate inventory 
methods. The project ran, however, into troubles when the chairman of the new 
government of Karelia, Sergey Katanandov, stated that inventories of Russian 
and Finnish NGOs were no longer needed. (OE 23.7.1998.) In Finland, the 
statement was analyzed in the context of the state-civil society relations. The 
cause for the statement was seen to stem from the fact that the tradition of 
consultation with civil society is lacking in Russia and the authorities are not 
accustomed to listen to what NGOs have to say (ibid.).  
Despite the changed frame of reference, the discussion in the letters remained 
focused on bilateral issues. Here it was the teachings of history rather than any 
abstract theoretical model of International Relations that formed the basis of 
decisions made and attitudes held. Russia had indeed opened up in a way that 
could not have been even imagined heretofore, yet the citizenry, as far as can be 
argued based upon the letters, maintained that if something sounds too good to 
be true, it probably is. The official rhetoric of Finland as a bridge builder 
resonated thus weakly with the local level perceptions. While most its partners, 
it was assessed, had either stepped back or began to capitalize on Russia’s 
weakness, Finland had not had the courage to abandon its old ‘friend’: 
 
Former ‘friends’ have disappeared, new partners, such as the IMF, set requirements, 
schedules, and criticize the usual Russian way of life. There is only one exception: 
Finland. Out of all the Russia’s neighbors only the Finns, those Chukhnas, slightly 
simple and sluggish, have continued along the former friendship policy line. When all 
the other bordering countries began to step back, in Finland talks about gateways and 
regaining lost markets began. And the presidents went to sauna. (L 23.1.1998) 
 
It was, yet again, the Karelia question, which dominated the debate. Heretofore, 
the pro-EU stance of the editorial board had been brought up quite openly, yet 
the paper had previously avoided direct statements about the Karelia question. 
In 1998 the situation, however, changed following Ilmari Susiluoto’s, at the time 
a senior researcher at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, colorful comments in 
which he praised President Ahtisaari’s open way of discussing the Karelian 
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question while calling the official Finnish stance in other respects as well as the 
Finnish media cowardly (E 20.1.1998).  
In his response to Susiluoto’s remarks, editorial reporter Erkki Pennanen 
defended the media by stating that to jump aboard the revanchist spirit, which 
had strengthened in certain circles in response to Russia’s perceived weakness 
would only lead to “daydream journalism and a Karelia debate in a ‘who's-
afraid-of-the-big-bad-wolf style’” (E 20.1.1998). For Pennanen, Susiluoto’s ideas 
sounded “too much like a psychiatrist’s or a charlatan’s advice.” While 
admitting that the Karelians who had lost their homes had “a natural right to 
moon over the divested Karelia in their thoughts and consider what happened a 
great injustice,” Pennanen attacked back by arguing that Susiluoto’s revanchist 
attempts to raise hopes about the return of Karelia were beyond what could be 
defended as “national therapy” and should thus be condemned harshly. The 
EU-Europe, the new frame of reference for Finland, was not the right place for 
such a debate. After all, post-war Europe was full of ill-taken areas and arbitrary 
borders, but the new European order was based on the fact that borders 
between countries are confirmed as unchangeable by common agreements. 
(Ibid.) 
If the aim of the editorial was to de-escalate the debate, it failed terribly. The 
statements it contained formed an easy target for criticism. The writing sparked 
an intense debate not just about reasoning against and in favor of the return of 
Karelia to Finland but also about how the topic should be discussed. Pennanen 
was blamed for siding with Russia – for using “variants of the expressions used 
by Russians” and making a distinction between Karelians and Finns “in an 
orthodox Russian manner” (L 29.1.1998). After all, the Karelian question “should 
be a matter of Finns and not Karelians” (L 2.6.1999). It was argued that 
Pennanen – and by extension Helsingin Sanomat – and the Russians were bound 
together in that they both saw the restoration of Karelia not as an issue of 
importance to the Finnish people as a whole but one that concerned only the 
Karelians, making it easier to trivialize. On the other hand, referring to those 
“who think they are highly intelligent in refusing the return of Karelia” as “non-
people” (L 5.7.1998) by a proponent of recession, hardly helped the disunion 
either.  
Also the premise of Pennanen’s reference to a wider European frame came 
under criticism. It was corrected that the fact that Finns now lived indeed in a 
EU-Europe did not dash all hopes of restoring Karelia but rather opened up a 
new opportunity as the borders could now “be returned under bilateral peaceful 
agreements” (L 9.7.1998). It was also corrected that one could not speak about 
revanchism with regards to Karelia for “after all Finland was the target of 
aggression, not its cause” (L 3.2.1998). Others argued that some of Stalin's legacy 
was already “repaired by the good that has sprung up in the interaction 
between” the people of the two countries (L 29.5.1998). It was nevertheless 
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considered important that also difficult issues could be talked about as 
otherwise the welfare gap at the border might turn into a normative gap as well.  
In response to this debate, Russians were assumed to respond by revisiting 
their own value system. The conclusions that Russians drew from this debate 
were taken to be a measure of their own value system. Finns wished not to 
“threaten Russians” but only to “appeal to their sense of justice, so that true 
friendship could be born between the neighboring nations” (L 29.5.1998). The 
proposal about returning the divested areas should not be taken as an 
intimidation but as “an invitation to the Russians to join the human population 
respecting justice and truth” and to “wash the shame from their faces” 
(L 30.7.1998). Only then Russians could finally “experience what it means to 
have a Finn as a friend” (ibid.). 
For the most part, the public debate about Karelia remained focused on 
whether the ceded areas should be returned back to Finland or not. What is 
more important here is that the debate escalated to the point that Editor-in-Chief 
Janne Virkkunen felt it necessary to step in and reveal the HS stance on the 
Karelia question but also on Russia more in general terms: 
 
A visit to Karelia  is advisable for every romanticist. Today's Russia is in many ways 
a developing country that has a nuclear weapon. Although one would have braced 
oneself for the matters, a surprise still awaits on the Isthmus. The Isthmus, along with 
Vyborg, is – to put it very mildly – in a deplorable condition. Flourishing agricultural 
areas are as meadows and the villages and unfinished buildings are deteriorating 
right in front of your eyes. Forests are untreated. Beautiful Vyborg is broken… The 
transfer of Karelian back to Finland would mean that we would get a large Russian 
minority, which should be granted equal conditions with the Finns. It is a huge 
financial burden that cannot be compensated by the Karelian forest resources… the 
region of Karelia does no longer have such a strategic importance as it had had for 
hundreds of years. (OE 23.8.1998) 
 
While Virkkunen’s column was regarded as “an important and welcome event,” 
it was also criticized heavily not just for downplaying the issue but also quite 
justifiably for feeding Finns’ “well-known dread of foreigners” (L 30.8.1998). 
Nevertheless, the provided description resonated among its audience. Similar 
suggestive and purposeful wording and framing were used in the letters: 
 
In the villages the self-sufficiency economy secures the food supply far to the winter. 
Sauna sustains purity and logs create warmth. The Tiiksa village shop had one piece 
of bread for sale on Monday. The health situation in Karelia has worsened throughout 
the 1990s. Now the decline is likely to steepen... Hospitals are for constant want of 
even the simplest equipment, such as surgical gloves and medical syringes. There is a 
chronic shortage of medicines, and hospitals cannot afford to purchase them… (L 
12.9.1998) 
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The worsening situation behind the border was deemed to make Russia weaker 
and, hence, provide and a rare opportunity to start negotiations (L 17.9.1998). 
Others took a more moderate stand. It was pointed out that Finns “should not 
underestimate the importance of the reassessment of the history” which was 
deemed as already ongoing in Russia (L 15.9.1998). However, given that Finland 
had “well-established borders – in every direction” (L 31.7.1998), it should not 
push the envelope but seek to “build close and cooperative relations across the 
border” (OE 23.8.1998). 
The debate on Karelia eventually turned into a debate about the debate itself. 
The younger generations “with no physical or even psychological bonds to the 
lost areas” saw that even patriotism had its limits and that it was useless to 
develop unnecessary threats (L 22.7.1998). While the older generations’ vigor 
was fuelled largely by emotions, the young tended to prefer reason. A further 
tension between the two was caused by the sentiment that “the younger 
generation – for example, a substantial part of the journalists – do not even 
know which area is talked about,” whereby the “debate gets impeded by a lack 
of factual knowledge” (L 21.11.1998). All in all, the debate often became 
personal. There were “too many seers of real truth” and even those presenting 
realistic estimates got often “branded too easily” (OE 10.12.1998). Any degree of 
consensus was clearly difficult to reach as the various arguments seldom 
accumulated making the whole debate a fitting example of the hot stove 
principle whereby having gotten quickly burned, most learned not to touch 
upon the topic again.  
 
The Weaker Russia, the Stronger Finland 
By 1999, Russia’s weight in international politics had fallen sharply from the 
superpower era of the Soviet Union. The editorial on January 26, 1999 suggested 
that due to Russia’s weakness and Finland’s increased political leverage thanks 
to the EU the tables were now turned, and it was Finland that had taken the 
upper hand. The fact that Russia had been investing heavily in its embassy in 
Helsinki, making it its largest embassy in Europe, was taken as an indication of 
a reassessment in regard to a concentration of resources. As the “normal 
management” of Finnish-Russian relations now required a lot less people than it 
did in the past, Russia was interpreted to be especially interested in Helsinki 
because of its new position as the capital city of the easternmost member of the 
European Union, providing Russia with “an important observation point.” This 
was deemed necessary as Finland had strongly promoted the Northern 
Dimension policy, which was to affect Russia directly. 
Russia’s internal problems were easy targets for Finns wishing to point out 
all that was wrong in Russia. “Already for the sake of our own security,” it was 
instructed, Finland should pay more attention to the “bloodless genocide going 
on in our great neighbor” (L 4.1.1999). Because the “production of a truly rich 
Russia” had been shut down and the people had been “impoverished,” Russians 
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were now “running around the world begging – the government for billions of 
credit and the others for medicines, clothes, food, etc., in order to slow down the 
rapid and complete destruction” (ibid.). 
Things in Russia had gone from bad to worse. The situation was assessed to 
be even worse than what it had been in the early 1990s before the launch of the 
market reforms because “ w hat was done encouraged by the West, was often 
done wrong, and the flaws only escalated.” The former super-power had been 
degraded to such an extent that many regarded it to be no longer able to “meet 
its international commitments” or to “get the country back on its feet under its 
own steam.” (OE 16.2.1999.) The national economy was down-and-out and the 
government was wavering on the brink of bankruptcy. The country was seen as 
groping helplessly without a clear direction. It was suggested that in order bring 
such a development to a halt Russia needed a new beginning (OE 16.2.1999) and 
a powerful president who could bring the nation together (E 6.3.1999). 
The situation behind the border had deteriorated to the point that the 
Republic of Karelia renewed its request for food aid from Finland. Among Finns 
there were, however, very conflicting views on how to approach the issue. 
Indignation welled forth largely due to the fact that there were, after all, plenty 
of people in need also in Finland (L 14.11.1999). Helsingin Sanomat's Moscow 
correspondent, Kalle Koponen (OE 20.2.1999), labeled the EU and US projects to 
provide food assistance to Russia as “one of the most irrational operations of 
recent times,” as “sheer nonsense.” The starting point of his criticism was the 
“small technical detail” that in Russia there was “no shortage of food,” there 
was a “shortage of money.” This shortage stemmed from the reason that the 
state’s affairs were being “managed by one of the most corrupt and incapable 
administrative apparatuses on the planet,” which could not be trusted to 
distribute aid to those in need (OE 20.2.1999).  
Aid work was also criticized for its “humanitarian façade,” while its true 
motive was argued to stem from “enlightened selfishness” (L 14.11.1999) and 
the Western self-interest to support its own agricultural production by keeping 
the export channels to Russia open. What Russia needed, Koponen stated, was 
not humanitarian assistance but “salvation from the corruption and the mire of 
political screw-ups” (OE 20.2.1999). After letting out his frustration, he arrived 
to a more important aspect of his argument: as neither the EU or the US were 
“humanitarian aid organizations,” the relief work ought to be left to dedicated 
and experienced voluntary organizations through whose the channels assistance 
could be delivered where needed most: 
 
It is dead certain that when the EU’s food aid has come and gone, the refrigerators of 
the Russian babushkas are still almost empty. They also remain empty, if it is up to 
the bureaucrats in Brussels and Moscow. The former live in abundance and take no 
notice of the realities in Russia. The latter wears bad shoes with every intention to 
acquire a better pair at their earliest convenience. (OE 20.2.1999) 
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The editorial board (E 24.2.1999) refined Koponen’s assessment into more 
politically correct terms, in so doing revealing the actual argument from its 
emotional load. In principle, it was suggested, one could cramp corruption and 
the abuse of assistance by refraining from delivering it altogether, but as the 
severity of the situation necessitated aid to be given immediately it had to be 
delivered directly to those in most immediate need through aid organizations, 
such as the Red Cross, that had proven their ability get things done. Such 
organization was desperately needed as otherwise the aid worth billions 
provided by the EU and other major stakeholders would continue to flow into 
the wrong hands causing more harm than good as intermediaries and shadowy 
men try roll up their own profits (E 1.10.1999). The EU’s lack of attachment and 
ability to monitor its aid became well demonstrated by the fact that it had 
delivered grain to Russia only for Russian brokers sell it abroad.  
It was also brought up that instead of pure aid work, Finns should engage in 
practical forms cooperation, whereby the Russian side could develop 
organizationally stronger and operationally more efficient. For example, Finnish 
trade unions had sought to assist their Russian counterparts in different ways 
and at different levels by emphasizing training and learning right advocacy 
(interest supervision) practices and the related associational work (L 28.4.1999). 
The mere aid work or direct money provision were assessed as insufficient and 
blamed for not necessarily leading anywhere. Instead, “Russian workers and 
their organizations themselves must be able to defend their interests; behind the 
border this cannot be done” (ibid.). 
It was also brought up that instead of pure aid work, Finns should engage in 
practical forms cooperation, whereby the Russian side could develop 
organizationally stronger and operationally more efficient. “The hungry should 
not be given a fish, but a fishing rod”; i.e., the aid had to be given in a way that 
would bring “jobs and money, consolidate the conditions, and create a new life 
of faith” (HS L 14.11.1999). It was explained that, for instance, Finnish trade 
unions had moved on to assist their Russian counterparts by telling them about 
better advocacy practices and the related associational work, as merely directing 
monetary provisions had been insufficient and led to nowhere. “Russian 
workers and their organizations themselves must be able to defend their 
interests,” it was asserted, because this was impossible do from behind the 
border (L 28.4.1999).  
Cooperation was perceived to be hindered by the fact that the availability of 
Russian visas had remained stringent and complicated (L 29.4.1999) but also due 
to cultural differences, misunderstandings stemming from bureaucracy, and the 
Russian “militsiya’s arbitrary and criminal activities” which for many had 
wrecked all confidence in the authorities and society as a whole (L 26.10.1999). 
The Finnish side was blamed for failing to prioritize which project to fund (L 
14.11.1999) and for not utilizing the language skills of the ever-increasing 
number of Russian immigrants (ibid. cf. E 27.7.1999). 
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A cascade of responses flooded in to HS after Ivan P. Aboimov, Ambassador 
of the Russian Federation to Finland, criticized NATO action in Yugoslavia in 
his own writing (L 11.4.1999). While the topic had little to do with Finland, 
many were downright irritated by the picture Mr. Aboimov painted of Russia’s 
place in world affairs. A number of letters address the issue by reflecting upon 
the Finnish experience. The teachings of history were used as valid grounds for 
predicting the future, as Russians’ ability to change was deemed to be 
negligible. It was argued that Russia had not obtained “such a moral or ethical 
level” that it could “afford to advise, teach, and to criticize anyone, anything and 
anywhere” (L 15.4.1999), but it still had a long way to go before it could “teach 
the truth” (L 15.4.1999; L 18.4.1999). HS Moscow correspondent, Kalle Koponen 
(OE 21.11.1999), responded by drawing attention to Russian action in Chechnya. 
According to his vernacular description: 
 
Russia is ominously retreating into its shell. It feels that the outside world do not 
understand it. ... Russia's political life is a continuous chaos; the economy is a mess 
and corroded by corruption. ... As its engines, Russia has three demons, which have 
weakened the discernment of its political leadership: thirst for revenge, racism and 
the bitter need to direct its frustration about its own incompetence at somewhere… 
[t]he Russians [bear a] huge disappointment and fatigue in constant bardak, chaos. 
Perpetual inferiority complex in front of the West, the loss of superpower status, the 
collapse of living standards and public health, the whole fiasco of liberal reforms has 
now been given an emotional lightning rod by the nasty Chechens terrorist. 
 
While the public praised Koponen for sharing this information and the editorial 
board for giving it the exposure it deserved (L 23.11.1999), the Russian Embassy 
was less pleased. In his letter, addressed not to Koponen but to Editor-in-Chief 
Igor Andryushchenko, the press secretary of the Russian Embassy blamed the 
paper for forgetting the basic task of objective media (L 28.11.1999). Instead of 
giving readers enough information for them to determine by themselves what is 
essential and important in the world, Mr. Andryushchenko accused HS for 
“slandering all Russians, without exceptions, as racists and idlers suffering from 
paranoia.” Koponen’s use of language, Mr. Andryushchenko noted, 
immediately brought to mind “the notorious Cold War vocabulary.” What he 
had found equally pathetic was that the “omissions” of Koponen's story may 
have misled the readership of the otherwise “prestigious paper” (ibid.). 
The Foreign Ministers’ Conference on the Northern Dimension organized in 
Helsinki on November 11, 1999 was greeted with great expectations, as the idea 
of the concept had remained somewhat vague for many. For Finland, this was 
an opportunity to safeguard and strengthen the continuity of its own 
neighborhood policy in the EU and to prepare for the presumable fact that, 
unless tied to northern issues, EU focus would shift towards Central Europe as a 
consequence of the next enlargement (OE 11.11.1999). The atmosphere of the 
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meeting was, however, clearly overshadowed by Russia’s simultaneous actions 
in Chechnya. The remarkably low level of participation – out of the fifteen EU 
countries of the time, only the Foreign Minister of Finland participated in the 
meeting – could not but be taken as a sign that the topic had failed to arouse any 
significant political passion. 
For Finland, the situation was different not at least because of geographical 
proximity and the long common border with Russia. Finns were regarded as 
having the advantage in that they “understand the Russian mentality better than 
other Westerners” (OE 10.12.1999). Russia, it was heralded, was “an 
indispensable partner for the EU, a permanent discrimination of which out of 
the question” (E 13.11.1999). Even though Russia fought in the south, its effect 
was seen to radiate also to its western border (OE 18.11.1999). This was taken to 
imply there to be an increased need to search for European security architecture 
and to bring the NATO question, yet again, back onto the table. Nevertheless, the 
editorial of November 13, 1999 argued that the war should be regarded as a reason 
to strengthen the Northern Dimension and not as a justification to restrict it.  
The conference met the expectations in as far as the common desire towards 
the actual materialization of the policy. While this was largely taken to suggest 
that the meeting had been by and large a success, it was equally true that: 
 
…at the same time a funeral was held in Helsinki. …the EU’s strict declaration to 
Russia following the events in Chechnya… buried the dream or a wish that Russia 
would in the near future – during the next few decades – be transforming into a 
democratic market economy as had been wished during the initial post-Soviet 
euphoria. At the same time it was confirmed that the Western policy has not worked. 
(OE 16.12.1999) 
 
The EU statement to Russia was seen to reflect the powerlessness and 
hopelessness of the Union. It was taken as a sign that the EU itself knew very 
well that its words had little significance in the turmoil of Russia. The West had, 
it was summarized, tried three different paths: Russia was given financial 
assistance, attempts had been made to engage it cooperation through 
agreements and arrangements, and it had been persuaded towards 
parliamentary democracy through the synergy of these two, but all three fronts 
had failed (OE 16.12.1999). 
The both parties were blamed for their hypocrisy. The Russian authorities 
had not complied with any of the “beautiful agreements” that it had signed 
while the EU had “turned a blind eye to everything in order to smear Russia's 
hard hit superpower soul” and instead re-declared its desire to keep Russia as a 
partner (OE 16.12.1999; OE 18.11.1999). However, the reform and transition 
expectations, previously included in most statements, were no longer 
observable. Accordingly, while on September 15, 1998 an editorial column had 
suggested that the relations between the West and Russia had been based at 
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least on a mutual pretense – Russia pretended to be a democracy and the West 
pretended to believe in it – now, a bit more than a year later, the pretense was 
deemed to be simply over (OE 1.12.1999). In reality, it had become questionable 
whether it was at all possible for Russia and the major Western countries to 
arrive at real partnership or whether the intense competitive position would 
continue as inevitable also in the future (OE 16.12.1999) 
On the other hand, it was reminded that Russian history was “a terrible 
burden,” and it should thus be given a lot of time (OE 18.12.1999). 
Contemporary analyses were blamed for lacking a historical perspective. It was 
seen that the Russian case was not primarily about a transition from a command 
to a market economy but more fundamentally a transition from despotism to a 
lawful civil society, democracy, and parliamentarism. The problems apparent at 
the moment were believed to derive from the fact that when the Soviet Union 
collapsed the reforms had been initiated in a wrong order. Unlike when the 
rationing of mercantilism was demolished in the 1860s in Finland, in Russia the 
market forces were liberated before despotism was dismantled and replaced by 
with a lawful democracy and a legal framework that would have supported the 
birth of a functioning market economy (OE 18.12.1999). 
The other major issued hindering the rapprochement between the EU and 
Russia was seen to derive from their very different logics. While the EU’s 
spreading to the east is “sincerely intended as a friendly embrace” (OE 
22.12.1999), Russian thinking was still dominated by the traditional nineteenth-
century world model, in which international order was based on the role of 
states, an ongoing merciless battle between the states for the strategic and 
economic interests and, above all, on the balance of power between the great 
powers. Even though Russia's contemporary elite represented the perspective of 
the superpower-era generation, the future of Russia's relations with Europe was 
reckoned to depend largely on the new generation that had grown up under 
changed conditions and exposed to strong cross-national trends. 
Regarding bilateral issues, it was proposed that moving the border to its pre-
war location would open up an opportunity to extend the neighboring area 
cooperation also to the northern areas, the home of various Finnic peoples (L 
2.6.1999). For some, such talks about Karelia indicated rather that the teachings 
of history had been forgotten. Russia’s dubious actions, for example in 
Chechnya, were put forth as evident proof that Russia of today behaved much 
like its Cold War persona (L 18.12.1999). The populist rhetoric about repatriating 
Karelia was deemed as worrisome for it could be regarded as “defiant in the 
Russian eyes” (ibid.). After all, Russia was still deemed to be “a great power, a 
nuclear power,” where instability had only increased. “Applying for revenge,” it 
was argued, would thus not “even patch up the bruises of self-esteem.” Instead 
a true self-esteem should enable “wise diplomacy to be used in managing the 
relations between the peoples.” (L 18.12.1999.) 
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The editorial of November 1, 1999 reported that Russian government daily 
newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta had blamed the Finns for bringing the Karelian 
economy to its knees. It accused Finnish forestry companies of “macerating 
Karelia” by defining logging ban areas, but it had also attacked environmental 
organizations, the actions of which were seen to be driven by "big money" and 
the “desire for revenge.” The HS editorial section rightly ignored the article as 
an “excess related to Russia's internal power struggle.” While there certainly 
were risks associated with the wood trade, it maintained that trade per se 
should be promoted for it raised the standard of living in Karelia and planted 
the principles of sustainable development (E 1.11.1999). 
 
5.2.4 To Transform or not to Transform?  
With Vladimir Putin in power, a “new era of intense interaction” had begun in 
Finnish-Russian relations (E 2.3.2002). President Putin's reform policies and his 
earlier connections to Finland were seen to open up new possibilities for 
interaction. The publicly announced intention of a weakened Russia to promote 
its own national interests was interpreted to indicate that the country was 
seeking to create good economic relations with EU countries and aim to attract 
foreign investments to Russia in order to boost the country's economic growth. 
The leading idea of President Putin’s foreign policy thinking was interpreted to 
be to show the West that Russia wants to be a part of Europe and to establish the 
closest possible economic and political cooperation with the European Union 
and preferably also with the United States (OE 16.4.2002). 
While the first years of the Putin era could be assessed quite differently in 
retrospect, at the time the assessment was that President Putin had been very 
successful in his most important task: stabilizing the political conditions that 
had wavered on the verge of turmoil during the Yeltsin era – and even without 
“any dictatorial or illegal strokes” (OE 16.4.2002). The imminence relating to 
Russia's instability or military threat had thus given way. It was seen necessary 
to seize upon the situation by increasing investment in Russia “already for the 
sake of the Finnish interests” (E 7.3.2002). The “investment,” however, was only 
used as a fancier word for neighboring area assistance, which according to this 
reading ought to be seen as investing in the future by attempting to fix some of 
the existing problems before they would reach and cross the border to Finland.  
However, the euphoria over Putin evaporated swiftly. Whereas the events in 
Russia had been central to the international news flow throughout the last 10–15 
years, now, all of a sudden, Russia had become almost forgotten. “Nothing of 
special interest” seemed to take place in Russia; the weight of the country was 
judged as having clearly fallen also in international politics, and few seemed to 
know what was actually happening in Russia (OE 16.4.2002). No news was not, 
however, good news from Russia’s own perspective or from that of its Western 
partners.  
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In his op-ed of June 12, 2002, Finnish diplomat and former minister Max 
Jacobson must have articulated the thoughts of many by proposing that the 
Finns’ strong historical distrust and reservation towards Russia stems from the 
strong and enduring belief that even if the world is changing and the Finns with 
it, Russia still remained unchanged. Finland, according to this perception, 
occupied a position of an outpost of Western civilization. This crux of the 
Finnish realpolitik had also penetrated into the Finns’ consciousness so deeply 
that it prevented many from seeing the apparent transformation set in motion in 
Russia. Due to the strong westward trend embarked on by President Putin, 
Jacobson corrected that Russia has indeed become increasingly European (OE 
12.6.2002). 
The statement could not be swept under the rug. Rather it pulled the entire 
rug out from under the feet of a large share Finns, who had learned to see Russia 
as the ‘other.’ By now it had become ever clearer that while god may have 
indeed failed (see Grossman 1949), history had not come to an end (see 
Fukuyama 1992) and that civilization might not after all clash (see Huntington 
1993; 1996). The East and the West as most used to know them no longer existed, 
and the acknowledgement of that shook the very pillars upon which a major 
part of Finnishness had been built. 
Accordingly now at the very latest it had become time to realize, as president 
Kekkonen had already once noted, that while shifting the border was not a 
realistic goal, cooperation and interaction were the new words on the streets. 
The border readjustment, Jacobson (OE 12.6.2002) explained, was not realistic 
not only because of Russia's negative stance regarding the matter but also for the 
current state of affairs was now “a part of a pan-European reality” and the 
Finnish-Russian border only one among many that had been “drawn with the 
sword after the Second World War.” Thus, if one were to begin to modify them, 
“the whole European order would start to rock.” Essentially, there was thus no 
reason to seek the readjustment of the border for the role of the borders per se in 
Europe had fundamentally changed: in an united Europe, b orders were no 
longer insurmountable crevasses, which insulate countries from each other” but 
“open” (OE 12.6.2002). 
Russia's borders were not yet quite as open, but the fact that Russia had 
begun to integrate into Europe was seen to provide opportunities to prevent the 
looming humanitarian catastrophe in Karelia and to revive its economy through 
cooperation. This, Jacobson specified, would not be merely a humanitarian 
operation but of significant benefit to both parties as new economic 
opportunities would open up to those living on the Finnish side as well. On the 
Russian side, the services created in the Karelian Isthmus could be of benefit to 
the city of St. Petersburg, which was developing into the center of Russian 
foreign trade (OE 12.6.2002). In order to encourage CBC, the Imatra-Svetogorsk 
border crossing point was finally opened to international traffic. This was 
largely thanks to the EU as practically all of the border crossing facilities on the 
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Russian side were funded by the EU's Tacis funds. An open border, it was 
expected, would boost the trade and tourism industry of the border region and 
diversify the economic life of the entire province (E 8.7.2002). 
The long borne grudge could not, however, be suppressed under the new 
top-level rhetoric. In particular, the idea to set up an environmental fund for 
Northwest Russia evoked strong resistance. “Russia,” it was demanded, “ought 
to clean up its own mess,” the vast majority of which was seen to derive from its 
navy that had been recklessly spreading its pollutants and warfare debris all 
over the place (L 17.7.2002). The author found it incomprehensible that both 
Finland and the EU were pledging immense amounts of money as a “poor relief 
for this irresponsible ‘superpower’” although it was already in hock to Finland.  
An op-ed of September 29, 2002 made a valid effort to explain the vernacular 
terminology. Neighborhood, it was clarified, was a more intimate and intensive 
form of relationship than partnership. While “ p artnership can sometimes 
become passive, sometimes even forgotten” it was righteously argued, 
neighborhood geographical proximity  was in effect day and night. Despite 
being referred to as a “partnership,” the author saw that almost all of the key 
questions of EU-Russia cooperation relate to the neighborhood. Cooperation on 
environmental problems is, above all, in the interests of the neighbor, and the 
neighbors are also at the forefront when it comes to the Northwest Russia’s 
social and health problems, criminality, and migration (OE 29.9.2002). 
Geographical proximity and the long common border were also the reasons 
why the border control had to be maintained in order. “Finns’ fears are now 
coming true,” it was declared when Russia began to move its troops from the 
Finnish border to Central Asia and the Caucasus (E 20.11.2002). Even though 
one might have considered this as a positive development, the relaxation of the 
border control on the Russian side, however, resulted in a serious problem: the 
border, particularly its remote areas, had begun to leak. This was worrisome for 
drugs; “millions of illegal immigrants” and “prostitution and other forms of 
eastern criminality” could thus easily spill over to Finland (ibid.). Geography 
thus spoke for itself. Whereas Sweden and Ireland, the other “non-aligned” 
members, had EU or NATO allies on all sides, Finland had a 1,300-kilometer 
border with Russia. Even though the Cold War-era threat had receded, there 
were no guarantees that Russia's development towards a democratic 
constitutional state would be an unavoidable fact (E 12.1.2003). 
 
Concerns in Cooperation 
Russia was seen to be developing in a positive direction, but many had grown 
exasperated with the slow pace of change. In principle, there was a desire to 
help Russia integrate into the international cooperation, but in practice the 
“bureaucratic heaviness and inertia of the Russian decision-making, as well as 
the different working culture in general” were seen to throw a spanner in the 
works and, if anything, nourish the Finns’ own prejudices quite effectively. 
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Cultures logically collided at the border, where truck traffic and customs 
clearance problems culminated frequently in situations defused only by lengthy 
negotiations at the higher levels. 
Particularly in the field of environmental protection the chasm between the 
countries was gaping. Unlike Finns, it was assessed, Russians were not taking 
the “risks seriously”; Russians’ “negligence and outright disregard” for 
environmental risks could and did not deserve understanding (OE 9.2.2003). 
Such rhetoric was cut out for fostering an impression among the public that 
instead of protecting actively the environment and being responsible for its 
actions, Russia was trying to make others, most notably Finland, take care of, 
i.e., pay for, the actions required. While the consequently emerged “unpleasant 
features” in the Finns’ attitudes towards Russians were painted formally as pity, 
the language and individual word choices used in the editorials, and especially 
in the op-eds by HS staff, only added fuel to the fire and fed a negative view 
towards Russia. 
Perhaps the greatest strain arose from the fact that in the perceptions of 
Finns, Russia had evolved from a threat to a risk, the latter of which being in no 
way better. Russia was as country of contradictions, the development of which 
could not be predicted. During its “young democracy,” it had prospered 
noticeably, largely due to its immense oil and gas reserves, yet its social 
problems were immense. The “new Russia” was already in operation in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, but there were tens of millions of people living in poverty 
and misery, especially in rural areas; wealth was still a special right of a small 
but growing minority. (OE 13.4.2003.)  
President Putin was taking Russia towards the West but at the same time 
tightening the internal conditions (E 31.8.2003). While the increased control was 
disquieting, on the flipside it meant that the “state, which as recently as in 1998 
was feared to fall toward economic disaster and chaos” was now “internally 
stable” (OE 2.6.2003) and thus a more manageable neighbor. The stability came, 
however, with a horrid price tag. In practice, Russia was approaching a one-
party system: the president had “a downright frighteningly free hand” within 
the limits that “the unreliable Russian bureaucratic machinery and its relative 
weakness” had granted to him (E 9.12.2003). 
 
Friends with Benefits? 
Cooperation with Russia was deemed as necessary, yet due to the fact that it had 
“not been able to create a social order that would be capable for cooperation” in 
North-West Russia, which was in serious need of foreign investment, the 
“countless possible areas of progress” could not be materialized. It was seen that 
problems (criminality, spread of drugs) could not be stopped with restrictions or 
at borders but would necessitate “favorable social development in countries of 
origin and transit” (OE 17.4.2003). Cooperation would, however, allow Europe 
to “do a lot to shape Russia's, and thus also its own, future” (OE 2.6.2003). This 
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did not mean that the EU should have promised Russia membership but that 
Russia should rather be tied to a European wide integrative region now that it 
has shown interest in cooperation. Those shaping European policy-making, it 
was suggested, should not just wait for the Russian move but answer the 
strategic question of what they want from Russia – and act accordingly: 
 
Europe could, of course, suppress the interaction with Russia to a minimum: to buy 
"gas with sausages" and try to protect the "Fortress Europe" from the soft security 
threats sprouting from the Russian soil. Nice looking little cooperation projects can 
still provide the basis for a diplomatic rhetoric. Superficially, the strategy looks right. 
The problem is that it follows largely the line of unsuccessful attempts of the 1990s. 
Much more promising solution would be to try to help Russia to complete its 
transformation and elevate this as the most important goal of EU policy…. The 
European project is not complete without a renewed and united Russia. (OE 2.6.2003) 
 
Such assurance spread also to the letters, which had typically been more 
reserved towards Russia and preferred to see it as a threat. An exceptionally 
large number of letters highlighted the positive aspects of having Russia as a 
neighbor. The remigration of Finns from the former Soviet Union, which began 
in 1990, had so far already brought more than 30,000 people with their families 
to Finland. The negative publicity that this group, often stigmatized as ‘ryssä,’ 
received was seen as having been unreasonable. Instead, the fact of the matter 
was “there has never been such a large number of well-educated crowd of 
experts who know Russia thoroughly” in the country, and Finland would do 
itself a favor should the skills of these remigrants be utilized effectively. (L 
27.4.2003.) It was also asserted that there were “countless reasons to recognize 
the Russian language and culture as part of the past and the present reality in 
our country” and that “exercising anti-Russian propaganda fits poorly in the 
world situation and the state of affairs” (HS 24.5.2003).  
Although there were opinions also to the contrary, some suggested that a 
united and strong Europe, including Russia, would in principle be “the only 
hope for peaceful development in the world” (L 18.7.2003). The “irreversible 
process” of European integration was depicted as being necessary to prevent the 
“accelerating cycle of violence” caused by the United States’ “neoconservative 
leadership.” It was seen that when the EU evolved into a “political, economic 
and cultural community covering the entire Europe, including Russia,” it would 
be strong enough to stop US domination (ibid.) 
In addition, Europe was seen to need Russia because of its “fundamentally 
European culture, the vast natural resources and educated population.” “Europe 
enriched with Russia” could thus “lead the world into a peaceful and 
prosperous future.” (L 18.7.2003.) In contrast, according to an alternative way of 
thought the world political situation could change quickly and Finns should be 
prepare themselves and rethink the NATO option for “one day in the future 
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Russia will again become a superpower, which exerts self-conscious policies 
towards its neighbors” (L 7.11.2003). It was maintained that the security threat 
had not disappeared, and even though relations with Russia were decent for 
now, no one could guarantee that they would remain so indefinitely. The 
bottom line was that Finns ought not to forget the “miracle of the Winter War” 
and subsequent constant Soviet pressure (L 28.11.2003) but they should instead 
know better and join NATO when it was still possible – after all, geography had 
still not changed (HS 29.12.2003). 
According to an expert analysis, the debate on Finnish security policy had 
run aground on outdated threat scenarios (HS 22.12.2003). It was seen that 
Finland continued to position itself as if the East-West division was still in effect 
by adhering to strict border policy and being reclusive vis-à-vis Russia. The 
West no longer existed in the sense that Finland presumed it did (ibid.). Instead, 
it was advised, Finland – and Europe as whole – should view Russia in the 
frame of the North-South axis, as a potential source of security and a part of the 
transatlantic cooperation structure (OE 2.6.2003). 
The EU-Russia Summit held in St Petersburg, Russia in May 2003 was 
regarded as President Putin’s opportunity to show the leaders of the West and 
the whole world that Russia wished to be part of Europe. The fact that Putin had 
indeed managed to gather such a large group of heads of state and prime 
ministers to St. Petersburg indicated that the feelings were mutual. In an 
interview already prior too the presidential elections, President Putin had 
stressed that despite its multifacetedness Russia belonged mentally to the scope 
of the Western European culture and would continue to strive to remain in that 
frame (OE 3.6.2003). Accordingly, in his annual State-of-the-Nation address to 
the Federal Assembly in the Kremlin on May 16, 2003, Putin declared one of the 
major elements of Russia’s foreign policy to be “the broad rapprochement and 
real integration with Europe” and while this was bound to be “a complicated 
and long process,” it was Russia’s “historical choice.” 
In Finland, the declared objectives were deemed to be correct but unrealistic 
as Putin was seen as lacking either “the means or the courage to implement 
them” (OE 3.6.2003). It was underlined that Russia was still “dominated by the 
Post-Soviet declaration culture” in which the adoption of a program was more 
important than its implementation (OE 2.6.2003). The same, however, could 
have been said about the EU, at least on the grounds of President of the 
European Commission Romano Prodi’s assurance that Russia and Europe 
belong together like vodka and caviar. In this spirit, the EU and Russia agreed to 
reinforce their cooperation by creating four “common spaces” on the basis of 
common values and shared interests as means to integrate Russia into Wider 
Europe. This was a clear sign that, on the general level, the EU wished to 
understand Russia's convergence efforts and saw also obvious benefits in the 
process.  
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On a practical level, the EU saw a lot more obstacles than what Russia was 
able to appreciate. The same applied to Finnish-Russia bilateral relations. As 
explained by Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja in his address at the 
Finnish Embassy in Moscow in February 2003, the relations were: 
 
…better today than what they have ever been. The birth of a new Russia has opened 
our long border, which had been closed for over 70 years. There are no political 
problems between our countries, but all the more practical difficulties. 
 
Some of these were fairly harmless, but not all. EU membership had given 
Finland firm backing in its relations with Russia, but it was also seen to create 
problems (OE 9.2.2003). Being at the time the only EU neighbor of Russia, 
Finland was afraid of ending up stuck between a rock and a hard place if the 
other EU countries wished to give in to Russia's call for the abolition of the visa 
regime. Finland and many other EU countries considered the visa freedom 
advocated by Putin to be very premature, even though this had to be read 
between the lines of the polite statements of statespersons. In the Summit’s press 
conference, Finnish President Halonen rejected Putin’s proposal firmly but in a 
rather embellished manner by explaining that Finland's official view on visa-free 
travel between the two states was “cautiously optimistic” and that “visa-free 
travel would require a huge number of measures from Russia and also the EU 
should define its opinion before such an arrangement could be formally 
discussed” (HS Int. Edit. 2.6.2003). Not everyone, however, supported the visa 
requirements, for it was seen to not only prevent impulsive forms of interaction, 
obstruct cross-border interaction among ordinary people, and stall “the birth of 
a normal civil society” in the neighboring areas but also reduce the revenue that 
Finland could gain from tourism (L 22.9.2003).  
Whereas on the governmental level Finnish-Russian relations were excellent 
and both sides had expressed a willingness to continue developing the relations 
favorably, behind the “diplomatic façade of Moscow” glimpses of the official 
circles’ informal irritation with Finnish foreign policy could, however, be caught 
(E 12.6.2003). Finland was criticized for its “worsened attitude” towards Russia 
and for being the most steadfast of the EU countries in rejecting Russia's hopes 
of visa-free travel by interpreting the Schengen Agreement “arbitrarily” at its 
own borders. Finland, however, had a “natural explanation” to these 
accusations. Being an immediate neighbor and the only EU country with a 
common border with Russia, Finland was understood as being familiar with the 
problems that would ensue by renouncing the visa requirement in “a completely 
different way than someone like Greece or Italy” (E 12.6.2003). This was to 
suggest that the geographical proximity continued to matter and that Russia 
simply tended to seem more European the further away one located from it. 
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Mixed Signals: Rhetoric vs. Practice 
By 2005, relations with Russia had turned colder, and the blame for this was put 
mainly on Russia’s shoulders. The earlier positive efforts of Russia's foreign 
policy had turned negative (OE 3.3.2005). Its actions in particular towards the 
Baltic countries were deemed as inconsistent with the EU-Russian strategic 
partnership and its objectives. The reason for this was sought in the essence of 
Russia. Western values, it was suggested, make Russians feel anxiety, and the 
belief that the Western civilization would be a threat to the Russian civilization 
had rooted deep. It was further seen that Russia's current government had 
sought to actively maintain the belief that Russia was entitled to an Empire with 
a security buffer created by obedient neighboring countries (OE 6.1.2005). 
Internally, the 2004 enlargement of the EU ignited a fight between political 
camps about the future of the Northern Dimension. A group of social-
democratic europarlamentarians (MEPs) was of the opinion that EU-Russian 
relations had moved from the donor-recipient relationship of the last decade to 
real and equal partnership (L 8.3.2005). They saw that the ND had served as a 
useful cage for regional cooperation between citizens and various communities 
across the EU's external border. It provided well-needed glue that held the 
numerous individual projects, actors, and targets together. It had thus become of 
significant importance to regional security, prosperity, and stability (ibid.). 
A group of MEPs from the National Coalition Party, in turn, saw that the 
powder of ND had not ignited. Rather the initiative had remained small-scale 
business when compared, say, to the EU’s Mediterranean strategy 64  (L 
14.3.2005). They reminded the public that the ND had been born into a very 
confusing and institutionally overlapping post-Cold War environment and that 
it had ever since then been merely “synonymous with environmental 
partnership with Russia.” In practice, they claimed, it had neither succeeded in 
engaging the EU's attention to the north nor had it created added value to the 
other projects and forums with their own arrangements in the region. Instead, 
the “jumble of Northern European cooperation” was still as much all over the 
place as it had been in 1999. A new concept, Baltic Sea strategy, could move 
things along by engaging actors in pragmatic forms of cooperation around “the 
most natural unifying factor” there was, the Baltic Sea. (Ibid.) 
Following the fifteenth EU-Russia Summit, which took place in Moscow on 
May 10, 2005, the debate turned even more to EU-Russia relations. At the 
Summit, the EU and Russia reached an understanding that they would improve 
their cooperation. In order to give more concrete content to the long term 
Common Spaces agreed upon at the earlier Summit in 2003, the leaders of the 
EU and Russia now adopted a single package of medium-term road maps as a 
                                                          
64 Reportedly, there had been about 200 million, less than four per cent of the Mediterranean 
financing, in use. 
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sort of outline of the areas which needed to be intensified as well as how to 
make these objectives a reality. 
The editorial of May 12, 2005 was, however, quick to point out the obvious. 
By its tone, it was assessed, a ‘roadmap’ was a too specific a word to describe the 
agreement, which was little more than a list of common interests. Even though 
the agreement was critiqued as lacking any concrete advances, it was 
acknowledged that it presented a step in the right direction: it was seen as 
recognition of the fact that Russia and the EU needed each other and that they 
had many common interests that could be promoted only by way of closer 
collaboration. Furthermore, the agreements were taken as an indication that the 
EU was attempting to “speak with one voice with Russia” and that Russia 
would have to discuss with the Union per se instead of picking out only those 
member states that were “the most complaisant to its own pursuits.” (E 
12.5.2005.) 
Paavo Väyrynen, a veteran politician of the Centre Party and then Member of 
European Parliament, was more pessimistic and put forth that EU-Russia 
relations have plenty of problems to which the new arrangement was not going 
to have any noticeable effect (OE 14.5.2005). In his view, the core of the problems 
lay in the fact that both parties were at a crossroads, looking for their identity 
and lacking a clear vision of the future of Europe: 
 
Russia does not know whether it belongs clearly in Europe or whether it should it be 
an emphatically Eurasian country. It has not yet internalized the very essence of 
democracy. In turn, the EU does not know whether to develop into a pan-European 
union of countries or to strive towards a small-European federal state. Both Russia 
and the EU behave like a superpower. (OE 14.5.2005) 
 
Based on his experience, Väyrynen noted that in International politics great 
powers tend to prefer bilateral solutions; multilateral cooperation is favored 
only if they are able to manage and control it. This, Väyrynen suggested, was 
also the reason why Russia did not want to be part of the ENP but preferred the 
special common areas; instead of accepting the EU as a legitimate geopolitical 
player, it had become apparent that Russia wanted to maintain close bilateral 
cooperation between individual EU member states, especially the major ones. 
(OE 14.5.2005.) 
Väyrynen criticized the EU for scolding Russia, for attempting to maintain its 
own spheres of influence in the territory of the former Soviet Union while at the 
same time the Union itself strove as a superpower to expand its influence in all 
directions. The EU, Väyrynen maintained, was characterized by a desire for 
bilateralism, which had become apparent in that multilateral European 
organizations are, on the one hand, downplayed but, on the other hand, also 
considered to be competitors that should not extend their operations into EU 
territory. (OE 14.5.2005.) 
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For these reasons, Väyrynen argued, it was clear that Russia had no interest 
in becoming a part of the EU, and more attention would have to be paid to 
alternative interpretations of Europe. Väyrynen saw that Russia was a part of 
Europe and, hence, further integration was natural, the democratization and 
Europeanization of Russia being proof of its willingness to integrate with the 
rest of Europe. Väyrynen suggested appropriately that integration did not 
require Russia to be a member of the EU, but that integration could also be 
promoted outside the EU. Instead of developing common bilateral areas of 
cooperation, Väyrynen proposed that the EU and Russia should make an effort 
to build a wider Europe through multilateral pan-European cooperation areas 
based on already existing and well functioning institutional structures: the 
Council of Europe and the OSCE: 
 
We should develop the European Council into a European confederation, which 
would provide the main advantages of the integration immediately to all European 
countries. Russia would get a short cut to democratization and Europeanization, and 
it could affect the European development more than with its current policy. The 
whole of Europe would gain stability and strength, allowing the continent's position 
to be strengthened worldwide. (OE 14.5.2005) 
 
Harry Helenius, the Finnish Ambassador in Moscow (cited in OE 1.6.2005), 
informed that Russia had only now begun to really understand what the EU 
actually was. Russia’s leadership, he clarified, did not really even have an EU-
strategy, it was just waiting to see what the EU would do. The EU surely knew 
how to set forth standards and criteria to Russia, but the time had come for it to 
realize that Russia was not seeking for EU membership and could thus not be 
subjected to the EU's pre-conditions and requirements the same way as the 
candidate countries could (OE 1.6.2005). 
Ilkka Kanerva, Member and the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament (National 
Coalition Party), in turn saw that Finland should renew its own Russian policy; 
being a small country, Finland could not wait for what the EU or the large EU 
member states would like to do with Russia (L 23.5.2005). He saw that the jointly 
drafted and recently signed Road Maps confirmed both the Russian desire to be 
part of Europe and the EU's ambition to keep Russia connected to Europe. The 
Road Maps were expected to give new momentum for the practical cooperation, 
but, as Kanerva assessed, their great principled importance lay in the fact that 
through them Russia would return to its long-term course: to “the desire to be a 
European state,” which had been broken by the October Revolution (L 
23.5.2005). However, given that the implementation of the Road Maps would 
take some time, Finland should not sit and wait but ought to formulate its own 
road map, a new Russia-strategy (L 23.5.2005). 
Despite the changed circumstances and increased cooperation, it was 
maintained that the Finnish-Russian border must be carefully controlled also in 
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the future. As a borderland of the EU, Finland had great responsibility in 
controlling illegal immigration and transit flows (E 3.4.2005). The liturgy and 
modesty of the past had disappeared almost altogether from the manner in 
which Finnish-Russian relations are handled in public. Matters were reported, 
somewhat disconcertedly, as being discussed with their real names to an extent 
that it was necessary to ask, in which state relations between the countries 
actually were (OE 1.6.2005). On the other hand, this new realism meant that 
there were no more reasons to build barriers out of political tensions, but 
politician and CSOs alike should focus their efforts on the development of 
cooperation both at the level of people's everyday life and in the “larger circles” 
(E 22.8.2005).  
For instance, Karelianism was deemed to be “alive and well,” even if the 
state border would remain at its present location; after all it was claimed that 
Finns owned Karelia “spiritually” even if it would not be “a part of the Finnish 
state” (HS 23.8.2005). Also Pentti Hyttinen, Mayor of the Regional Council of 
North Karelia, attempted to go beyond the customary Karelia question and 
advocated that instead of painting threats, attention should paid to raking the 
benefits of globalization, i.e., enlarged market-areas, reduction in the importance 
of borders, and growing importance of knowledge, as well as cultural 
enrichment and diversification (L 23.10.2005). According to Mr. Hyttinen, it was 
not irrelevant how Finns acted “in our own sandbox,” the Republic of Karelia. 
After all, he saw that it was only “natural to begin eradicating poverty from our 
own yard.” This, he saw, would lead to increased travel, exchange of ideas and 
knowledge, and make both sides more prosperous. (L 23.10.2005.)  
Mr. Hyttinen was referring to Euregio Karelia, which had sought to build 
“spiritual bridges” between the regions as well as activates economic 
development on both sides of the border. Russia's lively economic growth had 
increased Finnish companies’ interest in the neighboring areas, and some had 
already located their production or extended subcontracting beyond the border 
in search of competitive advantages. But as Hyttinen concluded, there was still 
plenty to discuss and develop. Interest in Russia had been slowed down in 
particular by uncertainty over the treatment of foreign investments. Also, many 
other operational preconditions for business were still very fragile. Customs and 
border formalities continued to cause extra friction and logistics, as a key 
prerequisite for business growth, also posed a major development challenge. 
Likewise, data connections lagged behind. All in all, Hyttinen summarized, it 
was particularly unfortunate that more open borders did not only enable 
positive cross-border innovations but also invited unwanted interaction, such as 
systematic criminality and drug trafficking. (L 23.10.2005.) 
Despite these practical problems, the Finnish-Russian “special relations” 
formed a better basis for interaction than working through Brussels would (OE 
24.8.2005). Even though talks about good neighboring relations with Russia 
sounded like the liturgy of bygone days, it was argued that with the exception of 
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Finland and Norway there were “almost nothing but bad news for Russia from 
the Western Front.” Thus, out of Russia’s western neighbors, Finland had once 
again become the one with whom relations were in order with every respect; 
Finland had never caused problems for Russia and had been trying to 
understand it even when it had been difficult. For this reason, it was deduced 
that President Putin must understand that “Finland could not be classified in 
any ‘russophobic bloc’ of the new EU member states,” but that it belonged 
among the old member states, which had a genuine interest to promote the EU-
Russia relations in every way. The perceived reason why Russia had failed to 
show this trust and instead had kept on causing problems continually (such as 
repeatedly violating Finnish air space) had to do with the fact that 
“ u nfortunately, in Russia, the left hand often does not seem to know what the 
right hand is doing” (OE 24.8.2005).  
In either case, Russia was once again emerging as Finland's largest trading 
partner and it was seen to offer immense opportunities not just for trade but also 
for other forms of cooperation (OE 25.9.2005). However, the problem of seizing 
them, it was admitted, derived from the Finnish side. While for the younger 
generation Russia was “no longer that superpower neighbor, with whom one 
had to try to get by” and older generations’ image was often “colored by 
attitudinal stereotypes” (OE 25.9.2005). While it was acknowledged that these 
attitudes had their understandable history, it was seen that they should be let go 
for they were often out of date or simply incorrect and served only to whitewash 
the fact that the Finnish understanding of today’s Russia was lacking. Granted 
that the inter-state relations were managed well, tepid personal interest was 
blamed for having caused Finns to lose a part of their privileged vantage point 
onto Russia. The lack of interest was regarded as particularly vexing because 
one of Finland’s assets had traditionally been the “ability to understand the 
‘Russian soul’ better than many other countries” (OE 25.9.2005). The experience 
gained during the past decades was thus seen to be slipping into the sand as a 
blind eye was being turned to these new possibilities.  
In all, it was largely agreed that EU membership had brought a new impetus 
for Finland to take care of its external economic relations but that this should not 
be done at the expense of bilateral relations with Russia. Faith in Russia’s ability 
and willingness to adhere to EU requirements and nurture the model Western 
democracy lived on (L 16.12.2005), but the manner in which Russia was 
addressed began to show maturation. More (neo-) realist arguments could be 
used in public without fear of being labeled as Russophobic. It was suggested 
that the current columnists, “these prisoners of the past,” should be changed 
and “replaced by young Finnish and Russian columnists” (L 19.1.2006) who did 
not necessarily share the emotional load which would have prevented them 
from writing about this with their real names. In addition to having credible 
national military forces, it was suggested, the best preventive defense work 
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would be to increase inter-cultural exchange and free movement of citizens in 
every possible way (L 30.12.2005).  
This was, however, easier said than done as “the Soviet-era queuing culture” 
was going through a renaissance at the border (L 27.4.2006). The “age-old play” 
at the crossing points continued (L 24.4.2006) because the Russian government 
came constantly up with a variety of unfounded fees or unnecessary regulations 
and bureaucracy that tangled border traffic and involved additional costs (E 
23.4.2006). This manifested itself as a frustration in the writings: 
 
Reportedly we are good friends. The unbroken flow of assistance still continues from 
Finland to Russian Karelia. With the help of huge financial support from Finland and 
the EU, new, modern buildings and facilities have been built for the Russian customs. 
Apparently, we have also significantly funded the training of the customs staff at the 
eastern border. It is paradoxical to have to be subjugated to constant tyrannization 
after such a friendly gesture. (L 1.5.2006) 
 
As the truck queues at the border grew only longer and chaos worsened (E 
11.11.2006), it was seen that the border had become a chaotic place, exposing the 
people close to the border to danger (L 15.11.2006.). It was argued that the 
wanton border management was the Russian authorities’ deliberate attempt to 
wag Finnish internal security (ibid.). 
Russia’s intimidating actions over natural gas might against Ukraine were 
taken as an indication that Russia was trying to maximize its influence in all 
surrounding areas (OE 10.1.2006). In contrast, the “growing and stabilizing” 
markets behind the border had made Russia more tempting for Finnish 
entrepreneurs and companies (E 7.1.2006) and the market's optimism was so 
strong that as long as Russia was sufficiently stable and its economy growing, its 
internal political developments remained secondary. While investing in Russia 
came with “many real and imaginary disincentives” (E 20.4.2006), from the lack 
of legislation to corruption (E 7.1.2006), it was seen that with patience and hard 
work the related risk could, however, pay off. Finland could hardly afford to 
miss such an opportunity and should now at last start to make use of its 
advantageous geographical location.  
If, however, Europe really wished to create a genuine strategic partnership 
with Russia, those difficult topics could not be ignored (OE 12.1.2006). Even 
though the roadmaps had been agreed upon, they were also seen to present a 
major problem. It was suggested that they had gone unrealized not because 
solutions to key issues had not been found but rather because in practice the EU 
had “moved the most difficult puzzles to the distant future, or even swept them 
under the carpet altogether.” Instead, it was argued, the once broad and diverse 
EU-Russian agenda now focused only on one aspect: energy. Such a 
development was seen to be detrimental to Russia because it only maintained 
the illusion that, as an "energy superpower,” Russia could respond to the 
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economic and security challenges of the 2000s alone and boosted the temptation 
to invoke energy superiority to its favor in Russia’s relations with its neighbors. 
(Ibid.) This only confirmed that Finland should not hide behind Brussels but 
rather nurture its bilateral relations with Russia as well.  
In order to do so, it was, however, necessary to speak openly about the 
nature of these relations. Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Finnish Armed Forces, was the first one to assess the situation. During his 
visit to the United States, Admiral Kaskeala took an unusually outspoken 
political stance by commenting on the state of democracy in Russia. He saw that 
the situation could change “overnight” because all the strings were now in the 
hands of President Putin. Hence, there was more reason to be concerned about 
political developments in Russia than over reports that Russia had been 
increasing its military presence near the Finnish border. (HS 7.3.2006.) 
Either way, what was most illuminating was the nature of the reactions to 
Kaskeala’s statements. For instance, Defense Minister Seppo Kääriäinen (Centre 
Party) first rushed to distance himself from these statements by saying that, at 
least according to his knowledge, there was nothing that would raise concerns 
about developments in Russia but then readjusted his stance by emphasizing in 
a traditional manner that the relations between Finland and Russia were in good 
shape and should be kept that way. He also rectified that Kaskeala’s statement 
had been “well in line” with the 2004 security policy report and reminded that 
Finland affords freedom of speech (HS Int. Edit. 27.2.2006; L 18.3.2006). In the 
letters, the discussion focused on the position of Kaskeala, that of Finland, and 
on the nature and quality of the Finnish debate on Russia in more general terms. 
Helsingin Sanomat itself took Kaskeala’s side by stating that he had set a good 
example on how important it was to follow the developments in Russia with 
open eyes, discuss it openly, and rectify false information and conclusions (E 
9.3.2006). 
Some saw that the whole debate sparked by Kaskeala’s statement resembled 
a farce and served only to indicate that Finns in general did not have a terribly 
realistic view of contemporary Russia (L 18.3.2006). The problem was not the 
debate on Russia taking place in Finland but rather the lack thereof. Given the 
general consensus that the future of Russia would be of vital importance to 
Finland, “ w e should have the right to express our concern about the Russian 
development without the irrational fear that the sky will fall on us” (L 
18.3.2006). After all, the pragmatism, even sympathy, of the Finnish approach to 
Russia, it was believed, might open up the opportunity for Finns to do their part 
to influence the development of Russia's in a constructive way: 
 
The best Russia policy would to be an honest partner: not to claim black to be white 
or not open one's mouth about problems, but at the same time be ready to cooperate 
with the Russians… Russians do not need the Finns’ kowtowing and trepidation, but 
a reliable partner with broad understanding of Russia. (L 18.3.2006) 
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Others, however, questioned whether Finland would really be able to help 
Russia. The problem, it was corrected, stemmed not from a lack realist debate 
but rather from the lack of a coherent message and Finns’ tendency to 
“reconfirm the elements in the neighbor, which should be let go” (L 26.3.2006).  
From an IR perspective, Russia's main problem was seen to be that it had 
gotten stuck in the classical concepts of political power. Instead of advancing 
from the twentieth to the twenty-first century, it had rather returned to the 
nineteenth century. According to this view, Russia must have felt that it had to 
continue to tussle for power with other counterparts that were trying to weaken 
it by destabilizing the ‘balance’ and by narrowing its ‘sphere of influence.’ As 
the Russian way to ‘real Europe’ was blocked, its only choice was to anchor itself 
in the past, to classical Europe and return to the conception that in fact it was 
Russia that represented genuine Europe. (L 26.3.2006.) 
It was seen that Finland was more sympathetic than most, but as a small state 
it still had to face all the dangers of the power political world. Form the Russian 
angle, Finnish talks about security guarantees, EU packing, NATO options, 
territorial defense, and the inviolability of borders, as well as the need to 
maintain conscription and to preserve land mines were completely rational and 
understandable as this was exactly the kind of speech Russia needed to hear in 
order to convince itself that it was also on the right track. As a consequence, 
from the Russian point of view, Finland was a European country much like 
Russia and “not European in such a ‘wrong’ way as the Baltic countries, 
characterized as half-fascist and as having sold their souls to Americanness.” 
Finland could thus be regarded as a country that respected power in a healthy 
manner and could be considered an important partner of Russia's in nurturing 
the lessons of the past. This, it was deduced, could actually explain why Finland 
possessed trust capital and a good discussion relationship vis-à-vis Russia. (L 
26.3.2006.)  
 
Tightening the Screws  
In Finland it was seen that the "managed" or "Eastern" democracy policy of the 
Putin administration had led democratic development in Russia into a corner 
(OE 30.5.2005). The Kremlin had built a centralized system that had neither 
place for competing views nor for free public debate. The whole society in 
Russia had become more tightly controlled by the central government, which 
had forced civil society into a difficult position. The war in Chechnya and the 
"war on terror" were seen to narrow the scope of civil liberties and crumble 
democracy even further. 
It was also seen that Putin's government could not, however, eliminate 
NGOs completely, even though it clearly relegated them to the sidelines. This 
was seen to be because Russia's political system had to, at least to some extent, 
give some semblance of a democracy if the country wished to maintain its place 
as part of the international community. Putin was seen to seek to use civil 
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society to his own benefit in pursuing his own political ends and in maintaining 
his support. (OE 30.5.2005.) 
The plight of Russian NGOs was only increased by the fact that foreign aid 
had begun to decline rapidly as Western donors flinched in response to change 
in Russian state policy and were disappointed by the fact that the process of 
democratization had not progressed as hoped. The experts behind the writing 
saw that right now the Russian NGOs needed support more than ever before 
because the shutdown of international cooperation meant that the results gained 
so far in the democratization process of Russia would disappear into the sand. 
(OE 30.5.2005.) 
Especially a lot had been gained through cooperation with grassroots NGOs. 
A good example of was the cooperation between Finnish and Russian NGOs 
that had already been going on for almost ten years with the support of the 
Russia-network of health and social welfare organizations. Through the 
network, corresponding organizations working on both sides of had entered 
into direct contact with each other and formed agreement on the objectives and 
practices of their work, in so doing producing a number of “success stories”: 
 
The organizations’ partnership is not only about the fact that Finland "exports" or 
"teaches,” but the process is a clearly two-way by its nature. Cooperation with 
Russian organizations has also helped the Finns to reflect in a new way upon their 
own actions and to see how things can be done differently. (OE 30.5.2005) 
 
Thus, it was suggested, Finland should continue to support a practical 
partnership with the neighboring area cooperation funds. After all, “the 
organizations and activists participating in cooperation are often the best experts 
in creating and promoting the democratic rules of the game” (OE 30.5.2005). It 
was also understood that creating a democratic civic culture would take time 
and patience and that it was unrealistic to expect that the attitudes and practices 
would change overnight throughout entire Russia. Although the Russian civil 
society had developed greatly since the early 1990s, the number of NGOs could 
already be counted in hundreds of thousands, and the organizations had 
succeeded in building broader coalitions to drive their goals, their influence on 
the federal level was still regarded as still weak (OE 30.5.2005; E 26.7.2005; E 
28.11.2005).  
While there were apparent problems on the grand scale of things, locally the 
NGOs was seen to have an important role, for example in promoting the welfare 
of their own communities, in providing employment, producing services, and in 
helping the socially vulnerable groups. In some areas, such as southern Russia, 
human rights organizations especially had, however, become “the authorities' 
eyesore, even targets of downright persecution” (OE 30.5.2005). 
In addition to mere civil society links, the Finnish experts called for 
cooperation between the government and NGOs. However, they were also 
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forced to admit that equal dialogue was difficult to create when the balance of 
power between the state and the civil society was evidently disproportionate 
and those in power had quite prejudiced attitudes toward NGOs. For these 
reasons, international cooperation, it was proposed, should aspire to: 
 
…strengthen the position of Russian non-governmental organizations by helping 
them to promote democracy, the rule of law and respect for human development. 
Support to organizations in the current political situation is also particularly 
important because we must not leave alone those people who are building the basis of 
democracy and civil society in their own country at the level of everyday life. (OE 
30.5.2005) 
 
Things started to go from bad to worse in July 2005 when President Putin 
dictated strict rules of the game for the work of NGOs during a large roundtable 
with NGO representatives organized at the Kremlin (E 26.7.2005). Putin 
declared his willingness to encourage the NGO activities and admitted that the 
development of civil society was an integral part of a modern, democratic state. 
However, Putin specified that foreign funding of any political activity in the 
country should be placed under state control. “No self-respecting state will 
allow this, and we will not allow it,” Putin asserted firmly.  
The credibility of the statement was immediately questioned by the editorial 
of August 26, 2005, which reminded that in the past the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union had funded the operations of more than one party in Finland with 
large sums of money, though not in public (E 26.7.2005). Putin's statement 
caused considerable confusion also in Russia, as the current law prohibited 
political parties from taking foreign election money but allowed support for 
operational expenses. The latter had indeed been done explicitly and openly. For 
example, the United States alone was reported as having channeled tens of 
millions of dollars ($ 85 million in 2005) of assistance annually for the 
bourgeoning civil society in Russia (E 26.7.2005; E 28.11.2005). 
What was not reported in the HS was that during the roundtable, the idea of 
establishing a Civil G8 forum65 and coordinating its activities with Russia’s G8 
presidency received Putin’s backing. Given Putin’s stand on foreign monetary 
and other forms of aid, his endorsement of the Civil G8 and, in particular, the 
involvement of Western organizations in its preparation phase was unexpected 
but could be interpreted to reflected Putin’s pragmatic approach to relations 
with the West as well as his awareness of consultative mechanisms with civil 
society tied to intergovernmental organizations; i.e., to “show that Russia is a 
democratic country that treats NGOs with respect” (Lokshina 2006). 
                                                          
65 Civil G8-2006 forum was officially announced at a press conference on December 20, 2005 by Ella 
Pamfilova, who had been appointed by President Putin in early November as the chair of his Civil 
Society Institutions and Human Rights Council (formerly called the Commission of Human Rights). 
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In November 2005, the Duma began consideration of a draft NGO bill 
requiring everyone, including current NGOs, to register with the Ministry of 
Justice, banning the presence of branches departments or representative offices 
of foreign NGOs in Russia, e.g., Greenpeace or Amnesty International (forcing 
them to register as Russian organizations), forbidding foreigners from belonging 
to Russian-based NGOs and strengthening the auditing functions of the 
government to monitor, control, and restrict domestic and particularly foreign 
funding of NGOs (E 28.11.2005; Nichol 2006, 11). In the West, the bill was 
commonly interpreted to reflect the Putin administration’s perception that 
foreign-based or funded NGOs had helped trigger “color revolutions” in 
Georgia and Ukraine and that NGOs could similarly try to subvert the 
government in Russia (Bigg 2005).  
President Putin and State Duma officials said the proposed amendments to 
the NGO law were designed to counteract terrorism and money laundering. The 
most important reason seemed, however, to be foreign financial support, which 
was directed on supporting political activity – thought Putin had not made clear 
what he included in “political activity.” In Helsingin Sanomat it was pointed out 
that this would not be limited to political parties as Putin had also taken, for 
example, environmental groups as his eyesore (E 28.11.2005). Environmental 
NGOs, according to him, had taken a stand against important projects for 
Russia's national interests, such as the construction of oil ports in the Baltic Sea 
or the Eastern Siberian oil pipeline and that this had been done with foreign 
financial support. Such statements, the editorial stated, show that Russia still has 
a long way to go towards a civil society, where free civic action with its 
international linkages is a matter of course. Accordingly, it was characteristic of 
the current state of democracy in Russia that although the bill was seen from 
Western perspectives as most dubious, it passed by an overwhelming majority 
(370 to 18) in its first reading in the Duma (E 28.11.2005; EurActiv 2005). 
Harsh criticism of the draft NGO bill followed from both Russian and 
international NGOs but also by some U.S. officials, the Council of Europe, the 
EU Civil Society Contact Group, and EU politicians, as well as the media. 
President Putin, with the backing of numerous Public Chamber members, then 
suggested some changes to soften the draft (EurActiv 2005; Nichol 2006, 11). The 
new version of the bill “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the 
Russian Federation” permitted foreign NGOs to operate in Russia under the 
condition that they submitted regular reports of their funding and programs, 
which could then be reviewed against Russian interests. In the second reading in 
the Duma, the bill was approved and signed into law in December 2005 and 
scheduled to enter into force in April 2006. 
The fact that the new NGO law was so easily passed in the Duma was taken 
as a clear indication of the Kremlin’s phobia of revolution (OE 5.2.2006). The 
color revolution had put the decision makers on their toes, which – despite the 
concession made in the revised law – in turn put the Russian non-governmental 
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organizations in a tight spot. It was appropriately stipulated that such a 
development of strangulation should also cause concerns in Finland (OE 
5.2.2006). 
It was put forth that the ‘managed democracy’ and the ‘vertical of power’ 
pursued by President Putin clashed with the philosophy of Russian NGOs. 
Many NGO representatives emphasized that they had no interest in revolution 
but that they rather worked to the benefit of the most vulnerable groups of 
people seeking, in so doing, solutions to painful problems related to social 
security, health care and education, which were not taken care of by the 
government. It was reminded that the economic importance of associational 
activity was well understood in the Russian Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade, which was also the only government sector to take issue against the 
new law (OE 5.2.2006). 
Russian NGOs stressed that the realization of the law would require 
significant financial investments and more administrative staff form the state. 
Furthermore, the law was also in conflict with the Russian Constitution, 
international law, and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. For many, the most 
disturbing aspect of the law was, however, its vagueness (OE 5.2.2006). The 
criteria had been left so vague that in practice civil servants – or the Kremlin – 
was free to decide who was authorized and who was not (OE 5.3.2006). The 
apparent room for interpretation subjected the NGOs to authorities’ 
arbitrariness by allowing them to terminate any organization, or deny its 
registration, if it threatened, in their view, the Russian “national interests” with 
its “political activities” (OE 5.2.2006). 
The new NGO Law was feared to impede cooperation between Russian and 
Western NGOs, as in addition to human rights and environmental organizations 
also many socially oriented organizations were heavily dependent on Western 
funding. In some cases, a Russia organization had been almost solely relying on 
foreign funds, the termination of which thus threatened to close down the 
organization altogether. Even thought NGOs were forced into a tight spot, a 
glimpse of hope was seen in the situation (OE 5.2.2006). It was explained that in 
some Russian regions, such as in St. Petersburg and Perm, successful 
cooperation had developed between the government and NGOs in the last ten 
years. It was, however, feared that the enforcement of the law could 
compromise also this cooperation. As a result, it was depicted, some NGOs were 
doomed to close down, whereas some could be forced underground, similar to 
the Soviet era, in order to avoid regulatory control – putting independent and 
voluntary civil action was thus at risk. (OE 5.2.2006; cf. OE 5.3.2006.) 
Pettiness and paranoia had become Putin's trademarks and the present 
atmosphere in Russia recalled the stagnation of the Leonid Brezhnev era (OE 
5.3.2006). The Kremlin had already taken control over radio and television 
stations as well as the Parliament and provincial governors; only the oligarchs 
and the judiciary were on the loose for the time being. Now Putin was attacking 
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NGOs, even though they were weak and he himself in his prime. The reason for 
this was seen to be that the NGOs could be seen as the last islands of 
independence – and that Putin seemed confident the United States’ Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) was exploiting them to threaten his power. For some, 
however, the situation provided to be an awkward transition to economic 
matters: 
 
…the development that is taking place in Russia regarding civic organization and 
human rights issues, and that we are so horrified about, is probably only good for 
Finland. The Russians’ rapidly increased prosperity may well bring well-being to us 
as well. When it appears to fall upon areas which do not appear to develop on their 
own, what is the harm in that, if the Russians come and do it? (L 12.2.2006) 
 
The argument that the author was going after was that the “direction of the 
neighboring area cooperation is changing,” because due to the proximity of 
Russia and the attractiveness of Finland as a safe and incorrupt country could 
bring more entrepreneurs and capital not just to Russian border areas but also to 
the Finnish side. Nevertheless, it was clear that the “managed” democracy 
policy of the Putin's administration had forced the democratic development in 
Russia into a corner: 
 
History is unlikely to remember Putin for being a catalyst of Russia's democratic 
development, a builder of a constitutional state and civil society, even though those 
were the goals he set for himself at the beginning of his term. Putin has neither been 
able to do anything about the eternal scourge, corruption…. The list of major 
disadvantages of the country could be continued for long. (OE 2.4.2006) 
 
 
5.2.5 New Realism: Russia as a Contradictory Neighbor, but a 
Necessary Partner 
The honeymoon between Russia and the Western democracies was heralded as 
being over (E 1.5.2006) when a new kind of hardness appeared in Russia's 
foreign policy agenda. It was seen that Putin was deliberately taking Russia ever 
further from the ideals of Western democracy and the Western market economy 
based on private ownership. This was reflected in Russian foreign policy, which 
had been getting an increasingly self-conscious make-up and now picked its 
goals in confined manner from a national perspective. In Finland, the 
strengthening of Russia was followed disconcertedly. 
While it was clear that the change was based on an increase in energy prices, 
which in turn had strengthened Russia’s financial room to maneuver, Russia's 
foreign policy was, however, seen as being “reminiscent of a consumer, who 
goes shopping without deciding what he really wants to buy” (E 1.5.2006). 
Consequently, there was an apparent risk that Russia could be “becoming a 
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great power, without the idea of the state, a good partner and a threatening 
problem simultaneously or alternately, always depending on the current market 
trends change” (ibid.). 
In addition to a more assertive foreign policy line, the internal developments 
in Russia were also followed anxiously. In his annual speech on television, 
President Putin had defined worrying demographic (instead of democratic!) 
development as the most urgent problem of modern Russia (E 11.5.2006), which 
was interpreted to tell a lot about the priorities of the leadership (E 8.6.2006). 
Putin had been vowing in the name of democracy, but his views on its 
development in Russia were blamed to be a “vision of an enlightened autocrat” 
(E 5.6.2006). Whereas in the beginning of Yeltsin’s term a democratic euphoria 
was burgeoning in Russia, during the Putin presidency, it was explained, 
democracy was not allowed to evolve from the bottom up and must been 
controlled in an autocratic manner from above (E 5.6.2006). 
As Finland's six-month EU presidential term neared, the discussion turned to 
what ought to be done with this opportunity. There was a long list of issues, 
which had to be either agreed upon or at least discussed. There were, however, 
also issues that would not be handled formally in the meetings. Geography and 
history divided Europe in two; relations with Russia – or attitudes towards 
Russia – separated Eastern and Western states from one another (OE 28.6.2006). 
It was clear that Russian relations would be a challenge for Finnish presidency, 
but it was also the topic to which Finland had the most to contribute. Russia's 
importance had all the while increased on the EU's agenda, and even if 
increasingly self-confident, it had to be persuaded to commit genuinely 
European cooperation somehow. However, when compared to the festive mood 
of exactly seven years ago when Finland began its first presidency of the EU, the 
mood was now different. While back then: 
 
…officials had uttered French verbs in unison and learned about the working group 
management strategies. Flags flapped, ties were selected and willow grouse’s breast 
was roasted while waiting for the important EU visitors. Finland was very much 
ready to take Europe to the new millennium. (E 1.7.2006) 
 
Now the public interest in the six-month period was diluted. For Finland, the 
EU had become already business as usual. However, while during the previous 
Finnish presidency the construction of Russian relations had come to a halt due 
to the tension surrounding the war in Chechnya, Finland now had a second 
chance to build more coherent, trust-based relations with Russia. (E 1.7.2006.) 
It was suggested that Russia had to be dealt with as it was, and “not as one 
would ideally wish it to be” (OE 7.7.2006). No one could deny that Russia had 
oil, gas, influence, a growing market, and its own will. While it thus was “too 
big and too self-aware to be influenced much by nagging,” there was no reason 
to accept its self-characterizations. After all, from their Soviet-era experience, if 
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anyone Finns should know how easily courtesy, self-indulgence, and 
opportunism can change into self-deception. This was to suggest that while in 
the West many still wished to believe that Russia’s road to democracy was a 
mere question of time and learning, during President Putin's second term in 
office, Russia had not been “lingering on the road to democracy,” but rather 
been “hurrying up on its way out from there.” (OE 7.7.2006.)  
For ordinary Finns, Finnish-Russian relations had become a constant cause of 
irritation (OE 27.8.2006). Although the relationship between the two countries 
was officially in better shape than ever, trade was soaring and Russians’ 
overnight stays in Finland increasing, sparks were downright flying because 
forest fires in Russia had brought smoke and fine particles across the border to 
Finland. Calculations on how much Finnish mortality and health expenditure 
would increase due to the fires were presented and people appeared particularly 
upset by the fact that the Russian authorities were not, in their view, doing 
anything to extinguish the flames. 
It became apparent that the times of shushing were certainly over in Finland. 
While Finns were sweating over the EURO-4 emissions and catalytic converters, 
Russia, it was accused, had a cavalier attitude towards environmental protection 
(E 16.8.2006). This was seen to indicate a bad attitude problem – “pure ignorance 
and laziness,” which was only made worse by a kind of crooked pride that a 
superpower did not need or accept help. It was seen that cooperation should be 
easier and Russia should “wake up and realize” that environmental issues were 
common and neighboring countries had to be able to cooperate “without the 
simple-minded sense of national pride” (E 16.8.2006).  
However, whereas it was certainly a positive development that the things 
could be openly criticized and discussed with Russia, it was noted that it was a 
shame that “nasty and dismissive generalizations” have been made about the 
next-door neighbor (OE 27.8.2006). The attempt to cool off the debate remained, 
however, somewhat superficial and came with an undertone that, if anything, 
served to reconfirm the normative difference between the two countries: 
 
Finland and Russia are separated by the Europe’s deepest gap in living standards. 
People in the Nordic welfare states live in a completely different world than Russia 
and the Russians. In Finland, the basics issues are generally speaking in good 
condition and people have moved in some way to a fine-tuning phase of living… In 
Russia, a new start for the former social system and the ruins of the imperial empire is 
being sought. Now, an attempt to erect the pillars of a new social system is being 
made. Everything else remains to be done. (OE 27.8.2006) 
 
In the end, the crux of the matter was that there was no common understanding 
of the problem. Whereas in Finland the fires were seen as a severe public health 
issue and fine particle invasion, in Russia the fires ranked as only one of the 
many daily life issues of a large country. The public health aspect of it was 
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hardly even more recognized, and if it were, there were a number of more 
pressing challenges to deal with (OE 27.8.2006). Nevertheless, the fact that 
Russia paid off, well in advance, its more than $ 20 billion debt to the Paris Club 
countries, Finland among them, but could not afford to allocate resources to put 
out the forest fires made Russia seem duplicitous, pretending “to be poor at one 
time and rich at another” (E 27.8.2006).  
A more pressing question had to do with instability and downright 
vigilantism in Russia. The murder of Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian journalist 
and human rights activist, was taken to reflect the state of Russian society and 
seen as yet another indictment of what a desolately long way Russia was facing 
on the road towards stable democracy and freedom of speech (E 10.10.2006; L 
10.10.2006). The murder and how it was dealt with cast a dark shadow over 
Russia and aroused both grief and consternation in the letters. The uproar 
caused by the murder came in an inconvenient time for Finland as the EU 
Summit in Lahti was only ten days away and it was feared that the topical issue 
would downplay the agreed program. The Finnish government was even 
criticized for having invited President Putin to the meeting (E 20.10.2006).  
At the same time as the Summit, more than 300 civil society actors from 
across Russia and EU countries gathered in “Together for the Future” Forum to 
discuss the future forms and opportunities for EU-Russian cooperation at the 
level of civil society. This was seen as desperately needed given that the EU 
regarded Russia as a strategic partner and genuine partnership presupposed 
active contacts also at the civil society level. CSOs had already developed 
networks to a certain point within the Barents and Baltic Sea regions, but within 
the EU there had not been meetings in which civil society actors with 
connections to Russia could have discussed together with Russian actors 
questions of networking as well as the development of cooperation. 
In the actual Summit, Russia had to face a more coherent Union. While 
before various EU member states had been seeking compromises by 
communicating directly with Moscow, as was preferred also by Russia, the 
situation was now different. Politkovskaya’s murder and other events that had 
revealed the rise of human rights violations in Russia, as well as the 
authoritarian power politics illustrated by the events at the Georgian-Russian 
border, drove the member states in one row and cemented unity amongst them. 
The situation was new also for Putin: at this time he had to face the EU, which 
told its criticisms of these events and its desire to build a common energy policy 
for the Union with one voice. From the Finnish perspective, it was a great 
benefit that this voice was that of Finland and that there was enough courage to 
raise it. (E 22.10.2006.)  
An entirely different matter, of course, was whether the EU’s unity would 
withstand and how Putin would react to the Western criticisms. Even though 
the EU set itself up as united in front of Russia in Lahti, there were doubts 
whether this would endure a real test (E 24.10.2006). There was a general 
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consensus that Russia's progress towards democracy had been painfully slow 
and not at all straightforward, and this should not and could not be ignored in 
Finland or anywhere else in Europe. While these setbacks formed yet another 
good reason to treat Russia with caution and to maintain distance (OE 
26.10.2006), at the same time the economic interdependence between EU and 
Russia had only strengthened. It was thus argued that Russia’s democratic 
development should not be made into  the threshold question that would 
overshadow everything else on the EU-Russian agenda. Keeping Russia’s 
democratic development “flamboyantly on view in the meetings between the 
EU and Russia” was seen to be merely “a publicity game of politicians,” 
something that was talked about in the public but not at the negotiating table 
(OE 26.10.2006). 
In Finland, the alarming developments in Russia caused Janne Virkkunen, 
the then HS Editor-in-Chief, to announce his and his newspaper’s support for 
Finnish membership in NATO. Virkkunen based his stand on a traditional 
geographical argument and put forth that while it was true that Finland, 
Sweden, and Austria are colored with the same crayon on the political map of 
Europe, demarking them as neutral countries that also joined the EU on the 
same day but had not sought to join NATO, Finland alone shared a common 
border with Russia. Accordingly, only Finland would be directly threatened 
should things go wrong in Russia (OE 28.10.2006). 
To make things worse, less than a month from the EU Summit in Lahti, the 
unity of the EU had already began to crack (E 14.11.2006). The “we-spirit” that 
Matti Vanhanen (Centre Party), Prime Minister of Finland at the time, had 
heralded as having been found in Lahti was now on a thin ice as particularly 
Poland and the Baltic countries had become far more critical of Russia than the 
rest of the member states. It was acknowledged it to be futile to try to whitewash 
the fact that the member states, Finland included, had many questions needing 
to be negotiated bilaterally (E 23.11.2006). This meant that the perfunctory smiles 
had been doled out and what happened in Lahti also stayed in Lahti.  
As a result, the accomplishments of the official Helsinki EU-Russia Summit 
remained slim. While little was expected from the summit, even less was there 
to remember about it. At a press conference of the Summit, both sides 
nevertheless reassured the public that the meeting had been important and that 
the prospects of Russia-EU relations remained bright (OE 19.12.2006). Much 
more the leaders in that situation were not able to say. What was positive about 
the Summit was that it was the first occasion in which the Northern Dimension 
policy was discussed at the top level (see subsection 4.5.4). The resultant 
revitalization of the policy was great news for Finland and it confirmed that 
relations with Russia had to be maintained at the top of Finland's political and 
economic agenda.  
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Geography Remains – Expertize Does Not 
Given that few other matters could have as tangible an effect on Finnish security 
and well-being as the social and economic transformations in Russia, the 
development of EU-Russia cooperation and the ability of Finland to understand 
and take advantage of these trends, it was seen that more attention had to be 
paid to these matters. In the government platform of the time, Russia was 
mentioned three times: in a vague sentence about foreign policy, in the context 
of the Northern Dimension, and in the transport section. This was deemed as 
insufficient for in addition to mere economic linkages, Russia provided a 
particularly great opportunity also in the fields of education, science and 
research, and culture. Furthermore, it provided also a skilled workforce. It was 
seen that common interests could be found in working towards the reliability of 
energy supply, environmental issues, security issues and threats, and 
opportunities of globalization. (L 16.1.2007.) 
The Russia report 66  published by the Committee for the Future of the 
Parliament of Finland confirmed that the importance of Russia to Finland had 
been only growing and a good future for Russia was important for Finland as 
well (E 27.1.2007). It repeated the old message that even if everything else would 
change, geography would remain the same. The Paasikivian premise had 
endured and Russia continued to be Finland’s neighbor – “[i]ts destiny has 
always influenced ours, and always will” (Kuusi, Smith & Tiihonen 2007, 7). In 
the letters in was concurred that the geography should not indeed be forgotten 
and Finns themselves should thus focus on getting along with Russia without 
major conflicts (L 14.2.2007). It was argued that the best and the safest way to do 
this would be to “continue and increase economic and cultural cooperation with 
Russia” (ibid.).  
While the report was largely agreed upon, it ignited a debate on the poor 
Russian language skills of Finns and the young people’s non-existent knowledge 
of Russia and lack of interest towards it. The old generations with their often 
transfixed attitudes were regarded as worrying too much about Russia, whereas 
the younger generations were blamed for not worrying enough (E 27.1.2007; L 
3.2.2007; L 12.2.2007; L 14.2.2007). Lack of knowledge and/or interest was seen as 
problematic for in the EU – at least in its western part and in Brussels – Finns 
still enjoyed appreciation as “connoisseurs of Russia” (E 12.2.2007). While such a 
reputation was largely welcomed, it had to be acknowledged that Finns’ 
expertise on Russia was on “an embarrassingly narrow base” and that “instead 
of really knowing Russia,” it merely referred to “an ability to get along with the 
great neighbor much better than many others” (E 12.2.2007). 
                                                          
66 In the report itself (see Kuusi, Smith & Tiihonen 2007), the experts of the Committee for the Future 
took boldly new paths in their effort to outline three different scenarios of Russia’s future 
development during the upcoming ten years. These were titled as 1) Influential Global Player, 2) 
Mosaic Russia, and 3) Power Elite’s Russia.  
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Strategic Distrust 
An op-ed published on February 16, 2007 aptly argued that two different types 
of logics were clearly pitted against each other. One of them was described as 
being mostly common sense-based, relying on the facts, while the other was 
depicted as being speculative, relying on hypothetical. Russia's Western partners 
were seen to believe in the former, while they were instinctively trying to banish 
the latter. The fact the little progress was made during the recent Helsinki 
Summit regarding the new Partnership Agreement was seen to reflect that the 
image of Russia had only continued to deteriorate in the West (OE 31.5.2007). It 
was considered as odd that the “strategic partners” could not even begin the 
negotiations on a new agreement (OE 16.2.2007). 
The cooling of the atmosphere, it was argued, had been so consistent that it 
had to be considered as the Kremlin's conscious policy (E 28.4.2007). Putin had 
sent, inter alia, a chilly message that the Kremlin would not tolerate foreign 
influence in Russian CSOs, though there was little evidence that the activities of 
the organization supported from the West would have exceeded the limits of 
normal interaction. It was seen that during Putin's second term Russia’s political 
system had diverged further and further away from the Western system, and 
the difference between the two in itself was now feeding the distrust (E 
28.4.2007). Others saw that the ever-colder atmosphere had been caused not only 
by “a series of agitating individual incidents and concrete disputes, but also by a 
very deep mutual disappointment” (OE 30.5.2007). 
Either way, “the Lahti spirit was lost” and “the gap between East-West 
grew” (E 17.5.2007). Now, six months from the Summit, it had become clear that 
Prime Minister Vanhanen had been either simply wrong or mistaken to sense 
the calm before the storm. Russia behaved ever more loutishly and attempted to 
poke the EU front in pieces. Thus, there was no longer a common we-spirit in 
relation to Russia; instead of talking with one voice, some of the countries 
asserted requirements on their own, others remained silent and the rest were at 
a loss for words. It was analyzed that from the Russian perspective the stalemate 
surrounding the new partnership agreement was not necessarily a negative 
thing as EU countries would have to buy gas and oil from Russia in any case (E 
17.5.2007). In Finland, the dispute was seen to be absurd for both Russia and all 
the EU must have known that they were “doomed for cooperation” (E 
17.5.2007). Even so, the way out of the stalemate was blocked because, no matter 
how necessary cooperation was, Putin did not have “the slightest intention to set 
up a faithful copy of Western constitutional democracy in Russia” and the EU 
would not accept Russia as an “equal partner without such a democracy” (OE 
30.5.2007).  
 
Geography, Geography, Geography 
In 2007, the traditional threatening image of Russia was reasserted by the 
Finnish Minister of Defense Jyri Häkämies’ (National Coalition Party) speech 
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about Finland’s security policy at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies in Washington, DC67. The speech, or rather a phrase the media picked 
up from it, led to a public uproar akin to which had not been experienced in a 
while. In its stinginess, the debate topped even that caused by Admiral 
Kaskeala’s statement a year earlier (see above). In all, it revealed much about the 
underlying attitudes that Finns hold towards Russia. 
Minister Häkämies stated that Finland was fortunate to be located in one of 
the safest corners of the world. This geographical location had, however, also its 
downsides. According to Häkämies, the three main security challenges “not 
only for Finland, but for all of us” were “Russia, Russia and Russia.” Few had, 
however, read the entire speech but focused rather on this single sentence – thus 
taking it out of its context. Those who read further began to notice that in the 
second part of his speech Häkämies backtracked by saying that “it would be a 
foolish and mistaken conclusion to draw” that the new Russia would threaten 
Finland's security. This was “not the case.”  
Criticism was spearheaded by Foreign Minister Tuomioja (Social Democratic 
Party). His statement, however, lost some of its credibility for Tuomioja had 
indulged in distortion, a common sin in the Finnish Russia debate, by claiming 
that Häkämies had declared Russia to be a threat to Finland (OE 11.9.2007) while 
in fact Häkämies had evoked the word challenge. These two words were seen to 
have a completely different meaning. Tuomioja’s wording – conscious or not – 
thus sounded like an attempt on his part to fuel already existing prejudices 
against Russia and fearful attitudes. Others blamed Häkämies for aggregating a 
normative anti-Russian alliance by stating that Russia was a challenge “for all of 
us” (OE 9.9.2007). As “us” was seen to include not just Finns but also Americans 
and apparently also all other countries that embraced Western democracy. Even 
though Häkämies’ use of plain language was praised, his underlying analysis 
was seen to be incorrect; the national security challenges of Finland extended 
beyond a single large neighbor. (Ibid.) 
The fuss caused by Häkämies’ speech was suggested to indicate in a 
depressing manner how difficult it was to have an unrestrained foreign and 
security political debate in Finland: 
 
In the bad old times people did not dare to say the king of the forest’s name aloud, so 
a rich set of euphemisms was created instead. Now in the place of the word “bear,” 
there is a word “Russia.” To mention that of three times corresponds to three bears 
attacking the only horse of the village. (OE 11.9.2007) 
 
The criticism towards Häkämies’ outspokenness was seen to confirm that the 
rhetoric of Finlandization had rooted incredibly deep into the minds and 
                                                          
67 The original English language version available at 
www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?663_m=3335&l=en&s=270 
 298   
 
backbones of Finns. It seemed that the fuss had given an excuse to dig out the 
“foreign political marking hatchets” from behind the woodshed, where they had 
been hidden well oiled (OE 11.9.2007). The hassle about a single sentence aside, 
Häkämies’ speech could be seen a rather clear articulation of Finland's position, 
why it stuck to the areal defense and general conscription and why it was not a 
NATO member.  
While the argument Häkämies had put forth was commonplace in the public 
debate in Finland, hearing it being said in such a formal situation was something 
new. Instead of evaluating the truthfulness of the statement, the public debate 
surrounding Häkämies’ assessment focused mainly, just as it had been the case 
with Admiral Kaskeala’s statements a year earlier, on whether or not it was 
suitable for the Finnish defense minister to say such things about Russia. 
The perpetual fuss caused by the speech was also seen to suggest that the 
security political debate in Finland was still the chore of a small circle; even a 
single cleverly timed address could influence the topics and priorities of the 
debate for weeks (OE 1.10.2007). The NATO debate that had began already in 
1991 and had since then continued without substantial changes, confirming 
Russia as the eternal other, was a good example of this. It was argued that it was 
hardly worth marketing the NATO membership for Finns with the threat of 
Russia, or other negative arguments, as the support of NATO would not grow 
until the new generation politicians manage to communicate to the people that 
NATO was a normal part of the current international system to which Finland is 
participating because of its own interest (OE 1.10.2007). 
 
Wishful Thinking and Power Politics 
On the level of EU-Russia relations, a shadow was cast over the cooperation 
designated as a  ‘strategic partnership.’ While the related treaties had not lost 
their significance, many had begun to doubt whether the partnership was 
anymore genuine. While the media on both sides conveyed an image that hardly 
corresponds to what real partners would expect from each other, it was seen 
that the choice had always been, and still was, that of Russia. The Western 
policy towards Russia could not be spared from criticism either; since the break-
up of the Soviet Union it had deviated from its own principles and only 
encouraged Russia to act as it had done. (OE 22.10.2007.) 
In his op-ed of October 25, 2007, Olli Rehn, then European Commissioner for 
Enlargement, responded by stressing that even though Russia's foreign policy 
line had unquestionably become tougher and record-high oil prices provided 
“food for muscles and weight to words,” what was needed was not a 
confrontation but rather strategic thinking and perseverance on both sides. Rehn 
insisted that the time had become for Russia to show that it was seriously 
committed to responsible, multilateral cooperation because “when one wished 
to join the European family,” it was necessary to “comply with the principles 
agreed by the family together” (OE 25.10.2007). Perhaps due his position, Rehn 
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chose to ignore the fact that Russia had recently been showing little interest in 
joining the European family, but rather sought to emancipate and remain single 
– or to create a family of its own.  
Rehn acknowledged that while Russia had prospered and stabilized, civil 
liberties had become more encumbered, democracy was going through a cold 
spell and the authoritarian mode of governance had been strengthened. The EU, 
he explained, did not preach about these problems, but sought to bring them up 
in the discussions with the Russian leadership. After all, strong economic 
interdependence with Russia was expected to counterbalance the political 
difficulties of the EU-Russia relationship. It was this interdependence that was 
believed to create a fruitful base for mutually beneficial cooperation also in other 
sectors. Rehn recalled that at the same time as Finland continued its close 
bilateral relations with Russia, it was also expected to continue its active 
involvement in the EU-Russia relations. He saw that the Northern Dimension 
provided a crucial platform in managing this because it was one of the few 
cooperation programs between the EU and Russia that actually worked. (OE 
25.10.2007.) 
Regardless of the level, good relations had to be preserved because there 
were a number of open questions waiting to be solved (L 19.12.2007). Those that 
had been on display in public ranged from the lease renewal of the Saimaa 
Canal, protection of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland, the development of 
the oil destruction measures on the Gulf of Finland, the alignment of the 
Russian-German gas pipeline with its environmental problems, problems with 
customs, and truck queues. Last but not least was the dispute on the timber 
export tariffs, which was also linked to the EU and to Russia's desire to join the 
WTO.  
In addition to these, Russia was struggling with large-scale internal 
problems. Threats were directed, above all, against the Russians themselves, but 
they were seen also as relevant questions in terms of Finland (L 21.10.2007). 
Third sector actors, civil society organizations, were seen to hold the key to 
solving some the problems, especially at local and regional levels to which the 
Russia State had now granted more practical responsibility of the welfare 
solutions. CSOs were seen to play an important role in coming up with new 
initiatives as well as complementing public services by filling in the gaps with 
their training and awareness-raising work. While the CSOs in this sector 
received government support, they were largely dependent on foreign 
financing. In spite of the 2006 NGO law, Finnish cooperation projects were still 
reported to be welcomed and necessary. (Ibid.)  
 
5.2.6 Govern and Conquer: Russia as a Neighbor, Partner – or on Its 
Own? 
The Putin-Medvedev era that followed Yeltsin's “wild years” was commonly 
given credit for stabilizing Russian society. The tragic acts of violence, whereby 
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human rights activists had been murdered, a number of activists and journalists 
mugged, NGOs harassed, and demonstrations repressed the by force, were 
taken to indicate that the stability was only superficial. As revised in the op-ed 
of August 21, 2009, the heavy legacy of the war in Chechnya as well as the 
widespread corruption and arbitrariness in the justice system, the Militsiya and 
the Federal Security Service (FSB) eroded societal stability and democratic 
development and suppressed the operational preconditions of the civil society 
by placing ordinary citizens and civil society activists in a very vulnerable 
position.  
Murders and assaults were seen to indicate that activism criticizing those in 
power and keeping watch on their actions had become more risky. As a result, it 
was explained, Russian civil society had become increasingly divided into two 
camps (OE 21.8.2009). The first one operated in close cooperation with the 
authorities and included, inter alia, a number of youth as well as social and 
health care organizations. From the authorities’ perspective, such organization 
seemed useful as they provided services that the government was unable to 
offer; even though some of the organizations were critical of the prevailing 
policy, their behavior did not threaten the political system in the eyes of the 
authorities. As it was, many activists had learned to accept that it was safer to 
avoid open confrontation with the authorities and instead direct their activities 
towards solving the everyday life problems of citizens. (OE 21.8.2009.) 
The other camp was seen to include organizations that were constantly in a 
collision course with the political and economic interest groups (OE 21.8.2009). 
Among others, they included human rights organizations as well as 
organizations investigating corruption and environmental organizations. These 
organizations had suffered from both the law on combating extremist activities 
that came into force in 2002 and the NGO law approved in 2006, which had 
narrowed their living space significantly and subjected them increasingly to 
greater state control: 
 
As things stand, public watchdog activism requires exceptional courage in Russia. It 
is likely that some of this kind of activism has to go underground and turn to the 
“kitchen politics” familiar from the Soviet era; i.e., begins to act in secret from the 
public scrutiny. (OE 21.8.2009.) 
 
The broad design of the laws had enabled the authorities to interpret them 
arbitrarily and to apply them selectively. Critical organizations had been closed 
down, or they were deprived of the right to register, inter alia, by appealing to 
fire safety violations and taxation ambiguities. Also computers had been 
confiscated. (OE 21.8.2009.) Such a practice was far from the rhetoric of the early 
Putin era, when activists had reason to be optimistic about the future of Russian 
civil society. For example, in November 2001, President Putin told the first Civic 
Forum, a large meeting initiated and sponsored by the Kremlin that gathered 
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together representatives of state institutions and the civic sector, that there could 
not be a strong democratic state in the context of a weak society (Weigle 2002, 
137). In his often-cited opening speech Putin addressed the audience by stating 
that: 
 
Without a true relationship of partnership between the state and society there can be 
neither a strong state nor a prosperous and happy society. What is needed is an equal 
dialogue. And we are aware that the effectiveness of the dialogue depends on us to a 
great extent, on the representatives of power.... We are ready to listen attentively and 
to hear what you propose. I believe that now that the time of truly great opportunities 
has come for Russia and its citizens such cooperation can become highly 
productive…. It is our duty together to use the historical chance presented to us. 
Otherwise, we may again find ourselves in the ‘backyard of civilization.’ (Cited in 
Salmenniemi 2007, 19) 
 
Last Chance for a New Beginning? 
The problematic relations at the EU-Russia level shifted the focus back onto 
bilateral relations. Finland was seen to lack an actual national strategy towards 
Russia – it only had “uncoordinated fussing in individual, in themselves good, 
things here and there.” If the situation got difficult, Finns were seen to 
“immediately seek help from Brussels.” (L 28.1.2009.) It was seen that a lot of 
both Finnish national and EU money had been burned in the “bureaucratic 
guidance” of the numerous stand-alone programs and the neighboring area 
cooperation projects, yet, in the absence of a strategic thread, coordination, the 
results remained “minimal, if not non-existent.” (Ibid.)  
It was contemplated that this was due to a lack of genuine interest for many 
would prefer “not have to touch that direction even with tweezers.” The 
political conditions and general uncertainty, it was seen, were used only as 
excuses for not even considering the opportunities that Russia would offer. 
However, given that “ o ddly enough,” it seemed that the Russians still 
preferred to cooperate “with their familiar neighbor, a national strategy was 
urgently needed now when the financial crisis had shattered Russia’s illusions 
of striking it rich on its own. The realization of this was seen to enable more 
honest and “persistent cooperation based on the economic realities.” (L 
28.1.2009.) 
During his visit to Finland, well-known Russian scientist Dmitri Trenin 
argued that the reality revealed by the economic crisis had “saved Russia into 
the twenty-first century” after the relationship with the West had first declined 
to “the Brezhnev-era level” (OE 24.2.2009). The crisis was seen to undermine 
Putin’s unwritten social contract, whereby the people were satisfied with 
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“securocracy”68 as long as living conditions improved. A more pessimistic way 
of seeing the situation was to consider the rapprochement only as a phase, 
which did not erase the more prominent trend that Russia was moving away 
from the European values and seeking to nullify the EU's foreign policy 
objectives. The difficulties arose from the fact that Russia was “playing with 
different rules” and had been turning its policy ever more visibly against the 
Western ideas and actions. (Ibid.) 
The popularity of the system created by Putin was seen to be based on three 
pillars: economic growth, the promise of "order,” and the return to foreign 
policy, which would raise the country back up among the leading powers in the 
world (OE 8.8. 2009). Now that the global economic crisis had hit Russia hard, 
all the pillars had begun to falter. However, if the system could cope with 
current problems, it was accurately foretold, Putin could be re-elected in the 
2012 presidential election, whereby he would get the opportunity to terminate 
the model of two strong leaders. It was seen that in this case, Russia could 
become more reluctant and unable to reform itself and sow seeds of problems 
not just with its borders but also in the neighboring countries. (OE 9.7.2009.) 
In particular, Putin’s statements about the negative repercussions that would 
ensue should the NATO military infrastructure approach the Russian border 
caused alarm in Finland where debate about the pros and cons of the 
membership had been lively. The negative repercussions, to which Putin had 
alluded, were interpreted to mean that should Finland join NATO, it would 
affect CBC and trade adversely – and this had to be avoided as it was seen that 
cooperation had been highly beneficial for Finland. Thus, the border should not 
be hardened but softened; a sensible way to do this would be to give up the visa 
regime as soon as possible (OE 30.4.2009). 
The Neighboring area cooperation program, in particular, was taken as an 
example of mutually beneficial cooperation (E 8.6.2009). Even thought the 
projects were carried out in practice on the Russian side, such as in the case of 
treating the sewage of St. Petersburg, they were seen to serve Finnish interests as 
well. According to Minister of the Environment Paula Lehtomäki (Centre Party), 
the use of Finnish funding had not only led to network building and mutual 
learning processes but it also allowed the entrenchment of Finnish technology 
and know-how in Russia. Granted that the environmental challenges knew no 
borders, Lehtomäki saw that it as important to invest in “improving the state of 
our common environment also beyond our borders” (L 18.6.2009). 
Others, however, insisted that neighboring area cooperation was a “lame 
expression” (L 24.6.2009). Even if supporting the wastewater project at its early 
                                                          
68 Securocracy [sekurokratia] is a term used mainly by Docent Arto Luukkanen by which he refers to 
the political system of Russia under the Putin leadership, during which the power has been given in 
the hands of the state security apparatus, such as army, police, and the federal security service (see 
Luukkanen 2009). 
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stages may have been understandable, it was argued that one could now only 
question the meaningfulness of the support that continued to flow despite 
Russia had evidently become wealthier thanks to its massive oil, gas, and arms 
exports:  
 
Shouldn’t every state take care of themselves, in particular of their infrastructure? 
One would think that Russia – perhaps the richest state in the world in terms of 
natural resources – would take it already as a question of honor. (L 24.6.2009) 
 
A sense of acrimony stemmed from the premise that Russia had been targeted 
by Finnish broad-based assistance since the early 1990s. The example shown by 
the state had been followed and put in practice by municipalities, municipal 
associations, churches, regional councils, schools, civic and charitable 
organizations, and even private individuals, who had – with their own input 
and voluntary work – participated in supporting the neighboring areas in 
Russia. In addition to pure financial aid, various goods from clothing to hospital 
beds had been taken across the border. In most cases such… 
 
… relief work has been mainly designed, done, and even eventually almost completely 
paid for by the Finns…. Even Russia’s unpredictable administrative bureaucracy, 
tangled border crossings, not to mention the refusals of entry, has not deflated our 
enthusiasm for our voluntary aid work. When necessary, A Finn can be very spunky 
in his actions. (L 24.6.2009) 
 
It was proposed that “no matter how good the targets of aid may feel like,” the 
continuum of the neighboring area cooperation should be looked at more 
critically because “continuous support makes one passive.” Thus, the Finnish 
support funds to Russia had to be reassessed (E 12.8.2010). If nothing else, “its 
name should be changed to match the actual situation, i.e., to near area 
assistance.” That would be “more honest to both parties.” (L 24.6.2009, emphasis 
added). 
In the debate in the parliament about the NAC and other Finnish public 
funds used to support the Russian border region, the principles had been greater 
than the sums of money. There was hardly any disagreement over the fact that 
the development of the Russian side was important for Finland. While over the 
year even the small streams had cumulated into quite a stream – even 
overflowing to many in the public, what was interesting about the dispute in the 
parliament was that it was fundamentally about measuring and outlining the 
role of the state in the everyday Finnish-Russian relations (E 12.8.2010).  
Equally significant with respect to the ongoing debate was the fact the 
original 1992 agreement, which enabled the creation of the NAC program to 
begin with, was on behalf Finland signed by then Foreign Minister Väyrynen 
(Centre Party), who was now the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development, 
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under the authority of whom the NAC belonged. It was thus expected that 
Minister Väyrynen would do his best, once again, to advocate maintaining the 
appropriations at the current level. In May 2010, the Foreign Ministry, Minister 
Väyrynen in the lead, organized a seminar to discuss the cooperation with 
neighboring areas in Russia carried out by Finnish NGOs. In his introductory 
speech, Minister Väyrynen stressed that Finland had two types of motives with 
respect to the program:    
 
It can bring about positive developments in the neighboring areas, which creates 
social stability in the region and the basis for positive economic development. On the 
other hand, cooperation can be used to repel threats to Finland, such as to prevent the 
spread of communicable diseases. (Väyrynen 2010) 
 
During the present governmental term, the NAC had been renewed, by 
broadening it geographically to reach further in Russia and by narrowing its 
scope substantively. In the event, Minister Väyrynen used the changing 
operating environment as a justification for increased focus on economic 
cooperation but stressed that was also important to maintain the broad scope of 
cooperation and develop further the traditional sectors such as environmental, 
social, and health, as well as nuclear safety. As the state laid emphasis on 
economic activity in its own activity, Väyrynen (2010) explained, the role of 
NGOs in social, health and educational sectors would get emphasized and their 
respective share of funding could be increased. The Russian partners, in turn, 
made up their share, for example, by providing the needed facilities (E 
12.8.2010). 
Instead of the mere sums of money, the real question had to do with the 
discord over which of the numerous joint projects had actually contributed to 
balanced development and took into account the interests of both parties, as was 
required by the agreement. It was regarded that in less than two decades, Russia 
had undergone many changes and was no longer overly interested in the advice, 
for example, on the rule of law, democracy, and civil society development (E 
12.8.2010). The Finns, in turn, had over the years experienced a lot of frustration, 
as many projects had turned out differently from what had been planned.  
Problems arose already from the simple fact that the objectives of 
cooperation defined by the Foreign Ministry differed from those defined in the 
2007 Government Program. While the latter stressed particularly environmental, 
nuclear safety, and social and health sectors, the former now put weight on the 
economic matters. Even though the Foreign Ministry had not listed in detail 
which projects it believed should be eliminated, the general consensus went 
along with the notion that there was plenty to be cut. It was seen that only the 
most important projects should be selected and that the structure of the 
organization deciding upon them should be rethought (L 13.8.2010) The projects 
should no longer be financial vending machines for their practioners (E 
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12.8.2010), independent of the results, but the results gained should be evaluated 
vis-à-vis the support received. 
In the debate it was also often noted that the funds had not in any case been 
intended to be permanent but as a solution during the transition period. Thus, to 
continue the allocation of funds towards that purpose was to indicate that the 
belief that Russia was indeed transitioning into to something was still alive. If 
the target of the expected transition was to become a Western democracy, 
Finland might need to continue funding the neighboring areas for quite some 
time as Russia was currently on its way towards the opposite direction. On the 
other hand, if the funding was supposed to continue until Russia had become 
rich enough to manage its own affairs independently, one could easily argue 
that Finnish aid should have been terminated already a long time ago. 
Certainly, the Neighboring Area Cooperation had developed from assistance 
to Russia to broader action that was justified by Finland's own interests. The 
question was not just about assisting Russia but also about the development of 
cooperation that was needed in order to seek shared interests and solve common 
problems. It was seen that the amount of funding had also influenced what kind 
of actors had been recruited for the funded projects and what had actually been 
done in practice (L 13.8.2010.). The brevity of the funding was seen to limit the 
construction of a long-term horizon.  
It was suggested that instead of chopping up the NAC funds into even 
smaller pieces alongside the EU funding, it might make sense to consider 
organizing a proper funding mechanism for a few key long-term joint projects 
(L 13.8.2010.) This, of course, would require prioritization, i.e., defining the most 
important sectors from the Finnish perspective. A good way to start, it was 
proposed, would be to choose those important projects that had been perceived 
to lead to important social benefits on both sides of the border. Among the 
chosen there could also be projects arising purely from the initiatives of non-
governmental organizations, in which case a credible demonstration of 
effectiveness and social relevance would be essential. (Ibid.) 
 
Unrealistic Images 
More realism was also called for in Karelia debate in Finland. The romantic 
image of a lost Karelia that many hold was claimed to be, from an academic 
point of view, “skewed and imaginary” (OE 4.8.2009). The bond to the border 
regions was claimed to be superficial:  
 
A zeal for Karelianism springs unto life in most cases only during the summer. It 
belongs to the summer in the same way as the Midsummer festival [Juhannus], flies 
and barbecue. During the winter, Karelia is not wanted – For the Finns, the Russian 
Karelia does not exist in the winter. (OE 4.8.2009) 
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The writing went on to fan the flames by asserting that contemporary tourism 
had a clear political frame: Russian Karelia was made more Finnish by being 
present there. Furthermore, it touched upon a sacred topic by suggesting that in 
addition the human tragedy, the yearning after the lost Karelia could be 
explained by an attempt to spread a map of political memory around Karelia as 
well as by the unfortunate trauma caused by the military operation that had 
failed. The experienced bitterness caused by the loss, it was argued, had ever 
since then been reproduced in memoirs:  
 
Those who now look back on those dramatic times were children at the time, and 
their memories are in accordance with that: fragmentary, patchy and selective. Also, 
today’s debate on the ceded Karelia is partly based on the impressions of childhood. 
The building blocks of the reminiscences are the sunny summers, playgrounds, 
primary school and the home yard of the childhood. (OE 4.8.2009) 
 
The academic image of the present-Karelia was thus not, in all its realism, 
compatible with the “politically oriented or emotional love of Karelia.” 
Integration of the two lenses of analysis, however, was expected to make 
contemporary travels across the border more enriching than what it was to 
“meander in the ruins of the Finnish houses in border area.” (OE 4.8.2009.) 
The writing touched a nerve among many. As could have been expected, 
many Karelians and their descendants struggled to recognize themselves in the 
disparaging generalization presented as an academic perspective. The Karelians’ 
right to reminisce was reclaimed by rectifying that they were not seeking for 
traces of Finnishness but of themselves, their families, and ancestry (L 7.8.2009). 
Such heritage tourism was thus a key part of the Karelian identity, which had 
traditionally been strongly place specific and geographically bound. It was also 
seen to give the young descendants of the Karelian immigrants “a lot of 
meanings, social capital, and particularly a sense of solidarity” (ibid.). These 
travels could also be seen as the first forms of cross-border interaction as many 
had sought to help elderly and families with children residing in Karelia in 
various ways during their travels.  
The editorial staff of Helsingin Sanomat limited themselves in stating that 
better knowledge about the Swedish and Finnish history of the formerly Finnish 
Karelia would undoubtedly be beneficial for the current population and an 
obvious target in a civilized country. This, in turn, could create a more solid base 
for the relations between Russia and Finland as well as the Russians and the 
Finns, which should gradually achieve a more natural and more mature phase 
(E 11.11.2009). 
Even if there was no reason to forget what had happened, it was also 
suggested that the Finns should let the memories of the Winter War rest in peace 
(HS 22.1.2010). It was time to stop wallowing in time of war as ” n ot every 
ailment, ache, indisposition or sleepless night” could no longer be due to the 
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war (L 17.1.2010; cf. L 15.1. 2010). Others, however, disagreed and corrected that 
on the Finnish side, the Winter War should be remembered as a Finnish heroic 
tale, which had to be told in every suitable opportunity (L 30.1.2010). The reason 
why the war was less known on the Russian side was seen to be due to the 
simple reason that ” o ver there, the new generations do not know anything 
about the Winter War, as it is not told in school textbooks at all” (ibid.). 
 
Rethinking the Basis of Relations 
The experience from the Nord Stream gas pipe negotiations highlighted ever 
more clearly that economic cooperation with Russia needed clearer rules of the 
game. While no one could decide on Russian economic policy on its behalf, the 
Western countries were seen to possess leverage to decide on the terms of 
cooperation and to stick to them (OE 22.10.2009). Economic cooperation was 
seen as a good start for it promoted stability and enabled peaceful growth and 
development; it was understood that Russia would not become akin to EU 
countries in the foreseeable future, but already its commitment to the Western 
economic system would create opportunities for growth and democracy. It was 
also necessary to rethink the basis of international (i.e., interstate) cooperation (L 
8.12.2009) as they were seen to have a major impact on the other forms of CBC.  
But there were also many open questions. What was the current role of 
Nordic cooperation? Should all cooperation be treated as EU cooperation? How 
should Russia be involved? It was proposed that in order for the EU to start 
constructing its relations with Russia with a clean slate, concrete actions, instead 
of ceremonious affirmations, would be needed. The best way to proceed was 
seen to be to create a common, firm, and realistic strategy for Russia that would 
be approved and committed by the Commission, Council, Parliament, and the 
member countries alike (L 8.12.2009).  
While Finland now operated in the EU frame, it had not, however, changed 
the fact that Russia was Finland’s immediate neighbor and as such it was hard 
to ignore. It was not easy for a small country to balance next to a great power 
(OE 25.2.2010). It was also noted that Russia too had its own views of its 
neighboring countries. After all, it was reminded that through its history, Russia 
had had 24 different neighbors, 17 of which belonged to it at one point in 
history. (Ibid.)  
It was explained that the countries that shared the “burden of a common 
history with Russia” had turned to different security policy solutions. Some had 
resorted to NATO, while others had run down their national defense 
understanding that it would in any case be insufficient if Russia were to attack. 
In Finland, defense remained strongly based on national defense because “ i f 
we are attacked, the best ways to survive are credible territorial defense and the 
’spirit of the Winter War.’” While clear irritation particularly of Estonian and 
Polish approaches had shone through official speeches and documents of the 
Russian foreign policy leaders, Finland's approach was expected to be clear to 
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Russia: in an extreme situation, Finland would defend its existence with arms. It 
was thus assessed that the Finnish-Russian special relationship was, above all, 
based on a “balanced and wise foreign policy” and a thorough knowledge of the 
Russian way of thinking. (OE 25.2.2010.) 
From the Russian perspective, some of the neighbors had been labeled as 
hostile and anti-Russian, while others received high marks. Finnish-Russian 
relations, it was noted, had been described as being even embarrassingly good, 
which it certainly was if compared to Russia’s relations with Estonia or Poland. 
However, if compared with Germany, Finnish-Russian relations were appraised 
as satisfactory. (OE 25.2.2010.) This was because Finland was not… 
 
…a superpower, the cooperation with whom would yield world political weight. 
Russia has not benefited in its EU's policy from Finland as it perhaps had hoped for 
when our country joined the European Union. In addition, there exists a lot of snappy 
criticism of Russia in Finland and our common history is not simple either. (OE 
25.2.2010)  
 
It was assessed that Finnish-Russian technological cooperation must have been 
valuable to Russia, and many Russians did holiday in Finland, but Finland 
could not be seen with these respects unique to Russia. Instead, from the 
Russian point of view, respect and appreciation were the cornerstones of 
cooperation; courage and patriotism meant a lot to Russians. (OE 25.2.2010.) 
There was thus every reason to argue that Finnish-Russian relations were a 
broader phenomenon than ordinary inter-state relations (OE 9.4.2010). In 
addition to geographical proximity, it was based on historical, cultural, and 
economic development, as well as on the existence of the Finnish kindred 
peoples on the territory of Russia. Also the Baltic Sea was seen as a unifying 
factor as it defined the Finnish-Russian parallel interests in politics, economy, 
environment, and culture. The increase in “the political will to build friendly, 
mutually beneficial and equal relations in the Russian centralized power 
apparatus” created a hope that the cooperation would develop favorably (ibid.). 
It was suggested that Russia’s attitude towards Finland was now so 
favorable that it would be a perfect time to explore the possibilities for new 
scientific cooperation and to establish a multi-disciplinary research center 
together (OE 9.4.2010). Vyborg, it was proposed, would be an ideal location for 
this due to its history, culture, and location. It was regarded that a lot depended 
on Finnish-Russian Intergovernmental relations, as the agreements signed at 
that level could pave the road for cooperation at other levels and fields. In order 
for the cooperation to be successful, there was also a need for careful planning of 
operations as well as for people who were able to shoulder the delivery of 
agreed programs and solve problems emerging from disagreements. Otherwise, 
it was predicted, the bureaucratic attitudes and delays would downplay any 
progress made. (Ibid.) 
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The rhetoric stressing the importance of cooperation largely ignored the 
alternative discourse that pointed towards drawbacks to Russian society. The 
two seldom met in the same context. For instance, it was reminded that that in 
Russia the freedom of speech still required a lot of courage (E 3.5.2010). 
According to Freedom House statistics, there was no freedom of expression in 
Russia. On the list of 192 countries, Russia ranked among the most difficult 
cases; number 175 to be exact, next to Congo, Gambia, and Vietnam. Certainly, 
the state of freedom of expression did vary between the 83 administrative 
districts of Russia. The situation was reported to be relative good for example in 
the Republic of Karelia and in St. Petersburg, much worse in Moscow, but non-
existent in 20 districts, mainly in the Caucasus. Freedom was, however, no 
longer restricted by direct pre-censorship but more indirectly, yet effectively, by 
the threat of economic intimidation, the prohibitions imposed under cover of 
fight against terrorism, insecurity caused by the unsolved murders of 
journalists, and the fear of falling into disgrace of the political leaders. (E 
3.5.2010.)  
Whichever approach was taken, the conclusion remained the same: it was 
never boring with Russia as there were plenty of surprises. From being a serious 
question of life or death, relations with Russia had, however, become a more 
lighthearted topic. In Finland one could “follow the relations with Russia in all 
seasons, both inside and outside” (OE 4.8.2010). Recently the weather had 
favored outdoors, as it had been possible to watch as Presidents Halonen and 
Medvedev had been cruising cheerfully along in a golf cart in Naantali. After 
that the presidents promised that officials would quickly solve the controversial 
dispute about an import ban that Russia had suddenly ordered on Finnish dairy 
and meat products. And this was exactly what happened. The fact that foreign 
trade issues commonly prepared by public servants at ministries could be taken 
care of with a political announcement could not but bring to mind the Soviet era. 
Many pondered whether Russia was looking for cooperation or conflict. The 
common answer was yes; the two were not mutually exclusive alternatives to 
Russia. Relations with Russia were now “broader and more open than ever 
before during Finland's independence” and there had to be also room for 
friction in the broad spectrum of human, economic, and political interaction (OE 
4.8.2010). Disputes on custodies, deportations, timber export tariffs, truck traffic, 
and foodstuffs did not necessarily indicate that Russia was seeking for conflicts 
particularly with Finland. They rather proved that Finland did not have any 
special immunity to problems. However, while in general the relations were 
“healthy,” even “entertaining,” especially when compared to the forced 
friendship of the past, Russia undoubtedly produced conflicts with a logic that 
was difficult to discern (ibid.). 
The conflict rhetoric was seen to stem from the perception that to the 
intelligence service circles, which had been granted increased authority during 
the Putin administration, reforms and openness were solely a threat and not an 
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opportunity. A similar trend was suggested by the summer camp of the youth 
organizations in support of the Kremlin (HS 25.7.2010), where the reforms had 
been talked about, but all the opponents had been labeled as fascists (OE 
4.8.2010). It was clear that such a trend should be reacted upon in order to 
remind Russia that it also needed friends, and that it should stop acting like a 
“schoolyard bully” (L 25.8.2010). 
 
Practical Consequences of the Open Border 
There was the smell of smoke in the air. An op-ed published on August 22, 2010 
described how in South-East Finland, Russian forest fires and the glow of the 
steppes had been almost an every summer phenomena. However, now also the 
rest of Finland had had to notice that the state's most heavily guarded border 
was powerless to the acts of nature:  
 
Pallas' Sand grouse migrated from the east, delighting the bird lovers, but so did 
Colorado beetles and grasshoppers. And during the days of the worst heat waves, I 
wished that the border would extend as wall into heaven. For the Russians, the 
border with Finland seems to be more like a string rather than a wall. (OE 22.8.2010) 
 
The records were broken in the number of border crossings at the crossing 
points of South-eastern Finland. About 80 per cent of them had been made by 
Russians. In practice this had become apparent in Lappeenranta and other 
Finnish cities by the border as the visitors from across the border had been 
walking from a shopping center to another and paying for their tax-free 
purchases in a thick wads of bills (OE 22.8.2010). While this brought more jobs 
and money to the Finnish border region, the local response was not only 
positive. Bloody murder was screamed when the regional newspaper reported 
that Russian language street signs were planned for Lappeenranta – the uproar 
did not subside, even when specified that the question was only about guide 
signs for tourist (ibid.). 
Those who emphasized the links to Russia bragged that the trip from 
Lappeenranta to St. Petersburg was shorter than that to Helsinki. In practice, the 
comparison hobbled; Helsinki was less than three hours away, but to St. 
Petersburg one could not go just like that. Many who had traveled in Russia 
must have been able identify themselves with the description about the border 
crossing to Russia provided in the op-ed of August 22, 2010: 
 
I do not get used to the uncertainty that overtakes me in Russia. It starts already at the 
Finnish border post: how to pass through, which papers to show, how to behave. 
Suspense continues on the Russian side, where the wide border zone with strict 
limitations awaits. Car should not be stopped for no other reasons than compulsion; 
side roads cannot be deviated to, nor people or goods can be taken on or off aboard.  
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In a related writing it was also noted that while “Russians vacation and shop in 
Finland without an effort and fly away from Lappeenranta on Ryanair, many 
from here would cross the eastern border “only by order.” However, on the 
other hand, it was argued that as the eastern border becomes thinner, interaction 
increases, distrust dissipates, and thus the border per se becomes more secure. 
The commercial and cultural relations were seen to work already just fine: “[m]y 
friend from Imatra fetches at times diesel, at times linen curtains from Sveto[-
gorsk].” (OE 22.8.2010.) 
 
Back to Power Politics 
The world was integrating, and Finland had become increasingly influenced by 
things happening at greater geographical distance. In August 2010, the then 
Minister of Finance Jyrki Katainen (National Coalition Party) stated while Russia 
was an important EU partner, as one was supposed to say, it was a 
comparatively small economy, which focused mainly on exports of raw 
materials. According to Katainen, Russia desired to see itself as a more 
significant geopolitical player than what it in reality was. “Listening to Russia 
speaking,” Katainen noted, it was difficult to believe that its economy was “only 
the size of the economy of the Netherlands” (HS 17.8.2010a/b; HS 18.8.2010). 
That was to say that Russia was not an economic superpower, “not by any 
indicator.” While Katainen had a point, his estimate of the size of Russia 
economy was off mark – by some $ 700 billion; “the correct point of comparison 
would have been Spain” (HS 20.8.2010). Foreign Minister Stubb (National 
Coalition Party) corrected Katainen's statement by refining that Russia could not 
be taken as a superpower in economic sense for only three per cent of the world 
economy came from Russia (HS 20.8.2010). 
The reaction followed a typical pattern: people heard what they wanted to 
hear whereby the actually message got twisted. The quite realistic, even though 
not numerically accurate, comments made were labeled as “childish defiance” 
(L 22.8.2010). The “boys of the National Coalition party,” it was suspected, must 
have been fool enough to blurt out such things because given their young age 
they could “not know Russian history as well as both the classical and 
kremnological literature through which information on the Russian national 
character can be attained.” By revealing a lot about his own world view, the 
author of the letter then went on to portend that there was “a danger that the 
skillful Russian politicians would see the through the simplistic Jyrki-Boy 
[Katainen]… Lord have mercy on Finland” (L 22.8.2010). 
The apparent fact that even the slightest criticism of Russia caused such 
uproar and a storm in a teacup indicated that Finlandization still raised its ugly 
head (L 23.8.2010; cf. L 25.8.2010a/b). While the criticism was directed more 
broadly to the Finnish society, the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of 
Helsinki, which functions as a national center of research, study, and expertise 
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pertaining to Russia and Eastern Europe, was not spared from accusations 
either. It was regarded… 
 
…downright ridiculous that the researchers from the Aleksanteri Institute are 
dragged to the TV to comment whether or not Katainen’s talk insulted the Russian 
bear. After all, a representative of the Institute cannot answer but that we have 
already stopped beating our wives, that is, to say that Katainen talked dirty and 
harmed the Eastern relationship. If the representative of the Aleksanteri Institute were 
to say something else, soon he would no longer get visas from the Kremlin, and a 
promising career would soon be only a memory. Journalists should ask advice from 
the retired journalists. They have nothing to lose. They can tell the truth even about 
Russia. (L 23.8.2010) 
 
For others, it had been refreshing to hear these opinions on Russia as direct 
comments had traditionally been far and between in the Finnish politics. Many 
had wondered… 
 
… why so different news comes from our two neighboring countries, Sweden and 
Russia? We rarely receive unpleasant surprises from the West; the East instead is 
unpredictable. We can of course refer to the history and cultural differences. I think 
they will not explain everything. Would it be a bit of the same type of phenomenon as 
with school bullies: bullying continues because the subject is unable to give back? (L 
25.8.2010)  
 
Yet another approach to the issue was that the entire debate on Russia was 
missing the point; to talk about a superpower was Finns’ way of stigmatizing 
and criticizing Russia’s foreign policy by skirting the actual point – the threat of 
Russia (OE 5.9.2010). It was claimed that when Russia was talked about in 
Finland, almost without exception such concepts as the “sphere of influence” 
and “great power” were dug from the word storage. Both concepts, it was seen, 
were used loosely, and instead of assessing international politics, they were 
used to condemn Russia’s foreign policy. It was reminded that the great 
powerness, in turn, ought not to be seen as related only to what kind of status 
the state had in relation to others but also and above all to what the state could 
do in relation to other states. Thus, it was told, Russia wished to stick to its own 
great power status in order to defend the traditional system of sovereign states. 
(Ibid.) 
The current debate was thus, in fact, a debate about Russia being a possible 
threat to Finland and the rest of the world – and this had little to do with the 
superpower problematique (OE 5.9.2010). After all, the threat that Finns saw had 
to be related specifically to Russia as the superpowerness of the United States 
was not questioned in a similar manner: 
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What difference does it make whether we believe that Russia is superpower or not? 
Nothing. What makes a difference is whether Russia is a threat and to whom Russia 
can be a threat. That is what we really want to talk about. What difference does it 
make for us whether the Russian government leaders consider their country a 
superpower or not? Nothing until we know what superpower means in Russia. If 
Russia's superpower identity makes it a threat to other states, the superpower status 
is relevant. (OE 5.9.2010) 
 
According to a HS Gallup poll (HS 13.9.2010), an overwhelming majority of 
Finns did, however, see Russia as a superpower, especially in military terms. 
Nevertheless, people still took living next to such superpower in stride. Nearly 
60 per cent of the respondents were satisfied with the Finnish political 
leadership’s attitude to Russia; less than one tenth wished for more complying 
attitude, while almost 30 per cent called for a bolder take. Interestingly, the 
article that revealed the results had been titled as “ o ne in five is afraid of 
Russia” (HS 13.9.2010), while the fact of the matter was that 75 per cent did not 
see Russia as a threat. Such formulation should not be ignored as statements 
about public opinion made in the media usually not only reflect but can also 
drive popular attitudes. Whether or not the formulation had been conscious act, 
it served as a reminder of how necessary it was to have critical and attentive 
public debate on the threats and fears. Topics touching upon threats and threat 
perceptions were particularly sensitive. As the reactions to the poll results 
confirmed, calculations and hidden goals were easily seen even in pertinence 
(OE 18.9.2010).  
In all, the poll results suggested that Finns’ understanding of Russia as a 
threat had not changed noticeably in recent years. The young considered the 
fear as unnecessary slightly more often than those who were 65 years or older, 
but in general the opinions did not show the kind of warming that what the Pew 
Research Institute had discovered earlier this year, for example, in the attitudes 
of the French, Germans and Poles. 69 per cent of Finns still viewed Russia with 
suspicion. (E 14.9.2010.) Such a high level of doubt and disbelief, if the numbers 
were trusted, could easily be fueled and molded into fear by choosing wording 
that could be interpreted to confirm them to be justifiable. This way, as the 
example of the wording in the title illuminated, the sender may modify the 
message, if so chosen, to better match with what the receiver, the audience, is 
expected to want to hear.  
 
 
5.3 RUSSIA IN HELSINGIN SANOMAT  
 
Taken together, the authors of the letters are neither demographically nor 
politically unrepresentative of the general public. Instead, they tend to be well-
educated and gainfully employed but include also representatives of various 
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interest and lobby groups, some of which write to the paper regularly in order to 
advance their cause. The sampling is also unrepresentative for in addition to the 
capital region, Helsingin Sanomat is mostly read in the other large Finnish cities – 
and as a consequence also receives most of the input for its opinion pages from 
these larger cities (Figure 28). This is, of course, quite logical as that is where the 
majority of Finns live. Unless the issue at stake happens to be clearly of national 
focus, residents from other parts of the country understandably direct their 
letters by in large to regional papers.  
 
 
 
 
Writings dealing with timely, topical issues are preferred. Many of these come 
and go, but some have managed to remain newsworthy for extended periods of 
time. Russia, and the border with Russia, is understandably a topic that has 
evoked strong opinions year after year. The share of letters devoted directly to 
Russia (or the Soviet Union) has decreased around the turn of the millennium 
but has increased slightly since then (Figure 29). The better the relations are, the 
less Russia is talked about, whereas the widespread uncertainly of the 1990s as 
well as Russia increased self-confidence in latter half of the 2000s clearly caused 
more concerns among the general public.  
The thematic categorization of the collected articles was not an easy task to 
undertake as a great number of articles could easily be placed under several 
different themes as a consequence of which the categorization is prone to being 
subjective. Thus, the following figures (30 and 31) are meant not as accurate 
numerical description but rather to illustrate the overall trends and to give an 
overlying glance to the collected data. 
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The differences between different types of opinion articles were minimal in this 
respect. Letters, op-eds, and editorials all approached Russia and the border 
typically either from security/foreign political or social vantage point. The other 
pre-given categories, chosen based on the most common topics among all 
articles (i.e., not just opinion articles) dealing with Russia, were seldom 
addressed. In particular, both border management and economic issues are 
clearly underrepresented in the opinion articles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security/foreign political (45.4 per cent of the total) as well as social issues (34.5 
per cent of the total) of various kinds have dominated the content of letters 
throughout the entire study period. In the letters, softer social issues (38.0 per 
cent of the total) challenged the harder security and foreign political issues (42.2 
per cent of the total) on certain years (1995–1998, 2006, and 2010). In the op-eds 
and editorials, the ranking was clearer as approximately the half of the writing 
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fell rather consistently under the security and foreign policy sector. Trade and 
other economic related issues were discussed particularly in the editorials (16.0 
per cent of the total). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1 No News is Good News 
A further analysis reveals that those who approach Russia from a cultural 
perspective depict it in a less negative manner (Figure 32). While the share of 
positive evaluations remains low, though higher than in other sectors, most 
writings had a rather neutral tone. Many of these dealt either with the 
opportunities the cultural scene in Russia offered or the cultural similarities 
between Russia had with Finland. In all the other sectors, it was the differences 
rather than the similarities between the countries that were brought up and 
were used to portray Russia in a more negative light. 
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When the tone of the articles is analyzed in a temporary fashion, an interesting 
trajectory is revealed. The articles were coded negative, neural, or positive based 
on the image they portray of Russia; i.e., if a particular text was positive towards 
its actual topic, say environmental protection, but at the same time still painted a 
negative picture about Russia, it was given a negative value. This is because 
what this study aims to discover is that what kind of image of Russia does the 
writing convey to a reader; i.e., how is Russia presented in the media. 
Figure 33 depicts how the tone has altered during the study period. The 
cautiousness of the early 1990s soon turned into more critical voices and the 
nascent euphoria fuelled by the projection that the transition in Russia would be 
simple and short was quickly overshadowed by the increased awareness of the 
negative ramifications and side effects of the collapse of the Soviet system. Also, 
the freer condition following the 1992 began, slowly but surely, to overset the 
deep-root tradition of self-censorship by allowing a more direct formulation of 
opinions in public. The culmination point was seen in the late 1998 to early 1999 
when the Russian society was shaken by a severe financial crisis, which left the 
country in the state of despair.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sometimes things have to get worse before they can get better. The crisis served 
to reset the relations as the apparent human drama that followed gave Russia a 
more human face as the distinction between the state actions and the ordinary 
people grew ever clearer in the perceptions of the Finns. Whereas in 1999 no less 
than 76.1 per cent of the articles were written in a negative tone, by 2002 the 
figure had decreased to 45.5 per cent. The rapid shift can be explained largely by 
the high hopes associated with Mr. Putin coming to power as he was seen to 
bring well-needed stability after the perplexities of the 1990s. A stable Russia 
was perceived as a better option for Finland than an unpredictable and 
uncontrollable Russia.  
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
1990 1991 1994 1995 1998 1999 2002 2003 2006 2007 2009 2010 
Negative 
Neutral 
Positive 
 318   
 
Despite the official cooperative rhetoric on the EU-Russia level, its translation 
into practice never materialized in any concrete manner. Mutual strategies 
reflected the shared interest in enhanced cooperation and, surely, the EU and 
Russia became increasingly important partners, but the relationship fell from the 
start far short of being a ‘strategic partnership’ in any meaningful interpretation 
of the term. Accordingly, despite much acclaimed introductions, the Common 
Spaces and Road Maps, even if valuable achievements as such, have actually 
accomplished fairly little. 
The tone of the articles grew more negative as it had become evident that 
instead of seeking to transform the country into a Western style democracy, as 
the West had hoped, President Putin was working vigorously to restore the 
country’s unity, to strengthen the authority of the state, and to bring the federal 
power closer to the regions in order to re-gain Russia’s great power status. 
Fuelled by its vast energy sources and the related economic growth, Putin’s 
Russia grew ever more self-confident, assertive, and aware of its strategic global 
importance. By 2009, at the peak of the financial crisis, the share of the negative 
writings had again raised up to 68.8 per cent.  
History, however, repeated itself once again as the tone of the writing began 
to improve rapidly in the aftermath of the crisis. During 2009–2010, remarkable 
changes occurred also in Russia’s self-perception. The financial crisis shook the 
country profoundly and revealed how deeply interconnected the global 
economy actually was. Bringing one’s own house in order was no longer 
enough, but crises could only be overcome through coordinated, cooperative 
effort. Realization of this prodded Russia to reset and redefine its relations most 
notably with the United States, but the tone towards the new partnership 
agreement with the EU has warmed up as well. As can be assessed on the 
grounds of Russia’s new foreign policy guidelines, which were leaked to the 
media in May 2010, the country’s relations with the West should become much 
friendlier and more cooperative in order to attract more foreign investments (see 
Laine 2011).  
When the analyzed articles are divided in two separate groups, the letters 
forming one and the op-ed and the editorials the other, an almost perfect 
correlative trend lines are revealed (Figure 34). Even though the letters can 
hardly be seen as a comprehensive representation of the vox populi, they do 
definitely represent the voice of the people more accurately than the intellectual 
op-eds or the newspapers own stand as described in the editorials. Many letters 
are written in response to op-eds and editorials, but the as the figure suggests 
the op-eds and editorials also hold the power to steer the topics and tones of the 
letters. The causality is, of course, hard to proof and it has to be borne in mind 
that all the published letters have gone through a selection process. The 
apparent finding here is that negative writings fuel more negative writings 
rather than striving to challenge the proposed view. 
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Analyzing all the different types of articles separately confirms the tone of the 
op-eds (neg. 62.1 %, neut. 31.7 %, pos. 6.2 %) and editorials (neg. 61.6 %, neut. 
31.7 %, pos. 6.7 %) go largely hand in hand. The letters were not any more 
positive (6.7 %) but less negative (48.5 %) and, accordingly, more neutral 
(44.7 %). Figure 35 presents the same finding in absolute numbers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In all, out of the 2,383 analyzed articles, only 171 offer positive connotation. 
Ninety, or 52.6 per cent of them, were in the form of a letter; 53 positive stances 
were voiced in the editorials and 28 in the op-eds. Most of these (21.1 per cent) 
approached Russia from a cultural perspective with trade and economy related 
writings ranking second (11.4 per cent). At the other end, from a security and 
foreign political, environmental, and, lastly, political angle there were clearly 
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less positive things to say about Russia; these sectors received only 5.2, 3.9, and 
2.8 per cent positive hits respectively. 
The signifier category of ‘place,’ while small in absolute terms (n=67), was in 
relative terms used most often to give a positive description of Russia, as 10.5 
per cent of the writings were positive. The reason for this is, however, that to an 
extent Karelia was used with respect to different signified. In some writings 
Karelia was approached almost as a Finnish internal issue with little or no 
reference to Russia. In a particular writing, it was even argued, “after all, 
spiritually we own Karelia, even if it would not be part of the Finnish state” (HS 
23.8.2005). In all the other signifier categories there were fewer than 10 per cent 
of positive description of Russia, stories (4.6 per cent) and events (4.5 per cent) 
ranking last in terms of positive evaluations.  
When the positive descriptions are analyzed in terms of their respective 
signifier and sector categories, it is revealed that the most of the positive 
writings focus on activities in the social field, in the field of trade and economics, 
or security and foreign policy (Table 3). Stories received a positive connotation 
in the sector of security and foreign policy. While the figures on the table below 
reflect the uneven distribution of the writings with respect to the categories 
used, what stood out was that with the exception of trade-related writings, most 
writings in these categories focused on Karelia rather than Russia. 
 
 SIGNIFIER Total 
ACTIVITY EVENT OBJECT PLACE STORY 
SECTOR BORDER 
MANAGEMENT 
Count 5 0 0 0 0 5 
% of Total 2.9 .0 .0 .0 .0 2.9 
CULTURE Count 6 0 5 1 3 15 
% of Total 3.5 .0 2.9 .6 1.8 8.8 
ENVIRONMENT Count 3 1 0 1 0 5 
% of Total 1.8 .6 .0 .6 .0 2.9 
POLITICS Count 1 1 0 0 0 2 
% of Total .6 .6 .0 .0 .0 1.2 
SECURITY & 
FOREING POLICY 
Count 19 2 11 2 23 57 
% of Total 11.1 1.2 6.4 1.2 13.5 33.3 
SOCIAL Count 23 4 14 2 13 56 
% of Total 13.5 2.3 8.2 1.2 7.6 32.7 
TRADE/ 
ECONOMICS 
Count 21 0 3 1 6 31 
% of Total 12.3 .0 1.8 .6 3.5 18.1 
Total Count 78 8 33 7 45 171 
% of Total 45.6 4.7 19.3 4.1 26.3 100.0 
 
 
A chronological summary of the most positive factors used in forming the image 
reveals only minor changes (Table 4). Objects, most commonly with reference to 
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Finnish leadership, dominated the debate around the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Activities such as development in Russia, Russian actions, and the 
maintenance of Finnish-Russian relations then took over. While writings in 
which activities were used as the main signifiers tended to focus on current 
situation or look towards the future, stories were generally based on the past. 
Interestingly, story was the most positive signifiers during both of the major 
financial crises, thought it was seldom used with a reference to trade or other 
economic related issues. Apart from the early 1990s, out of the three opinion 
writing types analyzed here, letters painted the most positive (thought still 
rather negative) image of Russia in the context of CBC. 
 
 
 
Period Main Positive 
Signifier 
Main Positive Sector Main Positive 
Type 
1990–1991 Object (13) Security/FP (12) Editorial (13) 
1994–1995 Activity (13) Security/FP (6) & Trade/Econ (6) Letter (15) 
1998–1999 Story (9) Security/FP (10) & Social (10) Letter (17) 
2002–2003 Activity (10) Security/FP (7) Letter (12) 
2006–2007 Activity (21) Social (15) Letter (17) 
2009–2010 Story (17) Security/FP (18) Letter (18) 
 
 
5.3.2 Russia as a Semiotic Sign 
Following the semiotic line of thought, an extra effort is put on understanding 
how people design and interpret meanings, how semiotic systems are shaped by 
social interests and ideologies, and how they are adapted as society changes. 
The basic logic here is that of contextualization: no semiotic form, material entity 
or event, text, or action has meaning in and of itself. Attention has to be paid to 
the social dimensions of meaning and power operating through the human 
processes of signification and interpretation – or ‘semiosis’ as Peirce would call 
it – in shaping individuals and societies. Building on the work of Thibault (1991; 
1993), this study suggest that the Finns as a nation, have regular and repeatable 
patterns of meaning-making, which are typical of them, which help define and 
constitute a sense of a community, and to distinguish it from other communities 
and nations such as Russia. 
Knowledge is not merely socially constructed but perpetually co-constructed 
by language and culture. As Vygotsky (1978) explains, an individual’s naked 
perceptual field is layered with additional meaning through language and 
culture. An individual, he states, does not simply see the world in color and 
shape, but also as a world with sense and meaning: “I do not merely see 
something round and black with two hands; I see a clock” (ibid., 39). The 
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analytical constructs derived from social semiotic theory do not provide a 
neutral or value-free “window” on an objective and pre-existent reality 
(Thibault 1993) nor can they determine how an individual reader might 
interpret the representations of the news items in a real social context. Including 
editorials, op-eds, and readers’ contributions in the analysis help formulate at 
least a suggestive impression of this process. 
The Saussurean sign provides us with an analytical angle on this process. 
Signs have multiple meanings, which are profoundly relative to particular social 
settings, discourse, and context. Inspired by, though not directly based on, the 
work by Edensor (1998; 2002), Hall (1996) and Wodak (2004; 2008; also De Cillia, 
Reisigl & Wodak 1999), several categories of signifiers can be discerned. Activity 
signifiers can be characterized as being of longer duration or having certain 
permanence, whereas events on the other hand are generally of one-time 
occurrence. Places refer to specific geographies and landscapes. Objects can be 
categorized either as being material culture or personifying certain groups. 
Lastly, stories refer to accounts, narratives, and myths. These main categories 
consist of multiple subcategories, 153 in total. The signified, Russia, is given 
meaning through the signifiers grouped here under five main categories, but the 
relationship between the two is in a constant state of flux as people connect form 
and meaning in ways deemed apt to the particular need and occasion. While a 
signifier may have a negative connotation at one time or on a specific place, in 
another period or region it may be the opposite.  
 
 
 
 
As Figure 36 implies, a vast majority (77 per cent) of all the analyzed writing fall 
under the main signifier categories of activity and story. Objects ranked the 
third, while evens and in particular places were used seldom. These are, of 
Activity 
39 % 
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7 % 
Object 
13 % Place 
3 % 
Story 
38 % 
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course, analytical distinctions to help structure the analysis. In practice, the 
categories are interrelated as many writings used more than one of them 
simultaneously. However, in most case the primal signifier was relatively 
obvious to indicate. 
A more detailed analysis reveals that writings focusing on different topics 
use signifiers from different categories in forming the image of Russia (Figure 
37). No fewer than 64 per cent of the stories dealt with security and foreign 
political issues while, for example, signifiers from a category ‘place’ were often 
used in environmental writings. Trade-related issues were most commonly 
brought up in relation to activities. The social aspect received a significant 
representation in all the categories, while culture and border management 
played in a miniscule role throughout the collected material. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of the 153 signifiers that were distinguished from the analyzed material, 45 
were used at least ten times (Table 5). Most commonly, Russia was approached 
though by commenting on its development or lack of it, followed by stories 
about the relations in general, the Karelian question in particular, but also 
through reinterpretations of the past. The meaning of Russia as an object was 
sought through four different connotations: 1) Russia as a cultural whole, as the 
‘other,’ 2) Russian leadership and state level policies, 3) Russians as a nation and 
individual citizens, and 4) through the Russian minority in Finland. In addition, 
Russia was given meanings indirectly by referring to its actions and perceived 
attitudes with regard to other objects, most notably the Nordstream gas 
pipeline. 
However, as table 6 summarizes, op-eds and editorials were largely 
analogous, but letters differed with relation to all the signifier categories. While 
the former focus on the development and events in Russia, the letters paid more 
attention to the Finnish relations with Russia.  
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ACTIVITIES  STORIES  OBJECTS  EVENTS  PLACES 
Russian 
development 
200 FIN-
USSR/Russia 
relations 
148 Russia as 
a country 
81 Mishap in 
Russia 
33 Baltic 
sea 
28 
Russia's 
actions 
84 Karelia 
question/ 
Relocation of 
border 
143 Finnish 
leadership 
74 Conflict/ 
Disagreement 
31 Karelia 19 
Trade 69 Historical 
review/ 
Commentary 
140 Russians 
as a 
nation 
57 Russian 
elections 
24   
Transit traffic/ 
Queues 
58 NATO 108 Russian 
leadership 
30 Border 
incident 
16   
Managing 
Russia 
55 Finland's position 94 Gas pipe 29 Critical 
review 
12   
Cooperation/ 
interaction 
48 Perceived threat 62 Finland 25 Sign of 
strength 
11   
Forming new 
relations 
39 Russia as an int. 
actor 
46 Rus. past 
leaders 
21 Meeting/ 
Conference 
11   
Remigration 39 Scars of the past 36 Fin. past 
leaders 
12     
Aid/charity 
work 
34 EU-Russia 30 Russians 
in Finland 
10     
Language 
question 
31 Nation-building 24       
EU's 
influence/role 
31 Finland as a 
mediator 
15       
Defense 16 Lack of language/ 
Knowledge 
15       
Refugees 12 Wars 10       
Border control 10         
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Signifiers used in forming the image have remained relatively stable during the 
years (Figure 38). The two main groups (activities and stories) stand out also 
when the material is studied on an annual basis. Due to the lack of personal 
connection and experiences, many Finns seem to build their image of Russia on 
broader descriptions and developments in the country as well as both internal 
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and foreign policy actions. Especially in the letters, different types of stories 
were commonly used to confirm the traditionalist perception of the Russian 
threat and inability to change with the help of historical evidence. The teachings 
of history were a pressing signifier, which were commonly referred to as side 
notes also in the writings that primarily focused on something else.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the signifiers used in forming the image has not changed much, the 
changing social and political context has influenced more the fluctuation of the 
signifiers within the five main signifier categories. Interestingly, the same 
signifier can stand for more than one signified, constituting in so doing a 
different sign. For example, when cross-border cooperation is talked about using 
Karelia as a signified, the tone is quite often positive, whereas when the signified 
is Russia, the tone is more often negative. Similarly, places and stories about 
Karelia had a positive, or at least neutral, take clearly more often that those 
depicting Russia as the signified.  
Analysis of the different types of articles separately reveals that while most 
of the letters (48.0 %) were formulated as stories, activities (51.6 %) were the 
dominant signifier in editorials (Figure 39). In the op-eds, both activities (40.3 %) 
and stories (38.8 %) were used quite evenly. In particular, the contemporary and 
potential future trajectories in Russia were left for the editorials and op-eds. 
Instead, a vast majority of the letters dealt either with the past or more recent, 
local level concerns. The argumentation presented was typically based on 
personal experiences, though broad generalization was also often drawn based 
on them. The wars, the resultant border treaties, and the Karelian question 
caused by them were reinterpreted on numerous occasions, often without any 
clear goal. The following examples demonstrate typical formulations in the 
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letters: “Based on the experience from the Second World War, I believe that... 
“(L 14.2.2007); “I am probably not pouring too much oil on the fire a if I interpret 
that the Finns feel that Russia has not…” (L 7.7.2009). 
Historical writings are always also political by their nature. They seek to 
manage the history and convince the other of what ‘really’ happened. The 
signifiers themselves are thus loaded with meaning and they are used to 
express, organize, and maintain shared ways of conceptualizing the image of 
Russia. Thus, the writings have also an ideological function, as they serve to 
convey ideological norms of a culture and naturalize the cultural values, 
attitudes, and beliefs as something self-evident and obvious. They are 
stimulated by the desire to create the ‘correct’ picture and to find the ‘truth,’ 
something to be shared and hailed.  
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from year 1991, when the collapse of the Soviet Union drew attention to 
contemporary activities, stories formed the main category in the letters 
throughout the entire research period (Figure 40). The most common individual 
signifiers were (in order) 1) the Karelian question/relocation of border, 2) 
contemporary Finnish-Russian relations, 3) historical reviews and 
reinterpretations, 4) the NATO option and its impact on the Finnish-Russia 
relations, 5) Finland's position in Europe and its impact on the Finnish-Russia 
relations, and 6) Russia as a threat. 
In the editorials and op-eds, the situation was the opposite as activities were 
clearly the most common signifier category with the exception of the 2003, when 
the upcoming EU enlargement brought about intense debate in the form of 
stories most notably about the position of Finland vis-à-vis the Baltic States in 
relation to Russia. In the editorials the most used signifiers which could be 
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categorized as activities were 1) Russian development, 2) Russia's foreign 
political actions, 3) internal management of Russia/domestic issues, 4) trade with 
Russia, and 5) attempts to forming new relations unhindered by the experiences 
of the past. The same signifiers ranked on the top also in the op-eds, thought 
also stories about history events, Finland’s positions, NATO, and EU-Russia 
relations were brought up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research on Russia has the advantage that every Finn, particularly those 
past the middle age, has something to say about the topic. Many letters 
conformed to the Paasikivian doctrine that wisdom begins with the recognition 
of facts, and in order to improve relations, Russia ought to acknowledge what in 
Finland is largely perceived as downright wrongdoings. Particularly the Karelia 
question transformed during the years to be increasingly more about principle 
and less about practice, from a possible reality to a fading myth. Given the aging 
population, the direct links to the lost areas have become fewer and farther 
between. Accordingly, the analyzed material suggests that the connotation of 
Karelia has been transforming from one of geographical area or a concrete place 
to more of a state of mind, the discussion of which now serves more of a 
therapeutic function than anything else. 
Out of the main categories used, events (65.0 %) followed by activities 
(58.1 %) depicted the most negative image of Russia (65.0 %) (Figure 41). ‘Story’ 
was the only category in which less than 50 per cent of all writings in that 
category were negative – but only barely. While story was the most neutral 
category, it was places and object that were used, in relational terms, more often 
to convey a positive image of Russia. 
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As table 7 indicates, there are again clear differences between the letters and the 
op-eds and editorials. With the exception of stories, the op-eds and editorials 
were generally more negative towards Russia than the letters. The difference 
gets emphasized in particular in the smallest categories, places and events, as 
though given the small sample size the statistical representation of the results 
are somewhat decreased. Thus, the greatest statistical difference can be found in 
the activity category, which was used clearly more negatively in the op-eds than 
in the letters. 
 
 
 
L E T T E R S   T O   E D I T O R 
Signifier 
O P-E D S   and   E D I T O R I A L S 
Total 
number 
Positive Neutral Negative Negative Neutral Positive 
Total 
number 
421 9.5 47.3 43.2 <ACTIVITY> 68.7 24.9 6.4 591 
59 5.1 49.2 45.8 <EVENT> 74.6 21.2 4.2 118 
180 11.7 36.1 52.2 <OBJECT> 57.9 34.8 7.3 164 
34 14.7 47.1 38.2 <PLACE> 69.7 24.2 6.1 33 
643 3.3 44.9 51.8 <STORY> 46.3 46.6 7.1 337 
1337 6.7 44.7 48.5 <TOTAL> 61.8 31.7 6.5 1243 
 
 
In the letters, places, most commonly Karelia, serve as the most positive signifier 
in forming the image of Russia. In the editorials and op-eds, places were used 
very negatively, but here the main signifier was also different: the Baltic Sea. The 
Event Activity Object Place Story Total 
Negative 65,0 58,1 54,9 53,7 49,9 54,9 
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most positive signifier category for the editorials and op-eds was object. Most of 
these writing depicted Russia as an important neighbor that had a lot give, 
mainly in terms of trade, for Finland. Nevertheless, in all signifier categories 
Russia gets portrayed in overwhelmingly negative terms.  
The social and political events seem to have an influence in the fluctuation in 
the signifiers according to which the image of Russia is formed. While the 
building blocks have remained rather stable, as activities and stories dominated 
the entire 20-year study period, the image of Russia is nevertheless constantly 
made afresh as various signifiers are used during different times and in different 
contexts and to address different topics. This is to say that image of Russia has 
not been evolving so much from one to another but that Russia is rather seen 
differently though different thematic fields and at different levels. As a global 
superpower, Russia looks very different than it does as a next-door neighbor 
with whom daily practicalities need to taken care of. 
The Saussurean assertion about the arbitrary relationship between signifier 
and signified is, when taken outside linguistics, difficult to verify. Instead, this 
study leans towards Barthes’ claim that the signifiers themselves are coded and 
loaded with meaning. The denotation and connotation of a particular signifier are 
interlinked and as such they construct a message – a myth, as Barthes would call 
it. This myth serves to maintain largely invented, imaginary, unproved or over 
even false collective beliefs that are in turn used to justify the socially 
constructed image, in this case, of Russia. The signs are thus produced by this 
myth, but they also serve to maintain it.   
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6 Civil Society Engagement: 
Institutional Practices  
Whereas the previous chapter focuses on the discursive practices of civil society 
through the analysis of newspapers material, this chapter focuses on the 
institutional practices of civil society. Two datasets are used to provide different, 
yet mutually complementary, perspectives on the studied phenomenon. The 
two perspectives are intertwined as when conducting the interviews, it became 
clear that it is with the public debate rather than the official rhetoric that civil 
society actors are more familiar. 
Whereas the discursive practices studied above illuminate how the image of 
Russia is formed in the public debate, the interview material presented in this 
chapter is used to investigate civil society as a sphere of organization and the 
institutional practices that have influenced, and been influenced by, the 
perceptions fostered. The image of Russia impacts and even directs civil society 
engagement in CBC, yet at the same time the increased knowledge gained 
thought cooperation influences the image of Russia that the civil society actors 
hold. A positive image is, therefore, not only a result of CBC practices but also 
its prerequisite. It has to be kept in mind that the interviews were conducted in 
late 2007, 2008, and 2009, and naturally much has since taken place. With the 
help of the discursive context above, the interview material can, however, be 
situated within its own timeframe. 
Civil society has begun to occupy a major role in the development of Finnish-
Russian CBC. In the European comparison, the Finnish-Russian case stands out, 
however, in a number of respects, which need to be understood when cross-
border practices are studied. The Finnish-Russian border region is very sparsely 
populated with continually dwindling numbers, especially amongst its younger 
denizens. Distances are long, and the urban centers are situated far away from 
each other. These geographical and sociological constraints together with the 
insufficient number and uneven distribution of border-crossing points hinder 
CBC’s potential (see European Commission Communication “Wider Europe — 
Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbors,” e.g., Németh et al. 2012 for more details). As a result, Finnish-
Russian cooperation cannot in many cases be characterized as being cross-
border cooperation, but rather as interregional cooperation – in practice, remote 
or telecooperation – where transnational, though often virtual, networks play a 
crucial role. The border, then, only increases the relative distance, posing a 
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barrier in terms of marking a difference between two very different cultures, 
languages, political systems, living conditions, and the like. All this 
undoubtedly makes the basis of cooperation challenging. 
 
 
6.1 ACTORS ACTIVE IN CROSS-BORDER INTERACTION 
 
Despite the burdensome geographical constraints, the historical burden and 
strict border crossing procedures, and the insufficient number and uneven 
distribution of border-crossing points, Finnish-Russian CBC has become more 
nuanced and balanced during the last two decades. Certainly, the CSOs 
operating across the Finnish-Russian border face now a rather different reality 
than they have in the past. The superficial friendship rhetoric of the past has 
turned into more pragmatic cooperation based on a rather realist evaluation of 
the situation, which in turn has allowed the formation of a more voluntary 
friendship. The increased permeability of the border together with increased 
(potential) funding options has brought about new kind of possibilities, even if 
grasping them has proven to be easier said than done. While there has been a 
gradual growth of cross-border ties amongst civil society organizations, for 
some maintaining these relations have been too much to handle. The 
organizations interviewed for this study confirmed Skvortsova’s (2005, 37) 
finding that even though the basic situation is a positive one, in many cases the 
upsurge of cooperation has been closely suggestive of a love story in which two 
partners meet, fall in love, marry, only to become disappointed and finally get 
divorced.  
The core of the cooperation is heavily based on very few key networks actors. 
A lot of local level work has been and is done, which does not become visible 
through the analysis of different programs or funding instruments. Even if 
cooperation across the border has been troublesome and even disappointing for 
many individual actors and organizations, the networks have managed to keep 
up active cooperation across the border already for a long time – heedless of 
individual project time frames or funding periods. It is exactly this type of long-
term cooperation that is perceived as most beneficial by the actors themselves. 
Even if short term projects, for which funding is often easier to find, may be 
efficient in avoiding endless debates of which principles should frame 
cooperation or focusing a particular issues or a problem, they often do not 
produce the broader and longer term objectives originally set out in the PCA, 
neither do they contribute to any major extent to the creation of social capital 
and more constructive dialogue between the neighbors, which is in turn likely to 
create more proponents of deeper integration. More long-term cooperation 
certainly requires resilience, patience, and flexibility; that is precisely what 
makes it rarer, though not nonexistent.  
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6.1.1 Thematic Focus of Cross‐Border Interaction 
The  thematic  focus of  cooperation has  changed only  little during  the  last  two 
decades. More importantly, the activity sectors are clustered geographically. The 
social  and  health  sector  is  by  far  the most  visible  and  active  in  CBC  at  the 
Finnish‐Russian  border.  Reasons  for  this  are  multiple.  The  economic  and 
political transformation in Russia was pushed forward at a very high social cost. 
The rapid changes  in  the general social situation and  the drastic weakening of 
the country’s economy had the most negative impact on those who occupied the 
most  precarious  positions  in  terms  of  social  welfare  and  health.  A  difficult 
economic and social situation  in  the 1990s  led  to  the establishment of self‐help 
groups and new NGOs for distribution and administration of humanitarian aid 
and support from the Western countries.  
In  Finland,  the  social  and  health CSOs  have  long  already  been  important 
players  in the Finnish society. In conjunction to the construction of the Finnish 
welfare  state,  some CSOs  began  to  be  regarded  as  serious  partners  for  other 
sectors,  if  not  semi‐authorities.  Given  their  vast  practical  knowledge,  social 
CSOs hold great potential as CBC actors. As a result, the Finnish working model 
was  simply  stretched  to  cover  also  cooperation with Russia, where  there was 
great demand for social and health services. This was, of course, helped by the 
fact  that  the  social  and  health  sector  had  long  been  one  of  the main  priority 
sectors defined by the Finnish state, and thus there has been a continued flow of 
funding  available  for  activities  and  projects  concerned,  inter  alia, with  public 
health  promotion  (diabetes,  epilepsy,  cancer),  welfare  for  the  aged  and  the 
disabled, social exclusion, and mental health, as well as substance abuse and for 
the promotion of healthy lifestyles. The large number of social, especially health‐
related, CSOs is also partly explained by the fact that they are well networked.  
Culture  has  also  been  an  important  sphere  of  cross‐border  activities.  The 
Finno‐Ugric nationalistic movements  in  the Republic  of Karelia were  the  first 
ones  to  institutionally  transform  into NGOs  in  the  beginning  of  perestroika. 
Cooperation with  Finnish  partners  followed  soon  after. Whereas many  older 
Finnish cultural CSOs focus on Karelia, the newer ones see the metropolis of St. 
Petersburg  as  a  fascinating  target.  All  in  all,  cultural  cooperation  has  been 
developing  from  traditional  friendship  and  twinning  activities  to  more 
substantial forms of cooperation focusing, for example, on multidisciplinary art, 
childrenʹs  and  youth’s  projects,  tolerance  education,  diversified  educational 
projects,  artistic  and  traditional  handicrafts,  literature,  literary  art  and  library 
cooperation,  cultural  heritage,  and  tourism  and  traveling  but  also  on 
cooperation in cultural administration and governance.  
In  2000,  the  Finnish‐Russian Cultural  Forum was developed  as  a  result  of 
cooperation  between  the  Finland‐Russia  society,  the  Finnish  Ministry  of 
Education  and Culture,  and  the Russian  Federation Ministry  of Culture.  The 
forum seeks to activate and promote direct cultural cooperation between CSOs, 
cultural  institutions,  and  artists  by  helping  participants  to  find  partners  and 
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launch joint ventures, by arranging continuous partnership activities, including 
an annual Forum arranged alternately in Finland and Russia, and supporting 
cooperation between the Finnish and Russian cultural administration. Between 
2000 and 2011, altogether 1,574 project proposals have been made within the 
Forum. 
There are also a variety of religious and spiritual CSOs operating across the 
Finnish-Russian border. In particular in the 1990s, numerous Finnish parishes 
were involved in development, humanitarian, social/welfare, missionary or 
simply friendship work in Russia. In Finland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
plays a central role in promoting societal cohesion and combating social 
exclusion. It forms a central element of the Finnish civil society and an essential 
factor of the identity of many Finns (see Yeung 2003). The social work of the 
church has long been a central element of the Finnish welfare model and thus 
also suitable for being extended to CBC.  
The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland cooperates on educational, 
diaconal, and child welfare and youth work with the cross-border churches. 
Also the Finn Church Aid (FCA) has a wide global network and established, 
direct, local contacts. Especially during the late 1980s and 1990s, the FCA was 
exceedingly active in advocacy work and development cooperation in Russia. 
However, as the FCA works to help the world’s most vulnerable and poorest 
people, Russia has not anymore been given the top priority due to its improved 
economic situation. 
The Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church has also been conducting fruitful 
bilateral ecumenical talks with the Russian Orthodox Church since the 1970s. 
The negotiations have mainly been theological in nature. Likewise, there have 
been doctrinal discussions with the Finnish Orthodox Church. Characteristic of 
these talks has been that two churches, living in the same social context but in 
different traditions, have been able to view together their own conceptions, and 
those of the other party, on important theological and pastoral questions. 
Discussions like these increase the mutual understanding and tolerance of the 
churches. 
The economic CSOs work with activities with the objective to promote and 
advice economic activities such as rural entrepreneurship or tourism in order to 
implement a new type of economic cooperation culture between the two 
countries, which would then consolidate the region’s business life, economy, 
employment, and services. Also trade unions have, yet again, become more 
active in interaction. Bilateral interaction between Finnish and Soviet trade 
unions began during the 1970s. The interaction of the times consisted mainly of 
official delegation visits from side to side on a regular basis. Also a number of 
declarations concerning cooperation were drafted, yet most of them led to little 
action in practice. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the setting began to transform. 
The 1990s was a period of transition, which ultimately led to the new phase of 
multilateral cooperation. Today, the Finnish-Russian cooperation between trade 
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unions is administrated through international umbrella organizations and 
networks. However, Finnish organizations see still a need to maintain also 
bilateral relations with Russia. All the three Finnish central organizations (STTK, 
SAK, and Akava) interact jointly with the Russian trade union movement, 
particularly with the Moscow-based Federation of Independent Trade Unions of 
Russia (FNPR), by far the Russia’s largest national trade union center. Also 
individual unions have direct bilateral links to Russia.  
Since the Finnish EU membership the EU-funding has been used for various 
educational projects in Russia, mainly in the Republic of Karelia, but later also in 
Kaliningrad. In practice, the focus of cooperation has included educational 
projects regarding social dialogue, advocating, and protecting workers’ rights 
due to increased movement of labor and cooperation with employers’ 
organization and authorities as well as improving the general image of trade 
unions in Russia. In Russia, the number of trade union members has decreased 
drastically, and the reasons for this are numerous. Breaking the overall image 
and the legal stranglehold of the Soviet-era trade union structure on the 
provision of social security benefits has been crucial in enabling new unions to 
gain legitimacy in the eyes of workers. For many in Russia, the entire trade 
union movement appears still as a burden. Also relative poverty and a gray 
economy reduce the eagerness to participate and pay the required dues.  
Cooperation has become increasingly multilateral. In addition to the global 
level, the International Trade Union Confederation, and the European Trade 
Union Confederation, as well as the Pan-European Regional Council, 
cooperation takes place within a sub-regional context. The Baltic Sea Trade 
Union Network (BASTUN) was established in Helsinki in July 1999 in 
connection with the European Trade Union Confederation Congress. The 
network works as a forum where by the trade union confederations of the Baltic 
Sea Region exchange information and discuss and define common interests. 
BASTUN aims at political and social influencing, coordinates joint projects, 
many of which are run by EU funds, and raises issues related to the Baltic Sea 
Region within the international trade union family. Two Russian unions (the 
Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia and the All-Russia 
Confederation of Labor) are members of the network. The trade unions of the 
Baltic State’s have brought in needed knowledge about the situation and 
working culture in Russia, which has been for the Finnish trade unions at times 
difficult to come to terms with. Through BASTUN, both Finnish and Russian 
trade unions participate in the activities of relevant international organizations 
in the region (The Council of Baltic Sea States, Baltic Sea Parliamentary 
Conference, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic 
Council and the Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social 
Well-being). 
Also the Finnish chambers of commerce, particularly those located in Eastern 
Finland, are increasingly active in relation to Russia. Chambers of commerce 
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operate at the interface between private and public sectors; as a rule the 
chambers of commerce promote the business environment by provide training, 
up-to-date information on economic management, legal advice, tax counseling, 
advice on export documents, etc. Furthermore, the Finnish-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce (FRCC)69, a registered non-profit association founded in 1946, offers 
companies focusing particularly in Russian trade various services in the fields of 
market research, company operation, export promotion, training, information, 
and consultation. The FRCC is a lobby organization for its members; through 
various working groups and projects the board members and the operative 
management seek to influence issues, which hinder the development of trade 
between the countries. By the end of 2010, the FRCC numbered around 850 
members, about 750 of which are Finnish and some 100 Russian. 
Chambers of commerce are, by their nature, clearly more business-oriented 
than most of the other CSOs included in this study. Hence, they are also driven 
by a different operational logic, as their aim is to promote Finnish interests 
rather than cooperation as a value of its own. In addition to operating 
bilaterally, the Finnish Chambers of Commerce are part of larger supranational 
networks, such as Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association (BCCA) and 
the European Association of Chambers of Commerce (EUROCHAMBRES), both 
of which also have Russian members. Both bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
is today heavily financed by EU funding mechanisms.  
Also various expert and development organizations have become more 
active internationally since early 1990s. As an example, Pro Agria is the leading 
agricultural expert organization in Finland, the main goal of which is to serve its 
members, mainly rural entrepreneurs, in Finland by providing comprehensive 
farming and business consultation to enhance their production, profitability, 
and broader rural development. However, at the same time, Pro Agria is an 
association of public utility, which is involved in development work in Russia. It 
carries out work that is in the interest of the public organizations (state or 
regional councils) and receives also funding from them. The work includes 
mainly the transfer of knowledge and know-how across the border in order to 
vitalize Karelian agricultural production.  
Pure forms of political cooperation are rare, but the operations of many 
CSOs’ have political nuances. Due to the broad differences in today’s party 
politics between the countries, the cooperative links between actual parties are 
infrequent. However, many Finnish parties have sub-groups, which are more 
involved in CBC. Good examples of these are Svenska Kvinnoförbundet, the 
women's organization of the Swedish People's Party and the Green Women’s 
Association, which is the women’s association of the political party known as 
the Green League of Finland. However, these groups work for their specific 
cause (in these cases, women’s rights), the actual political content being on the 
                                                          
69 The Finnish-Soviet Chamber of Commerce until the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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background. Nevertheless, due to their political background and links, they 
form an important and a well-functioning channel for their CSO partners to get 
their voices heard by the political elite not only in Finland, but also at the 
Nordic, EU, and UN levels. Also some political youth organizations have voiced 
their interest in cooperation. Another example is formed by certain children’s 
activity organizations, which also function as a special interest group for 
children in political discussion. In practice, the international cooperation here 
commonly takes place in the form of camps where children from Finland and 
Russia and various other countries spend time together.  
An interesting and rather recent example of politically nuanced cooperation 
is the Finnish-Russian Civic Forum. The forum was established in 2007 sparked 
by the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, seen as a sad manifestation of the current 
situation and development of Russian society. The objective of the forum is to 
promote interaction and cooperation between citizens and peoples of Finland 
and Russia by supporting and strengthening civil society contacts across the 
border. Despite its long and influential line-up of key Finnish political actors, 
being an association, rather than a governmental body, the forum has already 
been willing and able to address the Russian situation more outspokenly than 
the government ever could. For example, the Forum played a key role in helping 
the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, which was liquidated by a court 
decision based on the new NGO law in Russia, to get registered in Finland in 
order to continue monitoring the situation with human rights in Chechnya. The 
Forum is also a participant in the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum (est. 2011), a 
permanent common platform for cooperation and coordination of civil society 
organizations from Russia and the EU. During its so far short existence, the 
Forum has managed to establish itself as umbrella organization competing in 
friendly terms with the Finland-Russia Society by providing a well-need 
alternative approach to the decades old friendship model. 
An important platform for a security-related discussion is provided by the 
Finnish Committee for European Security (STETE), the members of which 
consist of all the leading Finnish political parties and other political 
organizations, the trade union movement, the women's, youth, student and 
peace organizations, as well as other NGOs. Its executive committee consists of 
representatives of leading political parties. The underlying design of STETE is to 
facilitate networking and cooperation between politicians, officials, and civic 
society actors between all Baltic Sea countries in order to create a fruitful base 
for common future challenges. STETE’s idea is “to include decision makers in 
the dialogue, but still offer an unofficial platform for discussion and open the 
door for sensitive matters.” As an example, STETE together with its Finnish 
NGO partners organized an international NGO-based forum in Helsinki in 
December 2–3, 2008 in connection with the 16th OSCE Ministerial Council hosted 
by the Finnish OSCE Chairmanship. The OSCE Civil Society Forum 
concentrated on the OSCE’s human dimension issues and gave the participating 
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civil society actors a possibility to carry their recommendations for the high-
level discussions of the Ministerial Council.  
Other organizations active in Russia consist mainly of human rights 
association such as Amnesty International and the Finnish League for Human 
Rights, which are religiously and politically non-aligned yet have a strong 
societal influence through, for example, giving statements and disseminates 
information about human rights. Both organizations operate in Russia mainly 
through or in cooperation with their European or Global level bodies. It must 
also be noted that there is small, but relative loud independent citizen 
movement, Pro Karelia, the aim of which is to return the Finnish Karelia, ceded 
to the Soviet Union as a result of the Second World War, back to the context of 
Finland and the EU. According to their vision, returning Karelia back to Finland 
would only strengthen the neighborly relations and contribute positively to the 
development and prosperity of the Eastern parts of Finland and in the 
southwest parts of Russia.  
The environmental cooperation between Finland and Soviet Union 
commenced already in 1970s, when a scientific-technical cooperation agreement 
was signed between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, back then the 
CSOs in the Soviet side were scarce as a consequence of which Finnish CSOs 
cooperated directly with Soviet Ministries, authorities, research institutions or 
individual activities. Meetings, seminars, and expeditions were organized 
alternately in both countries. The very first concrete result of the cooperation 
was the establishment of Friendship Park consisting of areas on the both sides of 
the Finnish-Russian border with the objective of protecting nature in the border 
region, increasing nature conservation cooperation and initiation of further joint 
research projects. 
Already around 1970s satellite pictures illustrated a green belt of old-growth 
forest along the Finnish-Russian border, which has been largely untouched due 
to the strictly restricted access to the border area. However, at the end of 1980s 
the Soviet Union made the military border zones narrower, thus enabling people 
to visit the border areas. It was at this point that the economic potential of these 
areas began to be exploited, prompting the Finns to interfere by offering 
information on the old-growth forests and their natural values. The first 
government-to-government agreement was signed in 1985.  
The new program for cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe launched 
by the Ministry of the Environment in 1991 formed a new tool for cooperation. 
An inventory project on border forests was carried out jointly with the Karelian 
Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences from 1992–1994. The 
establishment of a Strict Nature Reserve in Paatsjoki in 1992 initiated the 
trilateral nature conservation cooperation between Finland, Norway, and Russia 
in Northern Lapland. Cooperation in the Murmansk region began in 1994 when 
a protected area was re-established in Kutsa. Cooperation in the Leningrad 
region began in 1994 with the planning of a natural reserve in the eastern 
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archipelago of the Gulf of Finland. Protected areas have been planned also for 
the Karelian Isthmus and for the St. Petersburg area in connection with the 
Finnish-Russian Development Program on Sustainable Forest Management and 
Conservation of Biological Diversity in Northwest Russia. Plans for the 
management and use of the proposed protected areas have also been prepared 
through the support of the Tacis program. 
The Finnish-Russian Development Program on Sustainable Forest 
Management and Conservation of Biological Diversity in Northwest Russia was 
initiated in 1997 with the aim of coordinating forestry and nature conservation 
cooperation between Finland and Russia, and extending international 
cooperation in this domain. The objective of the program was to promote the 
ecologically balanced development of the forest sector and the protection of 
nature areas. The program’s nature conservation projects are being carried out 
in the Republic of Karelia, in the regions of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Leningrad, 
and Vologda, and in the City of St. Petersburg. The program had links with a 
number of other international programs, e.g., with the EU Nordic Dimension 
forestry program as well as with the Barents and the Arctic Councils. 
Furthermore, the International Contact Forum on Habitat Conservation in the 
Barents Region (HCF) was established in order to improve and coordinate 
nature conservation protection between Finland, Russia, Sweden, and Norway 
in 1999. 
A number of projects have received additional support from the EU. The 
nature inventories carried out on the Green Belt and the protected area 
proposals from 1999–2001 were continued through the Karelian Parks project 
implemented by Metsähallitus Consulting. The EU Tacis program provided the 
support enabling the drawing up of plans for management and utilization of the 
proposed protected areas of in a number of locations. The initiatives were 
implemented in order to develop the infrastructure of the protected areas, and 
to promote their establishment and their future as areas for eco-tourism.  
All in all, the environmental cooperation at the Finnish-Russian border has 
developed clearly from bilateral towards multilateral, broader international 
cooperation. A number of cooperation projects that were originally being 
implemented bilaterally between Russia and Finland, Sweden or Norway have 
subsequently become multilateral projects implemented by all four countries. 
Similar networks have been created around the Baltic Sea region, a visibility and 
status of which has skyrocketed during the very recent years. Recently, the 
principal fields for cooperation have been pollution reduction in and around the 
Baltic Sea, improved oil spill management capacity, enhanced control of 
hazardous substances, sustainable forestry and nature conservation, and 
strengthened environmental management. Geographically, the environmental 
NGOs have formed their own multilateral networks within the Barents region in 
the north and Baltic region in the south, while the environmental cooperation 
with Russia Karelia has remained more bilateral. 
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6.1.2 Cooperation in the Area of Regional Development70 
Post-Soviet political transformations not only focused attention on local welfare 
systems and the need to develop them; economic development issues also came 
to the forefront of Finnish-Russian cooperation agendas. The collapse of state 
enterprises, ensuing economic crisis and a lack of investment capital in Russia 
affected Finland as well – dependency on Soviet markets resulted in a severe 
crisis of the Finnish economy in the 1990s. Again, self-interest dictated a need for 
cooperation. While this took place at a bilateral level, much concrete, project-
based work was again regionally focused on the two Karelias. Similar to the case 
of regional social welfare cooperation, economic development strategies for the 
Finnish-Russian borderland emerged out of horizontally organized networks. In 
addition to CSOs, also public agencies and private firms have been heavily 
invested in cross-border project development focusing particularly on tourism, 
industrial cooperation, and institutional aid for business development.   
Tourism especially is seen as one the most promising areas of economic 
development on both sides of the border as it provides a strategy of 
diversification for local economies heavily dependent upon forestry, wood 
processing, paper pulp production, and mining (see Izotov & Laine 2012). 
Partnerships between non-profit business development organizations, firms, 
and local and regional agencies have emerged and have targeted small 
businesses in Russian cities such as Sortavala and Finnish cities such as Joensuu, 
Ilomantsi, and Lieksa. Due to the rapid increase in foreign, primarily Finnish, 
visitors during the first half of 1990s, Sortavala experienced a boom in small 
hotels, restaurants, and the related services. Nevertheless, a lack of amenities, 
the poor state of infrastructure, and low standards degraded Sortavala’s image 
as a tourist destination. Development activities were thus put in place and 
investments sought to achieve a ‘European level’ of services. Another strategy 
was the promotion of expertise in gastronomy and hotel entrepreneurship 
through professional training. Public attention was drawn to the need to 
improve roads and thus the accessibility of the region and its attractions. In 
general, CSOs played a key role in improving the image of the region as a 
binational tourist destination and in improving the skills of local entrepreneurs 
to market their products.  
Further exchanges between Sortavala and Finnish border cities were 
promoted through the means of professional training as well as transfer of best 
practices and methods used in Finland. For example, the newly inaugurated 
Continuing Education Centre in Sortavala began to provide training for the 
unemployed, business training seminars were organized, and joint international 
education, in particular related to the development of small businesses in the 
border area, was commenced. Finnish CSOs have offered joint courses aimed at 
training qualified restoration and construction workers in order to upkeep the 
                                                          
70 This section builds on Scott and Laine (2012). 
 340   
 
traditional wooden houses and other valuable buildings. While these measures 
have helped protect the Finnish legacy in Sortavala, they have also helped 
improve the general image of the city. Business development support of a more 
material nature has also been supplied: computers, machines, tools, and 
equipment have been provided as part of attempts to strengthen local 
enterprises in Russia. 
Economic development cooperation at a more regional level is another 
important aspect of the work of CSO and multi-actor cross-border networks. The 
focus here has been on strengthening the industrial base, which on both sides of 
the border is largely extractive (forestry, paper, and mining). With EU and 
Finnish government funding, projects have been carried out that target joint 
marketing strategies, technological innovation, and industrial diversification.  
A further institutional ‘third sector’ strategy with which to promote cross-
border regional development took shape with the creation of Euregio Karelia in 
2000. As already discussed in the subsection 4.5.3, this ambitious initiative was 
based on the claim that cooperation would be able to overcome gaps in 
standards of living and improve the general economic and social development 
prospects on both sides of the border. Utilizing funds provided by the EU and 
other sources, the Euroregion facilitated numerous projects between 2001 and 
2008 that involved local and regional governments, CSOs, universities, and 
enterprises. From the beginning, the key figures behind the initiative promoted 
their institutional structure as a new European CBC model. The idea was that as 
the EU enlarged eastwards, joint administrative structures with Russian regional 
authorities would gain broader European significance (Cronberg 2000, Cronberg 
2003). In the planning phase of Euregio Karelia, Tarja Cronberg, head of the 
Regional Council of Finnish North Karelia, even anticipated that, “common 
decision-making procedures and common funds [would] create a foundation for 
establishing new border region identities” (Cronberg & Shlyamin 1999, 25–26). 
 
6.1.3 Examples of Cooperation in Entrepreneurial Development71 
Promoting entrepreneurial development in Russia is a considerable challenge 
given the lack of credit for smaller firms and a less than helpful institutional 
environment that limits access to markets. CBC driven by Finnish non-profit and 
profit-oriented organizations in cooperation with Russian local governments is 
an experimental field of business development and vocational training. One 
example of this is the St. Petersburg Business Campus Bench learning Network, 
which aims to improve the operational abilities of Finnish small and medium-
size companies (SMEs) in the St. Petersburg region. The Campus is coordinated 
by the Baltic Institute of Finland in close collaboration with the City of St. 
Petersburg and is co-financed by the EU and the Finnish Ministry of 
Employment and Trade. To improve the operational abilities of participating 
                                                          
71 This section builds on Scott and Laine (2012). 
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firms, the network applies advanced learning processes and helps to develop 
leadership and professional skills to better adapt to new business environments. 
While the main objective of the Campus is to facilitate market access for Finnish 
SMEs, it is reciprocal in the sense that the Campus offers high-level vocational 
and linguistic training for Russian participants (i.e., actual and potential 
employees of Finnish firms). All in all, the Campus is designed to enhance 
international networking and collaboration between regional authorities, 
universities, technology centers and enterprises. In addition, the project aims to 
ensure better cooperation possibilities between Russia and the EU in the field of 
fostering innovations.  
Another example of business development through CBC is the Technopolis 
PLC, a Finnish corporation that pursues aims of social entrepreneurship by 
marketing a service concept that addresses the needs of young technology 
companies. Technopolis provides premises, business and development services 
that it sells to client firms in order to finance its long-term operations of business 
promotion. As part of its activities, Technopolis provides services in contexts 
where traditional models of high-tech incubators are difficult to implement. The 
Technopolis St. Petersburg project aims to create a functional business 
environment for both Russian and international companies in order that they 
may focus on core activities.72 
 
 
6.2 A GENDERED CIVIC SECTOR? 
 
Interconnections between gender, civil society and political citizenship have 
been the popular topic in Finland but even more in post-Soviet Russia during 
the recent years (Salmenniemi 2005). The gendered, in practice female 
dominated, nature of civic activity became also apparent in the joint Finnish-
Russian cooperative context, yet it became manifested rather differently on 
different sides. In general terms, this occurred in two dimensions. The first one 
concerns the overall, ‘natural’ according to some, gender dimension of the CSOs 
involved in cross-border cooperation. A majority of interviewees brought up the 
relatively strong feminine composition of CSOs involved in CBC, which can, 
however, at least partly be explained by the fact CBC is heavily dominated by 
the field of social welfare and health, which have traditionally been, and still is, 
dominated by women.  
The second dimension of the gender sector is the special gender specific 
organizations; i.e., women’s organizations. As the gender policy in terms of 
women’s rights promotion is very central in the Finnish political agenda, the 
Finnish CSOs often bring the discussion of these issues into the Russian context 
as well. The women’s movement, an interviewee explicitly suggested, has a 
                                                          
72 See: www.technopolis.fi. 
 342   
 
“tendency to seek partners and really gain mutual understanding” even though 
its was clear that there was “a difference in mentality – such as biological 
essentialism” between the partners separated by the border (F #14).  
Indeed, the overall cause seems to be an enabling factor here. Even though 
on many occasions the work is carried out by small scale, pragmatic projects, the 
CBC with Russian CSOs is framed as a part of greater goal of working towards 
helping women and children all over the world. In this manner, the CBC is not 
seen as bilateral cooperation between Finland and Russia, but rather connections 
with Russia are made by way of participating in international organizations, 
such as the Soroptimist International. A common agenda is easy to find, as for 
this sector… 
 
…the motivation is the same all over the world...the same ideals, the same values, the 
same work for peace, and helping women and children. All our members, we are 
equal in our organization, and they are giving us a lot of information and we are 
returning our information and our friendship. It goes both ways. Russia’s no 
exception. (F #23) 
 
The importance of the gender aspect mirrors the main features of the 
cooperation in general; as Finnish partners are more active initiators and 
fundraisers of joint projects, they also have more influence on setting agendas 
and cooperation priorities. The Russian interviewees agreed that the dominance 
of the social and health sector is mainly a result of Finnish priorities. For Russian 
CSOs and local and regional authorities, these priorities were also very easy to 
understand, accept, and implement as they matched well with the needs of the 
Russian side. This has resulted in the discussion of these issues in Russia as well 
and in the promotion of a more critical understanding of what ‘gender’ issues in 
Russia actually entail. In order to comprehend the contextual differences and the 
asymmetrical setting between the countries and the issues that the CSOs face 
today, a glance at the history may be in order. 
 
6.2.1 Finland: A Genderless Gender Sector 
In contrast to the characteristic desire of organizations in the Anglo-Saxon world 
to create a new active civic identity divided between the public and private 
spheres, creating two unique forms of participation for men and for women; in 
Finland such a division has been absent. Already early on, both men and women 
were equally suitable for representing the ‘people’ and the ‘will of the people’ 
(Liikanen 1995). Both men and women worked together in the organizations and 
the distinctions between sexes were taken with the same naturalness as in the 
agrarian community in general.  
Men and women had their own places and duties, yet the interrelationship 
between the sexes formed a functional entity, which was not divided into the 
spheres of public and private. (Sulkunen 1987, 170; cf. Haavio-Mannila 1968.) 
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They had, in effect, created a ‘gender contract’ in the same essence that states 
may create social contracts with its citizens. It has been argued that both 
Finnishness and gender share the idea of sameness, which creates ‘genderless 
gender’ in the Finnish gender order (Kortteinen 1992). As argued by Lempiäinen 
(2000), Finnishness positions gender ideologically into a certain frame of 
thought, and in that way it stops the flow of gendered meanings. This, then, 
creates an area of sameness, one system instead of two areas; “the sexual 
difference, the idea of two different worlds, is understood with one logic, 
through one template.”  
The lack of stark separation of public and private life, and thus of men and 
women, already during the initial stage of the organizational expansion in 
Finland has been one of the most distinctive features of Finnish organizations. 
The fact that the non-gendered organizational model endured for long as a 
central feature of the entire organizational arena can then be seen as a result of 
the dominant position of agriculture as well as the strong agrarian tradition 
among the urban population in Finland. The activeness of women did not lead 
only to the improvement of the status of women but was reflected in a non-
gender-specific reform movement advocating the status of all of the 
disenfranchised groups. 
It was only later on when the organizational model began to acquire a more 
voluntary basis that the collective structure began to break down. The formerly 
coherent world view of the people was divided into separate life spheres and in 
this process also the role of sexes was reorganized according to the interests of 
these specific spheres. Perhaps, the most obvious development in this respect 
was that men, by far more than women, became politicized. Women, in turn, 
privatized the domesticity and societal caretaking as a feminine life sphere 
making themselves, in consequence, the basis of social moral. This, according to 
Sulkunen (1987, 172), was not, by any means, an act against men but, on the 
contrary, under such a division of labor women purposefully absolved men 
from these duties, enabling them to focus on anchoring the capitalist, ‘immoral,’ 
method of production and erecting the public bourgeois social structure. The 
legacy of this specification is clearly visible today.  
The women’s organization interviewed in Finland did, however, see the 
development somewhat differently. According to a representative of National 
Council of Women of Finland, many feminists in Finland do not agree with 
Sulkunen’s opinions (F #9). On the contrary, according to her, it was never a 
‘purposeful’ act on the part of Finnish women to leave the public sphere to men 
and turn to focus on domestic duties. This was never a choice but rather a 
continued flow of the status quo, since women in Finland were ‘granted’ the 
right to vote in 1906 because they were not considered full citizens, and 
therefore under the guardianship of their husbands or fathers until 1929. This 
means that women were politically, publicly, and economically active prior to 
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gaining the right to vote, being active especially in the underground movement 
against the Russian empire.  
After 1906, the first women Parliamentarians, according to Kuusipalo (2000) 
and a representative of the Coalition of Finnish Women’s Associations (F #14), 
immediately began working on social welfare issues, child care, and education 
because they had experience in this area and because the male politicians did 
not as they were not interested in issues of this nature; i.e., not because the 
women “chose” domesticity and issues related to it. “That actually was good for 
us, how else would our ‘welfare’ Finland been born?” (F #9). The public sphere 
outside social work and care, therefore, had “always belonged to men… there is 
a saying in Finnish: ‘world is the man’s home, home is the woman’s world’ and 
although the early suffragettes worked to change this, it took time for other 
women to realize this possibility – still many women thought and continue to 
think that politics is not for ‘real’ women” (F #9). Civil society, therefore, often 
remains the only way women can access and participate in the public sphere: 
through social work, “filling in the gaps.” 
In the field of social and health, the dominance of women is clearly more 
striking than in any other fields of the civil society. The fact that these 
organizations have gained a strong and visible footing in the Finnish society 
(according to statistics, 74 per cent of the volunteer workers in the field of social 
and health are women), most famously in connection with the formation of the 
welfare state, has made the entire civic activity to appear fairly feminine. 
Explanations for female activeness ranged from upbringing to having no choice: 
 
I just think that it’s the way we’ve [women] been brought up. We want to take the 
responsibilities that the government doesn’t – to fill in the gaps. And I think in 
Russia... women are feeling that if they don’t do their share, no one will…. We 
[women] think that it [taking care] belongs to us... if we didn’t start it, men wouldn’t 
have started it at all. They couldn’t have cared less… (F #9) 
 
[W]e wanted to get rid of the Russian empire. Women were needed in that work… 
Women saw that they were actually needed, and they wanted to go out to the public 
life… [T]hey got organized by themselves – the rich ladies did so first… Actually, it 
was because of these gentry women, who never married, that we got our rights. (F #9) 
 
However, it has to be kept in mind that on other fields of the civil sector, such a 
differentiation between men and women is a lot harder to find. Regarding, for 
example, volunteering – the basis of Finnish civil society, the activeness varies 
very little between women and men. According to the study carried out by 
Yeung (2003), men are actually slightly more active in volunteer work than 
women (38 % of men, 37 % of women volunteer), but women spend more time 
than men in volunteer activities (men 16 hours; women 29 hours per month). 
This, in turn, reflects where values lie in civil society – clearly the marked 
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distinction between Finnish men and women volunteerism in women and 
children welfare vs. other welfare or activities demonstrates the stark divide 
between the gender sector and other sectors of civil society and the lack of flows 
between the two.  
An interesting topic discussed in the interviews with the Finnish women’s 
organization was, then the question of how does the ‘genderless gender’ 
manifest itself in civil society today, and specifically in gender issues. On the one 
hand, this idea of ‘sameness’ and ‘gender neutrality’ seems to provide fertile 
ground for implementing gender-mainstreaming values. On the other hand, 
gendered discrimination persists and, according to many activists in the field, is 
actually getting worse, due to the phenomenon that there is no way to point to 
and describe this discrimination through the template of ‘sameness’: 
 
[W]e just had the news today that the income gap is widening in Finland… But [in 
this article that mentioned the gap] nobody said anything about gender, which 
reflects that Finland is such a gender-neutral country, we don’t see, reporters, 
journalists, politicians don’t see the gender, evaluate the gender, so they don’t see 
what it means. (F #14) 
 
[W]e talk about women’s issues sort of, but we don’t act on it. It’s not legitimate to 
put men and women as different – because our ethos has been about women and men 
work together and we have the same goals – it’s called the “Finnish gender contract.” 
(F #9) 
 
6.2.2 Russia: Feminist vis-à-vis Feminine  
In Russia, the gender and women perception is more complicated. The notions 
of feminine morality, care, and self-sacrifice are long embedded in Russian 
society, as well as in many societies in the world. Russian interpretations in 
particular, however, tend to more directly tie these (socialized) characteristics to 
women’s participation in a resoundingly feminine civil society. Soviet ideology 
served to only strengthen these feminine assumptions and reinforced an 
ideology of the ‘strong Soviet woman’ as the ‘moral backbone’ of the nation. 
Thus, civic activity and institutional politics have divergent meanings: civic 
activity is characterized by femininity and morality, collectivism and the 
‘common good’ whereas institutional politics were characterized by masculinity 
and self-interest, power, and egoism (Salmenniemi 2005).  
Central to Russian society are references to women’s endurance, moral 
superiority, and altruism that are translated as the explanatory ‘reason’ that 
women do not ‘descend’ into formal politics, whereas their overwhelming 
participation in civil society is accepted as ‘moral.’ According to Salmenniemi 
(2005), today’s civic activity is situated in a specific national gendered landscape 
and historical continuum, which explains why civic society is associated with 
femininely marked attributes (social and care work) and not with power and 
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radicalism. These assumed attributes stem from a common belief in biological 
essentialism to explain women’s and men’s positions and roles in society – that 
is, characteristics, personalities, and roles are tied explicitly to biology (the 
body), and therefore divergences in positions, respect, and hierarchy are 
deemed ‘natural.’ It establishes rigid boundaries between men’s and women’s 
proper spheres of activity and assumes a foundation upon which femininity and 
masculinity are grounded and which directs channels of and motivation for 
participation (Salmenniemi 2005, 744).  
Another elucidatory factor in women’s role in civil society perhaps derives 
from the Soviet period. Women were key partakers in blat networks (extensive 
informal ties to trade necessary goods and services) and were fluid actors in the 
‘semi-public’ sphere during the USSR where they conducted everything from 
procuring additional necessities to maintaining cultural events, traditions, and 
community building. This then implies that contemporary women’s activism in 
civil society, rather than in institutional politics, builds upon a tradition of 
accomplishment not through official state and political structures but through 
non-official channels, such as civic organizations (Salmenniemi 2005). However, 
a more plausible explanation is that civil society remains more open to women 
than formal politics because it does not require extensive material resources or 
powerful personal connections – both of which Russian women very rarely 
attain. In Finland, the situation is different: personified characteristics tied to a 
male or female biology still exists (albeit vaguely), but this is often not directly 
tied to women’s or men’s positions in society. Therefore, whereas in Russia 
gendered incongruity is deemed ‘natural,’ in Finland, discrepancies caused by 
gender may go unrecognized. 
Women also largely dominate the Russian CSOs active in cross-border 
cooperation. This female dominance is seen by the Russian CSO actors to be 
connected mainly with the strong recognition of gender questions and related 
organizations in Finland as well as the domination of the social policy field, 
which in turn has traditionally been, an still is, dominated by women; “ There 
are many women NGOs in comparison to other NGOs; therefore, the share of 
women NGOs is also very big in cross-border cooperation (R #56).” 
However, in most cases Russian interviewees did not refer to a feminist or 
gender organizations per se but merely to organizations largely run by women. 
Accordingly, Russian understanding of a women’s organization is quite 
different than that in Finland. In Russia, a more normative understanding of 
women’s role in the family and society can be observed: 
 
Like in the world and in the family, women are prevailing in our organization. 
Naturally, passive people cannot work here; therefore we have all who are active. 
And women are naturally more active. And our organization is not an exception. (R 
#52)  
 
   347 
 
On the other hand, a number of Russian interviewees reacted critically to 
questions on women NGOs and gender issues. These were women who claimed 
not to have anything to do with gender issues or “women’s problems,” even 
though they worked with social problems of children and mothers. Such a view 
can be explained by the fact that a part of the Russian population, as well as 
NGO representatives, regard gender issues as feminist issues, which have been 
brought from the West and which are not relevant to Russia. By making such a 
differentiation, social organizations often try to demonstrate their importance in 
comparison to gender organizations per se. 
Gender organizations are increasingly popular in Russia. However, 
oftentimes they do not deal with the social problems themselves but rather with 
the infrastructure of gender equality protection. Such organizations and centers 
work in the field of gender studies, expertise, organization of conferences, 
seminars, hearings, etc. They are mostly funded by the Western foundations or 
partners and are pro-feminist or Western-oriented. A number of Russian social 
and health organizations differentiate themselves from these gender 
organizations by claiming that they are not socially important enough.  
 
 
6.3 DOUBLE-EDGED EUROPEANIZATION 
 
The new EU policy documents concerning CBC have been a major source of 
inspiration for the discussion over new forms of cross-border regionalization. At 
the same time, their message has been rather directly linked to Europeanization 
and the spreading of a supranational European identity (Scott 2006, 22). In 
regard to CSOs and paradiplomatic interaction, the EU’s CBC documents 
continue to see civil society actors in normative terms, mainly as part of 
democracy promotion, as has been particularly the case in Phare and other pre-
accession instruments. Being openly based on the principle of conditionality and 
envisioning CSOs as a part of the process of Europeanizing and democratizing 
Russia, such an approach is susceptible to be written off or regarded as 
intrusion. As the concept of civil society is inherently linked with the concept of 
the state, EU support has been taken as aiming not just for civil society but 
involving an agenda for reshaping the state-civil society relationship as well.  
As explained in the section 4.2, Europeanization is a confusing concept for it 
has been used to refer to various different things. In this study, the concept of 
Europeanization is used to refer to shared institutional and discursive practices 
that take place in a common European frame, i.e., as a patterns of change away 
from state-centeredness whereby, inter alia, rules, norms, values, and resources 
are denationalized and become directed towards and/or increasingly influenced 
by the European (more precisely, European Union) model. In a temporal sense, 
in the Finnish case it refers to the post-1995 era, i.e., the phase during which new 
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supra-national administrative structures were put in place in the development 
of Finnish-Russian relations. 
 
6.3.1 The European Union as an External Stimuli 
Despite all the criticism, the role of the EU is generally being evaluated in 
positive terms by both sides. As the EU is fundamentally based on economic and 
political concerns, relations across its external borders have been characterized 
by parallel leanings. As the cooperation across the Finnish-Russian border has 
been dominated predominantly by social and health-related issues, it is not 
surprising that the EU appears detached or simply irrelevant in the eyes of 
many civil society actors. Given that its origins are also closely linked to 
concerns about democracy, human rights, and international conflict, the 
updated EU external policies now have a broadened focus, which in turn 
permits a greater number of CSOs to get better involved. Also the Russian 
stakeholders are now taken as more serious and equal partners than ever before. 
The EU now offers Russia a privileged partnership, building upon a mutual 
commitment to common goals and values – at least as long as they are 
‘European’ values.  
The European dimension provides CSO with a leverage to articulate social 
and political concerns in a broader international context and obtain greater 
moral material and support. Such support, along with the exchange of 
knowledge and best practices, has been vital for Russian CSOs as it has 
provided an alternative avenue for them to work on essential public services 
that financially strapped government has not been able or willing to provide. 
These services are frequently provided in direct collaboration with CSOs from 
EU member states and other international organizations: 
 
There are some positive shifts in collaboration with our authorities though they are 
come out too slowly. That’s why we cooperate with Europe and Finland. We hope 
that by means of this our relationships with the state will be developing faster, that 
this will influence our authorities and they will become more flexible when dealing 
with us. (R #72) 
 
While the EU certainly provides bigger circles and increased political and 
economic leverage, the bilateral cooperation had served an important role in 
maintaining the ‘special relationship’ and allowed more pragmatic forms of 
cooperation. On the other hand, the EU’s internal logic of stimulating regional 
development in the often peripheral border regions and erasing borders, the 
products of past conflicts, has not, however, fit the Finnish context, in which the 
border was still seen to possess an important filtering function. 
Civil society actors see that the Europeanization of the program 
administration promotes cooperation by bringing well-needed vigor in the 
currency of ideas but even more so in form of funding. Europe offers the 
   349 
 
national civil societies the chance to modernize and, when needed, to bypass 
national legislation that may discourage nonprofit growth and sustainability. 
The EU was seen to bring positive and progressive changes to Finnish 
legislation, laws, and statements particularly with regard to gender policy. 
Nevertheless, while the EU was considered to have good intensions and a 
progressive agenda, the respondents agreed that it brought very little in the way 
of action. Its main benefits were seen to stem from the fact that having an 
external player in the field has forced the two countries to move beyond, or at 
least broaden, the old bilateral agenda colored by history: 
 
…after we joined the EU – the EU policies replaced our old YYA policies... we cannot 
escape the history. We were, in a way, the only country taking care of the 
Soviet/Russia relations, until we got an important partner, the EU… The EU offers the 
most interesting funding mechanisms. Local and Neighboring Area Cooperation 
funding programs are nice, but do not compete in any way in the same category [with 
the EU funding], that’s a fact. (F #48) 
 
Tapping the new stimuli has, however, been far from straightforward. The new 
situation has offered new opportunities, the utilization of which has remained 
largely unused due to the apparent mismatch in the operational configurations 
between the Commission and CSOs. The interviewed CSOs maintain that in 
order to succeed the EU must forget its one-sided attempt to ‘order’ its external 
borders and transform the rhetoric about multilevel and reciprocal 
neighborhood building into practice. From their perspective, a greater focus on 
cooperation dynamics from below will help connect citizens and communities 
with the EU and make the abstract notion of a cooperative neighborhood more 
credible. 
Today, CSOs are better heard but not always listened to. According to the EU 
rhetoric, CSOs now have a valuable role to play in identifying priorities for 
action and in promoting and monitoring the implementation of CBC 
(Commission of the European Communities 2007, 11), but in practice it seems to 
lack actual means to do much about it. The EU is likewise, in some cases 
advisedly, undiscovered by CSOs; not all CSOs are capable of, or simply 
interested in, using the opportunities provided by the EU. Reasons for this are 
manifold and context dependent, but at least a part of it comes down to the fact 
that the operational space of most of the CSOs is still very much shaped by 
national states and their rules. On the other hand, some CSOs, especially in the 
neighborhood, have exaggerated expectations towards the ability of the EU, 
which may lead to excessive scale jumping and ignoring the roles of their 
respective governments as the principal decision makers. The lure of the EU 
urges these organizations into EU circles, whereby activities directed towards 
the national situation and circumstances, of which the respective civil society is 
an inherent part, may get neglected. 
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Albeit only a few had direct experience on the matter, the EU was 
characterized off-hand as being a distant and unapproachable actor for its 
projects were seen as overly laborious (bureaucratic) and too time-consuming 
given the limited resources that the CSOs have. The EU was seen as a 
“governmental organization” and, hence, it was logical that the “governments 
play the main role” and why “everything is a political question anyhow” (F #23).  
Were the expressed opinions influenced by the general trend and rhetoric or 
not, the fact of the matter is that with its standards of civil society engagement, 
the EU was seen to favor larger players and isolate smaller ones. The EU 
funding available was considered to be “as bureaucratic and unclear as it just 
can be” (F #20). Even though promising in principle, EU projects were judged to 
be in practice simply overly burdensome for smaller organizations to engage in 
more directly.  
 
[T]he EU projects are really off-putting because of the administration, reporting, and 
budgeting they require are all so burdensome. The idea behind them is good, but to 
administer them just requires too many resources – there’s no resources left for the 
actual work… Many simply cannot afford that. (F #32) 
 
We have given up with these EU funding mechanisms… I have a feeling that they 
[the EU] pay according to the text we provide, not the work we do (F #35). 
 
Above all, the EU funding mechanisms and procedures were criticized heavily 
for being overly lengthy, requiring employees to work solely on them, and for 
requiring the CSO in question to have a significant amount of personal funding 
to initiate the project as EU funding is oftentimes granted only after the project is 
implemented. The multi-tier structure of CSO was, however, seen to ease the 
situation. 
 
You would have to have enough time or money, because you need to spend at least 
three months in preparing before you even know you if receive any money. Since we 
have that European level organization, that’s their job, that’s what they do, so it’s 
easier for us. (F #14) 
 
To participate in a EU project is pretty complicated. The filling of papers to start 
with… and the whole procedure takes a lot of time, and effort, and maybe the money 
that you receive from that is not that much in comparison to the time and efforts it 
requires. (F #23) 
 
It’s a very difficult and involved process; you have to consider really carefully what 
you get for the amount of effort you put in for applying… and dealing with 
everything that comes with the money. Even if you have the money, it is so much 
work to put into the monitoring that maybe you don’t win after getting the money 
from the EU. (F #21) 
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[T]hey [EU projects] are so, so complicated; they take so much energy – especially the 
monitoring part which we take seriously. We had one EU project in 2004, that went 
ok, but it took a year before all the papers were correct, and then we got our money. 
So you would have to be a rich organization in order to survive… We have been 
partners, or taken part, in many projects, but not directing them. We give our 
expertise…. So somebody is crazy enough to apply! (F #9) 
 
While those left out, by force or by choice, emphasize that the application 
procedures, administration, reporting, and the required magnitude of projects 
make EU-projects seem unwelcoming and unapproachable, the ones that can 
‘afford’ to be included see that the EU projects do bring in bigger circles and 
resources, and thus appear unquestionably as more interesting. On the other 
hand, some of the organization based in the bigger cities further away from the 
border felt that they were excluded from the cross-border programs simply 
because of their location: 
 
We [here in big cities] are wondering that how on earth you, over there in Joensuu or 
Lappeenranta, survive on you own with these big actors [EU and Russia]... our view, 
of course, is that the entire Finland should be regarded as a border area... many other 
cities that are not even close to the border are still very active... we consider it very 
strange that the cooperation done from here [further away from the border] has no 
value, that we can not be part of the bigger frameworks. (F #48) 
 
The EU seems to be quite successful in having a say by setting an example. 
Europe is seen as a success story particularly in terms of social development and 
welfare, which appears to be an important demarcation line as well. A number 
of Russian respondents admitted that the ideal of a ‘social Europe’ has provided 
impetus for cooperation and transnational links have created a platform to gain 
knowledge of and discuss issues such as human rights, gender equality, and 
discrimination of minorities, which in the Russian national context have been 
sidestepped or even throttled. The EU was also perceived as “good for women” 
and as being more progressive than the Finnish state in promoting women’s 
rights and related issues. Thus, being part of the EU has been beneficial, as it has 
forced Finland to awake and realize that more could be done.  
Interestingly, it was mentioned on a number of occasions that Finns are 
doing a good job promoting gender and women’s rights outside of Finland but 
often forget to be active domestically. The reason for this was perceived to be the 
assumption that the situation of women in Finland was quite good in relation 
many other countries. However, the women’s CSOs strongly emphasized that 
Finland was “not such a paradise for women” after all (F #9). Such thinking was 
fuelled by the recent Gender Gap Report in the ranking of which Finland had 
just lost its pole position, being now the second best in the world, after Norway. 
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This, it was argued, proved “that things have not gone very far, or progressed at 
all in a while” (ibid.). In general, the overall feeling was rather negative towards 
the lack of progress in Finland. In contrast, the EU was portrayed as a positive 
force in Europe, and the one that will, with enough political leverage, bring 
about progress and changes in women’s rights and push a progressive gender 
agenda. The women’s organizations and networks just need to be more 
proactive in pushing, lobbying, and getting women in to high political 
representation and influence in order to make sure that gender issues are not 
forgotten. Such a perspective provides quite a contrast to the common, at least 
Finnish, way of though that Finland would be the leader in this respect.  
 
[W]hen we joined the EU, there was in Finland this very strong idea that we already 
have equality between women and men… and now they are coming and taking this 
away, so if we go there [to EU] we have to go and teach them, how to do this 
equality… It is good, what has happened, because we have seen that no, we are not 
number one, not even in Europe, or in the world… we have very many bad things 
here too. So that was good to happen to Finland, to see this. (F #21) 
 
While it was generally regarded as a positive development that CBC had 
become more balanced, some suggested that the Commission has forgotten to 
push for its own agenda as it now listened to Russia too much in the decisions 
concerning CBC priorities (F #9). This was seen to lead to slow down the 
potential progress that could be gained. It was, however, understood that 
cooperation that does not “bring in money” is bound to be sidelined anyway – 
“because of power relations, of course” (F #9). 
The CSOs also experienced that the room for maneuver allowed by the EU 
legislation has not been utilized enough, and that for example, the tax law has 
been interpreted from the CSO perspective more strictly that would have been 
more necessary. Most of the CSOs studied had some sort of link the EU either 
via an umbrella organization or a European supranational body such as the 
European Women’s Lobby. There was a broad recognition that the climate had 
changed since Finland became a member in 1995 as gender-related CSOs were 
no longer so isolated but now could magnify their influence and leverage within 
European networks – speaking “with stronger words, perhaps even bigger 
voice” (F #23). It was, however, emphasized that even though development had 
certainly taken place, it may not be only due to the EU.  
 
I don’t know if it [EU] is positive or negative, it’s more of a question of its usefulness. 
It’s quite useful, belonging to the EU, if you think about certain issues like trafficking 
or migration, and the gender issues and women’s rights in that context. If we 
wouldn’t be in EU or have cooperation and networks, we would just be… more alone 
in these [issues]. Now we have the possibility to discuss and learn, to get information. 
(F #21) 
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The broadened scope of EU policies makes the role of CSOs ever more 
important, yet the EU still lacks effective means to channel its assistance to 
where it would be needed the most. Instead, many local and regional level CSOs 
receive their shares through public agencies or private firms that are also 
invested in CBC. It is not uncommon to see representative of the different 
societal sectors as partners in a project. While the three sectorial partnerships, 
with the both horizontal and vertical linkages they imply, are certainly a 
positive phenomenon, the current arrangement remains far from balanced. This 
is not helped by that apparent fact that the EU, acting as a quasistate, has 
developed a systematic framework for implementing cross-border civil society 
projects that involves a bureaucratic process of implementation and that 
channels support for civil society projects largely through state structures. Here, 
the EU demands certain types of bureaucratic discipline, which includes 
budgeting, (including matching funds) auditing, monitoring and evaluating 
civil society projects which often subordinates CSOs to state agencies at the 
national, regional and local level – in so doing granting them the power to 
determine, with little accountability, which and what type of CSOs gets selected 
for grantees. This approach largely determines the types of CSOs that are 
capable of practicing such discipline and of accessing EU financial support. It 
also contributes to a ‘mission drift’ and the emergence of a privileged CSO elite 
separate from other CSOs and from its potential constituents. 
The EU funding, most importantly through past Tacis and INTERREG 
programs, has made actions increasingly project-based. Projects are regarded as 
useful for solving short-term issues, but also as challenges as they tend to lack a 
long-term vision and, hence, also coherence and at times commitment. Project 
based CBC also entails more frequent applications and increased reporting, both 
with which require special skills and, in particular, mastery of very specific EU 
language and knowledge. Especially the Russian CSOs implied dissatisfaction in 
this regard. Due to difficult the application process, poor language skills, lack of 
experience in project management, inability to find a required partner, and 
general lack of resources to implement the project should one be accepted, are 
brought forth as reasons for the lack of success in applying funding or as reason 
not to even bother. On the Finnish side, many local level actors seem also 
detached from the EU programs and their priorities. However, thanks to the 
three, four, or even five-tier model of the Finnish associational activity 
(consisting of village, municipal, district, national, and potentially international 
associations), the decisions, ideas, and priorities, as well as funding tend to 
reach the actors from all levels with a whimper rather than a bang. 
Another interesting point that emerges from the opinions of Finnish CSO 
actors towards EU policies is that there is neither a coherent European civil 
society nor is the EU a coherent actor in relation to Russia. Policy frameworks 
that endeavor to capture the entire picture are seen as destined to overlook 
country-specific issues and circumstances. It was often expressed that for CBC to 
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be effective, projects receiving EU funds should be derived from practical issues 
that emerge locally. Accordingly, a majority of the Finnish CSOs that have 
already managed to establish contacts with Russian CSOs work rather 
independently from EU initiatives and polices. According to many, cooperation 
has arisen from a general awareness of a common interest or problem, which 
has functioned as an impetus for cooperative initiatives. It is these bottom-up 
initiatives that have mobilized the people to take the first step across the border 
and engage in pragmatic and constructive forms of cooperation.  
The Russian CSOs that enjoy support from regional and local authorities, 
have the acquired organizational and infrastructural resources, and/or are 
managed by an internally oriented and educated persons are generally more 
involved in the EU-sponsored projects, EU organized forums, or major 
European civil society networks. In most cases, the Russia CSOs did not have 
direct experience on the EU program procedures, but they had been working 
together with the EU member partners, which are in charge of the application, 
reporting, and other communication with the EU. As a general rule, the 
availability of the funding is a lot more important than the source from which 
comes.  
 
6.3.2 Europeanization and its Influence  
In the Finnish case, the concept of Europeanization, with all its flaws, provides 
an alternative context for the age-old balancing at the border of East and West in 
all matters related to the border with Russia. In the national and regional level 
administrative discussions concerning CBC policies, the conceptual shift 
towards the new European rhetoric can be easily recognized. As Liikanen et al. 
(2007) have explained, this shift overlapped largely with broader changes in 
political perspectives. The state controlled bilateral relations came to an end 
together with the collapse of the Soviet Union and as Finland joined the Union 
soon after, CBC programs and projects were streamlined to match with the 
policy frames defined by the EU and the new Europeanizing rhetoric.  
This study supports the hypothesis that the normative power that the EU 
possesses as a ‘democratizer’ and ‘stabilizer’ is not only exercised explicitly 
through formal policy avenues but also through more subtle and informal 
channels. Europeanization is taking place most notably through informal 
networks and non-hierarchical institutional learning as civil society actors who 
engage in CBC between EU member states and neighboring countries are 
adopting new institutional and discursive practices that are widening the 
political landscape from the local to the national and European level. This is 
evidenced by the changing domestic agendas of CSOs in neighboring countries; 
these reflect an incorporation of social objectives defined by EU-based CSOs and 
a gradual appropriation of EU norms. The EU’s influence is, however, selective, 
appealing rather to civil society ‘elites’ who are politically influential or well 
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connected to transnational CSO networks. There appears to be a general failure 
on the part of the EU to interact more intensively with local societies. 
Civil society plays an important role in a bottom-up diffusion of ‘Europe’ 
beyond EU borders. Such Europeanization is not, however, taking place in terms 
of point-blank convergence to normative models but rather occurring as a 
complex process of accommodation and adaptation. Nor is this Europeanization 
taking place as a wholesale appropriation of EU norms and values but rather 
selectively; civil society actors are attempting to build bridges between states 
and very different societal contexts to define common agendas in the area of 
social policy and in the pursuit of social equity.  
The transfer of ‘European’ civil society agendas and values takes place within 
processes of contextual adaptation and through pragmatic strategies that de-
politicize cross-border cooperation between civil society actors. This is an 
illustrative example of how network governance, applied to civil society actors, 
has led to an informal, yet mutually reinforcing cooperation that transcends 
formal policy spheres. Such decentralized forms of CBC have helped put specific 
issues on the agendas of civil society groups in neighboring states. Through such 
decentralized, informal practices, issues such as gender equality, environmental 
awareness, transparent governance, social welfare, and minority rights are 
translated and framed locally. 
CSOs with more developed national profiles and managed by internationally 
oriented and educated elite are generally more involved in the wider political 
debate at the national level and communicate with EU representatives and 
participate in fora organized by the EU and major European civil society 
organizations. Regional and local CSOs tend to be marginalized from this level 
of political interaction, but, ironically, it is at the level of locally embedded cross-
border networks between local civil society organizations at which 
Europeanization as an ‘ideational’ projection of social values is most palpable 
and where the influence of CSOs is greatest. To an extent, cross-border learning 
processes within these networks often appear uni-directional, e.g., West to East. 
Through supporting structural modernization in former socialist states, the EU 
has sought to reshape national societies to better match with its own 
institutional image. This has also contributed to a ‘deformation’ of civil society is 
taking place to the extent that CSOs are partly becoming detached from their 
original social contexts and concerns; agendas are often externally imposed 
rather than developed locally. 
Russian respondents assessed the European Neighborhood program in 
positive terms, in comparison to the previous Tacis-INTERREG era but 
remained quite skeptical about the potential development of EU-Russian 
relationships in general – reflecting, thus, the official Russian federal rhetoric 
regarding this issue. It is obvious that, despite the rhetoric, the EU’s formal 
geopolitics have remained state-centered, whereby civil society actors in 
neighboring states feel marginalized and discriminated against.  
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Even though EU projects and funding were perceived as complicated and 
difficult to receive, the policies as such were mainly assessed as reasonably 
friendly and non-excluding. The Karelian respondent made a clear point of the 
Republic of Karelia being clearly, in comparison to other parts of Russia, a 
European region – a sort of a ‘pilot region’ of greater EU-Russian cooperation. 
Such understanding is closely connected with the overall positive evaluation of 
civil society development in Karelia. The Europeanness of the Republic is 
understood in terms of having various connections with the EU, i.e., in practice 
with Finland, through which European values but most notably ideas and 
modes of action get exported across the border. The regional government and 
the municipalities are named as the mediators in and engines of CBC, but the 
cross-border links are regarded as having benefited the Republic’s infrastructure 
and population as a whole. The special status of the Republic of Karelia is 
widely shared and may be taken as important an element of the Republic’s new 
regional identity73.  
Europeanness is taken to refer to specific attitudes towards, for instance, 
governance, labor, gender equality, and human rights. The European model of 
governance is characterized as being transparent, representative, accountable, 
scrupulous, punctual, and just. Work and production were seen as being good 
and of high quality; European societies were regarded as having greater equality 
of the sexes and respect for human rights. These characterizations were then 
used to make a demarcation between the ‘European’ practices and the present 
Russian ones. For instance, the European model of governance is perceived to 
allow greater CSO participation, whereas the Russian vertical of power and 
‘managed’ democracy are regarded as leaving little room for the CSOs. 
Russian civil society actors had often received training and education 
through cooperating with their EU partners. This had often led to the absorption 
of institutional rhetoric that emphasizes effective and efficient problem solving 
rather than the role of civil society in more normative terms. Europe was also 
often seen as a success story in terms of social development and welfare. Even 
though many aspects related to the EU (freedom of movement, single currency, 
large common market) were given a high value, the respondents noted that it is 
neither possible nor necessary for Russia to seek EU membership due to the vast 
and fundamental dissimilarities between Russia and the EU. However, deep 
association with the EU without any loss of sovereignty is seen as vastly 
preferable by the Russian CSOs.  
Despite its noble rhetoric, at times the Europeanization of CBC tends to 
confirm the existing differences between the EU and non-EU members. The 
Russian civil society actors, who work intensively with the Finnish and other EU 
partners, expressed a desire to break down the barriers between a Russian ‘us’ 
                                                          
73 As an example of this, in 2003 the Republic of Karelia was nominated as the European Region of 
the Year. 
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and EU-European ‘them.’ Nonetheless, respondents from both sides of the 
border underlined that Russia is a very special kind of Europe. As a non-EU 
member and a country, which does not seek EU membership, Russia has a very 
clear border, also in mental terms, with EU countries. Thus, the EU is not seen as 
an appropriate actor for supporting the Russian civil society. In the recent past, 
Russia has tried to build much more clear borders and to raise its national self-
understanding, which in turn reduces the significance of international 
cooperation of the Russian actors, especially regarding Western funding. The 
nationalized political discourse and demonization of international organizations 
and their Russian partners reduce the significance and achievements of 
international cooperation. The need for foreign funds is also being reduced by 
better availability of the federal funding for civil society – even if on a very 
selective basis. To what extent this will impact the motivation for CBC remains 
to be seen.  
 
 
6.4 CIVIL SOCIETY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
 
As the geopolitical climatic relaxed and the border became more permeable, it 
was seen that the CSOs did not only have a role to play in stabilizing the 
relations but that they also had vast practical knowledge about a number of 
issues seen as important concerning CBC. The Finnish working model was thus 
stretched to cover also cooperation with Russia – and this came about quite 
separately from ideological ambitions about Western democracy or civil society 
building. In addition to cooperation between CSOs, much interaction took, and 
takes, place at the individual, people-to-people level. While this is seldom visible 
in program reports or through the analysis of funding mechanisms, such 
personal level ties do form a crucial part of civil society interaction. 
There is a widespread agreement among the Finnish CSOs that their work 
and connections provide an alternative avenue for cooperation when inter-state 
relations go sour and play also a vital role eventually in re-establishing relations. 
While Finnish businesses have had clear difficulties adapting to the unfamiliar 
conditions in Russia and the jurisdiction of governments stops at the political 
border, as any action beyond that could be easily taken as an intrusion, 
individual citizens and CSOs are viewed to be less restricted from moving back 
and forth across the border and entering into cross-border cooperative 
relationships – breaking up, as a result, the surprisingly persistent East-West 
divide.  
CSOs are seen to have a number of qualities that emphasize their aptitude for 
CBC. In relative terms, CSOs are fairly flexible, innovative, realist and, as a 
result, able to react to local issues fast and effectively. CSOs tend also to be less 
bureaucratic as well as less constrained by long-term strategies than official 
governmental programs. In addition, CSOs are logically more suitable for 
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promoting civil society as a foreign governmental promotion of civil society 
could easily be seen as involving an agenda of reshaping also the state 
institutions, making it less acceptable in the recipient country. This is commonly 
understood both by the state institutions as well as the CSOs themselves: 
 
Genuine and productive cooperation between different countries and different 
cultures also calls for interaction and dialogue between ordinary people. Non-
governmental organizations do extremely important work in increasing dialogue and 
developing a wide range of cross-border cooperation between civil societies. 
(President of the Republic of Finland, Tarja Halonen at Forum on civil society 
cooperation of European Union and Russia, 17.11.2006 in Lahti, Finland) 
 
[B]ecause our work doesn’t take place at the official level, it is not like, as you know, 
ministers, members of the parliament or heads of the councils, who are there [in 
Russia] against their will, because they are forced to go there… we [NGOs] go to meet 
these people in a face-to-face situation, that’s the best way to have an impact, both 
sides. It influence the attitudes, personal relations, working methods, everything. At 
this level we learn to know each other. (F #32)      
 
All in all, it can be argued that cross-border interdependence has been created as 
the border became more permeable and people were finally able to interact with 
those with whom they were the closest geographically. The growth of cross-
border linkages among various CSOs has now become a driver of bottom-up 
integration in contrast to integration from above.  
 
6.4.1 Asymmetrical Bases for Cooperation 
The premises of Finnish-Russian cooperation are largely based on asymmetries 
and the externalities, whether they are positive (benefits) or negative (costs), that 
they imply. These cross-border flows are based on transactions, 
interdependencies, and interactions through people-to-people contacts between 
the two sides of the border. Such linkages represent opportunities and further 
development, if managed properly, but also to negative externalities and 
challenges that can hinder development. CBC is needed also in order to manage 
and diminish the negative side effects of increased interaction. While the 
difference and unfamiliarity that the border implies fuels interaction to an 
extent, as do differences in price levels and product selection, otherwise the 
transaction costs in such an asymmetrical setting tend to be high in comparison 
to expected profits. To cross the border still takes time, effort, and money.  
There are a variety of factors that hinder CBC across the Finnish-Russian 
border. In addition to the troublesome border crossing formalities, the visa 
requirement, and poor infrastructure (especially in the northern part of the 
border), CBC is discouraged by a general lack of information and knowledge, 
the related negative mentality and stereotypical thinking, and the substantial 
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gap between the Finnish and Russian laws and regulations. Differences in 
language and working culture lead to misunderstandings. Differences in 
institutional bases, organizational forms, and asymmetries in the available 
recourses and state support lead to different capacities for action and room to 
maneuver. More generally, the asymmetry in the governance approaches; i.e., 
centralized, vertical power-relations on the Russian side vis-à-vis more multi-
level, horizontal on the Finnish side (see Laine 2012; Németh et al. 2012), pose an 
apparent mismatch, with which regional actors need to struggle. Fortunately, 
the CSO actors tend to see most of these factors not as actual obstacles but rather 
as drawbacks – something that one just has to live with if involved in CBC. To 
many, the border “is just a regrettable fact that one has to live with.” It is “a 
drag, but not a barrier” across which “cooperation is not easy, but it can be 
done” (F #48). 
At the local and regional level in Finland, there is an overall interest in 
forging links with Russian organizations but also a keen awareness of the 
difficulties involved. Russian CSOs were blamed for being overly nationalistic, 
patriotic (F #23), and “scarily right-wing”(F #21). The language barrier is the 
most commonly mentioned inhibiting factor, a problem that Russians are 
expected to fix by learning to communicate through the medium of English. 
Also the difference in culture, with the obvious side effects (communication 
problems, lack of understanding of how to things work) posed a practical 
barrier: 
 
[T]he language barrier has been really big. And the language, of course, affects your 
thought. The Russian language; Russians they think and they speak like the French, 
you never know what’s the real point! ...we need to know if they have an actual goal 
and what do they need from us. (F #14) 
 
We don’t have any relations to Russia anymore... because we just haven’t been able to 
find any organizations, that aren’t so patriotic, nationalistic, enthusiastic… we have 
difficulties in cooperating with Russian organizations... I don’t understand why they 
are so nationalistic… it’s so difficult to cooperate with people that are always like 
“homeland, homeland.” (F #23) 
 
The border or the border crossing procedures were rarely mentioned as negative 
factors and visa issues only slightly more often. While visas are today easier to 
acquire, the application procedure still takes time making natural, day-to-day, 
unplanned, impulsive interaction impossible. Historical issues (the wars 
between Finland and Russia) were brought up in a couple of cases, but they 
were not perceived as significant obstacles, especially for or by younger 
generations. Other factors mentioned by the Finnish actors included difficulties 
in finding a trustworthy partner and the lack of general knowledge and know-
how. The Russian CSO activists, in turn, mentioned that sometimes it is difficult 
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to go through a project implementation without misunderstandings. The most 
often mentioned complaint dealt with Finnish partners’ overstated expectations 
about how projects goals can be achieved or different perceptions of how 
routine activities must be done. 
Also the very different working culture and difficult overall situation in 
Russia were seen as drawbacks also for the Finnish CSOs; to travel to Russia 
simply feels complicated and problematic. The high turnover of Russian 
authorities was perceived to harm the cooperation as there is not simply enough 
time to get to know the relevant people well in order to form the personal 
connections, which are often required to move things forward in Russia. It was 
also underlined that in Russia the role of the government is overpowering and 
that civil society has very limited chances to influence the system. The situation 
has, especially in Karelia, somewhat improved as a number of local CSOs have 
been able to create relations with the authorities. However, Russian authorities’ 
attitude towards foreign aid is still seen to harm cross-border cooperation:  
 
Russian authorities have been fairly unappreciative… they seen that it their job to 
take care of things, and they do not like that we try to tamper with that… during the 
Putin’s era the control over environmental organizations has been tightened… the 
foreign funding for Russian organizations is something that doesn’t fit in with 
Russian system… it has a whiff of interfering with Russia’s internal issues… they do 
not like that we fund and help Russian organizations. (F # 46) 
 
On the other hand, in cases it was the Russian CSOs themselves that were 
blamed for not having the ‘right’ (i.e., Finnish) attitude: 
 
They always want money… the first question always is: how should we do this as we 
do not have any money? My answer always is that you just have to do it even if you 
do not have money. Like we do it, we [in Finland] are doing a lot of things even when 
we do not have money, these things just have to be done, you have to look for 
volunteers. (F #36) 
 
From the Russian perspective, the problems seemed less problematic:  
 
Finns are mostly our partners. They don’t know Russian, we don’t know Finnish. But 
it doesn’t hinder our communication. We understand very well what they want to 
say, and they understand very well what we want to say. It means interaction 
between countries. It can proceed by the rules of the emotions. (R #52) 
 
A couple of Russian interviewees criticized the lack of information and 
informational infrastructure for the cooperation: 
 
There is a very deep informational vacuum… informational field is not developed. It 
would be good if there would be special resources for this. For example, this would 
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be able to bring information about life in Finland, or Baltic states. In fact, there are 
many myths that “Everything is good in Finland; it is just a paradise abroad.” If 
people would know that they also have problems there, it would be better. (R #55) 
 
The same issue was voiced also on the Finnish side. It was agreed that in the 
past Finnish groups’ establishment of cooperative contacts with Russian groups 
was carried out “the wrong way” since Finnish CSOs perceived their 
experiential superiority in understanding how civil society works and how it 
should be conducted. It was remained that: 
 
It’s important to involve them [Russian CSOs] in the discussion about that they want. 
There’s no idea to go to a country and tell them, ‘this is all wrong.’ It’s more like the 
Swedish way. Finns are a bit like it, but less so. Things are better these days in that we 
do tell them that we also don’t have a perfect society. (F #14) 
 
For the Russians, one of the major obstacles for CBC was the different scope and 
scale of the problems. An example given was the 30,000 registered people 
infected with AIDS in St Petersburg, compared to the just 326 people in the 
whole of Finland (R #54). The difference in the scope of the problems faced was 
also acknowledged by the Finnish CSOs. It was, however, seen that the 
problems posed a major barrier especially in the early 1990s, when most of the 
activities initiated by Finnish CSOs were directed towards St. Petersburg, a 
metropolis that boasts more denizens than Finland itself. Soon after, Finns 
became more active in the Republic of Karelia, where the problems were, even if 
just as serious by their nature, at least somewhat smaller in terms of scope. The 
difference in scales became apparent in the assessment of problems and needs, 
some of which were unheard of within the Finnish context. Nonetheless, it was 
also pointed out that often when an agreement about a mutual goal as well as 
about the division of labor has been reached, many of the mentioned drawbacks 
became suddenly less significant. For many, it was argued, the well-known 
differences simply formed an excuse not to get involved. 
Practical operations revealed that the difference between the two countries 
was not only evident in scales or even in the methods and forms of activities but 
also in the very systems through which the work had to be carried out (see 
Skvortsova 2005, 38). The vast differences in operational capacity, financial 
resources, and political support pose a major hurdle for CBC. Not only can 
Finnish organizations count on much greater resources from philanthropic 
sources, foundations, the EU and, in particular, the Finnish government, they 
are also considered by the government and political parties as partners in many 
areas of public policy. Russian CSOs are often partners of local governments for 
whom they often function as subcontractors of public services, but they play a 
clearly subservient role in terms of influencing public policy agendas. Russian 
organizations, particularly in peripheral regions such as Karelia, also have a 
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much more difficult time securing funds for CBC. Those Russian CSOs that 
receive foreign support have, in addition, been subject to critical scrutiny and 
suspicion by the present Russian government (Laine & Demidov 2013).  
 
6.4.2 Why Cooperate? 
The Finnish NGOs list a variety of motivations to cooperate with CSOs across 
the border. However, there seems to be an overall understanding that even 
though is it becoming clear that only Russia itself can solve its problems, it is 
Finns duty to help the nearby regions in this process. For example, the social and 
health sector has been enormously active setting up the welfare system and 
basic services in Karelia. For many, however, it would simply be abnormal not 
to cooperate with one’s closest neighbor: 
 
If we would not cooperate with Russians, with whom could we cooperate? (F #46) 
 
The starting point today is that this is not development cooperation, but the idea is 
that the border is only a titular one… we need to cooperate with our closest neighbor 
at all possible levels (F #48). 
 
For many, cooperation with Russia is portrayed as a value of its own and does 
not necessarily need to produce concrete results all the time.  
 
[T]here are some things that we just do... and I rarely stop to think, well, why do we 
do it? Why is this so important? But it is. (F #21) 
We must increase interaction somehow (F #45). 
 
We see how much work is needed and how much work they are doing... Sometimes I 
am really tired of travelling... but it’s just, when you get these feelings of cooperation 
that yes, we share a common agenda – it just gives you hope [to keep working]... In 
the international context, we can do so much. Alone you can’t. (F #14) 
 
Russia is also seen especially as ‘our,’ Finland’s, neighbor, and it is seen almost 
as a shame that Finns do not have closer ties with Russians:  
 
If you see in your own neighborhood, something not nice to happen to women and 
children then you try and help – you start from home (F #23). 
 
[I]t’s our neighbor country... and I think that Russia is part of Europe as well, and it’s 
not good to isolate Russia... or us from Russia! (F #21) 
 
Moreover, ignoring or isolating Russia is regarded as an unbeneficial strategy 
for Finland as being a large and powerful country; Russia is seen to have a lot to 
give to Finland in return in the long run. 
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Somehow it’s quite amazing that there is such a big, interesting country, with a strong 
culture... in Finland we are quite…. ignorant about this, maybe. There are very few 
people that speak Russian here as well… it is not wise. We could get a lot from 
Russia. (F #21) 
 
In a couple of interviews the long-term benefits of cooperation were brought up. 
It was seen that it is important to good relations with Russia, in every sector, as 
it is a significant market area and trade partner for Finland. Russia is seen as 
developing and becoming more prosperous, and Russian investments and 
money brought to the country by tourists is envisioned to play a highly 
important role in Eastern Finland:  
 
Our geographical situation is what it is; why not make good use of it? (F #45) 
 
Another motivation for Finns was mentioned to be the greater aim of raising 
awareness or advocate a topic or an issue relevant for the organization in 
question (environment, human rights, women’s organizations etc.), and yet 
another simply the quest for new experiences (especially the field of culture) or 
something else that cannot be found in Finland: 
 
The nature that the have over there, during the soviet times there was no settlement… 
the nature was totally empty, nothing had happened over there after the war… we 
don’t have that in Finland. That attracted many of us. (F #46) 
 
All in all, the role of CBC in building social cohesion and converge is also 
emphasized by the majority. Benefits for the Finns derive for interaction in itself; 
many highlighted the growth of trust and understanding even though more 
concretes goals have also been reached.  
 
When individual citizens meet citizens of another country in an everyday, informal 
setting, it has so efficient influence on the attitudes. A minister would have to talk six 
years to arrive to the same results with his papers… and if we are thinking about the 
very big picture, this is the best security policy there can be, interaction between the 
citizens. (F #32)  
 
6.4.3 Andrey Does Not Want a Barbie Backpack 
The earlier official, at times compulsive, ‘friendships’ visits have, for the most 
part, been replaced with more substantive cooperation. It has to, however, be 
acknowledged that the long history of such friendship served its purpose to an 
extent that it formed a basis for current cooperation, which in part relies on the 
connections and channels that were made earlier. The trend has also been 
moving away from the basic aid work towards more balanced interaction as the 
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standard of living has been rising and the basic needs have been getting better 
satisfied on the Russian side.  
While questions about whose agenda and interest dominate cooperation is 
often disregarded as irrelevant, at times even as accusatory. According to the 
Finnish CSOs, the Russian side has recently become more and more active in 
initiating cooperation. Yet as long as the funding derives mainly, if not 
completely, from the Finnish side, it is the Finnish CSOs who eventually 
determine which ideas are worth working for. It can thus be argued, with some 
exaggeration, that it is Russian interests with a Finnish agenda that still 
dominates the cooperation. 
Even if this is not done in point-blank manner, the tendency seems to be that 
the Finnish organizations choose those Russian organizations as their partners 
that best fit the Western model, whose agenda is closest to the Finnish/Western 
CSO agenda and ideology. In so doing, they govern the CBC agenda and import 
the Western values indirectly, yet efficiently. Those Russian CSOs that are 
willing to work for the cause driven by the Western CSOs are preferred as 
partners.  
Although many Russian CSOs have became more experienced and active in 
initiating cooperation, many of them are still quite passive in getting support 
and, therefore, not active in the development of the priorities for the CBC. The 
passiveness has, of course, understandable reason. Due to the difficult domestic 
conditions and downright harassment on behalf of the Russian state structures, 
many Russian organizations rely heavily on foreign funding. Nevertheless, the 
passiveness is manifested in timidity, or pure inability, to fight for the cause and 
uphold any specific preferences:  
 
Preferences? What preferences? Who want to help us, please, who want to work with 
us, please. If somebody needs us, we are ready to help as well. We have no 
preferences (R #52) 
 
Some of the Russian CSO representatives even admitted to modifying their 
preferences and interests during the process of project development as a means 
to improve the chances of obtaining funds. 
At times, however, the Russian interest collided with the Finnish one. 
Surprisingly, this was the most obvious in the case of women’s organizations. 
Small clashes were at times learning experiences for Finns as it forced the 
Finnish side to critically view and reassess the sensibility of the Finnish model – 
and perhaps to consider alternatives to the manner things are done in Finland. 
Practical reminders of this came about, for example, in that the gender division, 
or more appropriately the lack of it, applied in the Finnish society, could not be 
transplanted without question asked across the border (L 4.6.2002; 10.6.2002).  
Apart from that, it was mainly the underlying cause that created a schism. 
The Finnish side saw the Russian women’s CSOs as certainly feminine but “not 
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really feminist”: i.e., not aligned with the Finnish and Western ideas of feminism 
and the way in which women’s rights should be presented and enacted. As 
described in subsection 6.2.2, the Russian ideal seemed to connect womanhood 
very closely with motherhood and, as a result, many CSOs view gender issues 
from a family perspective rather than a purely feminist perspective, making it 
very difficult for Finnish and Russian CSOs to form a common understanding or 
agenda for cooperation. 
 
They were more like social organizations – of course working in violence against 
women but also in the family context. More like, not from a feminist perspective but 
from a family perspective. So they were more like the ‘third sector’ actors in my point 
of view. So they weren’t talking with the concepts that we are used to talk with. (F 
#14) 
 
Their organizations are so different… They want us to help men… to understand men 
and have programs for men… It has been awful to hear in Russia that young girls 
think that prostitution might be a great job and also being a stay home mother is 
really fantastic – even though your husband beats you but still… They had such a big 
burden during the Soviet Union that anything else is better than that. (F #9) 
 
What the Soviet-era burden that the interviewee referred to meant in practice 
was that Soviet women were expected, if not demanded, to work formal jobs (as 
‘equals’ to men in the labor force) and perform and procure domestic activities 
as well as to uphold social/community events and education all while providing 
a ‘moral backbone’ for the state and society. Soviet men, in turn, were expected 
to work in formal jobs or perform leadership roles in the Party and government 
bodies. Men were seen as ‘immoral’ and, therefore, unable to share in the other 
two ‘burdens’ allotted to women. This ideal was long established before the 
Soviet Union but only became further entrenched into the collective conscious, 
as these two burdens were ‘naturally’ belonging to women, where gainful 
employment in addition to these was to prove the ‘equality’ that the Union 
created among women and men. This ideal of ‘natural’ difference and, hence, 
‘natural roles’ in society and economy continue with as much strength today as 
in the past.  
Even though problematic, it is also understandable that the desire to further 
a Western understanding of feminism, women’s rights, and progress is inherent 
to every Western CSO that forges contacts with Russian groups. Coming from 
the Western feminist standpoint and ideals, it is hardly surprising that 
stereotyping, biological essentialism, womanhood that equates motherhood, 
morality of the self-sacrifice of women versus a natural and acceptable 
immorality of men for self-preservation are difficult concepts to accept and work 
through. Misunderstandings and frustration thus become a frequent problem, 
and success is therefore limited. Furthermore, for many activists and leaders in 
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women’s and feminist CSOs, working for women’s rights, respect, and health is 
very personal – thus, cooperation with organizations that work towards 
different goals and through rhetoric that is damaging to women (from a Western 
perspective) is dispiriting – a shattering of the ‘sisterhood’ of the women’s 
movement that most Western feminists still cling to.  
Such discouragement in spreading a ‘common feminism’ is a significant 
factor in explaining why most CSOs prefer to contact and cooperate with 
Russian CSOs that reflect the same ideals and goals that Western CSOs hold to. 
Another central reason is a lack of understanding in how to work towards 
common goals through different ideological bases. However, all the 
interviewees again were very open to knowledge-sharing and many were taking 
steps to break down these barriers of language and thinking by learning Russian 
and sending study delegations to Russia and vice versa. Moreover, Russian 
CSOs are being increasingly active in proposing potential areas for cooperation; 
yet lack often the know-how or other resources to tackle them on their own.  
In addition to spreading Finnish/European/Western values and working 
models, the CBC agenda was influenced by pragmatism and security concerns. 
There is a clear consensus that while the short term benefits of cooperation fall 
on the Russian side…  
 
 …the better everything work over there, the better it is consequentially for us. But 
then there is the proximity to the border – if we think about the security aspect, 
criminality, environmental aspects… things like this. The faster the development in 
Russia goes towards Western democracy, if that is possible… [laughs] …Anyways, 
we are neighbors, we share the same Baltic Sea, everything impacts everything. Also, 
if we thing about the economic life… Russia is an important trade partner for us – if it 
would be easy and safe to invest in Russia, which it is not at the moment… there are 
surprises all the time. If we could create a well functioning economic area, where the 
business life could operate, and if the movement of labor would be possible and terms 
of employment would be respected, if everything would function in a civilized 
manner – as they should – it would benefit all of us. (F #18)  
 
 
6.5 ENVIRONMENTS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL 
ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT74 
 
A less studied aspect of the Finnish-Russian civil society cooperation has been 
the role of civil society in developing Russia’s social economy and the impact of 
CBC in supporting social welfare, economic development, and the more general 
civil society endeavor. As elaborated previously (6.4.1), the main contextual 
factor that influences the scope, intensity, and quality of civil society cooperation 
is the institutional asymmetry and the large gap in capacities for action between 
                                                          
74 This chapter builds on ideas presented in Scott and Laine (2012).  
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Finnish and Russian civil society organizations. Another issue that deserves 
attention is the problem of project dependency and problems of financial 
sustainability of civil society cooperation. Furthermore, as context-sensitivity is 
of central importance, it is vital not to ‘benchmark’ the performance of Russian 
CSOs in terms of Western categories that apply to very different socio-political 
situations. Indeed, different conceptualizations and self-images of CSOs as 
providers of public goods must be taken into account. 
Through partnerships in the delivery of public services, CSOs in Russia, 
while as yet relatively inexperienced, are contributing to the emergence of a 
post-socialist social economy as a means to create sustainable alternative forms 
of public goods provision (see Anders 2010, Scott & Liikanen 2010). While CSOs 
pioneered many of these services, local governments often created agencies to 
expand the scale of delivery (Struyk 2003, 3). The Finnish experience shows that 
practices of social contracting, which in effect outsource public services to CSOs, 
could provide a viable, cost-effective, and sustainable form of civil society 
participation also in Russia. In contrast to the generally more restrictive 
regulation regarding civil society operation, laws have actually been put in place 
that facilitate social contracting and other economic activities in many Russian 
regions75.  
As was already mentioned, a major focus of the CBC between Finnish and 
Russian CSOs has concentrated on the field of social welfare and health care. 
The experiences generated by this cooperation challenge the supposition that 
metanarratives of universal norms, rather than contextual knowledge, are 
necessary for successful cooperation between Russian and international 
organizations as Sundstrom (2006), for example, suggests. As Volkov (1997) has 
argued, it is unrealistic to seek out Western civil society in Russia; it is more 
fruitful to discover Russian actors that fulfill functions similar to those carried 
out by civil society actors in the West. In fact, CBC can be seen to promote new 
forms of ‘policy learning’ outside formal institutionalized policy channels by 
creating a pragmatic, rather than normative, environment of transnational 
communication and exchange. This has been crucial for its success and 
endurance. Informal policy learning does not require structural equivalence 
                                                          
75 CSOs may engage in economic activities to the extent they advance the purposes for which the 
organization was created but may not pursue the generation of profit as its primary purpose (Article 
50(3), Civil Code, Articles 2 and 24(2), Non-Commercial Organizations Law, Article 37, Law on 
Public Associations, and Article 12, Charities Law). Profit from the economic activities of CSOs is 
generally taxed in the same manner as are commercial organizations. Lower tax rates may be offered 
by regional or local authorities for qualifying CSOs. In July 2011, the Russian Parliament adopted 
amendments to the Russian Tax Code that substantially improve the taxation of CSOs. For example, 
NCOs no longer have to pay profit tax or value added tax (VAT) on the value of the in-kind 
contributions (services or property rights) that they receive. Moreover, the amendments extend VAT 
exemptions previously applied to state budget funded institutions providing social services to CSOs 
providing the same services. (ICNL 2012.) 
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between civil society actors; it is promoted by common practices and agendas 
rather than by economic-political commonalities (Nedergaard 2006). 
 
6.5.1 External Funding Dependency and its Consequences  
While the formation of civil society does not directly mean that the public’s 
interests would be met, there is a coherent understanding that a vibrant civil 
society is a necessary condition for democracy (Hyden 1997; Inglehart 1997; 
Putnam 1993; Tocqueville 1969). Accordingly, Western governments, non-profit 
organizations and various international organizations have provided funding 
for the building of civil society in Russia, with the assumption that this is a 
crucial aspect of the transition to and the consolidation of democracy. To the 
disappointment of many, these good intentions have, however, provided 
unintended outcomes (see, e.g., Sperling 1999; Mendelson & Glenn 2000; Bae 
2005). It has become palpable that transplanting a workable model from its 
original context to another is not an unproblematic task. The very core of the 
problem has been that the concept of civil society is inherently a “product of the 
West” (Kocka 2004, 76), and as Basina (1997, 104, cited in Alapuro 2005, 8) has 
pointed out: “all ‘Western’ planted into our [Russian] soil bears fruits which 
differ considerably from the seed, and, what is most important, from the 
expected result.”  
The current funding mechanisms have caused many cross-border activities 
between Finland and Russia to be project-based with limited duration. 
Furthermore, these activities are either pre-defined by international 
organizations and the existing funding opportunities or dependent upon the 
acceptance of central authorities and/or regional and local elites in Russia. Even 
if projects are easier to manage and evaluate, the short-term character of many 
projects has resulted in a lack of long-term strategies, a lack of clearly defined 
perspectives and plans, and, hence, discontinuities in CBC. Partners are often 
chosen on the basis of their objectives, expertise, and capacities to carry out joint 
projects rather than with regard to the needs of the borderland communities. 
More long-term cooperation requires resilience, patience, and flexibility; that is 
precisely what makes it rarer, though not nonexistent.  
In many cases, development agendas are prepared by central organizations 
and their agencies, relegating local CSOs to an executive role through deciding 
what priorities will be funded. In addition, locally based Russian CSOs with 
greater knowledge of community problems, needs, and cultures have often been 
crowded out of cooperation projects because of their lack of visibility. At the 
same time, more professional and successful Russian organizations are often 
quite distant from the local communities and act more as centrally managed 
development agencies than bottom-up entities. Technical criteria here may 
outweigh more substantive criteria.  
The issue of funding dependency has been extensively dealt with in the past. 
According to Henderson (2002, 142), dependency on the West has resulted in 
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several serious problems with regard to civil society development in post-
socialist countries. Even if these issues fail to capture the big picture, the actors 
interviewed confirmed with practical examples that these issues are valid 
concerns and need to be acknowledged when future CBC is being planned. 
Firstly, finance from the West has created instances in which it is the Western 
donors, rather than the needs of Russian citizens, that dictate civil society 
agendas. For example, some Russian CSOs have redesigned their activities and 
agenda to fit better with those of donor organizations in order to safeguard 
future funding.  
Foreign aid has also strengthened the division between civil society ‘haves’ 
and ‘have-nots’ and centralized the resources in the hands of those with 
connections to the West, creating a fairly distinctive ‘civil elite’ (Henderson 
2002). Such an elite consisting of wealthy and educated activists may eventually 
form closer contacts with their transnational partners than with the constituents 
they are supposed to represent or the state structures they claim to be 
influencing. Even if the elite knows how to get organized and play the game, the 
everyday civic life is still far from reality (HS 28.8.2010).  
Instead of fostering horizontal networks, small grassroots initiatives, and 
civil development, the aid has contributed to the emergence of a vertical, 
institutionalized, and isolated civil community (Henderson 2002, 140). The 
fragmentation among Russian domestic CSOs is seen to hinder coalition 
building and resource mobilization. Rather than building networks and 
advocating the interests of the public, many groups that had received foreign 
funding are uncooperative or even competitive towards other CSOs. Even 
though the aim of many Western donors has been to facilitate grassroots 
movements, Russian CSOs tried to mimic the organizational style of Western 
donor organizations, which are often large, wealthy, centralized, and fairly 
‘corporate’ in nature. All this, together with the drastic political changes brought 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union, has led to a structural shift within Russia’s 
incipient civil society, which has actually weakened rather than enhanced its 
development potential (Bae 2005, 3). 
It is common for the Finnish and other Western organizations to choose their 
Russian partners out of those who already have a track record of having 
previously received funding and who have learned how to articulate their 
objectives in way that that complements the Finnish/Western agenda and 
expectations. In so doing, they govern the CBC agenda indirectly, yet efficiently. 
This forms an efficient channel of importing Western values to Russia. In 
practice, the Russian partners are often chosen from an already existing network 
of a Finnish umbrella organization or a network for these key actors have often 
good relations to corresponding Russian key actors and other organizations. 
Through such a preassessment, the Russian organization whose operations and 
agenda match the best the agenda of the Finnish CSOs seeking a partner is 
chosen. 
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Decent knowledge of English or Finnish is also often mentioned as an 
important practical criterion, as otherwise cooperation would be overly 
burdensome or costly (requiring an interpreter). Generally, the importance of 
personal connections is underlined repeatedly, as without them the 
establishment of a cooperative relationship has proven to be close to impossible. 
If a trustworthy contact has been created, the same partner is often kept in mind 
for future projects as well. Given the fairly small circles, the knowledge about 
and experiences of Russian partners gets circulated rapidly and those 
organizations that are deemed to be active for wrong reasons, i.e., for the money, 
are singled out. It has to be borne in mind that for many the partner has already 
been pre-selected as in many cases Finnish NGOs are involved in CBC only 
through a project run by an umbrella organization or by a supranational 
organization, utilizing thus the already exiting connections. 
In terms of future funding for civil society cooperation, the growing 
significance of the social economy and social contracting could provide an 
alternative that, as of yet, has remained untried. The potential for including such 
contractual arrangements within CBC projects, for example on Karelia, is 
undoubtedly large but the barriers to such practices remain formidable. As the 
CSOs interviewed commented, legal issues regarding the nature and regulation 
of social contracting in both Finland and Russia as well as the technical 
incompatibility of combining grants and income-generating activities as part of 
funding packages for CBC projects were but two obstacles. A development of a 
cross-border ‘market’ for social economy services would require a substantial 
rethinking of present, nationally oriented welfare policies. 
The Finnish CSOs continued to target the improvement of public health and 
social welfare in the Karelian Republic through the EU-funded Tacis program, 
which provided CSOs with the necessary practical tools in planning future CBC 
and gave guidance to proposal making and project work as well as partner 
search and financing. An essential part of the cross-border interaction took place 
in the form of pragmatic and material support, but an increasingly strong effort 
was made to improve the situation on the Russian side by elaborating upon new 
models for action, building institutional capacities, professional training, and 
creating infrastructural basis for local CSOs. These ‘improvements’ were, of 
course, based on a Western design, and as the Russian organization adopted 
them as the basis of their own agenda setting, the EUropean model of civil 
society became, to an extent, imported to Russia. The joint projects became an 
important driver of local development on the Russian side and the intensity of 
the CBC grew to the extent that it was seen to a certain extent to replace social 
services previously provided by the state (Izotov 2013). The void in educational, 
and to some extent recreational, activities caused by a lack of financial support 
and neglect on the part of the state was filled by technical, informational, and 
practical assistance provided by the Finnish CSOs. 
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A remarkable development brought along by the deepening of European 
integration, particularly through the EU’s CBC programs, has been the 
promotion of new discursive and institutional practices on the regional level 
paradiplomatic activity. This has been the most apparent in the rhetoric of cross-
border regionalization and in the formation of Euregions. In connection with the 
establishment of Euregio Karelia, such rhetoric has become part of Finnish-
Russian paradiplomatic relations and the borderland of Karelia became defined 
in terms of a new type of European cross-border region.  
Funding dependency is also seen to have been partly detrimental to social 
entrepreneurship, as it has encouraged easier ‘grant-seeking’ behaviors. Of 
course, the other side of this coin has been a dearth of alternative funding 
mechanisms. The lack of financing mechanisms, microfinance in particular, is a 
major problem as access to credit for the development of social enterprises is 
exceedingly difficult. Commercial loans are expensive and commercial banks 
remain hesitant to provide loans to voluntary organizations. This means that 
social enterprises are largely limited to trade-based activities, operating from the 
proceeds of the services and goods that they are able to sell. Russian CSO 
representatives mentioned that grants from foreign sources could theoretically 
be used to co-finance start-up investments in social enterprises but that these 
funds could also be subject to rigorous financial controls as well as heavily 
taxed. In addition, organizations that receive such funding are subject to close 
political scrutiny and must be exceedingly careful not to arouse suspicion of 
serving ‘foreign’ interest rather than domestic social needs.  
In terms of future funding for civil society cooperation, the growing 
significance of the social economy and social contracting could provide an 
alternative that, as yet, has remained untried. The scope of many Finnish CSOs 
has been increased to include service provision through contracting with local, 
regional, and national agencies – at least in areas where private 
entrepreneurship has not proven to be profitable. Initial assessments of the 
financial viability of social contracting with CSOs in Russia have been less than 
favorable due to a lack of cost-effectiveness, inefficient recruitment, strategic 
planning, and poor management techniques. 
There is a realization that a lack of independent funding sources – 
independent of foreign organizations as well as the Russian government – is a 
serious hindrance to greater CSO engagement in the social economy. Given 
extreme economic difficulties and low wages in most regions of the country, 
unpaid voluntary work is not a sustainable option. There is also a lack of strong 
firms working within the social economy that could assist in the promotion of 
entrepreneurial start-ups. Accordingly, attempts to develop a domestic 
infrastructure of microfinance and credit cooperatives have been initiated, also 
with coaching from European and North American CSOs. Initiatives such as the 
Russian Microfinance Centre (established in 2002) and the Fund ‘Our Future’ 
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(inaugurated in 2007) are, at the moment, few and far between but could signal 
an important change in the conditions of action for Russian social entrepreneurs. 
 
6.5.2 Processes of Social Learning 
Even if cross-border civil society cooperation has certainly had its problems in 
the Finnish-Russian case, in general terms a cautiously positive picture can be 
drawn based on practical experiences. One reason for this is the processes of 
social learning that have enabled Finnish and Russian civil society actors to 
learn how to operate in new international cooperation environments. In addition 
to highlighting contextual factors that influence civil society cooperation 
between Finland and Russia, there is clear evidence of social learning through 
CSO networks. Despite their differences in outlook, operating capacities, and 
resources, civil society actors from Finland and Russia confirm that CBC has 
been a major contributor to capacity building and the transfer of political skills. 
While the motives for establishing cross-border contacts have differed, direct 
interaction through exchanges of experience, training sessions, joint project 
implementation, and practical experience in the technicalities of working on 
either side of the border has benefited both Russian and Finnish CSOs. 
Given the nature of the situation, particularly in the early 1990s, initial 
interaction across the border was certainly closer to humanitarian work based 
on goodwill rather than cooperation between equal partners for mutual benefit. 
However, as Russian civil society has developed institutionally, Finnish CSOs 
have begun to engage in the practical training of Russian civil society actors in 
order to help them to develop their own organizational skills and increase their 
effectiveness in the new, internationalizing environment. Asymmetry, despite its 
problematic nature, has in itself been an important motive for cooperation: CBC 
is now becoming more of a two-way process in which both sides can learn from 
each other. 
Social learning is also evident in cooperation strategies in which, from the 
CSO actors’ perspective, the key to success lies in the avoidance of directly 
focusing on ambitious goals of social transformation and democratization. 
Resources are instead channeled into strengthening the conditions for civil 
society development in Russia and thus empowering Russian CSOs to improve 
their own situations. New opportunity structures within Russia would greatly 
increase incentives for entrepreneurial activities and help change negative 
attitudes towards social entrepreneurs. An important precondition for this 
would, of course, be a legislation enabling such for-profit activities. In addition, 
greater local and regional government autonomy would also strengthen the 
potential for social partnerships and thus provide a more sustainable basis for 
social enterprise operation. 
The Finnish civil society actors perceived CBC in positive terms and as a 
value in itself:  
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It [CBC] is extremely important… important as hell, in many, many ways. If we could 
get the Russian civil society to work, at the moment it doesn’t working at all… No 
other organizations than NGOs can bring this up… We have to deliver the message 
that citizens have to be able, and allowed to make their voices heard… and this way 
to plant the seed of democracy… it does not matter in which sectors the work is done 
as long as it includes volunteering, input and voices of individual citizens. Extremely 
important work, extremely. (F #32) 
 
From the Russian perspective, CBC was evaluated positively as it had allowed 
the Russian actors “to share experiences, extend the competencies, consolidate 
the forces to solve different problems” (R #52) and “exchange experiences, 
knowledge, and new technologies” (R #56). 
The role of horizontal networks is perceived as crucial for shaping the 
quality, thematic focus, and dynamics of cross-border activities in ways that are 
sensitive to local concerns. Such networks help shape the quality, thematic 
focus, and dynamics of cross-border activities in a means more sensitive to local 
concerns. Such networks have also enabled different actors to pool resources, 
share their knowledge and reduce CBC transaction costs for the smaller, local 
organizations. They have enabled different actors and organizations to come 
together and share their knowledge and reduce the transactions costs of 
cooperation for smaller, local organizations. Perhaps even more importantly, 
networking has helped individual organizations make the first steps across the 
border by providing the know-how and other resources that individual 
organizations often lack as well as by forming a framework that allows 
individual organizations to participate in CBC on an on-and-off basis. From a 
practical point of view, most of the problems that CSOs face dwarf the capacities 
of any single organization. In addition, networking has proven to be a more 
efficient way of attracting funding and made the actual application procedures 
easier for individual organizations. 
The respondents of this study fully confirmed the finding of Németh et al. 
(2012, 214) that on the Finnish side CBC with Russia has intensified also the 
relations among the Finnish CSOs working for the same cause. Inter- and 
transnational projects have not only lead to closer cooperation with other CSOs 
but also with relevant private sector and public sector actors interested in “going 
to Russia.” In cases where EU funding has been used, the intersectoral links 
have become a necessity as the ENPI CBC programs are largely managed by the 
Regional Councils, which have become key actors in pulling different actors 
together. In any case, this is deemed as beneficial as mutual learning does not 
respect sectoral boundaries. 
In contrast, based on the accounts of the actors interviewed on the Russian 
side of the border, cross-border projects have only seldom fostered domestic 
links. While example of this do exist, most notably in the field of social welfare 
and health, the existence of cross-border links has fuelled internal competition 
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between actors and organizations on the Russian side. This has been particularly 
the case when an international partner has been functioning as a channel for 
funding. The situation has not been helped by the Finnish habit of sticking with 
the same partner from one project to another. While this makes practical sense, 
as personal relations continue to matter and trustworthy partners are needed in 
order for CBC to succeed, the respondents from the Russian side would like to 
see the scope of partners involved in CBC to be broadened as to impede the 
formation of a civil elite. This situation is, however, expected to improve as the 
funding sources diversify and especially now that funding of CBC has become 
more balanced. 
While there is no single formula or institutional architecture that would 
characterize the cross-border networks, they are generally constructed around 
clusters of organizations with ties either to large national (i.e., Finnish) or 
international non-profit organizations. Larger and more experienced 
organizations within the network usually address politically relevant, 
bureaucratic, and the time-consuming aspects of grant-seeking and general 
project development while smaller, regionally embedded organizations with 
local knowledge carry out concrete projects. Thus, a division of labor is possible 
that distributes resources in a more appropriate manner than an individual CSO 
would be capable of. Through such networks, ‘weaker’ and smaller 
organizations can gain access to sources of support – although this can take 
place at the cost of operational autonomy.  
All in all, the presence of cross-border CSO networks appears to provide a 
favorable operating environment, even in conditions of fiscal tightening and 
political adversity. CSO actors in Russia have mentioned that cross-border 
activities with their EU counterparts have allowed them to grow professionally 
and develop the skills to address serious local problems. Furthermore, the 
interviewed CSO actors suggested that within networks, inexperienced 
organizations could mature and acquire hands-on project management 
experience and accumulate knowledge that could increase their independence in 
future.  
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7 New Civic Neighborhood 
The success the EUropean neighborhood building depends on various factors. 
The way the external border can be transcended depends on the role that the 
border is assumed to play; i.e., on the perception of what the borders are 
perceived to be. The conceptions of European borders are, in turn, dependent on 
the perception of what the European integration is all about; i.e., where the 
process of European integration is expected to lead us. Examining what Europe 
is helps us to understand what type of role civil society may potentially play in 
the process. While there are traces of all of them, the Finnish situation gets 
closest to Anheier’s (2008a/b) NPM-scenario, according to which civil society is 
becoming more corporate and has assumed tasks previously belonged to 
national states, modernizing in so doing the entire welfare state arrangement – 
from a welfare state to a welfare mix, where responsibilities are shared among 
different types of organizations. 
To focus simply on the EU would, however, be a political statement in itself. 
Europe is still not subsumed into the European Union. In fact, there have been 
an increasing number of incidents suggesting quite the opposite. The EU is 
nothing but an interpretation among many, and even quite a recent one. 
Understanding Europe as a civilization or through the processes of pan-
European unity, as Sakwa (2006, 22) has suggested, would change the entire 
picture dramatically and transform the manner in which Russia is seen 
completely. As any student of geography would know, Europe is, by 
convention, a continent and not a politico-economic entity. But this, then, forces 
one to ask where the borders of Europe are? Does European unity need to be 
confined to a certain geographical or territorial limit to begin with?  
Given that the Finnish-Russian border forms also a part of the EU-Russian 
interface, the different conceptions of both Europe and the EU influence the 
forms and motives of CBC. The different accounts are numerous and they all 
have an equally different take on the role and position of Russia. Whereas the 
mainstream EUropean story situates it in a Wider Europe, in the margins as a 
semi- or close outsider, to use Aalto’s (2006) categorization, the Pan-European 
dimension provides a ‘half-way house’ approach for integrating Russia by 
providing some sort of institutional framework but failing short of a fully-
fledged supranational transformative agenda (Sakwa 2010, 18). In particular 
regarding the former, the further away from Russia one is, the more likely it is to 
consider Russia European, while those sharing the common border tend to be 
more eager to draw the border (cf. Kuus 2011b, 1150). If, in turn, the 
Civilizational approach is used, Russia must be counted in.  
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Even though the Finnish-Russian border doubles as the EU external border, 
in the context of local and regional level CBC it is still approached in rather 
binational terms. While the rhetoric has certainly been Europeanized, much of 
the practices still carry traces of earlier traditions of Finnish political culture and 
Finnish-Russian relations. This is why it needs to be analyzed also in these 
terms; i.e., as a border that separates two very different historical trajectories of 
state and nation-building and two models of civil society. In order to 
deconstruct the border, we first need to understand how it has been constructed 
and what are the current forces maintaining it. In the Finnish-Russian case, it is 
clear that the different historical trajectories have led to different understandings 
of nationalism, which have led to different understandings of not just what is a 
nation, but also what is meant by trans-, inter/ or supranational. Given that the 
different understandings denote different political aspirations, objectives, and 
ambitions, each of them imply a different concept of an external border. 
 
 
7.1 BORDERS FOR WHOM AND FOR WHAT? 
 
The rhetoric concerning globalization and a borderless world depicts political 
borders as relicts from the past. Accordingly, the traditional view of borders as 
geometric lines running across often sparsely populated frontier territory at the 
edges of nation-states, demarcating thereby both functionally and symbolically 
the sovereign space of political entities has been downplayed by rescaling of the 
state most notably through macro level regionalization and transnationalization 
of governance. With an increasingly integrating Europe, the nature of borders 
has not only been altered, but also a new order based on their respective statuses 
has emerged. The distinction between an internal and external border keeps 
growing ever stronger as the former are being softened and the latter hardened. 
Even though in the dynamics of globalization borders create constrains for 
interaction and integration, their functions as filters of flows, constructs guiding 
and obstructing our activities, denotations of ‘weness’ and ‘otherness,’ and as 
symbols of power – or the lack there of, difference in, or the yearning for – 
remain imperative for many. The lure of nationalism and sovereignty remain, 
but at least in Europe both of the concepts have been redefined to permit 
increased transnational linkages. 
As is discussed in chapter two, the basic premise of this work is the notion 
that in order to understand the borders of today, one must first understand how 
they came to be. Understandings of the nature of state borders are 
simultaneously characterized by both continuity and change. While borders 
have over time become increasingly understood to signify more than simply 
lines on a map, as broader constructions they are also perceived differently by 
different actors. From the CBC perspective, significance lies not in what borders 
are, but what they are perceived to be. Broader, more multifaceted and 
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multileveled conceptions of borders allow for more activity particularly for civil 
society engagement in CBC. CSOs are important societal actors, functioning as 
innovators, facilitators, conveners, advocates, and service providers. Thus, the 
further into the society that borders extend, the more prominent the role of 
CSOs becomes. As is suggested in chapter three, due to the increased linkages 
with the public and private sectors, civil society activism can no longer be 
placed neatly within the ‘third sector,’ rather, civil society blurs the borders 
between sectors, creating new organizational forms that bind public and private 
activity together in the advancement of the common good. 
Despite the apparent centrifugal forces of globalization, national borders 
have remained a crucial research topic. While conceptions of a border are now 
evidently broader and fuzzier, national borders have remained imperative 
largely due to the increased prominence of nationalistic thought. The EU has 
clearly become too expansive to adequately nurture feelings of belongingness 
amongst its population, fueling the need to seek out smaller frames of reference 
for identity formation. As the European experience clearly shows, the nation-
state has endured as an idealistic mode of organization; people still want to 
belong to and identify with a particular nation, not to an unidentified political 
object. Nations have not disappeared, but the borders between them have been 
partly dismantled as new supranational institutions have come into being.   
The mental aspects of borders seem, however, to be more deeply rooted and 
sticky, and thus more time consuming to tear down. Borders of the mind are 
difficult to blot out as they often include strong stereotyped imaginations and 
imagined distinctions. Borders are thus not simply imagined or real, but 
imagined and therefore real. A border of the mind implies a mental incapacity to 
deal with others. One has to free his or her mind from the myths of the past and 
move beyond the biases and prejudices related to them for the future, by 
definition, lies ahead. While in principle we seem to trivialize, if not despise 
borders, it seems that in practice we are unable to live without them. This 
should not, however, be taken to axiomatically indicate some sort of hostility 
towards the other side. At least part of the allure of borders can be explained by 
psychological comfort and a sense of control over the space that the 
confinement, enclosedness, and demarcation brigs about. Even if cooperation 
comprises part of what North (2005, viii–ix) refers to as the “genetic architecture 
of humans,” it is equally human to draw borders and build fences, to manage 
space (Laine 2008). 
In the Finnish-Russian case, the national border is clearly perceived as an 
inconvenience to local life, but at the same time it is taken as an issue of 
nationalistic pride. Despite the EUropeanized rhetoric and the more 
multifaceted understandings of borders, the Finnish-Russian border is still very 
much a classical state border. To talk about borders – particularly in the Finnish-
Russian case – is to talk about difference. Excessive openness is now desired for 
it is perceived to erase this difference. Even though the difference has certainly 
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been transformed from downright threating to more exiting, even inviting, its 
existence still remains an imperative for many. 
The border, in a strict sense, causes only a few constraints. It is just “a 
regrettable fact that one has to live with” if involved in CBC; it is “a drag, but 
not a barrier” (F #48). However, what it signifies is what matters. The Finnish-
Russian border forms a barrier because it signifies where one set of rules end 
and another begins. Thus, cross-border flows reflect more than just a simple 
supply and demand relationship; they are impacted by a complex web of non-
economic factors, some of which encourage diminishing the barrier effect and 
others that reinforce it. Borders are expensive constructions and the lack of trust 
only adds to this cost. In the end, to cross a border is a move out of one's own, 
familiar culture and enter into a different and unknown one. It is these 
differences together with general unpredictability that is being pushed to the 
foreground as an explanation for the lack of cross-border relations.  
Borders continue to exist but they are transformed by networks, which 
penetrate right through them. What we have witnessed is an unprecedented 
multiplication, diversification, specialization, and personalization of borders 
(Popescu 2011, 77). A borderland is not a single system but a combination of 
several systems overlapping one another. The resultant porousness of borders 
both enables and necessitates cross-border cooperation. While transnational 
networks have increased cohesion within and beyond the EU, the structural 
arrangements demanded by them have created dichotomies more locally. The 
transnational ‘elite’ who cross borders regularly – whether in real life or 
virtually – perceive borders very differently from those who have decided to 
avoid crossing or those who are explicitly excluded. 
Categorizing borders as either ‘open’ or ‘closed’ paints a rather black and 
white picture. The reality is grayer, as a border may be permeable at one point in 
time and impermeable at another or may be permeable for some functions and 
impermeable for others. Accordingly, the very same border can reinforce 
nationalism among some while it may reinforce transnationalism among others. 
The sovereignty and territorial integrity is still deemed to be something worth 
protecting, while trade and economy-wise borders tend to pose obstructive and 
costly barriers. Accordingly, the function of borders is thus not just simply 
transforming one way or another, but due to the dual movement of integration 
and securitization, borders are simultaneously both opening and closing; i.e., the 
processes of de- and rebordering are not exclusionary, but occur simultaneously. 
In addition to merely enabling or disabling human achievement, in Agnew’s 
(2008) view there is a need to change the way in which we think about borders 
to openly acknowledge their both practically and ethically equivocal character. 
Borders should not be seen as fixed or as something that must be overcome, but 
as an evolving construction that has both merits and problems that must be 
constantly reweighed. This must be done, as Paasi has repeatedly argued, for 
borders are institutions and symbols that are produced and reproduced in social 
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practices and discourses. As human constructs, they can also be removed. 
Borders do not pre-exist, but they are always an outcome of social and political 
processes; change the process and you change the border. 
Even though a “post-Nietzschean/Foucauldian/Freudian/pragmatist/socially 
critical” way of understanding borders confirms that borders are indeed 
complex social constructions (Scott 2012), they also materially embedded and 
constituted (Paasi 2009). Borders not mere lines on the map, but they are 
sedimented in broader and smaller processes, from education to politics and 
economy, all over the border region and also linked in complex ways to the 
institutions of ‘external world.’ They vacillate (Balibar 1998; Brunet-Jailly 2011) 
and manifest themselves in practices and institutions that produce categories, 
distinction, and the sense of belonging. As such they are predominantly markers 
of inclusion and exclusion.  
Borders are about power relations. As today’s global politics illustrate, 
borders are not hardened by those who are weak, but by those who are strong. 
Strong players create strong borders because they can, because they hold the 
power to delimit. In so doing, one also tends to also get more detached from 
what is going on the other side of the border. The resultant lack of knowledge 
and information nourish uncertainty and fear, making the border per se a 
manifestation of irrational rationalities, misunderstandings, exclusion, and 
paranoia (van Houtum 2010; Scott 2012). 
 
 
7.2 THE COLD AND THE BEAUTIFUL: IMAGE OF RUSSIA 
AS A PARTNER 
 
When drunk, Finns oppose Russkies, Swedish speaking Finns, baseball, modern art, 
opera, the government, agricultural subsidies, men who read poetry and obnoxious 
regulars. When drunk, they can also to some extent love these very same things. (L 
18.5.1994) 
 
There is a 1000-pound gorilla in the room, and it is not going away. Even when 
the gorilla is sitting quietly in the corner of the room and causing no harm, its 
presence is apparent. Because it takes up most of the room, there is no ignoring 
it. Even its smallest movements cause anxiety among the rest, as no one can tell 
what it is going to go. And somehow, it has to be included in all the major 
discussions that are taking place in the room, be they about the EU, NATO – or 
even about the weather. It arouses strong feelings both for and against – 
everybody has something to say about it. 
The analysis of the public debate within the Finnish newspaper Helsingin 
Sanomat has provided a fascinating overview of how Finnish attitudes towards 
and images of Russia as a CBC partner and neighbor have evolved since the 
1990s. This also formed an interesting time for the beginning of the analysis as 
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the official image of the Eastern neighbor was beginning to crumble, creating a 
void that had to be filled. Accordingly, the Finnish media was freed from its 
shackles and now provided an oppression-free public sphere for civil debate.  
In the beginning, the analyzed texts suggested that in order to avoid dealing 
with the situation as it was, it was hoped that the gorilla, or rather the bear, 
would simply go away if it went unmentioned. Such beating around the bush 
began to transform into more straightforward accounts on the situation, but 
only slowly. According to common ways of thought, Finlandization and the 
related ideas that questioned the Finnish policy of neutrality, some 
extortionately, were unfair and served only to prove that not all understood 
what it had meant to live next to an unpredictable superpower. The groveling 
before the Soviet Union had heavy geographical and historical reasons: 
 
Let us consider Finland as a little brother living in the same space with aggressive big 
brother: would it be wise for the little brother constantly provoke the big brother, 
which not only hold superiority, but has also used it? (L 8.12.2003)  
 
While more general Western attitudes towards Russia have turned, at times in 
an instant, from euphoria to outrage and from despair to hope, Finns’ 
underlying attitudes towards Russia have been more stable. This can partly be 
explained by the fact that Russia is constantly present in the Finnish media and 
general public debate while elsewhere, further away, its image is formed based 
on more pointed events. Finns remain reserved and ground their stance on past 
experience. Whether this is called Russophobia or just realism depends on the 
angle taken. The debate about Russia, then, has certainly evolved during the last 
two decades, but the process has not been linear, nor has it been uncomplicated. 
Instead, multiple alternative trends have emerged and there is still plenty of 
room for interpretation. This is to say that the image and meaning of Russia has 
not simply changed from one to another, but it is seen differently in different 
contexts, at different levels sectors, and by different actors. Russia looks very 
different depending on whether it is approached at the level of everyday life, as 
a next-door neighbor, or as a global re-emerging superpower. 
Also different actors construct their image differently, on the basis of 
different principles. Supporters of the old friendship policy school continue to 
portray a romanticized vision of Russia and treat policies that aspire to abandon 
Finland’s historical unalliance with caution. In contrast, others have endeavored 
to fight against geographical factors and place Finland at the kernel of the EU as 
to confirm Finland’s position and identity as a genuine Western European 
nation (see, e.g., OE 10.8.2003). Among the Russia experts, the pessimists seem 
to be more often right than are the optimists (OE 16.2.1999). Some continue to 
see Russia as the eternal other, with whom any interaction is doomed to failure, 
while others maintain that cooperation is possible only by recognizing the facts 
– whatever they may be.  
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The further away one view Russia, the more European it seems to be. Right 
at the border, the contrast is more obvious as that is where the face-to-face 
everyday interaction most often occurs. This does not, however, have to be 
taken as an inherently negative thing. While some asymmetries, such as 
differences in language, governance models, financial resources, specification of 
respective interests, level of knowledge, and instability in objectives and of the 
people responsible for individual projects are the most common explanations for 
the lack of cross-border relations, differences in price levels or particular laws 
and regulations may actually encourage interaction. 
All in all, in contrast to the EU documents and the speeches by the Finnish 
political leadership, both of which draw a rather optimistic picture of the 
relations and developments in Russia, the public debate in HS is clearly more 
pessimistic. This study fully supports Lounasmeri’s (2011a, 15) findings that 
when it comes to time orientation, everyday discussion stems from the past and, 
at times, may even get stuck there. The standpoint and arguments advocated in 
the letters to the editor are commonly built on a traditionalist take built on past 
experience and the assumption that Russia has and will not change. Historical 
remarks are often guised as historical facts, which are then used to depict how 
things usually go with Russia. Accordingly, while editorial and op-eds tend to 
pay attention to more long-term developments, letters often focus on single, 
isolated events, which are then used as yet another evidence of Russia’s 
incapability to get things right – from the Finnish perspective, that is. The letters 
depict Russia as a threat and seek to maintain the difference, indicating that 
while increased interaction may be beneficial, the border itself continues to serve 
a purpose in terms of identity formation and mental constructions, as a 
reminder of what once happened.  
Media has played a central role in providing a public sphere for (re-
)producing historical images and narratives. Rewriting the history in retrospect 
is always a political project as it allows one to use history to further his or her 
own ends by purposefully highlighting some aspects and overshadowing 
others, reinforcing in so doing a particular interpretation of the course of events 
in the past. Such stories can partly be understood as therapeutic gut spilling, but 
can also be seen as attempts to manage the history to better match with the 
‘truth,’ objective in the subjective eyes of an individual and his or her politico-
ideological leanings. This is a prime example of how borders get reproduced, as 
explained by Papadakis (2005), through mobilization of historical memories in 
order to address past injustices or to strengthen group identity – often by 
perpetuating negative stereotypes of the ‘other.’ As a result, the already negative 
preconceptions get renewed and activated. While most letters delved upon local 
concerns, the analysis of Russian internal developments as well as its role in the 
international arena was left for the editorials and op-eds. 
It is, however, very difficult to move forward when you're looking backward. 
Editorials and op-eds, in which the elite accounts are emphasized, tend to take 
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more of a transitionalist approach and focus on potential opportunities, though 
at times in a somewhat dubious manner. They commonly speculate about the 
future, indulging at times in ahistoricism. As Lounasmeri 2011a, 15) notes, such 
writings often reduce the Russia relationship to the level of pragmatic pros and 
cons for the sake of manageability. At the same time, however, they risk 
ignoring the deeper underlying, often emotional reactions, which get 
emphasized in the letters. 
The myth of Russia serves to organize the shared ways of conceptualizing 
Russia in Finnish culture. In order to realize the desired meaning, words, 
phrases, and expressions are carefully, yet often intuitively, selected from the 
semiotic resources that are available socially and culturally. The selection of 
these recourses is determined by the underlying myth, which then again gets 
corroborated when they are used. This myth has also an ideological function. It 
is used to convey the ideological norms and the dominant cultural as well as the 
historical values of Finnish culture. It thus serves to naturalize collective 
attitudes and beliefs, even if ungrounded, to seem normal and self-evident. As 
long as they go unquestioned, the myth need not be taken as myth, but rather as 
the culturally objective and ‘true’ reflection of the ‘way things are’ (see Barthes 
1977, 45–46). 
The opinion pieces analyzed in this study cannot be taken merely as a form 
of communication, i.e., a transfer of knowledge from the author to the readers. 
Instead, they are prime examples of communicative meaning making, whereby 
they evoke a process of interpretation in the reader. The stronger the underlying 
myth is, the easier it is for the author (sender of the message) and the reader 
(receiver of the message) to arrive to a common interpretation. In the Finnish 
case, the taken-for-grantedness of the myth of Russia is implied by the way 
Russia can be talked and written about; many things are left unwritten, to be 
read between the lines. As a result, a sort of a cipher is created, which can be 
decoded only by those familiar with the codes and the social knowledge that 
they imply as intended by the sender.  
The social construction of a national identity could hardly be more obvious. 
The ‘we’ group gets defined through the process of othering; the more negative 
the qualities attributed to the ‘them’ group are, the more positive ‘we’ seem in 
comparison. The socio-economic gap at the border is often portrayed almost as a 
positive thing, as it is useful in bulking up the image of a prosperous Finland 
and in maintaining the difference from Russia. In the language used in 
especially in the letters, the image of Russia remains strongly associated with a 
bear that growls, hits, tramples, and does various other offensive things. The 
bear is something to be feared, but it is also used to maintain the image of Russia 
as aggressive, barbarian, slow, and headstrong. Heedless of their accuracy, these 
characterizations serve to confirm the difference between the two nations. 
Among Finns, they evoke feelings of assumed superiority vis-à-vis the neighbor 
who may be powerful but is depicted as non-civilized.  
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The colloquial language is full of various more abrasive expressions about 
Russia and Russians, none of which are positive and many of which are used 
even in quite formal settings without causing too much indignation. While 
writings of this nature were often singled out from the paper version of 
Helsingin Sanomat, the comments posted on the Internet pages of the newspaper 
resorted often such stereotypization in the absence of other means of getting a 
particular point across.  
The continued use of these derogatory sayings is validated by the fact that 
they are just lighthearted conventional expressions, but perhaps therein lies the 
very core of the problem: the everyday relations across the border are still far 
away from being ‘normalized,’ and also underutilized given the geographical 
proximity. While the use of these stereotypical and deliberately misleading 
descriptions tell more about Finns than they do about Russians, the underlying 
attitudes they imply is quite out of tune with the rhetoric that seeks to erode 
mental barriers. 
There seems also to be a continued need to feed and upkeep the image of 
Russia as a threat. While it is old news that bad news is more newsworthy than 
good news, the descriptions of Russia in the media goes well beyond that. The 
opinion writings chosen to be published portray a very negative perception of 
Russia and even issues that are positive from the offset tend to get twisted and 
transformed into negative descriptions. The negative preconceptions get 
renewed and utilized for various purposes, at times even with individual word 
choices. Russian decrees and statutes (in Russian: указ) having to do with 
Finland get usually translated as ukaasi, a Finnish word for ‘command,’ 
‘demand,’ or a ‘threat.’ The verb that is commonly used in this context is uhitella, 
to be defiant, which creates a further perception that Russia would be trying to 
dictate what Finland should do. Negative verbs are often followed by an epithet 
‘as usual’ or ‘again’ as to suggested this is what usually happens with Russia.  
There is also a tendency to place Finnish-Russia relations within the 
customary conflict rhetoric even without justification. As an illuminating 
example of this, an article in HS on September 9, 2010, which presented the 
results of a recent poll. The article was entitled “One out of five is afraid of 
Russia” while it would have been just as accurate that claim that 80 per cent, a 
vast majority, of Finns do not see Russia as a threat. While it is true that this may 
correspond with what some of the audience wants to read, or at least is 
accustomed to reading, in terms of the credibility of the newspaper such a 
generalizing and, indeed, populist take is problematic.  
But let us put the gorilla back on the table. When the debate acquired more 
substance and concrete examples that could be talked about with their real 
names, not with mental pictures and figures of speech, the gorilla began to 
transform into a more manageable partner. It was surely still big, but the 
increased dialogue decreased some of its unpredictably and allowed mutual 
exchange of ideas. Instead of evicting him, or having to fear him, there has been 
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a solid attempt to befriend him and to work together with him to solve our 
common problems. This has taken the edge off of the jungle fever, whereby with 
the relationship with the gorilla has become more normalized and the gorilla 
itself has become a welcome guest. 
 
 
7.3 CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT IN FINNISH-RUSSIAN 
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
 
The operational preconditions of civil society remain linked with the operations 
of the broader society surrounding it. There is, however, no reason to claim that 
this should always be understood in the frame of the nation-state. This is very 
different from suggesting that the sovereignty of the state would be threatened. 
As Häkli (2008, 6) argues, the bounded and very tangible territorial space now 
occupied by the Finnish nation-state has no clear alternatives when it comes to 
the organization of the state’s juridical and administrative powers. While the 
territorial sovereignty of the nation-states continue to form one of the leading 
principles upon which international relations are based, transnational relations 
are run by actors and organizations whose ability to function do not stop at the 
border. Thanks to the changes in the governance modes, the state is no longer 
the primary actor, nor is the nation-state the only conception of space to be 
applied in explaining human interaction. 
 
7.3.1 What Role for Civil Society? 
Civil society plays a crucial role in Finnish society. Its core remains in voluntary 
organization through which Finns have built their own, common wellbeing, in 
so doing developing the society as a whole. Civil society forms also a public 
sphere where issues of common concern can be discussed, citizenship expressed, 
and where Finnish participatory democracy is acted out from the bottom up. 
CSOs have all the potential to strengthen citizen participation, increase mutual 
trust and to transmit needs and expertise from the ground to decision-making. 
Civil society can thus do many things, but this is not to say that it necessarily 
will. It offers excellent preconditions for a range of activities but accomplishes 
little without the active participation of its citizenry. A mere membership does 
not equal an active citizen.  
The situation changes, however, remarkably when civil society activities are 
extended beyond their respective national frame. While CSOs encompass a 
number of qualities, which emphasize their aptitude for CBC (see subsection 
3.2.5), their operational basis changes if the work carried out gets too detached 
from their constituents. It is essential to remember that the primary focus of 
Finnish CSOs lies on the Finnish side of the border, as that is where their 
constituency resides. Engaging in CBC, in turn, is usually something to be done 
if and when the resources and time allow. There seems to be a coherent 
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understanding among CSO actors that CBC could yield considerable benefits 
but that it also involves substantial costs and risks. Any collaborative effort 
involves considerable transaction costs in terms of resources and time spent in 
negotiating and carrying out cooperative activities. The border dramatically 
increases these costs. Without supportive networks, or for-the-purpose external 
funding, resources and time might have a better rate of return if invested 
internally or towards building relationship with compatriotic organizations.  
This is also why the perception of Russia as a neighbor and partner impacts 
CBC practices. Especially when the work is carried out on a voluntary basis, it is 
essential that actors themselves feel that CBC is worthwhile. This really is what 
matters, as success of any cross-border endeavor is, in the end, measured by its 
respective constituents; i.e., what does this bring to us? What seems to matter is 
that through engagement in cross-border civil society cooperation people are 
able to create people-to-people contacts across the border, whereby they learn 
from each other and are forced to rethink their own viewpoints. The social 
capital formation that civil society CBC requires and depends on is not just a 
prerequisite, but also a result of this cooperation. Thus, CSOs in all their 
diversity have certainly a crucial role to play in any policy proposal or in 
projects aiming to enhance cooperation within a broader European 
neighborhood. 
In an increasingly internationalized society, civil society has become to play a 
strong role in various cross-border activities and engaged in roles that national 
governments themselves cannot operate effectively and legitimately. In the EU 
context, CSOs are valuable for they fill the void created by inefficient 
governance and a market economy. They also fight effectively against the 
apparent democratic deficit as involving CSOs into EU governance has meant 
greater transparency and decentralization, heightened accountability and the 
more efficient governance of public institutions. As Anheier’s (2008a/b) New 
Public Management model suggests, the contractual arrangements with CSOs 
has the potential to modernize the public sector and make it more effective; less 
government = less bureaucracy = more flexibility = greater efficiency. CSOs play 
a crucial role in transforming ideas from rhetoric into practice, as it is often 
CSOs that are responsible for policy and project implementation. 
The CSOs’ increased role in international relations can be largely attributed 
to the rise of transnational networks – enabled by multilevel governance. This 
has extended CSOs’ space for action, making it increasingly transnational, rather 
than nation-state bound. As a result, they bridge the gaps created by borders 
and bordering by reacting fast and effectively to the practical problems that they 
imply. When the links across a border have been made, the ensuing cross-border 
civil society has the potential to address bi-/transnational problems either 
directly by themselves or by pushing governments toward binational solutions 
by articulating policy alternatives, providing applicable knowhow, required 
research, and supportable arguments for preferred options, creating pilot 
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projects, and mobilizing support for adopting policies. Given that, in principle, 
civil society reflects the societal forces that operate largely independently from 
state interests, in cases it has been necessary for the sub-national organization to 
skip the state level altogether in seeking new allies directly from higher levels or 
from the same level across the border. 
Civil society is not, however, a magic bullet, and it should not be treated as such. 
Neither are CSOs exempt from economic pressures and environmental 
uncertainties that the other types of organizations, public and private alike, are 
struggling with. These pressures come with implications that may threaten civil 
society’s viability. During the financial crisis, civil society has also been 
confronted with great challenges from budget cutting to increased competition. 
While on the one hand these may hinder the ability of civil society to seize all 
the opportunities offered by a retreating state, the difficult times have, on the 
other hand, also come with opportunities. The societal role and significance of 
CSOs have only increased as people have turned to them in search of solutions 
to problems the state and the market have not been able to fix. This has 
emphasized the role of CSOs as service providers and strengthened their 
societal role even further. Expanded contracting of CSOs in governmental 
welfare provision and user empowerment projects are only two examples of the 
trend. As the recapitulative SWOT matrix shown in Figure 42 aims to show, 
there are a number of factors that either enforce or hinder the CSOs ability to 
function in the CBC setting.  
The next logical steps should be to figure out pragmatic ways to minimize 
weaknesses and use strengths to take advantage of the opportunities and to 
overcome the biggest threats. The strengths are specific to CSOs and separate 
them clearly from the other ‘sectors’ of society. This provided the CSOs with a 
clear niche in which to operate in order to capitalize on the opportunities. 
As the lists in the matrix above indicate, there are a number of things to 
consider. It is thus necessary to prioritize, especially with respect to the 
challenges. Many of the threats and challenges are external in the sense that 
influencing them directly can be difficult. However, they still need to be 
acknowledged until time and resources are available for finding a solution. 
Fortunately, most of the weaknesses have a clear solution. Lack of funds, for 
instance, might be solved by the means of social entrepreneurship, and 
fragmentation and poor monitoring overcome by focusing on already existing 
best practices or through training and quality management. 
Based on the interviews of the CSO actors conducted for this study, a number 
of practical suggestions can be made. These include 1) extending the timeframe 
of implementation beyond mere projects of limited duration, 2) reducing grant 
dependency, 3) enhancing the intersectoral relations and networking, 4) 
establishing greater rapport between CSOs and local governments, 5) stronger 
emphasis on capacity building at all levels of activity, 6) training CSO 
management to be better qualified for the ever more transnational environment, 
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7) better coordination between CSOs as well as with other CBC stakeholders, 8) 
encouraging innovation and mutual learning (instead of old habits), 8) more 
robust monitoring, evaluation, and prioritization as to avoid overlaps 9) forming 
better and easier two-way communication channels between the CSOs and the 
EU, and 10) more pragmatic funding mechanisms that do not sideline grassroots 
activism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the EU’s cooperation agenda has drifted on a collision course with Russia’s 
re-emerging superpower rhetoric, the transnational civil society links have 
become more effectively exploited by the EU within its ambitious project of 
regional cooperation. In the EU rhetoric, especially within the context of ENP, 
civil society is assumed to be a major political forum and force. While it has its 
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benefits, in the relations with Russia such a politicization of civil society 
cooperating has also its drawbacks. The more the CSOs assume the role of EU 
agents, the more they will also depend on the status of EU-Russia relations. As 
we have already clearly seen, the Russian state has interpreted this to involve an 
indirect agenda of reshaping state institutions and attacked against what it 
deems as foreign interventions by restricting the operational environment for all 
CSOs in Russia.  
In the post-Soviet space, where the development of civic action is still very 
much in its infancy, the normative load of the EU policies creates pressures for 
the nascent CSOs to modify their original makeup and adapt to the externally 
desired qualities. While there is no reason to deprecate the disquieting action 
that the state structures have placed upon civil society in Russia, a mere 
transplantation of an inherently foreign model of civil society will hardly be a 
solution.  Not the least because the EU tends to foster sort of a genetically 
enhanced model of civil society, stripped of from all but its beneficial 
characteristics. 
The success of any civil society endeavor remains largely based on its context 
specific circumstances. Thanks to its soft power, the EU model may be attractive 
and easy to stand up for, but when cultivated outside of its original habitat, in 
contexts and circumstances that differ greatly from those in which the model has 
developed, it is likely to colonize, even replace the indigenous, native forms of 
civic action. 
In the case of Russia, the Western (not just EU) funding has acted as a growth 
hormone, evident in the spearing numbers of CSOs – some of which has been 
created for the very purpose of obtaining Western funds. It can already be seen 
that such growth is neither natural nor maintainable. The focus needs to be 
readjusted from mere numbers to the actual forms and capacities of civic action. 
Cross-border cooperation plays a crucial role here; it can create new spaces for 
civil society engagement and local initiatives in the areas important for the local 
inhabitants themselves. 
While it is certainly true that civil society has become a major channel 
through which the EU’s normative power gets transmitted, much of the small-
scale local level CBC has been carried out in isolation from the EU’s grand 
geopolitical aims. Instead of focusing directly on the big goals of democracy 
building and importing Western values to Russia, the traditional Finnish 
approach, which has sought to strengthen the prerequisites for individual 
citizens in Russia in order for them to build better preconditions for their own 
well-being, has proven to be a more efficient way to gain acceptance and, as a 
result, tangible results. Through such pragmatism in civil society networks, the 
building of a civic neighborhood can go beyond the merely symbolic or 
politically expedient. Such networks can form the basis for mutual cultural 
knowledge, a key precondition for security. However, having been associated 
with the state-building process in the East, there is an apparent risk that CSOs 
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may, to their own disadvantage, loose track of their pragmatic mission in getting 
caught between the geopolitical projects of the EU and Russia.  
The future context of cooperation will be of decisive importance for the 
development prospects of the regions at and near the EU’s external borders. 
With the evolution of the ENP framework, a crucial future question remains as 
to how to adapt the regional perspectives of EU external relations to existing 
institutional models and how to bring Russian regional actors into the 
implementation and targeting of new policy instruments. The definition of 
common regional concerns and the construction of cross-border regions get 
highlighted not only in economic but also social, cultural, and political terms. 
The reasons for this are rather clear; it is civil society actors who embody the 
local political and social contexts, they are intermediaries par excellence between 
community concerns and more global processes that increasingly impact 
everyday life. Potential exists for horizontal, non-hierarchical institutional 
learning that involves motivated sectors of the population and strengthens their 
social impact locally and regionally. 
While much of the cooperation takes place separately from the EU programs, 
due to ever-decreasing national funds, the role of the EU is, however, bound to 
only increase. While it is certainly a positive development that the ENPI CBC 
programs are governed regionally, the EU’s focus on budgetary control, 
administrative standardization, and security issues has unfortunately promoted 
bureaucratic practices and policies of conditionality that tend to complicate CSO 
cooperation. The EU has developed a systematic framework for implementing 
cross-border civil society projects that involves a laborious implementation 
process that channels support for civil society largely through state structures. 
The EU demands certain types of bureaucratic discipline, which includes 
budgeting, auditing, monitoring, and evaluating civil society projects which 
often subordinates CSOs to state agencies at the national, regional, and local 
level. Regional Councils thus play a strong strategic and political role in CBC, 
but they also have a lot to say which CSOs get included in the programs. This 
contributes to the emergence of a privileged CSO elite, particularly on the 
Russian side, that may become isolated from its constituents. Thus, despite the 
EU’s strong rhetorical commitment to facilitating transnational civil society 
networks, this goal is often subordinated to the dictates of geopolitical ‘realism.’ 
In order to make the programs more inclusive and useful for the participating 
regions and localities, there needs to be more room for bottom-up initiatives and 
the voice of local actors in defining priorities and the means to achieve them.  
However, in areas such as social policy, welfare, health, and economic 
development there is great potential for common agendas that transcend 
geopolitical and inter-state tensions. Social policy has been a major victim of 
neo-liberal ideology and economic reforms that have privileged economic 
growth and liberalization. Thanks to civil society networks, shortfalls in public 
provision of social services have been partially compensated for while notions of 
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social equity, welfare, and group rights have been reframed as policy concerns 
in new member states and neighboring states.  
Instead of Europeanization, the local level CBC has rather given a new 
meaning to Finlandization, as it has very much been the Finnish, not necessary 
European, welfare model that has been extended to cover also cooperation with 
Russia. Such a pragmatic approach is likely to be more beneficial for the both 
sides than any grand bargain. After all, if the EU wishes to remain effective in 
Russia than the EU has to also remain attractive, given that the conditionality 
principle cannot be applied to Russia and the EU commitments and their success 
remains subject to local interpretation and acceptance. CSOs have a valuable 
role to play in this respect. While Europeanization has brought new momentum, 
the valuable experience gained during the last two decades from the bilateral 
cooperation should not thus be forgotten either. 
Alongside free-form voluntary civic action, during the past decades civil 
society has become increasingly important as a societal force in terms of service 
production. In practice, this entails that the number of service-producing quasi-
corporations, social enterprises, will increase in the future. As this tendency will 
in all likelihood continue in the coming years, one is forced to ask whether or 
not CSOs can act both as service providers and as sources of social capital at the 
same time. To what extent does becoming a part of the public hand downplay 
attempts to revive a sense of community and belonging and enhance civic 
mindedness and engagement? 
Charitable giving and especially volunteering has been characteristic of 
Finnish civil society, but as corporatization comes hand in hand with 
commercialization, this denotes also shifts in CSOs’ revenue structure as well as 
their organizational structure as more CSOs evolve from voluntary 
organizations and social economy organizations. Regarding CBC, this can be 
judged predominantly as a positive development, as it implies increased self-
sufficiency, but it also changes the ‘ethos’ and the entire civil society culture 
fundamentally. Service production comes with a pressure to become more 
professional, the underlying cause may shift from being value-based to more 
profit seeking, and networking and cooperation among CSOs may get 
overshadowed by increased competition, a concept that has been somewhat 
foreign to civil society activism. How far can we push the limits and 
organizational forms of civil society? Are we still talking about civil society in 
the first place?  
Based on all that has been said above, I would answer “quite a bit” and “yes 
we are.” The meaning of civil society has been far from stable. It has not only 
migrated extensively, but it also means very different things in different context. 
Instead of fixating on the organizational form, the focus needs to be on what is 
actually being done. Even if on an asymmetrical basis, CBC is about mutual 
learning: it attenuates our tendency to think in normative and categorical terms 
about what civil society is and what it should do. It opens up new perspectives 
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for understanding why civil society actors develop specific practices and 
provides insights into the specific social identities of civil society organizations. 
As the operational environment has changed, the organizational form has 
also had to adapt. If state-supported voluntary organizations enlarge the social 
capital of civil society, then why not for-profit or even company sponsored, 
social enterprises. After all, civil society is a political concept, not an economic one. 
Given that state funding has been cut drastically and EU funding is often out of 
reach, revenue generation through service production might be the only viable 
option to attain financial security, self-sufficiency, and independence.  
 
7.3.2 Self-sufficiency through Social Economy Development 76  
Even though a number of individual objectives have been reached through 
project-based cooperation, there is an apparent need to aspire for more long-
term, self-sustaining civil society cooperation. As discussed in subsection 3.2.3 in 
theory and section 6.5 in practice, one option could be to conceptualize also 
Finnish-Russian CBC in more socio-economic terms. A more social economy 
focused approach would offer alternative ways to generate social and economic 
welfare and innovative solutions to society's most pressing social problems 
thought social entrepreneurship.  
Before going further, it is important to acknowledge that broader cultural 
issues have evident bearings also on the development of social 
entrepreneurship. Practical experiences from cooperation provide insights into 
the social identities and embeddedness of both Finnish and Russian CSOs and 
how these ties influence their ability and motivation to participate in the social 
economy. This study has confirmed Alapuro’s (2008) characterizations that 
whereas Finnish CSOs tend to be informed by a more universal philosophy of 
democratic representation and, accordingly, perceive their own role as being 
based on general societal engagement and social justice, Russian CSOs are, 
generally speaking, more oriented towards satisfying specific group interests 
and care aspects of the social economy. Consequently, Finnish CSOs behave as 
societal actors with wider social and political agendas, the achievement of which 
necessitate the generation of profits. Russian CSOs, in turn, understand their 
grassroots agendas in less managerial and strategic terms. 
While this categorization is undoubtedly oversimplified, it explains at least 
partly the aversion of many Russian CSOs to employ entrepreneurial strategies 
in order to enhance their sustainability. The different societal role also means 
that the concrete interests of Finnish and Russian CSOs are quite different with 
respect to CBC. While Finnish actors focus on promoting functioning social 
economies in Russia as a sort of investment for the future, Russian CSOs are 
more often directly concerned with assisting specific groups and group interests 
                                                          
76 This section developed the ideas introduced in Scott and Laine (2012). 
 392   
 
that require new policy responses and forms of assistance no longer guaranteed 
by the state.  
A basic contradiction is still perceived between profit motives and attending 
to social needs. Most CSOs do not in fact see their raison d’être in raising 
investment capital (even if for social causes) but in either self-help forms of 
social activity or in partnerships with governments, local governments 
especially, in providing social services. This notion of purpose is also supported 
by a greater focus on specific group-related problems. This varies, for example, 
from the outlook of many Finnish CSOs who see themselves as advocates of 
wider social agendas. From the Western perspective, this might make Russian 
CSOs appear ‘clientilistic,’ but in the Russian case it appears to successfully 
concentrate resources for particularly disadvantaged groups.  
The impact of CBC in the development of the social economy in Russia has so 
far been somewhat ambivalent. Cross-border networks have helped establish 
partnerships in different areas of social welfare, economic development, 
training, and institutional capacity building that have assumed an important 
regional development role (Laine & Demidov 2013; Scott & Laine 2012). At the 
same time, the sustainability of joint projects is overwhelmingly dependent 
upon outside support, for example from the Finnish government, the EU, and 
large international foundations.  
Civil society cooperation across the EU’s external border is only slowly 
promoting entrepreneurial practices that could provide durable sources of 
finance. However, these ambiguities surrounding CBC and its impact on 
Russian civil society should not suggest that cooperation experiences can be 
reduced to a mere transfer of ‘best practices.’ Cooperation also has promoted 
new ways of seeing CSOs as actors whose roles and activities reflect their social 
and political embeddedness. 
The evolution of civil society interaction towards more reciprocal forms of 
cooperation suggests that processes of institutional learning have increased the 
effectiveness of CSOs on both sides of the border to address social welfare and 
other local development issues. This institutional learning takes place in the 
shape of professionalization, improved knowledge about local needs and 
situations, enhanced lobbying and grant-seeking practices, and a better transfer 
of information to local citizens on health, training, employment, and other social 
affairs. Nevertheless, a major challenge in the Russian case lies in securing the 
financial viability and sustainability of CSOs and in promoting the legitimacy of 
social enterprises as providers of public goods. Much of the debate on social 
enterprise and social contracting stems from attempts to manage political, 
demographic, and economic change in Western welfare states. As such, the 
concept of social entrepreneurship presupposes several structural, social and 
political conditions that are not well understood or even applicable in Russia. 
Furthermore, Russian CSOs rarely see themselves as targeting profits for wider 
social purposes, focusing rather on specific group interests and concerns.  
   393 
 
Unlike in Finland, social contracting with CSOs has so far not made headway 
in Russia due to a lack of cost-effectiveness, inefficient recruitment, strategic 
planning, and poor management techniques. While the notion of social economy 
is understood by Russian CSOs, principles of entrepreneurship seem foreign to 
many of them. As a result, social entrepreneurship generally takes place at a 
very small scale, often in rural areas, where trade-based social enterprises use 
profits to benefit specific social groups (e.g., homeless persons, the elderly, poor 
families, and persons with disabilities and chronic diseases). Despite a lack of 
trust in Russia’s traditional health care systems, the notion of social contracting 
as well as the role of CSOs as service providers has not yet been fully accepted 
by Russian society (Anders 2010). As a result many social contracting projects 
funded by international sources have been discontinued, also the problem of 
limited acceptance of social contracting as such is seen as cumbersome and 
restricting to civil society activities.  
Nevertheless, civil society CBC is an important contextual factor in the 
development of Russia’s civil society and social economy. It contributes to the 
social conditions that affect local development and to new forms of social 
solidarity in Russian society by supporting local welfare systems and strategies 
of local and regional development. CBC also helps to create spaces of civil 
society engagement in the Russian social economy through capacity building 
and networking diverse actors who individually lack resources to develop 
cooperation projects. Increased space for civic action is likely to help individuals 
and local communities to improve the quality of their personal and community 
life and to identify and better meet their own social and economic needs. 
Increased civil action, then, is likely to lead to the new and innovative solutions 
required to satisfy the needs of those ignored by the private or public sectors.  
The clearest long-term contribution of civil society CBC to the evolution of 
Russia’s social economy has been that of reframing social welfare issues as an 
important area of civil society endeavors. Furthermore, considerable potential 
exists for horizontal, non-hierarchical institutional learning that involves 
motivated sectors of the population and strengthens their social impact locally 
and regionally (Scott & Laine 2012). Creating a critical mass of CSO 
‘infrastructure’ will, in addition, help local communities and groups deal more 
effectively with changing economic and social conditions as well as adapt to the 
shifts in public policy that target social welfare. 
 
Conceptualizing a Cross-Border Space through Civil Society 
Organizations 
Finnish-Russian civil society CBC has shed new light on issues of local welfare 
and the potential roles of social entrepreneurship in local development. While 
operating conditions up to now have not directly favored entrepreneurial 
strategies, CBC has initiated partnerships between civil society and local 
communities in the provision of social services and governance of local 
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problems. Problems exist, however, in opportunistic ‘grant-seeking’ behaviors 
that inhibit more strategic and long-term approaches to social enterprise 
development. 
The interviews conducted for this study indicate that the social economy 
could represent an enormous playing field for civil society participation in the 
reconstitution of social and welfare policy in Russia – but it also could be of 
great benefit to Finnish border regions as well. In the light of current trends 
towards the decentralization and privatization of public services in both Finland 
and Russia, it would be prescient to conceptualize a cross-border space for social 
contracting and social welfare policies through civil society organizations. In 
this conjunction, it would also be necessary to understand how more ambitious 
entrepreneurial strategies for Russia’s emerging social economy could be 
promoted.  
New support structures could promote collaborative forms of policy 
formulation and delivery based on partnerships involving the state, the private 
sector, foundations, and civil society at large. This is particularly important in 
peripheral regions with limited prospects for short-term returns on social 
investment and where multiple support mechanisms are needed in order to 
nurture entrepreneurial activity. One possible strategy would be to develop 
international networks between public, private, and nonprofit sector actors that 
provide assistance to emerging and future social entrepreneurs though a variety 
of means, including: support in project development, securing grants (including 
the provision of guarantees), and assistance in the acquisition and provision of 
loans and investment capital, as well as training, advisory, logistical, and 
informational support. Social entrepreneurism provides a less risky option than 
direct partnerships with businesses as the latter would question the credibility 
of CSOs role as watchdogs and detach them from their value base. From the 
other angle, few businesses want a partner that claims to cooperate and yet 
remains critical all the while.  
Revenue generation does not mean that CSOs would have to renounce their 
value base or constituents. Quite the contrary, it may help the organization to 
strengthen both. A social enterprise operates like a business and seeks to earn 
revenue but manages its operations and redirects its surpluses in pursuit of 
social, cultural, or environmental goals. Operating at the border between the 
private sector and civil society (Figure 43), social enterprises are able to steer 
away from one-sided grant dependency and seek financial stability through 
revenue generation, for example by providing services, and to invest the profits 
back to its mission. In so doing, social enterprises gain also independence from 
state funding mechanisms and the criteria set by them.  
As the figure suggests, the borders of the space occupied by social enterprises 
can be stretched to either direction. The in-between space encompasses a wide 
range of organizations, from cooperatives and private limited companies to 
mutual societies. The distinction between market-oriented missions and socially-
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based missions is not explicit, but entrepreneurs can operate at different stages 
along the social enterprise continuum. 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of the short-term contributions of CBC to the development of social 
entrepreneurialism, the most obvious area where this has taken place is that of 
business development. Detailed investigations into this realm of the emerging 
Russian social economy were beyond the scope of this research. However, it 
became evident from interviews with CSO representatives in Russia and Finland 
that business development services, microloan facilities and technology transfer 
appeared to be logical areas for social entrepreneurial development whereas 
social welfare provision was not. As mentioned above, CBC has also been a 
heavily subsidized affair, often precluding the generation of socially oriented 
profits as part of the conditionality of EU and Finnish government funding.  
The clearest long-term contribution of CBC to the evolution of Russia’s social 
economy has been that of reframing social welfare and regional development 
issues as important areas of civil society initiative. Considerable potential also 
exists for horizontal, non-hierarchical institutional learning that involves 
motivated sectors of the population and strengthens their social impact locally 
and regionally (Laine & Demidov 2013; Nielsen, Berg & Roll 2009). Creating a 
critical mass of CSO infrastructure will help local communities and groups deal 
more effectively with changing economic and social conditions as well as adapt 
to shifts in public policy that target social welfare.  
social
entrerprises
PRIVATE SECTOR CIVIL SOCIETY
companies NPOs
Advocacy
Self-help
Profit
generation
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7.4 EPILOGUE: SOMETHING OLD, NEW, BORROWED, AND 
BLUE 
 
Finnish-Russian relations are a broader phenomenon than customary bilateral 
relations between two states. They are based on common history and those 
lessons learned from it, geographical proximity and the long common border, 
cultural linkages and the existence of kindred peoples, and economic 
development and trade interdependencies, as well as environmental factors that 
respect no borders. The relations have been both close and distant – at times 
both at the same time. They cannot be explained by the mere supply and 
demand factors, but the motivations for cooperation range from a sense of duty 
to an outright necessity. As a partner in cooperation, Russia is perceived at the 
same time as an opportunity and a drag, with high hopes and frustration. Like 
border regions in general, the Finnish-Russian border region is characterized by 
specific forms of living together that entail tolerance and solidarity; “cooperation 
with Russia is not easy, but in can be done” and “special know-how is needed in 
order to succeed” (F #48). 
This study has attempted to trace how the image of Russia as a neighbor and 
as a partner in cross-border cooperation has developed in Finnish public debate 
from the year 1990 onwards; i.e., since the building of direct neighborly relations 
became possible. Such a contextual analysis was seen as needed in order to 
study the discursive practices whereby the image of Russia is formed but also to 
avoid hindsight bias and to more adeptly situate the development of 
cooperation within the context in which it evolved.  
The Finnish-Russian relations of today cannot be fully understood without 
understanding the past. Equally important is to know how to break away from 
it. Only by being aware of the fact that the ‘teachings of history’ are open to 
various interpretations can the right decisions be made today without being 
blind to the political use of history (OE 6.12.1999). Accordingly, what Russia 
signifies to Finns has to be viewed through multiple lenses, all of which alter the 
picture in their own specific way. The era of Finland as an autonomous Grand 
Duchy in the Russian Empire, the nation-building process in the latter half of the 
nineteeth century, years of oppression in the early 1900s, the confrontation 
between the bourgeois and the socialists, gaining independence in 1917, the civil 
war of 1918, the power struggle between democracy and the right-wing 
dictatorship from the 1920s until 1936, then the Winter and Continuation War, 
after which Finland had to live in the shadows of the Soviet Union for five 
decades, have all added something to the complexity of these bilateral relations.  
Even though the Finnish-Soviet/Russian relations have been full of twists and 
turns, public opinion has changed more slowly. Albeit the opinion pieces cannot 
be deemed to portray public opinion accurately, they do provide a valuable 
glimpse into the state of the public discussion and the way individual citizens 
perceive Russia. The analysis of this level of the relations was deemed as 
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important for this study as this is where much of the people-to-people 
interaction takes place. The analyzed writings suggest that there is no coherent 
image of Russia but that there exist various different, often times contradictory 
perspectives. The previously faceless superpower became perceived more and 
more in terms of everyday life as the interaction across the border increased and 
people’s knowledge about the neighbor became increasingly based on personal 
experience.  
Two pointed events in the external environment during the study period 
raise clearly above all others: the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and 
Finland’s accession to the EU in early 1995. These incidents enabled new 
interpretations of the position of Finland, but they also marked deconstructive 
moments for the Finnish nation-state and the presumed unity between the 
nation and the state. Joenniemi (1993, 19) was quick to argue that as the 
permanent threat the Soviet Union was perceived to have lost its credibility, the 
meaning of state sovereignty could be put under scrutiny. The more open 
conditions allowed for the deconstruction of age-old stereotypes about 
‘Russianness’ and ‘Finnishness’ derived from the past and related to World War 
II and the era of a closed border and also cleared the way for the image to be 
reconstructed in a more truthful manner. 
With the end of the Cold War the previously stable border concept was 
transformed into something broader and more complex. In the Finnish case, the 
change was beefed up by the fact that the neighbor that Finns had learned to 
know, in both good and bad, suddenly disappeared. As a neighbor, the Soviet 
Union had not been the easiest kind, but at least the risk associated with living 
next to a sleeping giant could be assessed and managed, and the dangers could 
be judged. With its successor, the Russian Federation, the rules of the game 
changed fundamentally. The probabilities became harder to estimate because 
there was no longer any clear basis for making such a judgment.  
The end of history provided a new beginning, but few knew exactly with 
whom Finland was now dealing with. It was exactly this uncertainly that 
downplayed the potential that could have been gained from the freer climate 
and the more open border. Since then, Russia has been viewed as being in 
transition towards something. In the West, it was hoped that this something 
would be democracy and a market economy.  
The Russian internal developments have clearly influenced the nature of 
cross-border cooperation. In the beginning, given the turmoil that followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, CBC consisted mainly of pure humanitarian aid 
from Finland to Russia. As the situation improved, Russia became an actor of its 
own right, whereby CBC became more of a two-way street. More recently, 
Russia’s increased wealth and self-confidence have made its action ever more 
assertive, which has again created new tension on CBC practices. 
EU membership provided further treatment for the long-common-border-
syndrome and suggested a move away from the geodeterministic premise 
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whereby the geography of Finland predetermined or at least limited its choices 
with regard to its political development. The increasingly international context 
necessitated that national unity be redefined once again. This process is 
evidently still going on today. As the state has become redefined, so too could 
civil society. As an arena, it has become increasingly transnational. The share 
and scope of organizations and networks operating across the border and 
beyond the state has been on the increase. This tendency suggests that the time 
has come to approach interaction in post-national terms and conceptualize a 
cross-border space, a civic neighborhood, through civil society actor linkages. 
With the help of social contracting and social entrepreneurship, CSOs could gain 
further leverage to fill the gaps created by borders and bordering to bridge the 
apparent intersectoral crevasses.  
The external environment has changed radically during the last two decades 
and so too has Finland. Increased cooperation has eroded the understanding of 
the border with Russia as a strict cut-off line shutting-off contacts and retaining, 
if not generating, the mindset of repression, injustice, conflict, or even war. 
While the border is still a state border, the transnational practices that transcend 
it allow it to be approached as a social practice, situated within an 
understanding of neighborliness that recognizes and respects the values of the 
other and the contributions that it makes. The opportunities that would be 
allowed by more open conditions have not, however, been grasped to their full 
potential. The mental aspects of the border remain etched into the minds of the 
people so profoundly that its relevance has not faded even though the actual 
institutional border has subsided. The border still functions as a barrier, but its 
partial permeability allows for the relations across it to be now, at last, shaped 
by dialog rather than by confrontation. This dialog allows both sides of the 
border to gain more knowledge about their neighbor, which in turn fosters 
mutual understanding, another important prerequisite for effective cooperation. 
As a nation is inevitably a social construction, so too are its borders. As they 
can be constructed, they can also be erased. Changing the focus from seeing like 
a state to seeing like a border, as Rumford (2008) has advised, would allow us to 
disaggregate the state and the border, and unveil the potential that various 
actors of civil society hold in constructing, shifting, or even in erasing borders. If 
the border is no longer seen in national terms, and if the interaction is deemed 
not to occur between two states, but among people from these two, or more, 
states, such borderwork would go beyond issues of national belonging or 
citizenship as to allow expressions of transnational mobility and demonstrations 
of genuine political actorhood apart from state, or the EU, supported agendas.  
Thanks to the institutionalization of cooperation (e.g., Euregio Karelia), the 
relationships especially between regional level officials and authorities on the 
two sides of the border have improved. CBC projects but also less-visible 
personal-level interactions have significantly contributed to a more mutual 
understanding and interdependence, accumulation of trust, and the breaking 
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down of mental barriers (cf. Németh et al. 2012). The relationship may still be far 
from ideal, or even what could be considered as normal between two countries 
sharing a long common border. Still, at least in comparison with high level 
geopolitics, civil society cooperation seems to be developing forward and 
cultivating varying degrees of interdependence.  
As the recent developments suggest, the formation of a Finnish-Russian civic 
neighborhood depends greatly on how it is perceived on the non-EU side of the 
border. As the EU’s conditionality principle cannot be applied to Russia, a 
country without aspirations of EU membership, the carrot needs to be found 
elsewhere. In this respect, the finding that many civil society actors see their 
work as separate from the grand scale EU endeavors, may serve as a benefit. 
Certainly, the EU’s role in fuelling cooperation cannot be denied, as it certainly 
has created a supportive frame and a forum within which cooperation and 
regional dialogue has developed. It has also brought new impetus and forced 
the Finnish actors to move beyond the old rhetoric based on past experiences. 
Having said that, the main motives and initiatives for the cooperation have to 
arise from the local needs and concerns. The Russian regions adjacent to the 
Finnish border are, first and foremost, perceived as our neighborhood, and the 
self-perception this implies remains bounded within the national frame. 
The ENP era brought along a greater emphasis on CSOs in CBC across the 
external EU border but it also included a hidden agenda: an attempt to approach 
Russia through an alternative channel and to create operational basis for 
bottom-up forces seeking to influence the system. However, as the ever-
tightening climate for civic action in Russia, especially vis-à-vis ‘foreign agents,’ 
suggests such strategy may have been too obvious. In Russia, it was decoded as 
an attempt to influence Russia’s domestic issues and political institutions. In 
Finland, many civil society actors also renounced the Europeanization logic and 
rather underlined the cooperation as a value in itself. At the EU level, the post-
Lisbon securitization emphasis along the general new ‘realism’ in EU foreign 
policy has changed the picture yet again. Talks about the ‘ring of friends,’ which 
underlined the need to create better links with neighbors, now focus 
increasingly on a ‘secure neighborhood’ and the need to create a supportive 
buffer zone. Accordingly, the EU seems to have lost some of its faith in CBC and 
in the transformation process in Russia. This has urged the Union to retreat 
precisely to where it should not be – at the level of socio-cultural 
communication. 
The images of Europe relate directly to its neighborhood. The process of 
building a EUropean Neighborhood, as well as the way it is received in the 
‘Wider Europe,’ depends greatly on what the EU is expected to be. It makes a 
difference whether we are talking about a clearly defined buffer around the 
European super-state, backward hinterlands of Imperial Europe, economic 
functionalist catchment area, or, say, a transnational space of a value 
community. Whereas the very structure of EU foreign policy discourse is 
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grounded in the political distinction between ‘Europe’ and its ‘neighborhood,’ 
the idea of a civic neighborhood is open to broader, more inclusive definitions of 
Europe. As discussed in section 4.1.2., the EU, even if prominent today, has yet 
to monopolize Europe. Whereas EUropeanization tends to confirm the 
difference between those who are in and those who are out, a civic 
neighborhood is rather based on the idea put forth by Sakwa (2006, 24) that 
Russia is part of a broader European civilization, and it is exactly this cultural 
unity that can be built upon in order to transcend political divisions and 
geographical barriers. 
The understandings of a civic neighborhood are not based on specific policies 
or official definitions, but arise from more pragmatic – less normative – 
cooperation exercised through informal channels. Its aim is to normalize the 
relations and eventually create an uncoerced, free form neighborhood that 
would allow easy, unloaded dialogue even when disagreements occur. As such, 
its success and the permanence of cooperation depend greatly on its perceived 
usefulness; both sides need to feel that they are gaining something from it. The 
most successful examples can be found when the actors themselves feel that 
CBC is not only a means to an end but that there is added value to be gained in 
the process itself. After all, unlike the EU-Russia level rhetoric would suggest, at 
the Finnish-Russian border the question still has more to do with neighborhood, 
i.e., the maintenance of issues related to geographical proximity, than with 
partnership, i.e., need-based cooperation, which may be active at one time and 
passive at another. While partnership may at times be forgotten or ignored, 
“neighborhood cannot be just a project” (F #1). It has to be nurtured also when 
the interest do not match. 
It is at the border where actors from two very different traditions of civil 
society meet. While clashes are unavoidable, they are not insurmountable. In 
order to move beyond them, it is essential to understand the different logics that 
inform civil society agendas as well as their embeddedness within more general 
societal contexts. The differences that are bound to arise need not to be taken 
automatically as barriers or something to be fixed by cooperation, as it has 
already become clear that merely transplanting a model from one context to 
another is unlikely to endure and gain acceptance. While it is necessary to be 
aware of the differences, this study suggests that transnational civil society 
should be understood as an arena extending beyond the national confines. Such 
a cross-border space need not to be understood only as a broader mandate and 
action space for CSOs, but also in terms of a cross-border public sphere, a space 
for a public debate regarding issues of common concern, which necessitate 
cooperation across the border or which may be caused by its very existence. 
Increased people-to-people connections eroded faceless stereotypical images 
and attenuated the tendency to think normatively. In order to maintain the 
pragmatism of cooperation, the analysis of the situation ought not to focus 
excessively on what the civil society should be about and how it should be 
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organized, but rather on what actually gets done. What matters is that civil 
society actors detect common problems and are thereby of service to the citizens 
in their efforts to find common solutions (Stenius 2003, 17). 
Understanding borders and the dynamics of cross-border interactions is 
crucial here. While the models introduced earlier cannot be applied directly, 
they do help us to understand the potential of CSOs operating within such a 
cross-border space. Borders cannot be studied in isolation from the regions 
adjacent to them, and the Finnish-Russian border is certainly not an exception. 
Cross-border interaction can be seen to form a multilayered regional system, in 
which different networks operate at different layers. Building on Schack (2000), 
this study suggests that the very same border appears differently at different 
layers, to different networks. The Finnish-Russian border thus has a different 
meaning in different contexts; it seems relatively open to some, while almost 
completely closed to another. While governments tend to have fixed views of 
national borders – as that is where their jurisdiction stops – and businesses have 
had difficulties adapting to the unpredictable conditions in Russia, CSOs are 
freer to move back and forth across the international border and less restricted 
from entering into transnational cooperative relationships. 
The relaxation of the geopolitical climate also allowed increased interaction 
between borderlands at the regional level. However, unlike Martinez’s (1994a) 
scheme would suggest, this has not led to a linear development towards 
convergence. The situation has to be approached more laterally. Due to the 
different roles that the border plays, it is likely to become only more 
multidimensional, serving as a barrier for some and a resource for others. The 
status of the Finnish-Russian border as an external EU border bulked up with 
the Schengen acquis will not change in the foreseeable future, and even if the 
visa regime would be renounced, the border obtains functions that cannot be 
erased by a political decision. To what extent interaction among CSOs can 
evolve in an ever securitizing environment remains to be seen.  
All told, the entire equation of EU-level policies, the national level 
sovereignty endeavors, and the regional level civil society cooperation practices 
are interesting to look at. Even though every layer that transcends the border is 
part of a more extensive layer, the different layers still have also their own 
dynamics as well. Interestingly, even though CBC at the local and regional levels 
is regarded as separate from EU policies, it matches well with what the EU is 
aiming to do. Different levels do have different interests, but in the end they all 
work for the same underlying cause, normalizing the neighborly relations, and 
complement each other, albeit through different means. Despite the 
asymmetrical setting, cross-border ties among CSOs have grown gradually and 
created a sense of interdependence between the two sides. It is this sub-national 
level CBC that functions as an important driver of interaction, and thus also 
integration, by bringing the two sides closer to each other and forming a kind of 
a safety net when higher politics go sour.  
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So far, most of the bilateral cooperation projects have been funded by the 
Finnish Neighboring Area Cooperation funds. The NAC funds have been the 
main mechanism through which Finland has attempted to steer the 
development in Russia, at least right behind the border. As the program, 
designed expressly for a period of transition, was finally terminated at the end 
of 2012, one could postulate that from the Finnish perspective Russia has either 
completed its transition or that Finland has given up. Technically, of course, the 
question is about replacing the bilateral program with more multilateral EU 
programs. Be it as it may, if judged based on the funding mechanisms, the 
Europeanization finally overshadowed ‘Finlandization’ (!) on January 1, 2013. 
The EU has brought well-needed impetus into Finnish-Russian CBC, but it 
has also its downsides. The future trajectory whereby binational cooperation 
would rely entirely on support from Brussels sounds very unnatural. Especially 
as long as there are no practical means to distribute EU funds to the local level 
where much of the work is carried out. Still very few CSOs are able to bypass 
the national level and engage directly with the EU. In dealing only with 
‘organized civil society,’ the EU has also centralized and bureaucratized civil 
society and forced many small grassroots CSOs to dropout. In Russia, this 
situation has forced many CSOs to act as quasi-governmental bureaucratic 
organizations. After all, he who keeps company with wolves tends to learn how 
to howl.  
CBC is particularly necessary at the external border of the EU in order to 
maintain an adequate level of dialogue and cooperation between local 
communities, institutions, and populations and to promote balanced social 
development and economic growth as well as to avoid any feelings of a new 
division in Europe. If the local and regional level CBC is expected to thrive also 
in the future, all the levels will need to have better understanding of their own 
role and of the division of labor in this equation. More funding that is better 
directed, more easily accessible, and more reliable is needed where the practical 
knowledge and expertise is. It cannot be based on the superficial friendship 
rhetoric, but careful planning is needed in order to move beyond the formalities 
and maintain the cooperation successfully. Much depends on individual actors 
who are able to shoulder the implementation of the agreed programs and to 
solve emerging problems and disagreements.  
It cannot be denied that the EU has a great role to play not just in handing 
out money, but also in working towards creating a positive general context and 
a forum for regional dialogue that allows the subnational actors to cooperate 
and solve the problems together with their partners directly across the border. 
Despite its prominence, the EU must not be regarded as the only solution to this, 
but the CSOs themselves may need to take matters into their own hands and to 
seek further revenues through social entrepreneurship in order to ensure the 
continuity of cooperation. The situation where the public sector – at both the 
national level and the EU level – is being blamed for the lack of support of civil 
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society cooperation cannot but be deemed as somewhat twisted and may show, 
more than anything else, a lack of innovation and motivation to make things 
happen. The faceless EU, in particular, is easy to blame, and it provides an easy, 
trendy, and politically correct way to decline cooperation. The maintenance of 
cross-border ties still lies in the hands of a few, who have the aspiration and 
knowhow to get things done. The situation is, of course, not helped by the fact 
that the average Finn knows very little about modern Russia.  
The newspaper analysis conducted for this study suggests that Chandler’s 
(2002, 28) argument that language does not ‘reflect’ reality but rather constructs 
it may indeed have some merit. So far, little effort has been made to improve the 
popular geopolitical image of Russia. While understanding the potential of 
having Russia as a neighbor, many Finns, for their own reasons, continue to 
actively reconfirm the elements in the neighbor, which should be let go in order 
move beyond stereotypes. This tendency is only reinforced by the semiotic 
codes and load of the language used in the newspaper, which seems to inhibit 
people from critically evaluating the opinions and views that they hold. 
The best way to normalize neighborly relations is through increased people-
to-people interaction, and preferable this ought to occur from the bottom-up, not 
from the top-down. After all, to be able to work together, we have to trust one 
another – and to be able to trust one another, we have to know each other. The 
state institutions can do a lot to shape the operational environment, but it should 
not be the state’s task to maintain civil society cooperation. Given that the NAC 
program has been terminated and that the ENPI CBC is not properly equipped 
to deal with the overall context within which Finnish-Russian cooperation takes 
place, there is a risk that despite the rhetorical statements suggesting otherwise, 
the EUropeanization of Finnish-Russian cooperation may well become 
underfunded and more technocratic. This will put the durability of cross-border 
contacts to the test, but it also allows CBC to be restructured and redesigned 
away from predefined funding programs, periods, and priorities. The NAC 
funding has been extremely useful, but it has served its purpose. Unrestricted 
people-to-people interaction feeds inspiration and innovation and leads to new 
solutions – also in terms of financing. There is little reason to expect anything 
less. 
The term ‘neighborhood’ is not reserved only for the EU to use. A civic 
neighborhood is a bottom-up concept that is open to broader definitions of what 
is meant both by Europe and by a border. Civic neighborhood is a process, not 
only means to an end. It is not only an operational space within which civil 
society operates, but it also refers to a civil society as a public sphere within 
which the notion of ‘neighborhood’ itself is constructed. The discursive 
practices, studied above, not only form the frame for cooperation, but they also 
penetrate to the core of what is taking place in practice and how the neighbor, 
Russia, is viewed in this respect. 
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More than uniting states, the emergence of civic neighborhood is about 
uniting people. It is parallel to Rumford’s (2008; 2011) notion of borderwork, 
which extends the de-/bordering from the exclusive business of nation-states to 
include also the multiple ways in which ordinary citizens and various actors of 
civil society construct, shift, and erase borders. This is to say that civil society 
plays a role in defining what the neighborhood is all about. CSOs are not only 
carrying out tasks defined by others, as was the case during the friendship 
policy era or how their role tends to get projected in EU programs. Instead, 
CSOs themselves play a key role in articulating and modifying the objectives 
and practices of CBC. 
Civic neighborhood cannot to be confined within any strictly defined 
territorial limits. Rather it depicts a cross-border space that is more virtual than 
geographically bound. It is a manifestation of the debordering, a postmodern 
projection of the deterritorialization discourse. More than a mere geographical 
belvedere, civic neighborhood is an avant-garde network-space that is more 
constructive and constructed, rather than imposed. It derives from practice and 
pragmatism, rather than rhetoric. It works as long as it makes sense; instead of 
dwelling on one’s status or mere location, focus on the interdependencies would 
allow cooperation when and where it is not just necessary but also sensible.   
Though civic neighborhood does not coincide directly with any of the clearly 
projected models, it resonates better with the pan-European and the 
civilizational approach, than what it does with the conception of official Europe. 
Whereas the geopolitical vision of Europeanization promoted by the ENP, the 
official neighborhood, is based on a very Kristofian idea of the frontier, the 
foreland of the hinterland, civic neighborhood comes closer to a geostrategy that 
Walters (2004, 697) has called a ‘networked (non)border’ that downplays the 
relevance of the spatial border, the geographical borderlines, dispersing 
policing, and systems of control throughout the territory. As the distinction 
between internal and external, domestic and international become fuzzier, so 
does the division between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Civic neighborhood is not about 
national belonging or citizenship, but about transnational mobility and 
actorhood. As responsibility becomes shared through cooperation, the 
traditional views of borders are transcended. 
  
   405 
 
Sources
Aalberts, T. E. (2004): The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe – A 
Constructivist Reading. Journal of Common Market Studies 42 (1), 23–46. 
Aalto, P. (2006): European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe. London: 
Routledge. 
Aalto, P., H. Blakkisrud & H. Smith (2008): Introduction. In: Aalto, P., H. Blakkisrud & H. 
Smith (eds) The New Northern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood, 1–18. 
Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.  
Aarva, P. (eds) (2011): Suomen ja Venäjän välinen lähialueyhteistyö vuosina 2004–2009. 
Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.  
Agnew, J. (1983): An Excess of ‘National Exceptionalism’: Towards a New Political 
Geography of American Foreign Policy. Political Geography Quarterly 2, 151–166.  
Agnew, J. (1987): Place and Politics: The Geographical Meditation of State and Society. Boston: 
Allen & Unwin. 
Agnew, J. (1994): The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International 
Relations Theory. Review of International Political Economy 1 (1), 53–80. 
Agnew, J. (1995): The Hidden Geographies of Social Science and the Myth of the 
‘Geographical Turn’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 13, 379–380.  
Agnew, J. (2001): How Many Europes? The European Union, Eastward Enlargement and 
Uneven Development. European Urban and Regional Studies 8, 29–38.  
Agnew, J. (2005): Hegemony: The New Shape Of Global Power. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 
Agnew, J. (2008): Borders on the Mind: Re-framing Border Thinking. Ethics & Global 
Politics 1 (4), 175–191. 
Ahti, M. (1987): Salaliiton ääriviivat: Oikeistoradikalismi ja hyökkäävä idänpolitiikka 1918–1919. 
Espoo: Weilin & Göös. 
Airoldi, A. (2008): The European Union and the Arctic: Policies and actions. Copenhagen: 
Nordic Council of Ministers. 
Aittokoski, H. & I. Kovanen (2004): Suomalaiset suhtautuvat erittäin karsaasti Venäjään. 
Helsingin Sanomat 11 October 2004. 
Alapuro, R. (1988): State and Revolution in Finland. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.  
Alapuro, R. (2005): Associations and Contention in France and Finland: Constructing the 
Society and Describing the Society. Scandinavian Political Studies 28 (4), 377–399. 
Alapuro, R. (2008): Russian and Estonian Civil Society Discourses Compared. In: White, 
S. (ed.) Media, Culture and Society in Putin’s Russia, 72–91. Houndsmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Alapuro, R. (2010a): Associations and Representativeness in Finland and France. In: 
Alapuro, R. & H. Stenius (eds) Nordic Associations in a European Perspective, 269–
280. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
 406   
 
Alapuro, R. (2010b): Conclusion: How History Matters in Putting Nordic Associations 
into a European Perspective. In: Alapuro, R. & H. Stenius (eds) Nordic Associations 
in a European Perspective, 309–317. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Alapuro, R. & H. Stenius (1989): Kansanliikkeet loivat kansakunnan. In: Alapuro, R. et al. 
(eds) Kansa liikkeessä, 8–49. Vaasa: Kirjayhtymä. 
Alapuro, R. & H. Stenius (eds) (2010): Nordic Associations in a European Perspective. Baden-
Baden: Nomos. 
Alapuro, R. & M. Lonkila (2000): Networks, Identity, and (In)action: A Comparison 
between Russian and Finnish Teachers. European Societies 2 (1), 65–90. 
Amoore, L. (2009): Lines of Sight: On the Visualization of Unknown Futures. Citizenship 
Studies 13 (1), 17–30. 
Anders, R.-E. (2010): Whose needs? The Role of Civil Society Actors in Social Contracting 
in the Russian Federation. Paper presented at the VIII ICCEES World Congress, 
26–31 July 2010, Stockholm. 
Anderson, B. (1983): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso. 
Anderson, J, L. O’Dowd & T. M. Wilson (2010): Introduction: Why Study Borders Now? 
Regional & Federal Studies 12 (4), 1–12. 
Anderson, J. (1995): The Exaggerated Death of the Nation-State. In: Anderson, J., C. Brook 
& A. Cochrane (eds) A Global World?, 65–112. London: Oxford University Press. 
Anderson, J. (1996): The Shifting Stage of Politics: New Medieval and Postmodern 
Territorialities? Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 14 (2), 133–153. 
Anderson, J., L. O’Dowd, L. & T. M. Wilson (eds) (2003): New Borders for a Changing 
Europe. London: Frank Cass 
Anheier, H. K. (2002): The Third Sector in Europe: Five Theses. Civil Society Working 
Paper Series 12. London: Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics 
and Political Science. 
Anheier, H. K. (2008a): What Kind of Nonprofit Sector, What Kind of Society? 
Comparative Policy Reflections. In: Anheier H. K, G. Rossi & L. Boccacin (eds) The 
Social Generative Action of the Third Sector – Comparing, International Experiences, 
279–296. Milan: Vita e Pensiero. 
Anheier, H. K. (2008b): The Third Sector: Reflections on Policy Developments. 
Presentation at the International Committee on Fundraising Organizations 
Annual General Meeting, 16–17 May 2008, Berlin. 
Anheier, H. K. & W. Seibel (2001): The Nonprofit Sector in Germany. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Anheier, H. K., M. Glasius & M. Kaldor (2001): Introducing Global Civil Society. In: 
Anheier, H. K., M. Glasius, & M. Kaldor (eds) Global Civil Society 2001, 3–22. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Apunen, O. (1987): Rajamaasta tasavallaksi. In: Blomstedt, Y. (ed.) Suomen historia 6, 
Sortokaudet ja itsenäistyminen, 47–404. Espoo: Weilin + Göös. 
Archambault, E. (1996): The Nonprofit Sector in France. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
   407 
 
Ardrey, R. E. (1966): The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of 
Property and Nations. New York: Atheneum. 
Armstrong, J. D., L. Lloyd & J. Redmond (1996): From Versailles to Maastricht: International 
Organisation in the Twentieth Century. Houdmills: Palgrave. 
Aro, J. E., J. E. Rosberg & L. A. P. Poijärvi (1947): Koulun maantieto. Otava, Helsinki. 
Arola, P. (2003): Tavoitteena kunnon kansalainen: Koulun kansalaiskasvatuksen päämäärät 
eduskunnan keskusteluissa 1917–1924. Helsinki: University of Helsinki. 
Ashley, R. K. (1987): Foreign Policy as a Political Performance. International Studies Notes 
13, 51–54. 
Atwood, J. B. (1994) Nation-building and Crisis Prevention in the Post-Cold War World. 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 2(1), 11–17. 
Auer, S. (1997): Two Types of Nationalism in Europe? Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin 7 
(12), 1–10. 
Azam, G. (2003): Economie sociale, tiers secteur, economie eolidaire, quelles frontières? 
Revue du Mauss 21, 151–161. 
Bachmann, V. & J. D. Sidaway (2008): Zivilmacht Europa: A Critical Geopolitics of the 
European Union as a Global Power. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 34 (1), 94–109. 
Bachmann, V. & J. D. Sidaway (2009): Encore – The Hour of Europe? AAG Newsletter 44 
(6), 11. 
Backer, D. (2003): Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Possibilities, Patterns and 
Prospects. Journal of Human Rights 2 (3), 297–313. 
Bae, J.H. (2005): Underdeveloped Civil Society in Russia: Origin, Development and 
Differentiation of Independent Social Organizations in the Transforming Russia. 
Paper presented at the SES-COE Seminar “Russian Studies Dialogue: A Korea-
Japan Perspective” at Slavic Research Center, 16 May 2005, Sapporo. 
Baerwald, T. J. (2010): Prospects for Geography as an Interdisciplinary Discipline. Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers 100(3), 493–501. 
Balibar, E. (1998): The Borders of Europe. In: Cheah, P. & B. Robbins (eds): Cosmopolitics: 
Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation, 216–229. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Balibar, E. (2002): Politics and the Other Scene. London: Verso. 
Balibar, E. (2009): Europe as Borderland. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
27(2), 190–215. 
Balme, R. (1996): Les politiques du néo-régionalisme. Paris: Economica. 
Barbé, E. & E. Johansson-Nogués (2008): The EU as a Modest ‘Force for Good’: The 
European Neighbourhood Policy. International Affairs 84, 81–96.  
Barbetta, P. (1997): The Nonprofit Sector in Italy. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Barker, E. (1946): The Politics of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Barroso, J. M. D. (2007A): Comment at press conference in the European Parliament in 
Strasbourg on July 10, 2007. 
Barroso, J. M. D. (2007b): Dimensionen eines Imperiums. Die Welt 17 October 2007. 
 408     
 
Barroso,  J. M. D.  (2010): Remarks by President Barroso  (Speech/10/284) at  the Baltic Sea 
States  Summit,  2  June  2010, Vilnius. Available  through:  http://europa.eu/rapid/
search.htm (August 23, 2010). 
Bartelson, J. (1995): A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Barthes, R. (1977): Image‐Music‐Text. London: Fontana Press. 
Barthes, R. (1987 [1957]): Mythologies. New York: Hill and Wang. 
Barthes, R. (1988): The Semiotic Challenge. New York: Hill and Wang. 
Basina, Y. (1997): Krivoe zerkalo Evropy. Pro et Contra 2, 92–112.  
Batliwala,  S.  &  L.D.  Brown  (eds)  (2006):  Transnational  Civil  Society:  An  Introduction. 
Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. 
Beck, U. & E. Grande (2007): Cosmopolitan Europe. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beck, U. & N.  Sznaider  (2006): Unpacking Cosmopolitanism  for  the  Social  Sciences: A 
Research Agenda. British Journal of Sociology 57 (1), 1–23. 
Bell, D. (1987): The World and the United States in 2013. Daedalus 116 (3), 1–32. 
Bellah, R., R. Masden, W. Sullivan, A. Swindler & S. Tipton  (1996  [1985]): Habits of  the 
Heart:  Individualism  and  Commitment  in  American  Life.  Berkeley:  University  of 
California Press. 
Belokurova, E., N. Yargomskaya, M. Nozhenko & D. Torkhov  (2004): Why NGOs  and 
Regional Authorities Need Each Other. Models of Interaction in the Regions of the 
North‐West.  In: Gorniy, M.  (ed.) Public Policy: Issues of “Soft Security” in the Baltic 
Region. St. Petersburg: Norma Publishers. 
Benhabib,  S.  (1996):  Toward  a  Deliberative  Model  of  Democratic  Legitimacy.  In: 
Benhabib, S. (ed.) Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, 
67–94. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Berdyaev, N. (1915): Судьба России. Originally published as a pamphlet, Moscow: Sytin, 
I.  D.  (Klepinina  #7):  Thereafter  incorporated  into  the  Berdyaev  (1918)  book, 
“Sud’ba  Rossii”.  The  2008  translation  by  Fr.  S.  Janos  available  through: 
www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev (November 11, 2012). 
Berezin, M. & M.  Schain  (2003): Europe without Borders. Baltimore:  The  Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Berger, P. L. & R. J. Neuhaus (1977): To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in 
Public Policy. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 
Bergholm,  T.  (2001):  Suomen  ammattijärjestö  1907–1930,  Suomen  ammattiyhdistysten 
keskusliitto 1930–1969, Suomen ammattiliittojen keskusjärjestö 1969–. Helsinki: SAK.  
Bialasiewicz, L. S. Elden & J. Painter (2005): The Constitution of EU Territory. Comparative 
European Politics 3 (3), 333–363. 
Bialasiewicz,  L., C. Dahlman, G. Matteo Appuzzo,  F. Ciuta, A.  Jones, C. Rumford, R. 
Wodak,  J.  Anderson  &  A.  Ingram  (2009):  Interventions  in  the  New  Political 
Geographies of the European ‘Neighborhood’. Political Geography 28 (2), 79–89. 
Bigg, C.  (2005): Russia: NGOs  Say New Bill Threatens Civil  Freedom. RFE/RL Russian 
Political Weekly, November 23, 2005. 
Billig, M. (1995): Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. 
Black, A.  (1984):  Guilds  and Civil  Society  in European Political Thought:  From  the Twelfth 
Century to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
     409 
 
Blatter,  J.  (2004): From  ‘Spaces of Place’  to  ‘Spaces of Flows’? Territorial and Functional 
Governance  in Cross‐border Regions  in Europe and North America.  International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28 (3), 530–548. 
Blatter, J., M. Kreutzer, M. Rentl & J. Thiele (2009): Preconditions for Foreign Activities of 
European  Regions:  Tracing  Causal  Configurations  of  Economic,  Cultural  and 
Political Strategies. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 40 (1), 171–199. 
Bob, C. (2005): The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bobbio, N.  (1989): Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits of State Power. Trans. 
Kennealy, P. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Bodin,  J.  (1979  [1576]): Six Books of a Commonwealth [Les Six  livres de  la République]. New 
York: Arno. 
Boedeltje,  F.  &  H.  van  Houtum  (2008):  The  Abduction  of  Europe:  A  Plea  for  Less 
Unionsim and More Europe. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 99 (3), 
361–365. 
Boggs, S. W.  (1940):  International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Boli,  J.  &  G.  M.  Thomas  (eds)  (1999):  Constructing  World  Culture:  International 
Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Boltanski, L.  (1999  [1993]): Distant Suffering: Morality, Media  and Politics  [La  souffrance  à 
distance]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Bordachev, T. (2006): Towards a Strategic Alliance. Russia in Global Affairs 4 (2), 112–123. 
Borins,  S.  (1994):  Government  in  Transition:  A  New  Paradigm  in  Public  Administration. 
Toronto: Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management.  
Borodkina, O.  I. & A. N.  Smirnova  (2007):  The  Third  Sector  in  Russia:  Problems  and 
Challenges.  The Social Work & Society Online News Magazine  (SocMag), March  7, 
2007. 
Börzel,  T.  A.  (2002): Member  State  Responses  to  Europeanization.  Journal  of  Common 
Market Studies 40 (2), 193–214.  
Bosse,  G.  (2009):  Challenges  for  EU  Governance  through  Neighbourhood  Policy  and 
Eastern  Partnership:  the  Values/Security  Nexus  in  EU–Belarus  Relations. 
Contemporary Politics 15 (2), 215–227. 
Bottomore, T. (ed.) (1983): A Dictionary of Marxist Thought. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Bourdieu, P. (1986): The Forms of Capital. In: Richardson, J.G. (ed.) Handbook of Theory and 
Research in the Sociology of Education, 241–258. New York: Greenwald Press. 
Bourdieu, P. &  J.‐C. Passeron  (1998): Academic Order and Social Order. Preface  to  the 
1990  Edition.  In:  Bourdieu,  P. &  J.‐C.  Passeron  (eds)  Reproduction  in  Education, 
Society and Culture vii–xi. London: Sage. 
Bourne, R. (1916): Trans‐National America. Atlantic Monthly 118, 86–97.  
Braghiroli, S. & C. Carta (2009): An Index of Friendliness toward Russia: An Analysis of 
the Member States and Member of the European Parliament’s Positions. Electronic 
Publications of Pan‐European Institute 15/2009. 
Brenner,  N.  (1999):  Globalisation  as  Reterritorialisation:  The  Re‐scaling  of  Urban 
Governance in the European Union. Urban Studies 36 (3), 431–451. 
 410     
 
Brenner, N. (2005): New State Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Briner, H. (1986): Regional Planning and Transfrontier Cooperation: the Regio Basiliensis. 
In: Martinez O. A.  (ed.) Across Boundaries: Transborder  Interaction  in Comparative 
Perspective, 45–53. El Paso: Texas Western Press. 
Brown, D. (1999): Are There Good and Bad Nationalisms? Nations and Nationalism 5, 281–
302.  
Brown, R. B.  (2001): Marx  and  the Foundations of  the Critical Theory of Morality  and 
Ethics. Cultural Logic 2 (2). 
Browning,  C.  S.  (2003):  The  Region‐building  Approach  Revisited:  The  Continued 
Othering  of  Russia  in  Discourses  of  Region‐building  in  the  European  North. 
Geopolitics 8 (1), 45–56. 
Browning, C. S. (2005): Westphalian, Imperial, Neomediaeval: The Geopolitics of Europe 
and the Role of the North. In: Browning, C. S. (ed.) Remaking Europe in the Margins: 
Northern Europe after the Enlargements, 85–101. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Browning, C. S. & M. Lehti (2007): Beyond East‐West: Marginality and National Dignity 
in Finnish Identity Construction. Nationalities Papers 35 (4), 691–716. 
Browning,  C.  S. &  P.  Joeniemi  (2008): Geostrategies  of  the  European Neighbourhood 
Policy. European Journal of International Relations 14 (3), 519–551. 
Brubaker, R.  (1995): National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External Homelands 
in the New Europe. Daedalus 124 (2), 107–132. 
Brubaker, R. (2004): Ethnicity without Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Brubaker, R. (2010): Charles Tilly as a Theorist of Nationalism. The American Sociologist 41 
(4), 375–381. 
Brunet‐Jailly, E. (2004): Toward a Model of Border Studies: What Do We Learn from the 
Study of the Canadian‐American Border? Journal of Borderlands Studies 19 (1), 1–12. 
Brunet‐Jailly, E.  (2005): Theorizing Borders: An  Interdisciplinary Perspective. Geopolitics 
10 (4), 633–649. 
Brunet‐Jailly, E. (2007a): Border Security and Porosity: An Introduction. In: Brunet‐Jailly, 
E.  (ed.) Borderlands: Comparing Border Security  in North America and Europe,  1–18. 
Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. 
Brunet‐Jailly, E.  (2007b): Conclusions: Border, Borderlands and Security: European and 
North American Lessons ands Public Policy Suggestions. In: Brunet‐Jailly, E. (ed.) 
Borderlands:  Comparing  Border  Security  in  North  America  and  Europe,  351–357. 
Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. 
Brunet‐Jailly, E. (2010): The State of Borders and Borderlands 2009: A Historical View and 
a View from the Journal of Borderlands Studies. Eurasia Border Review 1 (1), 1–15.  
Brunet‐Jailly,  E.  (2011):  Special  Section:  Borders,  Borderlands  and  Theory:  An 
Introduction. Geopolitics 16 (1), 1–6. 
Bucken‐Knapp, G. & M. Schack (2001): Borders Matter, but How? In: Bucken‐Knapp, G. 
&  M.  Schack  (eds)  Borders  Matter:  Transboundary  Regions  in  Europe,  13–25. 
Aabenraa: Danish Institute of Border Region Studies. 
Bull,  H.  (1977):  The  Anarchical  Society:  A  Study  of  Order  in  World  Politics.  London: 
Macmillan.  
     411 
 
Buller,  J.  &  A.  Gamble  (2002):  Conceptualising  Europeanisation.  Public  Policy  and 
Administration 17, 4–24. 
Bursens,  P.  &  J.  Deforche  (2010):  Going  Beyond  Paradiplomacy?  Adding  Historical 
Institutionalism  to Account  for Regional Foreign Policy Competences. The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy 5 (1–2), 151–171. 
Busygina I. & M. Filippov (2008): End Comment: EU–Russian Relations and the Limits of 
the Northern Dimension.  In: Aalto, P., H. Blakkisrud & H. Smith  (eds) The New 
Northern Dimension  of  the  European Neighbourhood,  204–219.  Brussels:  Centre  for 
European Policy Studies.  
Butigan,  V.  (1998):  The  Political  Ethos  of  the  Civil  Society.  Paper  presented  at  the 
Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, 10‐15 August 1998, Boston. Available 
through: www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Poli/PoliButi.htm (March 13, 2009). 
Calabrese,  A.  (2004):  The  Promise  of  Civil  Society:  A  Global  Movement  for 
Communication Rights. Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 18 (3), 317–
329. 
Calhoun,  G.  (1993a):  Nationalism  and  Civil  Society:  Democracy,  Diversity  and  Self‐
Determination. International Sociology 8 (4), 387–411. 
Calhoun, G. (1993b): Nationalism and Ethnicity. Annual Review of Sociology 19, 211–239. 
Calhoun, G. (1993c): Civil Society and the Public Sphere. Public Culture 5 (2), 267–280. 
Calhoun, G. (1997a): Nationalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Calhoun,  G.  (1997b):  Nationalism  and  Civil  Society:  Democracy,  Diversity  and  Self‐
determination. International Sociology December 8 (4), 387–411. 
Calhoun, G.  (2007): Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Cameron,  F.  (2006): Citizens  in  the Cross  Border Co‐operation:  Support  from  EU  and 
Russia  to  the  Civil  Society  Co‐operation,  the  Future  of  Financing  NGO  Co‐
operation and  Influencing EU Programmes. Presentation at  the Together  for  the 
future: Forum on Civil Society Co‐operation of European Union and Russia, 17–18 
November 2006, Lahti, Finland. 
Cannon,  M.  (2005):  Cross‐border  Regionalism  Co‐operative  Europeanisation  or  Competitive 
Globalisation? Zurich: World Society Foundation. 
Caporaso, J. A. (1996): The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory 
or Post‐Modern? Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (1), 29–52. 
Carpenter, R. C. (2007): Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and 
Nonemergence  in  Transnational  Advocacy  Networks.  International  Studies 
Quarterly 51, 99–120. 
Castells, M. (1996): The Rise of the Network Society. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers. 
Central Intelligence Agency (1972): ‘Finlandization’ in action: Helsinki’s experience with 
Moscow. RSS No. 0059/72. 
Chagin,  K.  &  R.  J.  Struyk  (2004):  Russian  Nonprofits  as  Contracted  Providers  of 
Municipal  Social  Services:  Initial  Experience.  International  Journal  of  Public 
Administration, 27 (6), 417–437.  
Chakravartty, P. (2007): Governance without Politics: Civil Society, Development and the 
Postcolonial State. International Journal of Communication 1, 297–317. 
 412     
 
Chambers, S. & J. Kopstein (2008): Civil Society and the State. In: Dryzek, J., B. Honigand 
& A.  Phillips  (eds) Oxford Handbook  of Political Theory,  363–381. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Chandler, D. (2002): Semiotics for Beginners. London: Routledge. 
Christiano, T.  (1997): The Significance of Public Deliberation.  In: Bohman,  J. & W. Rehg 
(eds)  Deliberative Democracy.  Essays  on  Reason  and  Politics,  243–277.  Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Church A. & P. Reid (1996): Urban Power, International Networks and Competition: The 
Example of Cross‐border Co‐operation. Urban Studies 33 (8), 1279–1318. 
Cicero  (1966): De Re Publica  I.  Trans. Keys, C. W.  Loeb Classical  Library,  vol.  XXXIII. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Ciofalo, A. & K. Traverso (1994): Does the Op‐Ed Page Have a Chance to Become a Public 
Forum? Newspaper Research Journal 15 (4), 51–63. 
Clark,  J. & A.  Jones  (2008): The  Spatialities of Europeanisation: Territory, Government 
and Power in ‘Europe’. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33 (3), 300–
318. 
Clayton,  A.,  P.  Oakley  &  J.  Taylor  (2000):  Civil  Society  Organizations  and  Service 
Provision. UNRISD Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper No. 2. 
Clement, N. C. (2004): Economic Forces Shaping the Borderlands. In: Pavlakovich‐Kochi, 
V. et al. (eds) Challenged Borderlands – Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries, 
41–61. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Clement, N., P. Ganster & A. Sweedler (2005): Environment, Development, and Security 
in Border Regions: Perspectives from Europe and North America. In: Ganster, P. & 
D.  E.  Lorey  (eds)  Borders  and  Border  Politics  in  a  Globalizing  World,  199–236. 
Langham: SR Books. – Reprinted from Eskelinen, H., I. Liikanen & J. Oksa (1999), 
243–281. 
Cohen, J. L. & A. Arato (1992): Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Cohn T. H. & P.  J. Smith  (1995): Developing global cities  in  the Pacific Northwest: The 
Cases of Vancouver and Seattle. In: Kresl P. K. & G. Gappert (eds) North American 
Cities  and  The  Global  Economy:  Challenges  and  Opportunities,  251–285.  Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Colás, A. (2002): International Civil Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Colas,  D.  (1997):  Civil  Society  and  Fanaticism:  Conjoined  Histories.  Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press. 
Coleman, J. S. (1988): Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal of 
Sociology 94, 95–120. 
Collard,  S. & M. Law  (1989): The Limits  of Perspective Transformation: A Critique  of 
Mezirow’s Theory. Adult Education Quarterly 39 (2), 99–107. 
Commission of  the European Communities  (2000): Commission discussion paper  “The 
Commission  and  Non‐governmental  Organisations:  Building  a  Stronger 
Partnership,” COM (2000) 11 final, 18 January 2000. 
Commission of the European Communities (2001a): A Guide to Bringing INTERREG and 
Tacis  Funding  Together.  Luxembourg:  Office  for  Official  Publications  of  the 
European Communities. 
     413 
 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2001b):  European  Governance:  A  White 
Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, 25 July 2001. 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2002):  Communication  “Towards  a 
Reinforced  Culture  of  Consultation  and  Dialogue:  General  Principles  and 
Minimum Standards  for Consultation of  Interested Parties by  the Commission,” 
COM (2002) 704 final, 11 December 2002.  
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2003a):  Communication  from  the 
Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament:  Wider  Europe  – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours, March 11 2003, COM (2003) 104 final. 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2003b):  Communication  from  the 
Commission: Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, July 1 2003, 
COM (2003) 393 final. 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2004a):  Communication  from  the 
Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper, COM  (2004) 373 
final. 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2004b):  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council  Laying  Down  General  Provisions 
Establishing  a  European  Neighbourhood  and  Partnership  Instrument,  COM 
(2004) 628 final. 
Commission of  the European Communities  (2006a): Political Declaration on  the Northern 
Dimension  Policy.  Available  through:  ec.europa.eu/external_relations/
north_dim/docs/pol_dec_1106_en.pdf (January 15, 2010). 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2006b)  Northern  Dimension  Policy 
Framework  Document.  Available  through:  ec.europa.eu/external_relations/
north_dim/docs/frame_pol_1106_en.pdf (January 15, 2010). 
Commission of the European Communities (2006c): Communication from Commission to 
the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  on  Strengthening  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy, COM (2006) 726 final.  
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2006d):  Non‐paper  Expanding  on  the 
Proposal Contained  in  the Communication  to  the European Parliament and  the 
Council on “Strengthening the ENP” – COM (2006) 726 final of 4 December 2006. 
Available  through:  ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non‐paper_civil‐society‐
dimension_en.pdf (January 9, 2009). 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2006e):  European  Neighbourhood  & 
Partnership  Instrument:  Cross‐Border  Cooperation.  Strategy  Paper  2007–2013. 
Indicative Programme 2007–2010. 
Commission of the European Communities (2007): Europe on the Move: The Story of the 
European  Union.  Available  through:  ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/others
/58/timeline_en.pdf (January 7, 2010). 
Commission  of  the  European Communities  (2009):  European  Territorial Co‐operation. 
Available  through:  ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/index_en.htm 
(March 23, 2010). 
Connor, D. (1999): Public participation. Constructive Citizen Participation, 27 (3), 6–10.  
 414     
 
Conrad, C. (2011): Social Policy History after the Transnational Turn. In: Kettunen, P. & 
K. Petersen (eds) Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on 
Social Policy, 218–240. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Cornago, N.  (2010): On  the Normalization of Sub‐State Diplomacy. The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy 5 (1–2), 11–36. 
Costoya, M. M.  (2007):  Toward  a  Topology  of  Civil  Society  Actors:  The  Case  of  the 
Movement Change International Trade Rules and Barriers. UNRISD Civil Society 
and Social Movements Programme Paper Number 30. 
Council  of  the  European  Union  (2000):  Regulation  No  99/2000  of  29  December  1999 
concerning the provision of assistance to the partner States in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, Official Journal of the European Union, L 12/1. 
Cram, L. (2001): Imagining the Union: A Case of Banal Europeanism? In: Wallace, H. (ed.) 
Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration, 233–246. London: Palgrave. 
Cram, L. (2006): Inventing the People: Civil Society Participation and the Enhabitation of 
the EU. In: Smismans, S. (ed.) Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance, 241–
259. London: Edward Elgar. 
Cram,  L.  (2008):  EU‐Civil  Society  Relations:  The  Impact  of  the  EU  on  National 
Movements and National Identity. In: Kohler‐Koch, B, D. De Bièvre & W. Maloney 
(eds)  Opening  EU‐Governance  to  Civil  Society:  Gains  and  Challenges,  111–118. 
Mannheim: Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. 
Cram, L. (2009): Introduction: Banal Europeanism: European Union Identity and National 
Identities in Synergy. Nations and Nationalism 15 (1), 101–108. 
Creswell,  J. W.  (2009): Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches (3rd ed.) Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Criekemans, D.  (2010): Regional Sub‐State Diplomacy  from a Comparative Perspective: 
Quebec, Scotland, Bavaria, Catalonia, Wallonia and Flanders. The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy 5 (1–2), 37–64. 
Cronberg,  T.  (1999):  Border‐crossings:  The  Co‐construction  of  National  Security  and 
Regional Development.  In: Eskelinen, H.,  I. Liikanen &  J. Oksa  (eds) Curtains of 
Iron  and Gold. Reconstructing Borders  and Scales  of  Interaction,  317–328. Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Cronberg,  T.  (2000):  Euroregions  in  the  Making:  The  Case  of  Euregio  Karelia.  In: 
Ahponen,  P. &  P.  Jukarainen  (eds)  Tearing Down  the Curtain, Opening  the Gates. 
Northern Boundaries in Change, 170–183. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä. 
Cronberg,  T.  (2003):  Euregio  Karelia:  In  Search  of  a  Relevant  Space  for  Action.  In: 
Hedegaard, L. & B. Lindström (eds) NEBI Yearbook 2003, 224–239. Berlin: Springer. 
Cronberg, T. & V. Slyamin (1999): Euregio Karelia – A Model for Co‐operation at the EU 
External Border. INTERREG II: Crossing the Borders in the Northern Dimension, 
26–29. Oulu: Regional Council of Northern Ostrobothnia. 
Crook, A.  (2002): European Civil Society or Civil Society  in Europe? Working paper  for 
CIVICUS in Europe. Budapest: CIVICUS European Regional Office. 
Cunningham, H. (2004): Nations Rebound? Crossing Borders in a Gated Globe. Identities 
11 (3), 329–350. 
     415 
 
Dalby, S. & G. Ó Tuathail (1998): Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics: Towards a Critical 
Geopolitics.  In:  Dalby,  S.  &  G.  Ó  Tuathail  (eds)  Rethinking  Geopolitics,  1–15. 
London: Routledge. 
Danesi, M. (1994): Messages and Meanings: An Introduction to Semiotics. Toronto: Canadian 
Scholars’ Press. 
Danesi, M. (1999): Of Cigarettes, High Heels and Other Interesting Things: An Introduction to 
Semiotics. London: Macmillan 
De Blij, H. (2005): Why Geography Matters: Three Challenges Facing America: Climate Change, 
the Rise of China, and Global Terrorism. New York: Oxford University Press 
De Blij, H. (ed.) (1967): Systematic Political Geography. New York: Wiley.  
De Cillia, R., M. Reisigl & R. Wodak  (1999):  The Discursive Construction  of National 
Identities. Discourse & Society 10, 149–173. 
Dekker,  P.  &  A.  van  den  Broek  (1998):  Civil  Society  in  Comparative  Perspective: 
Involvement  in Voluntary Associations  in North America  and Western Europe. 
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 9 (1), 11–38.  
Dekker, P. & A. van den Broek  (2005): Involvement  in Voluntary Associations  in North 
America  and Western Europe: Trends  and Correlates  1981–2000.  Journal of Civil 
Society 1 (1), 45–59. 
Delanty, G.  (2006): Borders  in a Changing Europe: Dynamics of Openness and Closure. 
Comparative European Politics 4, 183–202. 
Deleuze,  G.  &  F.  Guattari  (1987):  A  Thousand  Plateaus:  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Della  Sala, V.  (2008): Birth of  a Union: Lessons  for North America  from  the European 
Union.  In: Y. Abu‐Laban, R.  Jhappan & F. Rocher  (eds) Politics in North America, 
115–132. Toronto: Broadview Press. 
Demidov,  B.  &  E.  Panfilova  (2001):  Role  of  Civil  Society  in  Curbing  Corruption  in 
Countries of Transition Economies. Social Economy and Law, Spring 2001. 
Diedrichs, U.  (2011): Modes of Governance  in  the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. In: Diedrichs, U., W. Reiners & W. Wessels (eds) The Dynamics of Change in 
EU Governance, 149–179. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Diez,  T.,  A.  Agnantopoulos  &  A.  Kaliber  (2005):  Turkey,  Europeanization  and  Civil 
Society: Introduction. South European Society and Politics 10 (1), 1–15. 
Dijkink, G.‐J. (1996): National Identity & Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Bride & Pain. London: 
Routledge. 
Dijkink, G.‐J.  (1998): Geopolitical Codes and Popular Representations. Geojournal 46  (4), 
293–299. 
Dimitrov, M. (2009): Popular Autocrats. Journal of Democracy 20 (1), 78–81. 
Dirlik, A.  (2002a): Whither History? Encounters with Historicism: Postmodernism  and 
Postcolonialism. Futures 34 (1), 75–90. 
Dirlik,  A.  (2002b):  Bringing  History  Back  In.  In:  Mudimbe‐Boyi,  E.  (ed.)  Beyond 
Dichotomies: Histories, Identities, Cultures and the Challenges of Globalization, 93–128. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Donnan, H. & T. M. Wilson (1999): Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State. Oxford: 
Berg. 
 416     
 
Donnan, H. & T. M. Wilson (eds) (1994): Border Approaches: Anthropological Perspectives on 
Frontiers. Lanham: University Press of America. 
Dryzek,  J.  S.  (2000):  Deliberative  Democracy  and  Beyond:  Liberals,  Critics,  Contestations. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Duchacek,  I.,  D.  Latouche  &  G.  Stevenson  (eds)  (1988):  Perforated  Sovereignties  and 
International  Relations:  Trans‐Sovereign  Contacts  of  Subnational  Governments.  New 
York: Greenwood Press.  
Dyson, K.  (2002):  Introduction: EMU as  Integration, Europeanization and Convergence. 
In: Dyson, K.  (ed.) European States and the Euro, 1–30. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Dzhibladze,  Y.  (2006):  Role  of  NGOs  in  Strengthening  Democracy  and  Civil  Society. 
Paper presented at the EU‐Russia Civic Co‐operation Forum, 17 November 2006, 
Lahti, Finland. 
Eagleton, T. (1983): Literary Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Eberly, D. & R. Streeter (2002): The Soul of Civil Society: Voluntary Associations and the Public 
Value of Moral Habits. Lanham: Lexington books. 
Eco, U.  (1979): A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington:  Indiana University Press & London: 
Macmillan. 
Edensor, T. (1998): Tourists at the Taj: Performance and Meaning at a Symbolic Site. London: 
Routledge. 
Edensor, T. (2002): National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life. Oxford: Berg. 
Edensor, T. (2004): Automobility and National Identity: Representation, Geography and 
Driving Practice. Theory, Culture and Society 21 (4–5), 101–120. 
Edwards, M. (2004): Civil Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Edwards, M. & D. Hulme (eds) (1995): Non‐Governmental Organisations – Performance and 
Accountability, Beyond the Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan. 
EEPA  (2009):  The  ENPI  Mid‐term  Review,  Available  through:  www.enpi‐
programming.eu/wcm (June 18, 2009). 
Ehrenberg,  J.  (1999):  Civil Society: The Critical History  of  an  Idea. New  York: New  York 
University Press. 
Eigen, P. (1999): The Central Roles of Civil Society in Combating Corruption in the Era of 
Globalization.  Address  to  the  Carter  Center  at  the  ‘Transparence  for  Growth’ 
conference, May 4, Atlanta. 
Elden, S. (2005): Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the Space of the 
World. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30 (1), 8–19. 
Elden,  S.  (2007): Governmentality,  Calculation,  Territory.  Environment  and Planning D: 
Society and Space 25, 562–580. 
Elden,  S.  (2009):  Terror  and  Territory:  The  Spatial  Extent  of  Sovereignty,  Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Elden, S. (2010): Land, Terrain, Territory. Progress in Human Geography 34 (6), 799–817. 
Eliasoph, N.  (1997):  ‘Close  to Home’: The Work of Avoiding Politics. Theory and Society 
26, 605–647. 
Eliassen, K. A.  (1981): Political and Public Participation  In: Allardt, E., N. Andrén, E.  J. 
Friis et al. (eds) Nordic Democracy, 126–137. Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab. 
     417 
 
Emerson, M.  (1999): Cosmos and Chaos and a Backbone  for a Wider European Order, 
CEPS Working Document No. 130. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
Emerson, M.  (2001): The Elephant and  the Bear. The European Union, Russia and  their Near 
Abroad. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
Emerson,  M.  (2004):  The  Wider  Europe  Matrix.  Brussels:  Centre  for  European  Policy 
Studies.  
Eskelinen,  H.  &  F.  Snickars  (eds)  (1995):  Competitive  European  Peripheries.  Heidelberg: 
Springer‐Verlag. 
Eskelinen, H.  I. Liikanen &  J. Oksa  (eds)  (1999): Curtains of Iron and Gold. Reconstructing 
Borders and Scales of Interaction. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Etzioni, A. (1973): The Third Sector and Domestic Mission. Public Administration Review 33 
(4), 314–323.  
EurActiv (2005): After European pressure, Putin announces softer NGO law: Background. 
Available  through:  www.euractiv.com/foreign‐affairs/european‐pressure‐putin‐
announces‐softer‐ngo‐law (May 3, 2006). 
Euregio  Karelia  (2000):  Our  Common  Border  2001–2006.  Online  paper.  Available 
through: www.karjala‐interret.com/euregio (August 17, 2009). 
European Economic and Social Committee (2007): The Social Economy  in  the European 
Union. Summary of  the  report drawn up  for  the European Economic and Social 
Committee by the International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, 
Social and Cooperative Economy (CIRIEC): Brussels.  
European  Parliament  (1996):  Resolution  on  the  Commission  Communication  on  the 
allocation of  funds and  the  implementation of Community  Initiatives  in Austria, 
Finland  and  Sweden  (COM  (95):  0123  –  C4‐0282/95):  of  4  April  1995,  Official 
Journal of the European Union, C 032, 05/02/1996 P. 0139. 
European Parliament (2009): Report on the review of the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (2008/2236(INI)): Committee on Foreign Affairs. Available 
through: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef (August 19, 2011). 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  (2006):  Regulation  No 
1638/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  October  2006 
laying  down  general  provisions  establishing  a  European  Neighbourhood  and 
Partnership Instrument, Official Journal of the European Union, L 310/1. 
Evers, A. (1991): Sektor oder Spannungsfeld? Zur Konzeption des intermediären Bereichs 
und  seiner  Organisationsdynamik.  In:  Bauer,  R.  (ed.)  Intermediarität  und 
Modernisierung.  Zur  Soziologie  von  Wohlfahrtsorganisationen,  729–732  Bremen: 
Universität Bremen. 
Evers, A.  (1995):  Part  of  the Welfare Mix:  The  Third  Sector  as  an  Intermediate Area. 
Voluntas 6 (2), 119–139. 
Evers, A. & J. L. Laville (2004): Defining the Third Sector in Europe. In: Laville, J. L. (ed.) 
The Third Sector in Europe, 11–42. Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
Faist,  T.  (2000):  Transnationalization  in  International  Migration:  Implications  for  the 
Study of Citizenship and Culture. Ethnic & Racial Studies 23 (2), 189–222.  
Ferguson,  A.  (1966):  An  Essay  on  the  History  of  Civil  Society.  Edinburgh:  Edinburgh 
University Press. 
 418     
 
Ferguson, A.  (1995  [1767]): An Essay on  the History of Civil Society. London: Transaction 
Publishers. 
Filtenborg, M. S, Gänzle, S. & E. Johansson (2002): An Alternative Theoretical Approach 
to  EU  Foreign  Policy:  ‘Network  Governance’  and  the  Case  of  the  Northern 
Dimension Initiative. Co‐operation and Conflict 37 (4), 387–407.  
Finnish Border Guard  (2011): Rajanylitykset. Available  through: www.raja.fi  (December 
28, 2011). 
Finnish  Border  Guard  (2013):  Suomen  itärajan  rajaliikenne  kasvoi  13 %  vuonna  2012, 
Available through: www.raja.fi (January 15, 2013). 
Finnish Customs (2007): Foreign trade statistics. Available through: www.tulli.fi (October 
7, 2008). 
Finnish National Board of Customs (2009): Trade by Regions and Countries; Imports by 
Countries  of  Origin,  Exports  by  Countries  of  Destination.  Available  through: 
www.tulli.fi (December 7, 2009). 
Finnish National Board of Customs (2012): Suomen ja Venäjän välinen kauppa. Available 
through: www.tulli.fi (November 12, 2012). 
Fiske, J. & J. Hartley (1978): Reading Television. London: Methuen & Co. 
Fleming,  T.  (2000): Habermas, Democracy  and  Civil  society: Unearthing  the  Social  in 
Transformation  Theory. Available  through:  adulteducation.nuim.ie/department_
staff/documents (October 12, 2010). 
Føllesdal, A.  (2006): EU Legitimacy  and Normative Political Theory.  In: Cini, M. & A. 
Bourne  (eds). Palgrave Advances  in European Union Studies,  151–174. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Foucault, M.  (1991): Governmentality.  In: Burchell, G., C. Gordon & P. Miller  (eds) The 
Foucault  Effect:  Studies  in  Governmentality,  87–104.  Chicago:  Chicago  University 
Press. 
Fowler,  R.  (1991):  Language  in  the  News:  Discourse  and  Ideology  in  the  Press.  London: 
Routledge. 
Freise, M., M. Pyykkönen & E. Vaidelyte (2010): A Panacea for All Seasons? Civil Society 
and Governance in Europe. In: Freise, M. et al. (eds) A Panacea for All Seasons? Civil 
Society and Governance in Europe, 9–23. Baden‐Baden: Nomos. 
Frenz, A.  (2008): The European Commission’s Tacis programme 1991–2006 – A  success 
story.  Online  paper.  Available  through:  ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/
neighbourhood/regional‐cooperation (March 22, 2010). 
Fritz,  V.  (2004):  State  Weakness  in  Eastern  Europe:  Causes  and  Concepts,  European 
University  Institute  RSCAS  Working  Papers  2004/35.  Available  through: 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP‐Texts/04_35.pdf (October 23, 2011). 
Fukuyama, F. (1992): The End of History and the Last Man. London: Hamish Hamilton. 
Galaty, M. (2003): Media: A Key Stakeholder in Civil Society. The Bridge 3, 2. 
Garton Ash, T. (1996): Catching the Wrong Bus? In: Cowan, P. & P. Anderson (eds) The 
Question of Europe, 117–125. London: Verso. 
Garton Ash, T. (1999): History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Despatches from Europe in 
the 1990s. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Garton Ash, T. (2004): Free World. London: Allen Lane.  
     419 
 
Garton Ash, T.  (2009a): Remarks  in panel discussion: The Collapse  of Communism  in 
Europe: A  Re‐examination  20  Years After.  15 October  2009.  10  Carlton House 
Terrace, London. 
Garton Ash, T. (2009b): 1989! New York Review of Books 5 November 2009. 
Gawrich, A.,  I. Melnykovska & R. Schweickert  (2010): Neighbourhood Europeanization 
through ENP –  the Case of Ukraine.  Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 48 
(5), 1209–1235. 
Geenhuizen,  van M. &  R.  Ratti  (eds)  (2001):  Gaining Advantage  from Open Borders. An 
Active Space Approach to Regional Development. Ashgate: Aldershot. 
Gellner, E. (1983): Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Ghaus‐Pasha,  A.  (2004):  Role  of  Civil  Society  Organizations  in  Governance.  Paper 
presented  at  the  Sixth  Global  Forum  on  Reinventing  Government  Towards 
Participatory and Transparent Governance, 24–27 May 2004, Seoul. 
Giaoutzi,  M,  L.  Suarez‐Villa,  &  A.  Stratigea  (1993):  Spatial  Information  Aspects  and 
Communication Barriers in Border Areas. In: Ratti, R. & S. Reichman (eds) Theory 
and Practice of Transborder Cooperation, 103–122. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhan. 
Giddens,  A.  (1984):  The  Constitution  of  Society:  Outline  of  the  Theory  of  Structuration. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
Giddens, A. (1985): Nation State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press 
Gilbert,  N.  (2002):  Transformation  of  the  Welfare  State:  The  Silent  Surrender  of  Public 
Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Giner, S.  (1995): Civil Society and  Its Future.  In: Hall,  John A  (ed.): Civil Society: Theory, 
History, Comparison, 305–314. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Githens‐Mazer,  J.  (2007):  Ethno‐Symbolism  and  the  Everyday  Resonance  of  Myths, 
Memories and Symbols of the Nation. Paper presented at conference on Everyday 
Life  in  World  Politics  and  Economics,  11  May  2007,  Centre  for  International 
Studies, LSE, London.  
Gober, B. (2000): In Search of Synthesis. Annals of the American Geographers 90 (1), 1–11. 
Goetz, K. H. & S. Hix (eds) (2001): Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National 
Political Systems. London: Frank Cass. 
Goldsmith, M. (1993): The Europeanization of Local Government. Urban Studies 30 (4/5), 
683–699. 
Götz, N. & J. Hackmann (2003): Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region: Towards a Hybrid 
Theory. In: Götz, N. & J. Hackmann (eds) Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region, 3–
16. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Gramsci, A. (1971): Selections from Prison Notebooks. Trans. Hoare, Q. & G. N. Smith. New 
York: International Publishers. 
Greenwood, R. & C. R. Hinings  (1996): Understanding Radical Organizational Change: 
Bringing  together  the Old and  the New  Institutionalism. Academy of Management 
Review 21, 1022–1054. 
Grey,  D.  L.  &  T.  R.  Brown  (1970):  Letters  to  the  Editor:  Hazy  Reflections  of  Public 
Opinion. Journalism Quarterly 47, 450–471. 
Grossman, R. (ed.) (1949): The God That Failed. New York: Harper and Brothers  
 420     
 
Gualini,  E.  (2003),  Cross‐border  Governance:  Inventing  Regions  in  a  Trans‐national 
Multi‐level Polity. disP ‐ The Planning Review 39 (152), 43–52. 
Guidry  J. A., M. D. Kennedy & M. N. Zald  (2001): Globalizations and Social Movements: 
Culture,  Power,  and  the  Transnational  Public  Sphere.  Ann  Arbor:  University  of 
Michigan Press. 
Guterres,  A.  (2001):  The  European  Treaties  Revisited:  What  Role  for  Europe  in  the 
Globalized World?, Speech delivered  at  the Conference  at  the Walter Hallstein‐
Institute  for European Constitutional Law, Humboldt University, Berlin,  7 May 
2001. 
Haavio‐Mannila, E. (1968): Suomalainen nainen ja mies. Helsinki: WSOY. 
Habermas, J. (1968a): Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics. Trans. 
Shapiro, J. J. Boston: Beacon Press.  
Habermas, J. (1968b): Knowledge and Human Interests. Trans. Shapiro, J. J. Boston: Beacon 
Press.  
Habermas,  J.  (1989):  The Structural Transformation  of  the Public Sphere: An  Inquiry  into  a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Habermas,  J.  (1991  [1962]): The Structural Transformation of  the Public Sphere: An  Inquiry 
into  a  Category  of  Bourgeois  Society.  Trans.  Burger,  T.  [Structurwandel  der 
Öffentlichkeit.  Untersuchungen  zy  einer  Kategorie  der  bürgerlichen  Gesellschaft]. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J. (1993): The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Habermas,  J.  (1995):  Moral  Consciousness  and  Communicative  Action.  Cambridge:  MIT 
Press.  
Habermas, J. (1996): Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Habermas,  J.  (2001  [1998]): The Postnational Constellation. Trans. Pensky, M. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Haglund‐Morrisey,  A.  (2008):  Conceptualizing  the  ‘New’  Northern  Dimension:  A 
Common Policy Based on Sectoral Partnerships.  Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies 16 (2), 203–217. 
Haikonen, J. & P. Kiljunen (2003): Mitä mieltä, suomalainen? Helsinki: Taloustieto. 
Häkli, J. (1999): Cultures of Demarcation: Territory and National Identity in Finland. In: 
Herb, G. H. & D. H. Kaplan (eds) Nested Identities, 123–149. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Häkli,  J.  (2002):  In  the  Territory  of  Knowledge:  State‐Centred  Discourses  and  the 
Construction of Society. Progress in Human Geography 25 (3), 403–422. 
Häkli,  J.  (2008):  Regions, Networks  and  Fluidity  in  the  Finnish Nation‐State. National 
Identities 10 (1), 5–20. 
Hakovirta,  H.  (1975):  Odota  ja  katso:  Analyysi  Suomen  läntisen  integraatiopolitiikan 
perusmallista.  In: Hakovirta, H. & R. Väyrynen  (eds) Suomen ulkopolitiikka,  415–
419. Jyväskylä: Gummerus. 
Hale, H. E (2002): Civil Society From Above? Statist and Liberal Models of State‐Building 
in Russia. Demokratizatsiya 10 (3), 306–322. 
     421 
 
Hall,  S.  (1980):  Encoding  and Decoding  in  the  Television Discourse.  In: Hall,  S.  (ed.) 
Culture,  Media,  Language:  Working  Papers  in  Cultural  Studies,  128–138  London: 
Hutchinson. 
Hall,  S.  (1996):  Introduction:  Who  Needs  ‘Identity’?  In:  Hall,  S.  &  P.  Du  Gay  (eds) 
Questions of Cultural Identity, 1–17. London: Sage. 
Hall, S. (1999): Identiteetti. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Hallberg,  P.  &  B.  Wittrock  (2006):  From  Koinonía  Politiké  to  Societas  Civilis:  Birth, 
Disappearance and the First Renaissance of the Concept. In: Wagner, P. (ed.) The 
Languages of Civil Society, 28–53. Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Hallikainen,  A.  (2003):  Venäjän  kahdet  kasvot.  Maakunnallisten  ohjelma‐asiakirjojen  ja 
vertailuaineiston välittämä Venäjä‐kuva. Tampere: Tampere University Press. 
Hansen,  N.  (1983):  International  Cooperation  in  Border  Regions:  An  Overview  and 
Research Agenda. International Regional Science Review 8 (3), 255–270. 
Hansmann, H. (1987): Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations. In: Powell, W. W. 
(ed.)  The Nonprofit  Sector:  A  Research Handbook,  27–42.  New  Haven:  University 
Press. 
Harju, A. (2000): Uusi työ – projekti työllistämisen tutkimus‐ ja kehittämishankkeena. In: 
Harju,  A.  &  Backberg‐Edvards,  K.  (eds)  Kohti  uutta  työtä.  Helsinki:  Suomen 
nuorisoyhteistyö Allianssi, Suomen liikunta ja urheilu & Sosiaali‐ ja terveysturvan 
keskusliitto. 
Harju, A. (2006): Finnish Civil Society. Helsinki: KVS Foundation. 
Harle, V. &  S. Moisio  (2000): Missä  on  Suomi? Kansallisen  identiteettipolitiikan  historia  ja 
geopolitiikka. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Harmsen,  R.  &  T.M.  Wilson  (eds)  (2000):  Europeanization:  Institution,  Identities  and 
Citizenship. Atlanta: Rodopi. 
Harryvan, A.G. &  J. van der Harst  (1997): Documents on European Union. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Hart,  S.  (2001):  Cultural  Dilemmas  of  Progressive  Politics:  Styles  of  Engagement  Among 
Grassroots Activists. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hartshorne, R. (1936): Suggestions as to the Terminology of Political Boundaries. Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers 25, 56–57. 
Hartshorne,  R.  (1939):  The  Nature  of  Geography.  Lancaster:  Association  of  American 
Geographers. 
Hartshorne,  R.  (1950):  The  Functional Approach  in  Political  Geography.  Annals  of  the 
Association of American Geographers 40, 95–130. 
Haukkala,  H.  (2001):  Succeeding  without  Success?  The  Northern  Dimension  of  the 
European Union.  In: Forsberg, T. & H. Vogt  (eds) Northern Dimensions 2001– the 
yearbook  of  Finnish  Foreign  Policy,  37–47.  Helsinki:  The  Finnish  Institute  of 
International Affairs. 
Haukkala, H. (2003): A Problematic ‘strategic Partnership’. In: Lynch, D. (ed.) EU–Russia 
Security Dimensions, 8–19. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. 
Haukkala, H.  (2009): Lost  in Translation? Why  the EU has Failed  to  Influence Russia’s 
Development. Europe‐Asia Studies 61 (10), 1757–1775. 
 422     
 
Havens, J. J. & P. G. Schervish (1999): Millionaires and the Millennium: New Estimates of the 
Forthcoming  Wealth  Transfer  and  the  Prospects  for  a  Golden  Age  of  Philanthropy. 
Boston: Social Welfare Research Institute. 
He,  B.  (1999):  The  Role  of  Civil  Society  in  Defining  the  Boundary  of  a  Political 
Community: The Cases of South Korea and Taiwan. Asian Studies Review 23  (1), 
27–48. 
Hefner, R.  (2003): Civil Society: Cultural possibility of a Modern  Ideal.  In: Elliot, C. M. 
(ed.) Civil Society and Democracy, 145–166. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hegel, G. W. F. (1991 [1820]): Elements of the philosophy of right [Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des  Rechts].  Ed.  Wood,  A.  W.;  Trans.  Nisbet,  H.  B.  Cambrigde:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Heikkilä, M.  (2006):  The Northern Dimension. Helsinki: Ministry  for  Foreign Affairs  of 
Finland. 
Heininen,  L.  (2001):  Ideas  and Outcomes:  Finding  a  Concrete  Form  for  the Northern 
Dimension Initiative. In: Ojanen, H. (ed.) The Northern Dimension: fuel for the EU?, 
20–54. Helsinki: The Finnish  Institute of  International Affairs and Berlin:  Institut 
für Europäische Politik. 
Heininen, L.  (2004): Circumpolar  International Relations and Geopolitics.  In: Einarsson, 
N.,  J.N. Larsen, A. Nilsson & O.R. Young  (eds) Arctic Human Development Report, 
207–225. Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute. 
Heininen, L. & R. Langlais (eds) (1997): Europe’s Northern Dimension: The BEAR Meets the 
South. Rovaniemi: University of Lapland. 
Helakorpi, S., P. Juuti & H. Niemi (1996): Tiimiorganisoitu koulu. Juva: WSOY. 
Helander, V., H. Laaksonen, S. Sundback, H. K. Anheier & L. M. Salamon (1999): Finland. 
In:  Salamon,  L.  M.,  H.  K.  Anheier,  R.  List,  S.  Toepler,  S.  W.  Sokolowski  & 
Associates  (eds)  Global  Civil  Society:  Dimensions  of  the  Nonprofit  Sector,  63–80. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies. 
Helanen, T. (ed.) (2003): Social Economy in Finland. Suomusjärvi: Suomen Kylätoiminta ry. 
Held, D., A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt &  J. Perraton  (1999): Global Transformation, Politics, 
Economic and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Henderson,  S.  L.  (2002):  Selling Civil  Society: Western Aid  and  the Nongovernmental 
Organisation Sector in Russia. Comparative Political Studies 35 (2), 139–167.  
Henderson,  S. L.  (2003): Building Democracy  in Contemporary Russia, Western Support  for 
Grassroots Organizations. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Henrikson,  A.  (2000):  Facing  across  Borders:  the  Diplomacy  of  Bon  Voisinage. 
International Political Science Review 21 (2), 121–147. 
Henriksson, M.  (2006):  The New Northern Dimension  Policy.  The  Proceedings  Papers 
from  the 4th Northern Research Forum Open Assembly, 5–8 October 2006 Oulu 
and Tornio, Finland, Haparanda and Luleå, Sweden.  
Henry,  L.  (2004):  Changing  Environments.  Green  Activism,  Civil  Society,  and  Political 
Transformation in Russia. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Hernes, H. (1988): Scandinavian Citizenship. Acta Sociologica 31, 199–215. 
Hertel, S.  (2006): New Moves  in Transnational Advocacy: Getting Labor and Economic 
Rights on the Agenda in Unexpected Ways. Global Governance 12, 263–281. 
     423 
 
Hettne,  B.  (1999):  Globalisation  and  the  New  Regionalism:  The  Second  Great 
Transformation.  In: Hettne, B., A.  Inotai & O. Sunkel  (eds) Globalism and the New 
Regionalism, 1–24. New York: MacMillan. 
Heurlin, B.  (1999): Denmark and  the Northern Dimension. DUPI Working Paper 11/99. 
Copenhagen: The Danish Institute of International Affairs. 
Hippler,  J.  (2004):  Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention  and Nation‐building  – Terminology 
and  Political  Concepts’  in  ‘Nation‐building:  A  Key  Concept  for  Peaceful  Conflict 
Transformation? London: Pluto Press. 
Hjelmslev,  L.  (1961  [1943]):  Prolegomena  to  a  Theory  of  Language  [Omkring  sprogteoriens 
grundlæggelse]. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.  
Hobbes, T. (1909 [1651]): Leviathan. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1983): Introduction: Inventing Tradition. In: Hobsbawm, E. & T. Ranger 
(eds) The Invention of Tradition, 1–14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hobsbawm,  E.  J.  (1990):  Nations  and  Nationalism  Since  1780.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hocking, B.  (1996): Bridging Boundaries, Creating Linkages: Non‐Central Governments 
and Multilayered Policy Environments. WeltTrends 11, 36–51.  
Holenstein, A.  (2009):  Introduction: Empowering  Interactions: Looking at Statebuilding 
from  Below.  In:  Blockmans, W., A. Holenstein, &  J. Mathieu  (eds)  Empowering 
Interactions: Political Cultures and the Emergence of the State  in Europe 1300‐1900, 1–
31. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Holmén, J. (2006): Den politiska läroboken: Bilden av USA och Sovjetunionen i norska, svenska 
och finländska läroböcker under Kalla kriget. Uppsala: Uppsala University. 
Honderich,  T.  (2005):  The Oxford  Companion  to  Philosophy.  Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press. 
Hooghe,  L.  (ed.)  (1996):  Cohesion  Policy  and  European  Integration:  Building Multi‐Level 
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hooghe,  L.  &  G.  Marks  (1996):  ‘Europe  with  the  Regions’:  Channels  of  Regional 
Representation in the European Union. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 26 (1), 73–
91.  
Hooghe,  L. &  G. Marks  (2001a): Multi‐Level Governance  and European  Integration. New 
York: Rowan and Littlefield. 
Hooghe, L. & G. Marks (2001b): Types of Multi‐Level Governance. European Integration 
Online Papers 5(11), Available  through: eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001‐ 011.htm  (May 
18, 2009). 
Hooghe, L. & G. Marks  (2003): Unraveling  the Central State, but How? Types of Multi‐
level Governance. American Political Science Review 97 (2), 233–243. 
Houtum, van H.  (1998): The Development of Cross‐border Economic Relations: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Study  of  the  Influence  of  the State Border on  the Development  of Cross‐
border  Economic  Relations  Between  Firms  in  Border  Regions  of  the Netherlands  and 
Belgium. Tilburg: CentER. 
Houtum, van H. (2000): Introduction: Current Issues and Debates on Borders and Border 
Regions  in  European  Regional  Science,  In:  Velde,  van  der  B.M.R.  &  H.  van 
Houtum (eds) Borders, Regions and People, 1–12. London: Pion. 
 424     
 
Houtum, van H. (2002), Borders of Comfort: Spatial Economic Bordering Processes in the 
European Union. In: Anderson, J., L. O’Dowd, & T. Wilson (eds) New Borders for a 
Changing Europe: Cross‐Border Co‐operation and Governance,  37–58. London:  Frank 
Cass.  
Houtum,  van H.  (2005): The Geopolitics  of Borders  and Boundaries. Geopolitics  10  (4), 
672–679. 
Houtum,  van H.  (2010): Waiting  Before  the  Law: Kafka  on  the  Border.  Social & Legal 
Studies 19 (3), 285–297. 
Houtum, van H. & F. Boedeltje (2009): Europeʹs Shame: Death at the Borders of the EU. 
Antipode 41 (2), 226–230. 
Houtum, van H. & R. Pijpers (2006): The EU as a Gated Community. In: Scott, J. (ed.) EU 
Enlargement, Region Building and Shifting Borders of  Inclusion and Exclusion,  53–61. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Houtum, van H. & Scott, J. (2005): Boundaries and the Europeanisation of Space: The EU, 
Integration and Evolving Theoretical Perspectives on Border. EXLINEA State of 
the Art Report. Berlin and Nijmegen. 
Houtum, van H. & T. van Naerssen (2002): Bordering, Ordering and Othering. Tijdschrift 
voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 93 (2), 125–136. 
Houtum, van H. and R. Pijpers  (2007): The European Union as a Gated Community of 
Fear: The Two‐faced Border and  Immigration Regime of  the EU. Antipode 39  (2), 
291–309. 
Hughes, O. E. (1998): Public Management and Administration: An Introduction. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Huntington, S. P. (1973): Transnational Organizations in World Politics. World Politics 25 
(3), 333–368. 
Huntington, S. P. (1993): The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72 (3), 22–49. 
Huntington, S. P.  (1996): The Clash of Civilizations and  the Remaking of World Order. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Hutchinson, J. (2000): Ethnicity and Modern Nations. Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (4), 651–
669. 
Hutchinson,  J.  (2004): Myth Against Myth: The Nation As Ethnic Overlay. Nations and 
Nationalism 10 (1–2), 109–124. 
Hyden,  G.  (1997):  Civil  Society,  Social  Capital,  and  Development:  Dissection  of  a 
Complex Discourse. Studies in Comparative International Development 32, 3–30. 
Hynds,  E. C.  (1991):  Editorial  Page  Editors Discuss  use  of  Letters. Newspaper Research 
Journal 13 (1), 124–136. 
ICNL  (2012):  NGO  Law  Monitor:  Russia.  Available  through:  www.icnl.org/research
/monitor/russia.html (October 1, 2012). 
Ignatieff, M.  (1993):  Blood  and Belonging:  Journeys  into  the New Nationalism. New  York: 
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. 
Ilmonen,  K.  (1998):  Uudet  ja  vanhat  yhteiskunnalliset  liikkeet.  In:  Ilmonen  K.  &  M. 
Siisiäinen (eds) Uudet ja vanhat liikkeet, 15–42. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
     425 
 
Ilmonen,  K.  (2005):  Kansalaisyhteiskunta  ja  yhteiskunnan  uudistumiskyky: Yhteiskunnallisia 
muutostrendejä  suomalaisessa  kansalaisyhteiskunnassa  1900‐luvun  lopulla.  Helsinki: 
Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos. 
Imig, D. & S. Tarrow (2001): Mapping the Europeanization of Contention: Evidence from 
a Quantitative Data Analysis. In: Imig, D. & S. Tarrow (eds) Contentious Europeans: 
Protest and Politics in an Integrating Europe, 27–49. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Immonen, K.  (1987): Ryssästä saa puhua... Neuvostoliitto suomalaisessa julkisuudessa ja kirjat 
julkisuuden muotona 1918–1939. Helsinki: Otava.  
Immonen,  K.  (1990):  Suomalaisten  Venäjä‐kuva  ja  uusi Neuvostoliitto.  Kuopio:  Snellman 
instituutti. 
Immonen, N.  (2006): Yhteisötalous Suomessa, sisäpiirin  slangia vai uutta yhteistyön  taloutta. 
Tampere: Tampereen seudun osuustoiminnan kehittämisyhdistys. 
Inglehart, R.  (1997): Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political 
Changes in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Islamoglu, H.  (2001): Civil  Society, Concept  and History  of.  In:  Smelser, N.  J. &  P. B. 
Baltes  (eds)  International Encyclopedia  of  the  Social  and Behavioral  Sciences,  Vol.  3, 
1891–1897. Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
Itkonen, H. (2000): Kansalaistoiminnan suuri linja. In: Itkonen, H., J. Heikkala, K. Ilmanen 
&  P.  Koski  (eds)  Liikunnan  kansalaistoiminta  –  muutokset,  merkitykset  ja 
reunaehdot. Helsinki: Liikuntatieteellinen Seura. 
Iwabuchi,  K.  (2002):  Recentering  Globalization:  Popular  Culture  and  Japanese 
Transnationalism. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Izotov, A. (2013): Repositioning a Border Town: The Case of Sortavala. In: Eskelinen, H. I. 
Liikanen  &  J.  Scott  (eds)  The  EU‐Russia  Borderland:  New  Contexts  for  Regional 
Cooperation, 167–182. London: Routledge.  
Izotov, A. & J. Laine (2012): Constructing (Un)familiarity: Role of Tourism in Identity and 
Region Building at  the Finnish‐Russian Border. European Planning Studies 21  (1), 
93–111. 
Jachtenfuchs, M.  (2001): The Governance Approach  to European  Integration.  Journal of 
Common Market Studies 39 (2), 245–264. 
Jakobson,  R.  (1971):  Language  in  Relation  to  Other  Communication  Systems.  In: 
Jakobson, R. (ed.) Selected Writings, Vol. 2, 570–579. The Hague: Mouton. 
Jeffery, C. (2009): Discoordination and Autonomy: Sub‐state Governments in Multi‐Level 
Settings?  ESRC  Seminar  Series:  Reforming  Intergovernmental  Relations  in  a 
Context of Party Political Incongruence. Brussels. 
Jensen,  J.  &  F.  Miszlivetz  (2005):  The  Languages  of  Civil  Society:  Europe  and  Beyond. 
Florence: European University Institute. 
Jensen, O. & T. Richardson  (2004): Making European Space: Mobility, Power and Territorial 
Identity. London: Routledge. 
Jepperson, R. L. (2002): Political Modernities: Disentangling Two Underlying Dimensions 
of Institutional Differentiation. Sociological Theory 20 (1), 61–85. 
Jessop, B.  (2002): The Political Economy of Scale.  In: Perkmann, M. & N.‐L. Sum  (eds) 
Globalization, Regionalization and Cross‐Border Regions, 25–49. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 426     
 
Jessop, B. (2007): State Power: A Strategic‐Relational Approach. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Jhappan,  R.  (2008):  The  ‘New  World’:  Legacies  of  European  Colonialism  in  North 
America. In: Abu‐Laban, Y., R. Jhappan & F. Rocher (eds) Politics in North America: 
Redefining Continental Relations, 27–49. Peterborough: Broadview Press. 
Joenniemi, P. (1993): Euro‐Suomi: rajalla, rajojen välissä vai rajaton? In: Joenniemi, P., R. 
Alapuro  &  K.  Pekonen  (eds)  Suomesta  Euro‐Suomeen:  Keitä me  olemme  ja mihin 
matkalla, 17–48. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute. 
Joenniemi,  P.  (2000):  Changing  Politics  along  Finland’s  Borders:  from  Norden  to 
Northern Dimension.  In: Ahponen, P.‐L. & P.  Jukarainen  (eds) Tearing Down the 
Curtain,  Opening  the  Gates:  Northern  Boundaries  in  Change,  114–132.  Jyväskylä: 
SoPhi. 
Joenniemi,  P.  (2008):  Re‐Negotiating  Europe’s  Identity:  The  European Neighbourhood 
Policy as a Form of Differentiation. Journal of Borderlands Studies 23 (2), 83–94. 
Joenniemi,  P.  (ed.)  (1997):  Neo‐Nationalism  or Regionality?  The Re‐structuring  of  Political 
Space around the Baltic Rim. Stockholm: NordRefo. 
Joenniemi, P. & A. Sergounin (2003): Russia and the European Union’s Northern Dimension: 
Encounter or Clash of Civilizations. Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic 
University Press. 
Joenniemi, P. & M. Lehti  (2003): The Encounter between  the Nordic and  the Northern. 
Torn  apart  but Meeting Again?  In: Lehti, M. & D.  J.  Smith  (eds) Post‐Cold War 
Identity Policies: Northern and Baltic Experiences, 128–157. London: Frank Cass. 
Johnson,  C. M.  (2009):  Cross‐Border  Regions  and  Territorial  Restructuring  in  Central 
Europe: Room for More Transboundary Space. European Urban and Regional Studies 
16 (2), 177–191. 
Jones, A.  (2006): The  Importance of  ‘Yesterday’s News’: Opportunities & Challenges  in 
Newspaper Digitization. Available  through:  oncampus.richmond.edu/academics
/library/digital/reports.htm (May 22, 2011). 
Jones, R. (2009): Categories, Borders and Boundaries. Progress in Human Geography 33 (2), 
174–189. 
Jones, R. (2012): Border Walls: Security and the War on Terror in the United States, India, and 
Israel. London: Zed Books. 
Jordan, A. (2001): The European Union – an Evolving System of Multi‐Level Governance 
or Government. Policy and Politics 29 (2), 193–208. 
Jordan, L. & P. van Tuijl. (2000): Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy. 
World Development 28 (12), 2051–2065. 
Jordan, W. C. (2002): Europe  in the Middle Ages. In: Pagden, A. (ed.) The Idea of Europe: 
From Antiquity  to  the  European Union,  72–90  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press. 
Jukarainen,  P.  (2001):  Rauhan  ja  raudan  rajoilla: Nuorten maailmanjäsennyksiä  Suomen  ja 
Venäjä sekä Ruotsin ja Suomen rajojen tuntumassa. Helsinki: Like. 
Jukarainen, P. (2002): Boundaries of Finland in Transition. Fennia 180, 83–88. 
Jusdanis, G.  (1991): Belated Modernity  and Aesthetic Culture:  Inventing National Literature. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
     427 
 
Jussila, O., S. Hentilä, & J. Nevakivi (1999): From Grand Duchy to a Modern State: A Political 
History of Finland since 1809. London: Hurst & Co. 
Kaiser,  K.  (1969):  Transnationale  politik:  Zur  theorie  der  multi‐nalionalen  politik. 
Politische Vierteljahresschrift 10, 80–109. 
Kaiser,  K.  (1971):  Transnational  Relations  as  a  Threat  to  the  Democratic  Process. 
International Organization 25 (3), 706–720. 
Käkönen,  J.  (1999): Asymmetry and  Interaction. Border  in  the  International System.  In: 
Eskelinen, H., I. Liikanen & J. Oksa (eds) Curtains of Iron and Gold. Reconstructuring 
Borders and Scales of Interaction, 377–384. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Kaldor, M. (2003): Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Kaldor, M., S. Selchow & H. L. Moore  (eds)  (2012): Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of 
Critical Reflection. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kangas, A. (2007): The Knight, the Beast and the Treasure: A Semeiotic Inquiry into the Finnish 
Political Imaginary on Russia, 1918–1930s. Tampere: Tampere University Press. 
Kant, I. (1991 [1784]): An Answer to the Question “What is Enlightenment”? In: Reiss, H. 
(ed.) Kant: Political Writings, 54–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kant,  I.  (1997  [1788]): Critique  of Practical Reason.  Trans. &  ed. Gregor, M. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kapoor, S. & C. Botan (1992): Studies Compare How Editors Use Letters. The Masthead 44 
(1), 5–7. 
Kari, M. & J. Markwort, J. (2004): Kolmas sektori EU:ssa ja eräissä Euroopan maissa. Helsinki: 
RAY. 
Katajala, K.  (1999): Near  the Metropolis, beyond  the Border: St Petersburg and Eastern 
Finland  before  the October Revolution.  In: Eskelinen, H.,  I. Liikanen &  J. Oksa 
(eds) Curtains of Iron and Gold: Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Integration, 297–
315. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Kaufmann, R. & H. Broms  (1988): A Semiotic Analysis of  the Newspaper Coverage of 
Chernobyl in the United States, the Soviet Union, and Finland. Semiotica 70 (1–2), 
27–48.  
Kaviraj,  S.  &  S.  Khilnani  (2001):  Civil  Society:  History  and  Possibilities.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Keane, J. (1989): Introduction: Democracy and the Decline of the Left. In: Bobbio, N. (ed.) 
Democracy  and  Dictatorship.  The  Nature  and  Limits  of  State  Power,  vii‐xviii. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Keating, M.  (1998):  The New Regionalism  in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring  and 
Political Change. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Keating, M. & L. Hooghe (2006): Bypassing the Nation‐state? Regions and the EU Policy 
Process.  In: Richardson,  J.  (ed.) European Union: Power and Policy‐making, 269–286. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Keck, M. E. & K. Sikkink (1998): Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics. Cornell: Cornell University Press. 
Keck, M. E. & K. Sikkink (1999): Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and 
Regional Politics. International Social Science Journal 51 (159), 89–101.  
 428     
 
Kekkonen, U. (1958): The Beginning of Cool Relations. Broadcast on 10 December 1958, in 
Helsinki. Available through: www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/10375 (May 16, 
2011). 
Kekkonen, U.  (1974):  Speech  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Finland  at  the  30th 
anniversary celebration of the Armistice Agreement and the establishment of the 
Finnish‐Soviet  Society  on  15/10/1974.  Published  writings  of  President  Urho 
Kekkonen (1900–1986), 154–159. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Kendall,  J.  (2005):  Third  Sector  European  Policy:  Organisations  between  Market  and 
State, The Policy Process and the EU. TSEP Working Paper 1. Available through: 
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/TSEP (May 28, 2011). 
Kendall,  J.  (ed.)  (2009): Handbook of Third Sector Policy in Europe: Multi‐Level Processes and 
Organized Civil Society. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Kendall,  J.  &  M.  R.  J.  Knapp  (1996):  The  Voluntary  Sector  in  the  UK.  Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Kennedy,  M.  (2002):  Cultural  Formations  of  Post‐Communism:  Emancipation,  Transition, 
Nation and War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Keohane,  R.  O.  (1989):  International  Institutions  and  State  Power:  Essays  in  International 
Relations Theory. Boulder: Westview. 
Keohane, R. O. & H. Milner  (1996):  Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Keohane,  R.  O.  &  J.  S.  Nye  (1974):  Transgovernmental  Relations  and  International 
Organizations. World Politics 27 (1), 39–62. 
Keohane,  R.  O.  &  J.  S.  Nye  (ed.)  (1971):  Transnational  Relations  and  World  Politics. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Kettunen, P. (2000): Yhteiskunta. Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought 2000, vol. 4, 159–197. 
Jyväskylä: SoPhi.  
Kettunen, P. (2009): The Conceptualisation of the Social in Europe’s Northern Periphery – 
‘Society’  in  Nordic  Political  Discourses.  Paper  presented  at  the  Comparative 
Conceptual History and Global Translation conference, 2–5 March 2009, Bangkok. 
Kettunen, P. (2011a): Welfare Nationalism and Competitive Community. In: Suszycki, A. 
M. (ed.) Welfrare Citizenship and Welfare Nationalism, 79–117. Helsinki: NordWel. 
Kettunen,  P.  (2011b):  The  Transnational  Construction  of  National  Challenges:  The 
Ambiguous Nordic Model of Welfare and Competitiveness. In: Kettunen, P. & K. 
Petersen (eds) Beyond Welfare State Models, 16–40. Cheltenham: Edward Edgar. 
Kettunen,  P.  &  K.  Petersen  (eds)(2011)  Beyond  Welfare  State  Models.  Transnational 
Perspectives on Social Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Edgar. 
Khilnani, S. (2001): The Development of Civil Society. In: Kaviraj, S. & S. Khilnani (eds) 
Civil  Society:  History  and  Possibilities,  11–32.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press. 
Kim,  J.  (2007):  Impact  of Globalization  on  the U.S.‐Mexico Border: Case Study  of Grassroots 
Activism for Migrant and Refugee Community. College Park: University of Maryland. 
Kinnunen, K.  (1998):  Suomi‐Neuvostoliitto‐Seuran  historia  1944–1974.  Jyväskylä:  Finland‐
Russia Society. 
     429 
 
Kitschelt, H.  (1986): Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti‐Nuclear 
Movements in Four Democracies. British Journal of Political Science 16, 57–85.  
Klemola, P. (1981): Helsingin Sanomat: sananvapauden monopoli. Helsinki: Otava. 
Klinge, M. (1997): Keisarin Suomi. Espoo: Schildts & Söderströms. 
Knudsen, T. & B. Rothstein (1994): State Building  in Scandinavia. Comparative Politics 26 
(2), 203–220. 
Kochenov,  D.  (2008):  EU  Enlargement  and  the  Failure  of  Conditionality:  Pre‐accession 
Conditionality  in  the Fields  of Democracy  and  the Rule  of Law.  The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International. 
Kocka, J. (2004): Civil Society from the Historical Perspective. European Review 12 (1), 65–
79. 
Kocka, J. (2007): The Mapping of Europe’s Borders: Past, Present and Future. In: Persson, 
H.‐A. & B. Stråth  (eds) Reflections of Europe. Defining a Political Order  in Time and 
Space, 37–48. Brussels: Peter Lang. 
Kohler‐Koch, B. (2008): Civil Society Contribution to Democratic Governance: A Critical 
Assessment.  In:  Kohler‐Koch,  B.,  D.  Bièvre  &  W.  Maloney  (eds)  Opening  EU‐
Governance  to  Civil  Society:  Gains  and  Challenges,  9–18.  Mannheim:  Mannheim 
Centre for European Social Research. 
Kohn, H. (1944): The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Kohn,  H.  (1955):  Nationalism:  Its  Meaning  and  History.  Princeton:  D.  Van  Nostrand 
Company. 
Koivumaa,  J.  (2009):  Geopoliittista  kuvittelua  Pohjois‐Suomen  raja‐alueilla:  tutkimus 
perifeerisyyden  purkamisesta  kylmän  sodan  jälkeisessä  kansainvälisessä  järjestelmässä 
1995–2004. Rovaniemi: University of Lapland. 
Kokko,  M.  &  H.  Rantatupa  (2000):  Leijonan  jalanjälkiä:  puoli  vuosisataa  suomalaista 
lionstoimintaa. Saarijärvi: Lions Club. 
Kolossov, V. (2003): ‘High’ and ‘Low’ Geopolitics: Images of the Foreign Countries in the 
Eyes of Russian Citizens. Geopolitics 8 (1), 121–148. 
Kolossov, V. (2005): Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches. 
Geopolitics 10 (4), 1–27. 
Kolossov, V.  (ed.)  (2012):  EUBORDERSCAPES  State  of  the Debate Report  I. Available 
through: www.euborderscapes.eu/index.php?id=project_reports (Feb 28, 2013).  
Kolossov, V. &  J.  Scott  (2011): Karelia: A  Finnish‐Russian  Borderland  on  the  Edge  of 
Neighbourhood.  In:  Eskelinen,  H.  I.  Liikanen  &  J.  Scott  (eds)  The  EU‐Russia 
Borderland: New Contexts for Regional Cooperation, 194–210. London: Routledge 
Kononenko, V. & J. Laine (2008): Assessment of the Finnish‐Russian Border: The Case of 
Vaalimaa  Border  Crossing  Point.  The  Finnish  Institute  of  International  Affairs 
Working Paper No. 57. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 
Kortteinen, M. (1992): Lähiö: Tutkimus elämäntapojen muutoksesta. Helsinki: Otava.  
Kostiainen, A.  (1998): Mass Tourists, Groups and Gelegates: Travel  from Finland  to  the 
Soviet Union  from 1950  to 1980.  In: Peltonen, A. & M. Heikkinen‐Rummukainen 
(eds)  Trends  in  Russian  Research  on  Tourism,  46–50.  Savonlinna:  The  Finnish 
University Network for Tourism Studies. 
 430     
 
Kostiainen, A. (1999): The Vodka Trail: Finnish Travellers’ Motivation to Visit the Former 
Soviet Union.  In: Toivonen, T. &  J. Ahtola  (eds) Travel Patterns: Past and Present, 
33–48. Savonlinna: The Finnish University Network for Tourism Studies. 
Kozák, K.  (2010): Facing Asymmetry: Bridging the Peripheral Gap in U.S.‐Mexican Relations. 
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
Kramer, R. M. (2004): Alternative Paradigms for the Mixed Economy: Will Sector Matter? 
In:  Laville,  J.  L.  (ed.)  The Third  Sector  in Europe,  219–236.  Cheltenham:  Edward 
Elgar. 
Kramsch, O.  (2001): Navigating  the Spaces of Kantian Reason: Notes on Cosmopolitical 
Governance within the Cross‐border Euregios of the European Union. Geopolitics 6 
(2), 27–50. 
Kramsch, O. (2004): Towards a Mediterranean Scale of Governance? 21st‐Century Urban 
Networks across  the  ‘Inner Sea’.  In: Kramsch, O. & B. Hooper  (eds) Cross‐Border 
Governance in the European Union, 191–208. London: Routledge. 
Kress, G. R. (1997): Before Writing: Rethinking the Paths to Literacy. London: Routledge. 
Kriesi,  H  (1995):  The  Political  Opportunity  Structure  of  New  Social  Movements:  Its 
Impact on Their Mobilization. In: Jenkins, J. C. & B. Klandermans (eds) The Politics 
of Social Protest, 167–198. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Kristof,  L.  (1959):  The Nature  of  Frontiers  and  Boundaries. Annals  of  the Association  of 
American Geographers 49, 269–282. 
Kumar, L.  (2000): Do We have  a Theoretical Framework  to Explain Social Movement? 
Third  System,  Third  Sector,  Third  Way  –  No  Way.  ISTR  Fourth  International 
Conference  “The  Third  Sector:  For  What  and  For  Whom?”  Working  Papers 
Volume. Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland  
Kuus,  M.  (2007):  Something  Old,  Something  New:  Eastness  in  European  Union 
enlargement. Journal of International Relations and Development 10, 150–167.  
Kuus, M. (2011a): Whose Regional Expertise? Political Geographies of Knowledge in the 
European Union. European Urban and Regional Studies 18 (3), 275–288. 
Kuus, M.  (2011b):  Policy  and  Geopolitics:  Bounding  Europe  in  Europe.  Annals  of  the 
Association of American Geographers 101 (5), 1140–1155. 
Kuusi,  O.,  H.  Smith  &  P.  Tiihonen  (2007):  VENÄJÄ  2017:  kolme  skenaariota.  Helsinki: 
Parliament of Finland, The Committee for the Future. 
Kuusipalo,  J.  (2000):  Gender  and  Top‐level  Politics  in  Finland  –  The  case  of  the 
Presidential Elections  in 1994 and 2000. Conference Report: Women’s Agency  in 
Politics:  Different  Approaches,  71–98.  GEP  International  Conference:  New 
Challenges to Gender, Democracy, Welfare States – Politics of Empowerment and 
Inclusion. Vilvorde Kursus Center, August 18–20.  
Kuzio,  T.  (2002):  The  Myth  of  the  Civic  State:  A  Critical  Survey  of  Hans  Kohn’s 
Framework for Understanding Nationalism. Ethnic and Racial Studies 25 (1), 20–39. 
Kuzio, T.  (2010): Nationalism,  Identity and Civil Society  in Ukraine: Understanding  the 
Orange Revolution. Communist and Post‐Communist Studies 43 (3), 285–296. 
Kymlicka, W. (1996): Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Kymlicka, W. (2001): Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
     431 
 
Ladrech,  R.  (2002):  Europeanization  and  Political  Parties:  Towards  a  Framework  for 
Analysis. Party Politics 8, 389–403.  
Laffan,  B.,  R.  O’Donnel  &  M.  Smith  (2000):  Europe’s  Experimental  Union:  Rethinking 
Integration. London: Routledge. 
Laine,  J.  (2008):  Cooperation,  Cohesion,  Growth:  Realistic  Prospects  for  the  Finnish‐
Russian Borderland?  In: Okuda, H. &  J. Kortelainen  (eds) Russian Border Regions 
from  the Perspective  of Two Neighbours.  Sapporo:  Centre  for Development  Policy 
Studies, Hokkai‐Gakuen University. 
Laine, J. (2011): In Search of Balance: Russia and the EU in the North. Polar Geography 34 
(3), 163–192. 
Laine,  J.  (2012):  Border  Paradox:  Striking  a  Balance  between  Access  and  Control  in 
Asymmetrical Border Settings. Eurasia Border Review 3 (1), 51–79. 
Laine,  J. & A. Demidov  (2013): Civil Society Organizations  as Drivers of Cross‐Border 
Interaction: on Whose Terms, for Which Purpose? In: Eskelinen, H. I. Liikanen & J. 
Scott  (eds)  The EU‐Russia Borderland: New Contexts  for Regional Cooperation,  131–
148. London: Routledge.  
Lash, S. & J. Urry (1994): Economies of Signs and Space. London: Sage. 
Laslett, P.  (ed.)  (1960):  John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government: A Critical Edition with an 
Introduction and Apparatus Criticus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Laurila,  J.  (1995):  Finnish‐Soviet Clearing Trade  and Payment  System: History  and  Lessons. 
Helsinki: Bank of Finland. 
Lavenex, S. (2004): EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’. Journal of European Public 
Policy 11 (4), 680–700. 
Lavenex,  S. & N. Wichmann  (2009): The External Governance of EU  Internal  Security. 
Journal of European Integration 31 (1), 83–102. 
Law, J. (2002): Objects and Spaces. Theory, Culture & Society 19 (5–6), 91–105. 
Ledeneva, A.  (1998): Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ledeneva,  A.  (1999):  The  Network  Economy  in  Post‐Soviet  Russia.  Social  Market 
Foundation Review 15. 
Lemon,  K.  (2007):  Fair  Elections  –  Interaction  between  Authorities  and  Civil  Society. 
Report prepared for the seminar on “European Standards and Electoral Process in 
Ukraine” organized in Kyiv, Ukraine, 13–14 September 2007. Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe, Venice Commission. 
Lempiäinen,  K.  (2000):  Whatever  Happened  to  Sexual  Difference?  One  Story  of 
Genderless Gender in the Context of Being Finnish. Paper presented at the Fourth 
European Feminist Research Conference, 28 September–1 October 2000, Bologna. 
Leshukov, I. (1999): Severnoye izmerenie ishet koordinaty tselei. Euro 11, 30–31. 
Leshukov, I. (2000): Northern Dimension: Interests and Perceptions. In: Lejins, A. & J.‐D. 
Nackmayr  (eds)  The Northern Dimension: An Assessment  and  Future Development, 
38–49. Riga: The Latvian Institute of International Affairs. 
Lewis, M.  (2006): Mapping  the Social Economy  in BC and Alberta: Towards a strategic 
Approach.  BALTA  Working  Paper  Series.  Canadian  Centre  for  Community 
Renewal on behalf of the B.C.–Alberta Social Economy Research Alliance. 
 432     
 
Lewis, M. & K. Wigen  (1997): The Myth of Continents. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Liepitz, A. (1994): The National and the Regional: Their Autonomy vis‐à‐vis the Capitalist 
World Crisis.  In: Palan, R. & B. Gills  (eds) Transcending the State‐Global Divide: A 
Neo‐Structuralist Agenda in International, 23–43. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Liikanen,  I.  (1995):  Fennomania  ja  kansa.  Joukkojärjestäytymisen  läpimurto  ja  Suomalaisen 
puolueen synty. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society. 
Liikanen,  I.  (1999)  Kansallinen  liike  ja  järjestäytyminen  Suomessa  ja  Virossa.  In: 
Koistinen, T., P. Kruuspere, E. Sevänen & R. Turunen (eds) Kaksi tietä nykyisyyteen, 
47–64. Pieksämäki: Finnish Literature Society. 
Liikanen,  I.  (2004a): Voluntary Association and  the Redefinition of Post‐Soviet Political 
Space. In: Alapuro, R., I. Liikanen & M. Lonkila (eds) Beyond Post‐Soviet Transition. 
Micro Perspectives on Challenge and Survival  in Russia and Estonia, 42–63. Helsinki: 
Kikimora Publications. 
Liikanen,  I.  (2004b):  Euregio  Karelia:  A  Model  for  Cross‐border  Co‐operation  with 
Russia? The IISS Russian Regional Perspectives Journal for Foreign and Security Policy 
1 (3). 
Liikanen,  I.  (2008):  New  Neighbourhood  and  Cross‐border  Region‐building:  Identity 
Politics of CBC on the Finnish‐Russian Border. Journal of Borderlands Studies 23 (3), 
19–38. 
Liikanen, I. (2010): From Post‐Modern Visions to Multi‐Scale Study of Bordering: Recent 
Trends  in European Study of Borders and Border Areas. Eurasia Border Review 1 
(1), 17–28. 
Liikanen,  I. & D. Zimin,  J. Ruusuvuori & H. Eskelinen  (2007): Karelia – A Cross‐Border 
Region?  The  EU  and  Cross‐border  Region‐building  on  the  Finnish‐Russian  Border. 
Joensuu: University of Joensuu. 
Limnéll, J. (2009): Suomen uhkakuvapolitiikka 2000‐luvun alussa. Helsinki: National Defence 
University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies. 
Lipponen, P.  (1997): The European Union Needs a Policy  for  the Northern Dimension. 
Speech  delivered  at  the  ‘Barents  Region  Today’  conference,  15  September, 
Rovaniemi. 
Locke,  J.  (1965  [1689]):  Two Treatises  of Government.  Ed.  P.  Laslett. New  York: Mentor 
Books. 
Lokshina,  T.  (2006):  Russian  Civil  Society:  The  G8  and  After.  Available  through: 
www.opendemocracy.net (July 18, 2009). 
Lösch, A.  (1954  [1940]): The Economics of Location. Trans.  Stolper, W. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  
Lounasmeri, L. (2011a): Lähellä, mutta niin kaukana? Suomalaisen Venäjäkuvan äärellä. 
In: Lounasmeri, L.  (ed.) Näin naapurista: Median  ja kansalaisten Venäjä‐kuvat, 7–15. 
Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Lounasmeri,  L.  (2011b):  Sinivalkoisin  vai  vaaleanpunaisin  silmälasein? Neuvostoliiton 
kuva  suomalaisessa  julkisuudessa  Tšekkoslovakian  miehityksestä  Janajevin 
junttaan.  In:  Lounasmeri,  L.  (ed.) Näin  naapurista: Median  ja  kansalaisten Venäjä‐
kuvat, 68–124. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
     433 
 
Lowenthal, A. F.  (1999): United States‐Latin American Relations at  the Century’s Turn: 
Managing  the “Intermestic” Agenda.  In: Fishlow, A. &  J.  Jones  (eds) The United 
State  and  the Americas: A  Twenty‐First  Century  View,  109–136. New  York: W.W. 
Norton & Company. 
Luhtakallio,  E.  (2010):  Local  Politicizations: A  Comparison  of  Finns  and  French  Practicing 
Democracy. Helsinki: University of Helsinki. 
Lundström,  T.  &  F.  Wijkström  (1997):  The  Nonprofit  Sector  in  Sweden.  Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Luostarinen,  H.  (1986):  Perivihollinen:  Suomen  oikeistolehdistön  Neuvostoliittoa  koskeva 
viholliskuva sodassa 1941–1944, tausta ja sisältö. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Luostarinen, H.  (1989):  Finnish Russophobia: The  Story  of  an Enemy  Image.  Journal of 
Peace Research 26, 123–137. 
Luukkanen, A.  (2009): Kuka omistaa Venäjän? – Omistamisen ja vallan dynamiikka Venäjällä. 
Helsinki: WSOY. 
Makarychev,  A.  (2006):  Russia’s  Energy  Policy:  Between  Security  and  Transparency. 
PONARS  Memo  No.  425.  Available  through:  csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs
/pm_0425.pdf (September 12, 2011). 
Makarychev, A. (2012): From Near Abroad to a Common Neighborhood: The Changing 
Contours of Post‐Soviet Regionalism. Paper presented at  the Relocating Borders, 
Second EastBordNet Conference, 11 January 2013, Humboldt University, Berlin. 
Manners,  I.  (2002):  Normative  Power  Europe:  A  Contradiction  in  Terms?  Journal  of 
Common Market Studies 40 (2), 235–258. 
March,  J. G. &  J. P. Olsen  (1984): The New  Institutionalism: Organizational  Factors  in 
Political Life. American Political Science Review 78 (3), 734–749. 
March,  J. G. &  J.  P. Olsen  (2006): Elaborating  the  “New  Institutionalism”.  In: Rhodes, 
R.A.W., S. Binder & B. Rockman (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, 
3–20. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Marin, A.  (2006):  Integration without  joining? Neighbourhood  relations at  the Finnish‐
Russian  border.  DIIS  Working  Paper  14.  Copenhagen:  Danish  Institute  for 
International Studies & Birmingham University.  
Marks, G. & L. Hooghe  (2000): Optimality  and Authority: A Critique  of Neo‐classical 
Theory. Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (5), 795–816. 
Marks, G. & L. Hooghe (2003): Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi‐
level Governance. American Political Science Review 97 (2), 233–243. 
Marks,  G.,  F.  Nielsen,  J.  Salk  &  L.  Ray  (1996):  Competencies,  Cracks,  and  Conflicts: 
Regional Mobilization  in  the European Union. Comparative Political Studies 29  (2), 
164–193. 
Marks, G., L. Hooghe & K. Blank (1996): European Integration and the State: Multi‐level 
vs. State Centric Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (3), 341–378. 
Martin, G. J. & P. E. James (1993): All Possible Worlds: A History of Geographical Ideas. New 
York: Wiley.  
Martinez, O.  J.  (1994a): The Dynamics  of Border  Interaction.  In:  Schofield, C. H.  (ed.): 
World Boundaries, Vol. 1, Global Boundaries, 1–15. London: Routledge. 
 434     
 
Martinez,  O.  J.  (1994b):  Border  People:  Life  and  Society  in  the  U.S.‐Mexico  Borderlands. 
Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. 
Marx, K. (1970 [1867]): Capital, Vol. I. Trans S. Moore & E. Aveling. London: Lawrence & 
Wishart.  
Marx, K.  (1977  [1859]): A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Trans. Rojas, R. 
Moscow: Progress Publishers.  
Mathews J. T. (1997): Power Shift. Foreign Affairs 76 (1), 50–66. 
Matthews, O. & A. Nemtsova (2008): The Medvedev Doctrine: He wants to build a new 
security  bloc  and  a  gas  cartel,  and  transform  Moscow  into  a  financial  hub. 
Newsweek Online, Nov 22, 2008. From the magazine issue dated Dec 1, 2008. 
Matthies, A.‐L. (1999): The Need for Plurality and the Finnish Third Sector Research. In: 
Siisiäinen, M., P. Kinnunen & E. Hietanen (eds): The Third Sector in Finland: Review 
to Research  of  the  Finnish Third  Sector,  207–219. Helsinki:  Finnish  Federation  for 
Social Welfare and Health. 
Matthies, A.‐L.  (2006): Nordic Civic Society Organisations and the Future of Welfare Services: 
A Model for Europe? Stockholm: Elanders Gotab AB.  
Maukkonen, P. (2005): Experienced Institutional Confidence‐New Justification for Nordic 
Cultural  Policy?  Macro‐level  Analysis  of  Nordic  Political  Tradition.  Available 
through: www.jyu.fi/ytk/laitokset (March 30, 2009).  
Maull, O. (1925): Politische Geographie. Berlin: Gebrüder Borntraeger. 
Mautner, G.  (2009): Checks  and  Balances: How Corpus  Linguistics Can Contribute  to 
CDA. In: Wodak, R. & M. Meyer (eds) Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis, 122–
143. London: Sage. 
Mavers,  D.  (2009):  Student  Text‐Making  as  Semiotic  Work.  Journal  of  Early  Childhood 
Literacy 9 (2), 141–155. 
Mayes, I. (2001): Sincerely Yours: The Readers’ Editor on… the Value, and the Hazards, 
of the Letters Page. Guardian 23 June 2001 
McCarthy,  J. D. & M. N. Zald.  (1987): Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A 
Partial Theory. In: Buechler, S. M. & F. K. Cylke (eds) Social Movements: Perspectives 
and Issues, 149–172. Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing. 
McGrew, A. & D. Held  (eds)  (2002): Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global 
Governance. Cambridge: Polity 
McIntosh  Sundstrom,  L.  (2006):  Funding  Civil  Society  –  Foreign  Assistance  and  NGO 
Development in Russia. Standford: Stanford University Press. 
McIntosh  Sundtrom,  L.  &  L.  A.  Henry  (2005):  Russian  Civil  Society:  Tensions  and 
Trajectories. In: Evans, A. B., L. A. Henry & L. McIntosh Sundstrom (eds) Russian 
Civil Society: A Critical Assessment, 305–322. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
McKinsey,  L. &  V.  Konrad  (1989):  Borderland Reflections: The United  States  and Canada. 
Orono: Canadian American Center. 
Mclean, G. F. (1997): Philosophy and Civil Society: Its Nature, Its Past and Its Future. In: 
McLean, G. F.  (ed.) Civil Society and Social Reconstruction, 7–81. Washington, DC: 
The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. 
McNeill, W.  (1986):  Polyethnicity  and National Unity  in World History.  Toronto:  Toronto 
University Press. 
     435 
 
Medvedev,  D.  (2008):  Address  to  the  Federal  Assembly  of  the  Russian  Federation. 
Available through: eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/11/05/ (November 10, 2009). 
Medvedev, S. (1998): Tertium datur est: North as the Third. OSCE Review 6 (2), 8. 
Medvedev,  S.  (2000):  Russia’s  Futures:  Implications  for  the  EU,  the  North  and  the  Baltic 
Region. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 
Meehan,  E.  (2003):  From  Government  to  Governance,  Civic  Participation  and  ‘New 
Politics’: The Context of Potential Opportunities  for  the Better Representation of 
Women. Occasional Paper No. 5. Belfast: Centre  for Advancement of Women  in 
Politics School of Politics and International Studies, Queen’s University. 
Meer, van der T. W. G., M.  te Grotenhuis & P. L. H. Scheepers  (2009): Three Types of 
Voluntary Associations  in Comparative Perspective: The Importance of Studying 
Associational  Involvement  through  a  Typology  of Associations  in  21  European 
Countries. Journal of Civil Society 5 (3), 227–241.  
Mendelson, S. E. &  J. K. Glenn  (2000): Democracy Assistance and NGO Strategies  in Post‐
Communist  Societies.  Washington,  DC:  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International 
Peace. 
Mercer, C.  (2002): NGOs, Civil  Society  and Democratization: A Critical Review  of  the 
Literature. Progress in Development Studies 2 (1), 5–22. 
Merivirta, K. A.  (1998): Ystävyysjärjestö ja poliittinen taustavaikuttaja? Suomi‐Neuvostoliitto‐
seuran rooli valtakunnanpolitiikassa 1944–1952. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä. 
Merkx,  J.  (2000):  Refugee  Identities  and  Relief  in  an African  Borderland: A  Study  of 
Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan. New Issues in Refugee Research Working 
Paper No. 19. Geneva: UNHCR. 
Meyer,  M.  (2009):  European  Civil  Society  and  Participation:  Introduction  to  Special 
CINEFOGO Issue. Journal of Civil Society 5 (3), 205–207. 
Miljan, L. & C. Howorun  (2003): Does Ownership Matter? The Effects of Ownership on 
the Coverage of Political Scandals in Hollinger and CanWest Owned Newspapers. 
Paper  prepared  for  presentation  at  the  Canadian  Political  Science  Association 
Meeting, Halifax, Canada. 
Miller, C.,  J. Howard, A. Mateeva, R. Petrov, L.  Serra & M. Taylor  (2009): Towards  a 
Typology  of  Civil  Society:  Understanding  Non‐Government  Public  Action.  In: 
Enjolras,  B. &  K.  Sivesind  (eds)  Civil  Society  in Comparative  Perspective,  71–103. 
Bingley: Emerald.  
Minghi, J. V. (1963): Boundary Studies in Political Geography. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 53, 407–428. 
Ministerial  meeting  (2008):  Joint  Statement  from  the  first  Ministerial  Meeting  of  the 
renewed  Northern  Dimension,  October  28,  2008  Saint  Petersburg.  Available 
through: www.ndphs.org/?doc,Joint_Statement (February 22, 2010). 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  Finland  (2008):  Murmanskin  alueella,  Karjalan 
tasavallassa, Pietarissa  ja Leningradin alueella  toteutettavan Zuomen  ja Vänäjän 
lähialueyhteistyön  toimintaohjelma  vuosiksi  2009–2011.  Available  through: 
formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=34823 (December 22, 2011). 
Ministry  for Foreign Affairs of Finland  (2010): Northern Dimension. Available  through: 
formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=15579 (August 22, 2010). 
 436     
 
Mitchell, J. (1973): Networks, Norms, and Institutions. In: Boissevian, J. & J. Mitchell (eds) 
Network Analysis, 15–35. The Hague: Mouton. 
Moeller,  S.  D.  (1999):  Compassion  Fatigue: How  the Media  Sell Disease,  Famine, War  and 
Death. New York: Routledge. 
Moisio, S. (2003a): Back to Baltoscandia? European Union and Geo‐conceptual Remaking 
of the European North. Geopolitics 8 (1), 72–100. 
Moisio, S. (2003b): Suomen EU‐politiikka on tunnustuksen hakemista. Helsingin Sanomat 
10 August 2003. 
Moisio, S.  (2007a):  In Search of  the Emerging Territoriality of  the EU. Geopolitics 12  (3), 
538–548. 
Moisio, S. (2007b): Re‐drawing the Map of Europe: Spatial Formation of the EUs Eastern 
Dimension. Geography Compass 1 (1), 82–102. 
Moisio,  S.,  V.  Bachmann,  L.  Bialasiewicz,  E.  dellʹAgnese,  J. Dittmer &  V. Mamadouh 
(2013):  Mapping  the  Political  Geographies  of  Europeanization:  National 
Discourses, External Perceptions and the Question of Popular Culture. Progress in 
Human Geography (online) DOI: 10.1177/0309132512472093. 
Mokre, M. & S. P. Riekmann (2006): From Good Governance to Democratic Governance. 
A  Policy  Review  of  the  First  Wave  of  European  Governance  Research,  EU 
Research  in  Social  Sciences  and Humanities, Policy Review  Series No.  2  (8EUR 
22094 EN). 
Montesquieu, C. de S.  (baron de)  (1949  [1748]): The Spirit of the Laws. New York: Hafner 
Press. 
Moravcik, A.  (2004):  Is There a Democratic Deficit  in World Politics? A Framework  for 
Analysis. Government and Opposition 39 (2), 336–363. 
Moré,  I.  (2011):  The  Borders  of  Inequality:  Where  Wealth  and  Poverty  Collide.  Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press. 
Morehouse,  B.  J.  (2004):  Theoretical  Approaches  to  Border  Spaces  and  Identities.  In: 
Pavlakovich‐Kochi,  V.,  B.  J.  Morehouse  &  D.  Wastl‐Walter  (eds)  Challenged 
borderlands:  Transcending  Political  And  Cultural  Boundaries,  19–40.  Aldershot: 
Ashgate.  
Morine, N.  (2009):  Philosophy  –  Study Roland  Barthes, Mythologies:  Semiotics,  Signs, 
Signifier  and  Signified,  Political  Propaganda.  Available  through: 
www.suite101.com/content/philosophy‐study‐roland‐barthes‐mythologies‐
a153925#ixzz1PRXPKDWG (August 2, 2011). 
Morozov,  V.  (2009):  The  External  Dimension  of  Identity  Construction:  Russia  as  a 
Europe‐Maker.  Paper  presented  at  the  50th  Convention  of  the  International 
Studies Association, 15–18 February 2009, New York. 
Moscovici,  S.  (1981): On  Social  Representations.  In:  Forgas,  J.  P.  (ed.)  Social Cognition: 
Perspectives on Everyday Understanding, 181–210. London: Academic Press. 
Möttönen,  S.  &  J.  Niemelä  (2005):  Kunta  ja  kolmas  sektori.  Yhteistyön  uudet  muodot. 
Jyväskylä: PS‐Publishing.  
Muñoz,  S. A.  (2010):  Towards  a Geographical  Research Agenda  for  Social  Enterprise. 
AREA 42 (3), 302–312. 
     437 
 
Murphy,  A.  B.  (1996):  The  Sovereign  State  System  as  Political‐Territorial  Ideal.  In: 
Biersteker,  T.  J.  &  C.  Weber  (eds)  State  sovereignty  as  social  construct,  81–120. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Murphy,  A.  B.  (2002):  National  Claims  to  Territory  in  the  Modern  State  System: 
Geographical Considerations. Geopolitics 7 (2), 193–214. 
Murphy, A. B.  (2005): The Changing Geography of Europeaness. Geopolitics 10  (3), 586–
591. 
Murphy, A. B. (2012): Territory’s Continuing Allure. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers (online): DOI: 10.1080/00045608.2012.696232. 
Nagel, G. (1974): Letters to the Editor: A Public Bid for Fame. Columbia Journalism Review 
13, 47–48. 
National Board of Patents  and Registration of Finland  (2012): Register of Associations. 
Accessed  on  the  internet  at www.prh.fi/en/yhdistysrekisteri.html  on August  25, 
2012. 
Nedergaard, P. (2006): Which Countries Learn from Which? A Comparative Analysis of 
the  Direction  of  Mutual  Learning  Processes  within  the  Open  Method  of 
Coordination  Committees  of  the  European  Union  and  among  the  Nordic 
Countries. Co‐operation and Conflict 41 (4), 422–442. 
Németh, S., M. Fritsch, H. Eskelinen, A. Izotov, J. W. Scott & D. Zimin (2012): Case Study 
on Finland – Russia.  In: TERCO European Territorial Cooperation as a Factor of 
Growth,  Jobs  and  Quality  of  Life  Final  Report,  213–276.  Warsaw:  ESPON  & 
EUROREG  –  Centre  for  European  Regional  and  Local  Studies,  University  of 
Warsaw. 
Nevakivi,  J.  (ed.)  (1994):  Finnish‐Soviet  Relations  1944–1948.  Helsinki:  University  of 
Helsinki. 
Newman, D. (2003a): Boundaries. In: Agnew, J., K. Mitchell & G. Toal (eds) A Companion 
to Political Geography, 123–137 Oxford: Blackwell. 
Newman,  D.  (2003b):  On  Borders  and  Power:  A  Theoretical  Framework.  Journal  of 
Borderlands Studies 18 (1), 13–26. 
Newman, D. (2006): The Lines that Continue to Separate Us: Borders in Our ‘Borderless’ 
World. Progress in Human Geography 30 (2), 143–161. 
Newman, D. (2012): Where to in Border Studies? Crossing the Disciplinary Borders in the 
Search for Questions. Paper presented at the Borderscapes III Conference, 28 June 
2012, Trieste. 
Newton,  K.  (2001):  Trust,  Social  Capital,  Civil  Society,  and  Democracy.  International 
Political Science Review 22 (1), 201–214.  
Nichol, J. (2006): Democracy in Russia: Trends and Implications for U.S. Interests. CRS Report 
for  Congress.  Congressional  Research  Service.  Washington,  DC:  The  Library  of 
Congress. 
Nieguth, T.  (1999): Beyond Dichotomy: Concepts of  the Nation and  the Distribution of 
Membership. Nations and Nationalism 5 (2), 155–173. 
Nielsen,  K.,  E.  Berg &  G.  Roll  (2009): Undiscovered Avenues?  Estonian  Civil  Society 
Organizations as Agents of Europeanisation. TRAMES 13 (3), 248–264. 
 438     
 
Nikolas, M. M.  (1999): False Opposites  in Nationalism: An Examination of  the Dichotomy of 
Civic Nationalism and Ethnic Nationalism  in Modern Europe. Melbourne: Center  for 
European Studies, Monash University. 
Nilsson, S.  (2013): Welcome address by  the EESC President at  the Northern Dimension 
Stakeholdersʹ  Meeting  and  3rd  Northern  Dimension  Ministerial  Meeting,  18 
February 2013, Brussels. 
Ninacs,  W.  &  M.  Toye  (2002):  A  Review  of  the  Theory  and  Practice  of  Social 
Economy/ÉConomie Sociale  in Canada. Ottawa: Social Research and Demonstration 
Corporation. 
Nokkala,  A.  (2009):  Uhka  ja  Kumppani:  Venäjä  Suomen  Puolustushallinnossa.  Helsinki: 
National Defence University. 
North, D. C.  (2005): Understanding  the Process  of Economic Change.  Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press. 
Novack,  J.  (2001):  The  Northern  Dimension  in  Sweden’s  EU  Policies:  From  Baltic 
Supremacy  to European Unity?  In: Ojanen, H.  (ed.): The Northern Dimension: Fuel 
for  the EU?,  78–107. Helsinki:  The  Finnish  Institute  of  International Affairs  and 
Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik. 
Nye, J. & R. Keohane (1971): Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction. 
International Organisation 25 (3), 329–349. 
Ó  Tuathail,  G.  (2002):  Theorizing  Practical  Geopolitical  Reasoning:  The  Case  of  U.S. 
Bosnia Policy in 1992. Political Geography 21 (5), 601–628. 
O’Brien,  R.  (1992):  Global  Financial  Integration:  The  End  of  Geography.  London:  Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 
O’Brien, R. J. (1999): Philosophical History of the Idea of Civil Society. Available through: 
www.web.net/~robrien (November 19, 2009). 
O’Brien,  R.  J.,  A.  M.  Goetz,  J.  A.  Scholte  &  M.  Williams  (2000):  Contesting  Global 
Governance:  Multilateral  Economic  Institutions  and  Global  Social  Movements. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
O’Dowd,  L.  (2001):  State  Borders,  Border  Regions  and  the  Construction  of  European 
Identity.  In:  Kohli,  M.  &  M.  Novak  (eds) Will  Europe Work?,  95–110.  London: 
Routledge. 
O’Dowd, L.  (2002): The Changing Significance of European Borders. Regional & Federal 
Studies 12 (4), 13–36.  
O’Dowd, L. (2010): From a ‘Borderless World’ to a ‘World of Borders’: ‘Bringing History 
Back In’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28 (6), 1031–1050. 
O’Dowd, L. & B. Dimitrovova (2006): Promoting Civil Society Across the Borders of the 
EU  Neighbourhood.  EUDIMENSIONS  State  of  the  Debate.  Available  through: 
www.eudimensions.eu/content/publications (November 18, 2008). 
O’Loughlin,  J.  (2000): Ordering  the  ‘Crush Zone’: Geopolitical Games  in Post‐Cold War 
Eastern Europe. In: Kliot, N. & D. Newman (eds) Geopolitics and Globalization: The 
Changing World Political Map, 34–55. London: Frank Cass. 
O’Loughlin,  J.  &  P.  F.  Talbot  (2005):  Where  in  the  World  is  Russia?  Geopolitical 
Perceptions  and  Preferences  of  Ordinary  Russian.  Eurasian  Geography  and 
Economics 46 (1), 23–50. 
     439 
 
O’Loughlin,  J., G. Ó Tuathail & V. Kolossov  (2004a): A Risky Westward Turn? Putin’s 
9/11 Script And Ordinary Russians. Europe‐Asia Studies 56 (1), 3–34 
O’Loughlin, J., G. Ó Tuathail & V. Kolossov (2004b): Russian Geopolitical Storylines and 
Public Opinion in the Wake of 9–11. Communist and Post‐Communist Studies 37 (3), 
281–318. 
O’Loughlin,  J.,  G.  Ó  Tuathail  &  V.  Kolossov  (2006):  The  Geopolitical Orientations  of 
Ordinary Russians: A Public Opinion Analysis. Eurasian Geography and Economics 
48 (2), 129–152. 
Ohmae, K. (1990): The Borderless World. New York: Harper. 
Ohmae, K.  (1995): The End of  the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economics. New York: 
Free Press. 
Ojajärvi,  S.  &  S.  Valtonen  (2011):  Karhun  ja  kassakoneen  naapurissa:  journalismin  ja 
kansalaisten Venäjät. In: Lounasmeri, L. (ed.) Näin naapurista: Median ja kansalaisten 
Venäjä‐kuvat, 19–67. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Ollus, S‐E. & H. Simola (2007): Finnish Re‐exports to Russia. BOFIT Online 5. 
Olsen, J.P.  (2002): The Many Faces of Europeanization.  Journal of Common Market Studies 
40 (5), 921–952. 
Olsen,  J.P.  (2003): Towards a European administrative  space?  Journal of European Public 
Policy 10 (4), 506–531. 
Olsson, G. (1991): Lines of Power/Limits of Language. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Öniş,  Z.  &  F.  Şenses  (2005):  Rethinking  the  Emerging  Post‐Washington  Consensus. 
Development and Change 36 (2), 263–290. 
Osborne, D. & T. Gaebler (1992): Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is 
Transforming the Public Sector. New York: Penguin.  
Paasi,  A.  (1986):  The  Institutionalisation  of  Regions:  A  Theoretical  Framework  for 
Understanding  the  Emergence  of  Regions  and  the  Constitution  of  Regional 
Identity. Fennia 164, 105–146.  
Paasi,  A.  (1992):  The  Construction  of  Socio‐spatial  Consciousness:  Geographical 
Perspectives  on  the  History  and  Contexts  of  Finnish  Nationalism.  Nordisk 
samhällsgeografisk tidskrift 15, 79–100.  
Paasi, A.  (1996): Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of  the 
Finnish‐Russian Border. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Paasi, A.  (1997): Geographical Perspectives on Finnish National  Identity. Geojournal 43, 
41–50.  
Paasi, A.  (1999a): The Political Geography of Boundaries at  the End of  the Millennium: 
Challenges of the De‐Territorializing World. In: Eskelinen, H, I. Liikanen & J. Oksa 
(eds) Curtains of Iron and Gold. Reconstructuring Borders and Scales of Interaction, 9–
24. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Paasi,  A.  (1999b):  Boundaries  as  Social  Practice  and  Discourse:  The  Finnish‐Russian 
Border. Regional Studies 33 (7), 669–680. 
Paasi, A. (1999c): Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows. In: 
Newman, D.  (ed.)  Boundaries, Territory  and Postmodernity,  69–88.  London:  Frank 
Class. 
 440     
 
Paasi,  A.  (2001):  Europe  as  a  social  Process  and  Discourse:  Considerations  of  Place, 
Boundaries and Identity. European Urban and Regional Studies 8 (1), 7–28. 
Paasi,  A.  (2005a):  The  Changing  Discourses  on  Political  Boundaries:  Mapping  the 
Backgrounds,  Contexts  and  Contents.  In: Houtum,  van H.,  O.  Kramsch  & W. 
Zierhofer (eds) B/Ordering The World, 17–31. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Paasi, A. (2005b): Generations and the Development of Border Studies. Geopolitics 10 (4), 
663–671. 
Paasi, A. (2009): Bounded Spaces in a ‘Borderless World’: Border Studies, Power and the 
Anatomy of Territory. Journal of Power 2 (2), 213–234. 
Paasi,  A.  (2010):  Border  Studies  and  the  Challenge  of  Relational  Thinking.  Paper 
presented  at  the  2010 European Conference  of  the Association  For Borderlands 
Studies, 24 September 2010, Veroia, Greece. 
Paasi, A.  (2011): Borders, Theory and  the Challenge of Relational  thinking.  In:  Johnson, 
C.,  R.  Jones, A.  Paasi,  L. Amoore, A. Mountz, M.  Salter, &  C.  Rumford  (Joint 
Article):  Interventions  on  Rethinking  ‘the  Border’  in  Border  Studies.  Political 
Geography 30 (2), 62–63. 
Paasi,  A.  &  E.‐K.  Prokkola  (2008):  Territorial  Dynamics,  Cross‐Border  Work  and 
Everyday Life in the Finnish‐Swedish Border Area. Space and Polity 12 (1), 13–29. 
Paasikivi,  J. K.  (1958):  Toimintani Moskovassa  ja Suomessa  1939‐41,  I  – Talvisota.  Porvoo: 
WSOY. 
Paavonen, T.  (1991): The FINN‐EFTA Agreement as a Turning Point  in  the Finnish Foreign 
Economic Policy. Turku: University of Turku. 
Paavonen, T.  (2001):  From  Isolation  to  the Core:  Finland’s  Position  towards European 
Integration, 1960–1995. The Journal of European Integration History 7 (1), 53–75. 
Paavonen,  T.  (2008):  Vapaakauppaintegraation  kausi:  Suomen  suhde  Länsi‐Euroopan 
integraatioon  FINN‐EFTAsta  EC‐vapaakauppaan.  Helsinki:  The  Finnish  Literature 
Society. 
Pagden, A. (2002): Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent. In: Pagden, A. (ed.): The Idea of 
Europe.  From  Antiquity  to  the  European  Union,  33–54  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press.  
Page, B. I.  (1996): Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Page, S. J. & M. T. Sinclair (1993): The Euroregion: A New Framework  for Tourism and 
Regional Development. Regional Studies 27 (5), 475–483. 
Papadakis,  Y.  (2005):  Echoes  from  the Dead Zone: Across  the Cyprus Divide.  London:  I.B. 
Tauris. 
Parker, N., N. Vaughan‐Williams, L. Bialasiewicz, S. Bulmer, B. Carver, R. Durie, et al. 
(2009): Lines in the sand? Towards an agenda for critical border studies. Geopolitics 
14 (3), 582–587. 
Pättiniemi  P.  (2006):  Social Enterprises  as  Labour Market Measure. Kuopio: University  of 
Kuopio.  
Pättiniemi,  P.  (2004): Work  Integration  Social Enterprises  in  Finland. Working.  Papers 
Series, no. 04/07, Liège: EMES European Research Network.  
     441 
 
Pättiniemi, P. (2008): Finland. In: Defourny, J. & V. Pestoff (eds) Images and Concepts of the 
Third Sector in Europe. EMES European Research Network WP no. 08/02. 
Pavlakovich‐Kochi,  V.,  B.  J.  Morehouse  &  D.  Wastl‐Walter  (eds)  (2004):  Challenged 
Borderlands: Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Payan, T. (2011): Theory‐Building in Border Studies: What the Borders of North America 
Have to Teach Us. Paper Presented at the 3rd International Winter Symposium of 
the Global COE Program  “Reshaping  Japan’s Border  Studies”  on  25 November 
2011, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan 
Pearce, J. (2003): Social Enterprise in Anytown. London: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. 
Peddle, D. (2000): Hegel’s Political Ideal: Civil Society, History And Sittlichkeit. Animus 5, 
113–143. 
Peirce, C. S. (1931–58): The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Eds Hartshorne, C., P. 
Weiss (Vols. 1–6) & Burks, A. (Vols. 7–8). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Peirce, C. S. (1960): Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume I. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Peirce, C. S. (1976): The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce. Ed. Eisele, C. The 
Hague: Mouton Publishers and Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press. 
Perälä,  R.  (2006):  Helsingin  Sanomat  1920‐luvulla.  Available  through: 
www.yle.fi/elavaarkisto (May 22, 2012). 
Perkmann,  M.  (2003a):  Cross‐border  Regions  in  Europe:  Significance  and  Drivers  of 
Regional Cross‐border Co‐operation. European Urban  and Regional Studies  10  (2), 
153–171. 
Perkmann,  M.  (2003b):  The  Rise  of  the  Euroregion: A  Bird’s  Eye  Perspective  on  European 
Cross‐border Cooperation. Lancaster: Lancaster University. 
Perkmann, M. & N‐L. Sum (2002): Scales, Discourses and Governance. In: Perkmann, M. 
&  N.‐L.  Sum  (eds)  Globalization,  Regionalization  and  Cross‐border  Regions,  3–21. 
Houndsmills: Palgrave.  
Pernaa, V. (2002): Tehtävänä Neuvostoliitto: Opetusministeriön Neuvostoliittoinstituutin roolit 
suomalaisessa politiikassa 1944–1992. Helsinki: The  Institute  for Russia and Eastern 
Europe. 
Perrin, A.  J.  (2006):  Citizen Speak: The Democratic  Imagination  in American Life. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Perrin, A.  J. &  S. B. Vaisey  (2008):  Parallel  Public  Spheres: Distance  and Discourse  in 
Letters to the Editor. American Journal of Sociology 114 (3), 781–810. 
Pestoff, V. (1991): Between the Market & Politics: Cooperatives in Sweden. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
Pestoff, V.  (1998): Beyond  the Market and State: Civil Democracy and Social Enterprises  in a 
Welfare Society. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Petersen, K.  (2011): National, Nordic  and Trans‐Nordic: Transnational  Perspectives  on 
the History  of  The Nordic Welfare  States.  In: Kettunen,  P. & K.  Petersen  (eds) 
Beyond  Welfare  State  Models.  Transnational  Perspectives  on  Social  Policy,  41–64. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 442     
 
Peterson, J. & M. Shackleton (2002): The EU’s Institutions: An Overview. In: Peterson, J. & 
M. Shackleton (eds) The Institutions of the European Union, 1–21. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pickles, J. (2003): A History of Space. London: Routledge 
Pietiläinen,  J.  (2001):  Venäjä  ulkomaan  uutisoinnin  kohteena:  erikoistapaus?  In: 
Lounasmeri, L.  (ed.) Näin naapurista: Median  ja kansalaisten Venäjä‐kuvat, 171–189. 
Tampere: Vastapaino. 
 Pietrzyk, D.  (2001):  Civil  Society  –  Conceptual History  from Hobbes  to Marx. Marie 
Curie Working Papers – No. 1. University of Wales: Aberystwyth. 
Piper, H. (1978): Realistic Finns Resent Term Finlandization. The Baltimore Sun 17 January 
1978. 
Plamenatz,  J.  (1973): Two Types of Nationalism.  In: Kamenka, E.  (ed.) Nationalism: The 
Nature  and Evolution  of  an  Idea,  23–36. Canberra: Australian National University 
Press. 
Popescu,  G.  (2008):  The  Conflicting  Logics  of  Cross‐Border  Reterritorialization: 
Geopolitics of Euroregions in Eastern Europe. Political Geography 7 (4), 418–438.  
Popescu, G. (2011): Bordering and Ordering the Twenty‐first Century: Understanding Borders. 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Poutiainen,  V.‐M.  (2009):  Social  Economy  in  Finland.  Paper  presented  at  the  second 
International CIRIEC Research Conference  on  the  Social Economy,  1–2 October 
2009, Östersund. 
Powell, W. W.  (1990): Neither Markets nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. 
Research in Organizational Behavior 12, 295–336. 
Prescott, J. R. V. (1965): The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries. Chicago: Aldine. 
Prescott, J. R. V. (1987): Political Frontiers and Boundaries. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Pries, L.  (1999): New Migration  in Transnational Space.  In: Pries, L.  (ed.) Migration and 
Transnational Social Spaces, 1–35. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Pries,  L.  (2001):  The  Approach  of  Transnational  Social  Spaces:  Responding  to  New 
Configurations of  the Social and  the Spatial.  In: Pries, L.  (ed.) New Transnational 
Social  Spaces:  International Migration  and  Transnational  Companies,  3–33.  London: 
Routledge. 
Pries,  L.  (2005):  Configurations  of  Geographic  and  Societal  Spaces:  A  Sociological 
Proposal between ‘Methodological Nationalism’ and the ‘Spaces of Flows’. Global 
Networks 5 (2), 167–190. 
Pries, L.  (2007): Transnationalism: Trendy Catch‐all or Specific Research Programme? A 
Proposal for Transnational Organization Studies as a Micro‐Macro‐Link. Working 
Paper  34/2007.  Bielefeld:  COMCAD—Center  on  Migration,  Citizenship  and 
Development. 
Pries, L. (ed.): (2008): Rethinking Transnationalism: The Meso‐Link of Organizations. London: 
Routledge 
Prokkola, E.‐K.  (2011): Cross‐Border Regionalization,  the  INTERREG  III  Initiative,  and 
Local Cooperation at  the Finnish‐Swedish Border. Environment and Planning A 43 
(5), 1190–1208. 
     443 
 
Prozorov, S. (2004): Border Regions and the Politics of EU‐Russian Relations – The Role of 
the EU  in Tempering and Producing Border Conflicts. Working Papers Series  in 
EU Border Conflict Studies No. 3. Copenhagen: Danish Institute For International 
Studies.  
Prozorov,  S.  (2006):  Understanding  Conflict  Between  Russia  and  the  EU:  The  Limits  of 
Integration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Przeworski, A.  (2000): Democracy  and  the Market: Political  Institutions  and Material Well‐
Being in the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Public Chamber (2007): Report Devoted to Status of Civil Society in Russian Federation. 
Moscow: Reports of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. 
Pulkkinen, T. (1989): Valtio ja vapaus. Helsinki: Tutkijaliitto. 
Pursiainen,  C.  (1998):  Venäläisillä  heikko  usko  demokratiaan.  Helsingin  Sanomat  23 
December 1998. 
Putnam,  R.  (1993): Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions  in Modern  Italy.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Putnam,  R.  (1995):  Bowling  Alone:  America’s  Declining  Social  Capital.  Journal  of 
Democracy 6 (1), 65–78. 
Putnam, R.  (2000): Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Radaelli,  C. M.  (2000): Whither  Europeanization?  Concept  Stretching  and  Substantive 
Change. Integration online papers (EIoP) 4 (8). 
Radaelli, C. M. (2003): The Europeanization of Public Policy. In: Featherstone, K. & C. M. 
Radaelli  (eds)  The  Politics  of  Europeanization,  27–56.  Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press. 
Radaelli,  C. M.  (2004):  Europeanization:  Solution  or  Problem?  Integration  online  papers 
(EIoP) 8 (16). 
Raik, K.  (2006): Promoting Democracy  through Civil Society: How  to Step Up  the EU’s 
Policy Towards  the Eastern Neighbourhood. CEPS Working Paper 237. Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies. 
Rainio‐Niemi,  J.  (2010):  State  Committee  in  Finland  in  Historical  Comparative 
Perspective.  In: Alapuro, R. & H.  Stenius  (eds) Nordic Associations  in a European 
Perspective, 241–267. Baden‐Baden: Nomos. 
Raittila, P. (1988): Suomalaisnuoret ja idän ihmemaa. Helsinki: Valtion painatuskeskus. 
Raittila,  P.  (2002):  Etniset  aiheet,  vähemmistöt  ja  niiden  suhteet  suomalaisessa 
journalismissa vuonna 2000.  In: Raittila, P.  (ed.) Etnisyys  ja rasismi  journalismissa, 
31–108. Tampere: University of Tampere Press. 
Raittila, P.  (2011): Venäjä kansalaismielipiteenä.  In: Lounasmeri, L.  (ed.) Näin naapurista: 
Median ja kansalaisten Venäjä‐kuvat, 125–168. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Ratti, R.  (1993): Spatial and Economic Effects of Frontiers: Overview of Traditional and 
New Approaches  and  Theories  of  Border Area Development.  In: Ratti, R. &  S. 
Reichman (eds) Theory and practice of Transborder Cooperation, 23–54. Basel: Helbing 
& Lichtenhahn. 
Ratzel, F.  (1903): Politische geographie: Oder die geographie der staaten, des verkehres und des 
krieges. Munich: Oldenbourg. 
 444     
 
Rauscher,  L.  &  B.  H.  Greenfield  (2009):  Advancements  in  Contemporary  Physical 
Therapy Research: Use of Mixed Methods Designs. Physical Therapy 89 (1), 91–100. 
Rawls, J. (1971): A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Reader,  B.  (2001):  Should  ‘a  Citizen’  Have  His  Say?  A  Historical  Argument  for  the 
Publication  of Unsigned  Commentary  in  ‘Letters  to  the  Editor’  Forums.  Paper 
presented AEJMC conference, 5–8 August 2001, Washington, D.C.  
Reah, D. (1998): The Language of Newspapers. London: Routledge. 
Reclus, E.  (1982): LʹHomme et  la terre,  reissued with an  introduction by B. Giblin. Paris: 
Maspero. 
Renfro, P. C. (1979): Bias in Selection of Letters to the Editor. Journalism Quarterly 56, 822–
826.  
Restakis,  J.  (2006): Defining  the  Social Economy  – The BC Context. Available  through: 
bcca.coop/sites/bcca.coop/ (October 2, 2011). 
Rhonheimer, M. (2005): The Political Ethos of Constitutional Democracy and the Place of 
Natural  Law  in  Public  Reason:  Rawls’s  “Political  Liberalism”  Revisited.  The 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 50 (1), 1–70. 
Richardson,  J.  E.  (2007):  Analyzing  Newspapers:  An  Approach  from  Critical  Discourse 
Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Richter, M. (1998): Montesquieu and the Concept of Civil Society. The European Legacy 3 
(6), 33–41. 
Ridley‐Duff, R.  J.  (2008):  Social Enterprise  as  a  Socially Rational Business.  International 
Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research 14 (5), 291–312. 
Risse‐Kappen, T. (1996): Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory 
and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet  the European Union.  Journal of Common 
Market Studies 34 (1), 53–79. 
Risse‐Kappen,  T.  (ed.)  (1995):  Bringing Transnational Relations Back  In: Non‐State Actors, 
Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Rodriguez, A. (2008): Hobbled NGOs Wary of Medvedev: Watchdogs are Civil Lifeline in 
Lawless Russia. Chicago Tribune 7 May 2008. 
Romanow, W. I., W. D. Soderlund, R. H. Wagenberg & E. D. Briggs (1981): Letters to the 
Editor  in a Canadian Federal Election: Hard News, Editors’ Cues And Readers’ 
Views. Journalism Quarterly 58, 57–68. 
Ronfeldt, D. & J. Arquilla (2001): Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future. First 
Monday 6 (10). 
Rosenau J. N. (1999): Towards an Ontology for Global Governance. In: Hewson, M. & T. J. 
Sinclair  (eds)  Approaches  to  Global  Governance  Theory,  287–301.  Albany:  SUNY 
Press. 
Rosenau,  J. N.  (2004):  Strong Demand, Huge  Supply.  In: Bache,  I. & M. Flinders  (eds) 
Multi‐Level Governance, 31–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rosenau,  J. N.  (2005): Global Governance as Disaggregated Complexity.  In: Ba, A. D. & 
M.  J.  Hoffmann  (eds)  Contending  Perspectives  on  Global  Governance:  Coherence, 
Contestation and World Order, 131–153. London: Routledge. 
Rosenthal, I. (1969): Who Writes the “Letters to the Editor”? Saturday Review 52, 114–115. 
     445 
 
Rosière,  S. & R.  Jones  (2012):  Teichopolitics: Reconsidering Globalization  Through  the 
Role of Walls and Fences. Geopolitics 17 (1), 217–234. 
Rothstein, B.  (2002):  Social Capital  in  the  Social Democratic  State.  In: Putnam, R.  (ed.) 
Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Societies, 289–332. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rouge‐Oikarinen,  R.  (2009):  Rajan  ylittävä  yhteistyö  muuttuvassa  Euroopassa:  Euroopan 
unionin  Tacis‐ohjelma  (1996–2004)  Suomen  lähialueyhteistyön  toteuttamisvälineenä. 
Oulu: Multiprint. 
Round.  J.  (2008):  The  Economic  Marginalisation  of  Post‐Soviet  Russia’s  Elderly 
Population and  the Failure of State Ageing Policy.  In: Goodman, R. & S. Harper 
(eds) Ageing  in Asia: Asia’s Position  in  the New Global Demography,  68–84. Oxford: 
Routledge. 
Rovisco, M.  (2010):  Reframing  Europe  and  the Global: Conceptualizing  the  Border  in 
Cultural Encounters. Environment & Planning D: Society & Space 28 (6), 1015–1030. 
Rowe, C.  (2009): On  the  Front  Line: How Regional Representations  in Brussels  Shape 
Intergovernmental  Relations  pan  Europe.  ESRC  Seminar  Series:  Reforming 
Intergovernmental  Relations  in  a  Context  of  Party  Political  Incongruence. 
Brussels. 
Rufin, J.‐C. (2001): L’empire et les nouveaux barbares. Paris: JC Lattès. 
Rumford, C. (2006): Theorizing Borders. European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2), 155–169. 
Rumford, C. (2008): Citizens and Borderwork in Contemporary Europe. London: Routledge. 
Rumford,  C.  (2011):  Interventions  on  Rethinking  ‘the  Border’  in  Border  Studies.  Joint 
articles with  Johnson, C., R.  Jones, A. Paasi, L. Amoore, A. Mountz & M. Salter. 
Political Geography 30 (2), 61–69. 
Rumyantsev, A.  (2012): Comment by  the Russian  ambassador  to Finland  regarding  an 
article  in Helsingin  Sanomat. Available  at:  http://www.rusembassy.fi/OpenFiles
/01.09.2012.pdf (October 12, 2012). 
Ruzza,  C.  (2000):  The  Europeanization  of  Environmental  and  Tourism  Policy  and 
Southern Europe. Innovation 13 (3), 291–310. 
Ruzza,  C.  (2010):  Commentary:  Explaining  Policy  Outcomes  and  Third  Sector 
Europeanization. Journal of Civil Society 6 (1), 81–85. 
Rytövuori‐Apunen, H. (2007): Unionin ajan idänpolitiikka. Helsinki: Edita Publishing. 
Sack, R. D. (1983): Human Territoriality: A Theory. Annals of American Geographers 73 (1), 
55–74. 
Sahlins,  P.  (1989):  Boundaries: The Making  of  France  and  Spain  in  the Pyrenees.  Berkeley: 
University of California Press.  
Saksa, A. (2010): On aika lisätä tiedeyhteistyötä Venäjän kanssa. Helsingin Sanomat 9 April 
2010. 
Sakwa,  R.  (2006):  Introduction:  the  Many  Dimensions  of  Europe  in  Contemporary 
Europe.  In:  Sakwa,  R.  &  A.  Stevens  (eds)  Contemporary  Europe,  1–28.  London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Sakwa,  R.  (2010):  Russia  and  Turkey:  Rethinking  Europe  to  Contest Outsider  Status. 
Russia. Nei.Visions 51. 
 446     
 
Salamon, L. M., S. W. Sokolowski & R. List (2004): Global Civil Society: An Overview. In: 
Salamon,  L. M.  &  S.W.  Sokolowski  (eds)  Global  Civil  Society: Dimensions  of  the 
Nonprofit Sector, 3–60. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. 
Salmenniemi,  S.  (2005): Civic Activity  –  Feminine Activity? Gender, Civil  Society  and 
Citizenship in Post‐Soviet Russia. Sociology 39 (4), 735–753. 
Salmenniemi, S.  (2007): Growing Flowers in the Frost: Civic Activity, Citizenship and Gender 
in Russia. Doctoral dissertation. Helsinki: Department of Sociology, University of 
Helsinki. 
Salmenniemi,  S.  (2008):  Kansalaisyhteiskuntateoria  ja  postsosialismi.  Sosiologia  45  (2), 
104–117. 
Sanoma  News  (2008):  Päivälehdestä  mediakonserniksi.  Available  through: 
www.sanomanews.com/historia (November 29, 2011). 
Sasse, G.  (2008): The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited  for  the 
EU’s Eastern Neighbours. Europe‐Asia Studies 60 (2), 295–316. 
Sassen, S. (1996): Losing Control. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Saukkonen,  P.  (2006):  Suomen  poliittinen  järjestelmä  –  verkko‐oppikirja.  Available 
through: blogs.helsinki.fi/vol‐spj (August 29, 2011). 
Saussure,  de  F.  (1983  [1916]):  Course  in General  Linguistics.  Trans.  Harris,  R.  London: 
Duckworth. 
Schack, M. (2000): On the Multicontextual Character of Border Regions. In: Velde, van der 
M. & H. van Houtum (ed.): Borders, Regions and People, 202–219. London: Pion. 
Schelde, van der B. & G.A. Hœkveld (1992): The Regional Development of Borderlands: 
An Explorative Study  in  the Franco‐Italian Alps. Cashiers de Géographie du Québec 
36 (99), 483–500. 
Schendel,  van W.  (2005):  Spaces  of  Engagement: How  Borderlands,  Illicit  Flows,  and 
Territorial States  Interlock.  In: Schendel, van W. &  I. Abraham  (eds)  Illicit Flows 
and  Criminal  Things:  States,  Borders,  and  the  Other  Side  of  Globalization,  38–68. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Schlesinger, P. (1998): Scotland’s Parliament: Devolution, the Media and Political Culture. 
ARENA Working Papers WP 98/3. University of Oslo. 
Schofer,  E.  &  M.  Fourcade‐Gourinchas  (2001):  The  Structural  Contexts  of  Civic 
Engagement:  Voluntary  Association  Membership  in  Comparative  Perspective. 
American Sociological Review 66 (6), 806–828. 
Scott, J. C. (1998): Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve The Human Condition 
Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Scott,  J.  W.  (1999):  European  and  North  American  Contexts  for  Cross‐border 
Regionalism. Regional Studies 33 (7), 605–617. 
Scott,  J. W.  (2002): A Networked Space of Meaning? Spatial Politics as Geostrategies of 
European Integration. Space and Polity 6 (2), 147–167. 
Scott,  J. W.  (2005): The EU and  ‘Wider Europe’: Towards an Alternative Geopolitics of 
Regional Cooperation? Geopolitics 10 (3), 429–454. 
Scott, J. W. (2006): A Review of Eiki Berg and Henk van Houtum (eds) Mapping Borders 
Between Territories, Discourses and Practices. GeoJournal 67 (1), 103–105. 
     447 
 
Scott,  J. W.  (2009):  Bordering  and Ordering  the  European Neighbourhood: A  Critical 
Perspective on EU Territoriality and Geopolitics. Trames 13 (3), 232–247.  
Scott,  J.  W.  (2012):  EUBORDERSCAPES:  Bordering,  Political  Landscapes  and  Social 
Arenas:  Potentials  and Challenges  of  Evolving  Border Concepts  in  a  post‐Cold 
War World. Presentation  at  the Borderscapes  III Conference  in Trieste  Italy,  28 
June 2012. 
Scott, J. W. & H. van Houtum (2009): Reflections on EU Territoriality and the ‘Bordering’ 
of Europe. Political Geography 28 (5), 271–273. 
Scott, J. W. & I. Liikanen (2010): Civil Society and the ‘Neighbourhood’ – Europeanization 
through Cross‐Border Cooperation? Journal of European Integration 32 (5), 423–438. 
Scott, J. W. & J. Laine (2012): Borderwork: Finnish‐Russian Co‐operation and Civil Society 
Engagement in the Social Economy of Transformation. Entrepreneurship & Regional 
Development 24 (3–4), 181–197. 
Seligman, A. B. (1992): The Problem of Trust. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Sending,  O.  J.  &  I.  B.  Neumann  (2006):  Governance  to  Governmentality:  Analyzing 
NGOs, States, and Power. International Studies Quarterly 50 (3), 651–672. 
Seppänen, E.  (2010): Venäjä vanha tuttu, vaan niin vieras. Suomen naapurikuvan todet, luulot 
ja harhat. Helsinki: Tammi. 
Setianto,  B.  D.  (2007):  Somewhere  in  Between:  Conceptualizing  Civil  Society.  The 
International Journal of Not‐for‐Profit Law 10 (1). 
Sharp,  J.  (2000):  Condensing  the  Cold  War:  Reader’s  Digest  and  American  Identity. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
Shields, R. (1991): Places on the Margin. London: Routledge. 
Shklovski,  I. & D. Struthers  (2010): Of States  and Borders on  the  Internet: The Role of 
Domain Name Extensions  in Expressions of Nationalism Online  in Kazakhstan. 
Policy & Internet 2 (4), 107–129.  
Shlyamin,  V.  (2000):  Oral  statement  in  a  neighboring  area  seminar  organized  in 
Tohmajärvi, Finland on 19 December 2000. 
Shlyamin, V. (2001): Euregio Karelia – New Challenges and New Opportunities. Bulletin 
N1 of  the TACIS Project “Euregio Karelia as a Tool of Civil Society”. Available 
through: www.gov.karelia.ru/News/2001/0518_01a_e (March 19, 2010). 
Sidaway, J. D. (2001): Rebuilding Bridges: A Critical Geopolitics of Iberian Transfrontier 
Cooperation in a European Context. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
19 (6), 743–778. 
Sigelman,  L.  &  B.  J.  Walkosz  (1992):  Letters  to  the  Editor  as  a  Public  Opinion 
Thermometer:  The Martin  Luther King Holiday  Vote  in Arizona.  Social  Science 
Quarterly 73 (4), 938–946. 
Siisiäinen, M.  (1991):  Associations. Atlas  of  Finland, Appendix  321. Helsinki: National 
Board of Survey & Geographical Society of Finland. 
Siisiäinen, M. (1992): Social Movements, Voluntary Associations and Cycles of Protest in 
Finland 1905–91. Scandinavian Political Studies 15 (1), 21–40. 
Siisiäinen,  M.  (1996):  Yhteiskunnalliset  liikkeet,  yhdistykset  ja  hyvinvointivaltio.  In: 
Matthies,  A.‐L.,  U.  Kotakari  &  M.  Nylund  (eds)  Välittävät  verkostot,  33–48. 
Jyväskylä: Osuuskunta Vastapaino. 
 448     
 
Siisiäinen, M. (1999a): Sosiaalinen pääoma, valta ja kolmas sektori. In: Hokkanen, L. P., P. 
Kinnunen & M. Siisiäinen  (eds) Haastava kolmas sektori, 10–13.  Jyväskylä: Finnish 
Federation for Social Welfare and Health. 
Siisiäinen, M. (1999b): Voluntary Associations and Social Capital in Finland. In: Dept, van 
J.,  M.  Maraffi,  K.  Newton  &  P.  Whiteley  (eds)  Social  Capital  and  European 
Democracy, 120–143. London: Routledge. 
Siisiäinen,  M.  (2005):  Sosiaali‐  ja  terveysalan  järjestöjen  kehityssuuntia  Suomessa.  In: 
Leppänen,  A.  (ed.)  Kansalaisyhteiskunta  liikkeessä  yli  rajojen,  244–251.  Helsinki: 
Palmenia Publishing. 
Siisiäinen, M.  (2009): New  and Old Associations  as Trusting Networks: Tracing  Social 
Capital  in  Jyväskylä.  In:  Häkli,  J.  &  C.  Minca  (eds)  Social  Capital  and  Urban 
Networks of Trust, 267–294. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Siisiäinen, M. & R. Blom (2009): Associational Activeness and Attitudes towards Political 
Citizenship  in Finland  from a Comparative Perspective.  Journal of Civil Society 5 
(3), 265–281. 
Siisiäinen, M. &  T.  Kankainen  (2009):  Yhdistys. Available  through:  kans.jyu.fi/sanasto
/sanat‐kansio/yhdistys (July 13, 2011). 
Simmel, G. (1997): The Sociology of Space. Trans. Ritter, M. & D. Frisby. In: Frisby, D. & 
M. Featherstone (eds) Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings, 137–170. London: Sage. 
Singletary, M. (1976): How the Public Perceives Letters to the Editor. Journalism Quarterly 
53 (3), 535–537. 
Singletary,  M.  &  M.  Cowling  (1979):  Letters  to  the  Editor  of  the  Non‐daily  Press. 
Journalism Quarterly 56 (1), 165–168. 
Skelcher,  C., N. Mathur  & M.  Smith  (2005):  The  Public  Governance  of  Collaborative 
Spaces: Discourse, Design and Democracy. Public Administration 83 (3), 573–559. 
Skinner, Q. (1996): Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Skvortsova, A. (2000): The Third Sector  in Russia. Lecture at the University of Bielefeld, 
Germany on 1 November 2000. 
Skvortsova,  A.  (2005):  Yhteistyön  pietarilaiset  ulottuvuudet.  In:  Leppänen,  A.  (ed.) 
Kansalasiyhteiskunta liikkeessä yli rajojen, 31–40. Helsinki: Palmenia Publishing. 
Smismans,  S.  (2003):  ‘Civil  Society’  in  European  Institutional  Discourses.  Paris:  Centre 
d’études européennes at Sciences Po. 
Smith, A. (1976 [1759]): Theory of Moral Sentiment. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Smith, A.  (1993  [1776]): The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, A. D. (1986): The Ethnic Origins of Nations. New York: Blackwell. 
Smith, A. D. (1995): Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Smith,  A.  D.  (1998):  Nationalism  and Modernism:  a  Critical  Survey  of  Recent  Theories  of 
Nations and Nationalism. London: Routledge. 
Smith,  A.  D.  (2000):  The Nation  in History: Historiographical Debates  about  Ethnicity  and 
Nationalism. Hanover: University Press of New England. 
Smith, A. D. (2001): Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
     449 
 
Smith,  A.  D.  (2009):  Ethno‐symbolism  and  Nationalism:  A  Cultural  Approach.  London: 
Routledge. 
Smith, J. (2012): The Problem of Succession in Russia, 1019‐2012. Paper presented during 
the VERA Day, 4 May 2012, Joensuu, Finland. 
Snellman,  J. V.  (1993 1842): Läran om staten.  In: Numminen,  J.  (ed.) Samlade arbeten III 
1842–23, 297–448. Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office. 
Social  Economy  Europe  (2012):  Social  Economy  and  the  European  Union.  Available 
through: www.socialeconomy.eu.org/spip.php?rubrique181 (April 2, 2012). 
Social  Economy  Lisburn  (2012):  What  is  Social  Economy?  Available  through: 
www.socialeconomylisburn.org (April 2, 2012). 
Soderlund, W. & K. Hildebrandt  (2001): Does Press Ownership Affect Content? A Pre‐ 
and  Post‐Study  of  the  1996  Hollinger  Corporation  Acquisition  of  Canadian 
Newspapers.  Paper  presented  to  the  annual meeting  of  the  Canadian  Political 
Science Association, Quebec City, Canada. 
Sperling,  V.  (1999): Organizing Women  in Contemporary Russia.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Sperling,  V.  (2006):  Women’s  Organizations:  Institutionalized  Interest  Groups  or 
Vulnerable Dissidents?  In: Evans, A., L. McIntosh  Sundstrom & L. Henry  (eds) 
Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment, 161–177. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 
Steiner, M. & D. Sturn (1993): From Coexistence to Cooperation: The Changing Character 
of  Austria’s  Southeastern  Border.  In:  Ratti  R.  &  S.  Reichman  (eds)  Theory  and 
Practice of Transborder Cooperation, 347–376. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhain. 
Stenius, H.  (1980): The Breakthrough of  the Principle of Mass Organization  in Finland. 
Scandinavian Journal of History 5 (1–4), 197–217. 
Stenius, H.  (1983): Massorganisation  och  nationell  sammanhållning.  Sosiologia  20,  112–
124.  
Stenius, H. (1987): Frivilligt, jämlikt, samfällt: föreningsväsendets utveckling i Finland fram till 
1900‐talets  början  med  speciell  hänsyn  till  massorganisationsprincipens  genombrott. 
Ekenäs: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland.  
Stenius, H. (1988): The Adoptation of the Principle of Association in Finland. Scandinavian 
Journal of History 13 (4), 345–354. 
Stenius, H. (2003): State, Citizenship and Civil Society. In: Götz, N. & J. Hackmann (eds) 
Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region, 17–25. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Stenius,  H.  (2010):  Nordic  Associational  Life  in  a  European  and  an  Inter‐Nordic 
Perspective.  In: Alapuro, R. & H.  Stenius  (eds) Nordic Associations  in a European 
Perspective, 29–86. Baden‐Baden: Nomos. 
Stepanenko, V. (2006): Civil Society in Post‐Soviet Ukraine: Civic Ethos in the Framework 
of Corrupted Sociality? East European Politics and Society 20 (4), 571–597. 
Stoddard,  T.  L.  (1974):  Area  Handbook  for  Finland.  Washington,  DC:  United  States 
Government Printing Office. 
Stokke,  O.  S.  (1997):  Regimes  as  Governance  Systems.  In:  Young,  O.  R.  (ed.)  Global 
Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience, 27–63. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
 450     
 
Stone  Sweet,  A.  &  W.  Sandholtz  (1997):  European  Integration  and  Supranational 
Governance. Journal of European Public Policy 4 (3), 297–317. 
Stone  Sweet, A., W.  Sandholtz & N.  Fligstein  (2001):  The  Institutionalization  of Europe. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stranius, L.  (2008a): Yksilöllinen kevytaktivismi haastaa perinteisen kansalaistoiminnan. 
Available  through:  www.kansalaisfoorumi.fi/aktiivinen‐kansalaisuus  (May  25, 
2011). 
Stranius,  L.  (2008b): Yksilöllinen  kevytaktivismi  on  uutta  kansalaistoimintaa. Helsingin 
Sanomat 1 July 2008. 
Strober, M. H. (2006): Habits of the Mind: Challenges for Multidisciplinary Engagement. 
Social Epistemology 20 (3–4), 315–331. 
Struyk, R. J. (2002): Nonprofit Organizations as Contracted Local Social Service Providers 
in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States.  Public 
Administration and Development 22 (5), 429–437.  
Struyk,  R.  J.  (2003):  Contracting with NGOs  for  Social  Services: Building Civil  Society  and 
Efficient Local Government in Russia. Chicago: Urban Institute.  
Stubb, A. (2008), Venäjään on suhtauduttava ilman komplekseja siitä, mitä Neuvostoliitto 
joskus aikoinaan on ollut. Savon Sanomat 23 April 2008. 
Stubb, A. (2009): Foreword. Northern Dimension. Publications of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 
Sulkunen, I. (1987): Naisten  järjestäytyminen  ja kaksijakoinen kansalaisuus. In: Alapuro, 
R.,  I.  Liikanen, K.  Smeds & H.  Stenius  (eds) Kansa  liikkeessä,  157–175. Helsinki: 
Kirjayhtymä. 
Sundstrom, L. M. (2006): Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in 
Russia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Sutela,  P.  (2001):  Finnish  Relations  with  Russia  1991–2001:  Better  than  Ever?  Paper 
presented at  the Norwegian  Institute  for Defence Studies  conference on “Living 
Next Door to Russia – the First Ten Years seen From the Neighbours’ Perspective” 
(BOFIT Online 11/2001), 11 October 2001, Oslo. 
Suutarinen,  S.  (2000):  Kansallisen  identiteetin  opettaminen  ja  uuden  vuosituhannen 
haasteet.  In:  Suutarinen,  S.  (ed.) Nuoresta  pätevä  kansalainen,  86–126.  Jyväskylä: 
University of Jyväskylä. 
Tammilehto, O. (eds) (1989): Kun edustajat eivät riitä. Kansalaistoiminnan opas. Juva: WSOY. 
Tarrow,  S.  (2001):  Transnational  Politics:  Contention  and  Institutions  in  International 
Politics. Annual Review of Political Science 4 (1), 1–20. 
Tarrow,  S.  (2005):  The New  Transnational Activism.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press. 
Taylor,  L.  J.  &  M.  Wrenn  (2003):  Forging  New  Relationships:  Social  Capital  in  the 
Transition. Forum for Social Economics 33 (1), 1–11. 
Taylor, P. G.  (1983): The Limits of European  Integration. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Taylor, P.  J.  (1994): The State as Container: Territoriality  in  the Modern World‐System. 
Progress in Human Geography 18 (2), 151–162. 
     451 
 
Taylor, P. J. & C. Flint (2000): Political Geography: World Economy, Nation‐State and Locality. 
Harlow: Prentice Hall. 
Telo, M. (2005): Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order. 
Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Thibault, P. (1991): Social Semiotics as Praxis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Thibault, P. (1993): Editorial: Social Semiotics. The Semiotic Review of Books 4 (3), 1. 
Tikka,  M.  (2009):  Kun  kansa  leikki  kuningasta:  Suomen  suuri  lakko  1905.  Helsinki:  The 
Finnish Literature Society. 
Tilly, C. (1975): Reflections on the History of European State‐Making. In: Tilly, C. (ed.) The 
Formation of National States in Western Europe, 3–84. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Tilly, C. (1991): Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union. Theory and Society 20 (5), 569–580. 
Tilly, C. (1996): The State of Nationalism. Critical Review 10 (2), 299–306.  
Tilmans, K.  (2008): The Concept of  the Citizen  in  the Early‐Modern Netherlands, 1400–
1700. EUI Working Paper MWP No. 2008/31 
Toal,  G.  (1996):  Critical  Geopolitics:  The  Politics  of  Writing  Global  Space.  Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Tocci, N., H. Darbouche, S. Fernandes, R. Hanau‐Santini, G. Noutcheva, M. Emerson & C. 
Portela  (2008):  The  EU  as  a Normative  Foreign  Policy Actor.  Brussels:  Centre  for 
European Policy Studies. 
Tocqueville, de. A. (1969 [1835/1840]): Democracy in America [De la démocratie en Amerique]. 
Trans. Lawrence, G.; Ed. Mayer, J. P. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. 
Topaloglou,  L.,  D.  Kallioras,  P.  Manetos  &  G.  Petrakos  (2005):  A  Border  Regions 
Typology in the Enlarged European Union. Journal of Borderlands Studies 20 (2), 67–
89. 
Torstila, P.  (2011): Speech by Secretary of State Torstila at  the 7th Annual  International 
Conference  Russia/EU/Norway  Cross‐Border  Cooperation  Conference, 
Kaliningrad 22 September 2011.  
Touraine,  A.  (2000):  Can We  Live  Together?  Equality  and Difference.  Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press. 
Tsygankov, A.  P.  (2005): Vladimir Putin’s Vision  of Russia  as  a Normal Great  Power. 
Post‐Soviet Affairs 21 (2), 132–158. 
Tunander, O. (1997): Post‐Cold War Europe: Synthesis of a Bipolar Friend‐Foe Structure 
and  a Hierarchic  Cosmos‐Chaos  Structure?  In:  Tunander, O.,  P.  Bayev &  V.  I. 
Einagel  (eds) Geopolitics in Post‐Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity, 17–44. 
London: Sage. 
Tuomisalo, T. (2009): Aivopesun jälkeen syytäkin metelöidä. Helsingin Sanomat 28 March 
2009. 
Turner, F. J. (1920): The Frontier in American History. New York: H. Holt & Co. 
Turner, G. (1992): British Council Cultural Studies: An Introduction. New York: Routledge.  
Urry,  J.  (2000):  Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities  for  the Twenty‐first Century. London: 
Routledge. 
Urwin, D. W. &  S. Rokkan  (1983): Economy, Territory,  Identity: Politics  of West‐European 
Peripheries. London: Sage. 
 452     
 
Uvin, P.  (2000): From Local Organizations  to Global Governance: The Role of NGOs  in 
International Relations. In: Kendall, S. & P. Uvin (eds) Global Institutions and Local 
Empowerment, 9–29. New York: St. Martin’s Press.  
Van  Dijk,  T.  (1992):  Racism  and  Argumentation:  ‘Race  Riot’  Rhetoric  in  Tabloid 
Editorials.  In:  Eemeren,  van  F.  H.  (ed.)  Argumentation  Illuminated,  242–259. 
Dordrecht: Foris. 
Van  Dijk,  T.  (1995):  Discourse  Analysis  as  Ideology  Analysis.  In:  Schäffner,  C.  &  A. 
Wenden (eds) Language and Pace, 17–33. Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
Van  Dijk,  T.  (1996):  Discourse  Studies:  A  Multidisciplinary  Introduction  (2  Volumes). 
London: Sage. 
Van Til, J. (2000): Growing Civil Society: From Nonprofit Sector to Third Space. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Vartiainen, P.  (1997): Miten globaalinen  ja  lokaalinen  tulee  tietoomme.  In: Ahponen, P. 
(ed.) Riskikirja, 107–122. Jyväskylä: SoPhi. 
Väyrynen,  P.  (2010):  Neighbouring  Area  Cooperation  Must  Invest  in  Economic 
Cooperation. Press release 140/2010 of 4 May 2010. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland.  
Venäläinen,  R.  (2011):  Suomalaisten  kansalaisjärjestöjen  lähialueyhteistyoö Venäjällä  vuosina 
2004–2009.  Helsinki:  Impact  Consulting  Oy,  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  of 
Finland & Edita Oyj. 
Vertovec,  S.  (2004): Transnationalism.  Series  Editor’s  note  in Kramsch, O. &  B. Hooper 
(eds) Cross‐border Governance in the European Union. London: Routledge.  
Vidal  de  la  Blache,  P.  (1913):  Des  caractères  distinctifs  de  la  géographie.  Annales  de 
géographie 22 (124), 289–299. 
Vihavainen  T.  (eds)  (2004):  Venäjän  kahdet  kasvot:  Venäjä‐kuva  suomalaisen  identiteetin 
rakennuskivenä. Helsinki: Edita. 
Vihavainen,  T.  (1991):  Kansakunta  rähmällään:  Suomettumisen  lyhyt  historia.  Helsinki: 
Otava. 
Vincent,  A.  (1977):  Liberal  Nationalism  and  Communitarianism:  An  Ambiguous 
Association. The Australian Journal of Politics and History 3 (1), 14 –27. 
Virtanen, P. (2004): Eurooppalainen rajapolitiikka  ja rajayhteistyö EU:ssa. In: Liikanen, I. 
&  P.  Virtanen  (eds)  Rajayhteistyö,  EU  ja  Venäjä,  31–45.  Joensuu:  University  of 
Joensuu. 
Voionmaa,  V.  (1919):  Suomen  uusi  asema:  Maantieteellisiä  ja  historiallisia  peruspiirteitä. 
Porvoo: WSOY. 
Volk,  Y.  (2006):  Russia’s  NGO  Law:  An  Attack  on  Freedom  and  Civil  Society.  The 
Heritage  Foundation  WebMemo  #1090.  Available  through:  www.heritage.org
/research/russiaandeurasia (February 12, 2009). 
Volkov, V.  (1997): Obshestvennost:  zabytaja  praktika  grazhdanskogo  obshestva.  Pro  et 
Contra 2 (4), 77–91. 
Vygotsky, L. (1978): Mind in Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Waever, O.  (1997):  Imperial Metaphors:  Emerging  European Analogies  to  Pre‐Nation‐
State Imperial Systems. In: Tunander, O., P. Baev & V. I. Einagel (eds) Geopolitics in 
Post‐Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity, 59–93. London: Sage. 
     453 
 
Wahl‐Jorgensen, K. (1999): Letters to the Editor. Peace Review 11 (1), 53–59. 
Wahl‐Jorgensen,  K.  (2001):  Letters  to  the  Editor  as  a  Forum  for  Public  Deliberation: 
Modes of Publicity and Democratic Debate. Critical Studies In Media Communication 
18 (3), 303–320. 
Wahl‐Jorgensen,  K.  (2002):  Understanding  the  Conditions  for  Public  Discourse:  Four 
Rules for Selecting Letters‐to‐the‐Editor. Journalism Studies 3 (1), 69–82. 
Wahl‐Jorgensen,  K.  (2003):  Different  Strokes,  Different  Folks:  Comparing  Danish  and 
British Op‐Ed Pages. Grassroots Editor 44 (4), 9–13. 
Wahl‐Jorgensen,  K.  (2004a):  Playground  of  the  Pundits  or  Voice  of  the  People? 
Comparing British and Danish Opinion Pages. Journalism Studies 5 (1), 59–70. 
Wahl‐Jorgensen,  K.  (2004b):  A  “Legitimate  Beef”  or  “Raw  Meat”?  Civility, 
Multiculturalism and Letters to the Editor. Communication Review 7 (2), 89–105. 
Wahl‐Jorgensen, K.  (2008): Op‐ed Pages.  In: Franklin, B.  (ed.) Pulling Newspapers Apart, 
70–79. London: Routledge. 
Walby, S.  (1999): The New Regulatory State:  the Social Powers of  the European Union. 
British Journal of Sociology 50 (1), 118–140. 
Walker, C.  (2010): Space, Kinship Networks and Youth Transition  in Provincial Russia: 
Negotiating Urban‐Rural and Inter‐Regional Migration. Europe‐Asia Studies 62 (4), 
647–669. 
Walker, R. B.  J.  (1991):  State  Sovereignty  and  the Articulation  of  Political  Space/Time. 
Millennium 20 (3), 445–461. 
Walker, R. B. J. (1994): Social movements/World politics. Millenium 23 (3), 669–700. 
Walters, J. P. (1997): The Coming Philanthropic Explosion. Philanthropy (Winter), 2. 
Walters, W.  (2004):  The  Frontiers  of  the  European Union: A Geostrategic  Perspective. 
Geopolitics 9 (3), 674–698. 
Walters, W.  (2006): Rethinking Borders beyond  the State. Comparative European Politics 4 
(2–3), 141–159. 
Wapner,  P.  (1996):  Environmental  Activism  and  World  Civic  Politics.  Albany:  State 
University NY Press. 
Warkentin, C.  (2001): Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society. 
Lanham: Rowman Littlefied Publishers. 
Warleigh,  A.  (2001):  Europeanizing  Civil  Society:  NGOs  as  Agents  of  Political 
Socialization. Journal of Common Market Studies 39 (4), 619–639. 
Warner, M. (2002): Publics and Counterpublics. Public Culture 14 (1), 49–90. 
Weber, M.  (1978): Economy and Society, Volumes 1–2. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Weigle, M.  (2002): State and Civil Society From Yeltsin  to Putin. Demokratizatsiya 10  (2), 
117–146.  
Weisbrod, B. (1988): The Nonprofit Economy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Wellman,  B.  (2001):  Physical  Place  and  Cyberplace:  The  Rise  of  Networked 
Individualism. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25 (2), 227–252. 
Werner, W.G. & J. H. de Wilde (2001): The Endurance of Sovereignty. European Journal of 
International Relations 7 (3), 283–313. 
 454     
 
Westlund, H.  (1999):  An  Interaction‐cost  Perspective  on Networks  and  Territory.  The 
Annals of Regional Science 33 (1), 93–121. 
Whitney, M.  (2010): Mixed Methods Research  in  the Social Sciences. Scientific  Inquiry. 
Suite 101. Available through: suite101.com/article/mixed‐methods‐research‐in‐the‐
social‐sciences (November 12, 2011). 
Wiarda,  H.  J.  (2003):  Civil  Society:  The  American Model  and  Third World  Development. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
Will, C. & J. Kendall (2009): A new Treaty for Europe? Towards ‘Open, Transparent and 
Regular  Dialogue  with  Representative  Associations  and  Civil  Society’?  In: 
Kendall, J. (ed.) Handbook of Third Sector Policy in Europe: MultiMlevel Processes and 
Organised Civil Society, 293–316. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Wodak, R.  (2004): National and Transnational  Identities: European and Other  Identities 
Oriented  to  in  Interviews with EU Officials.  In: Hermann, R. K., T. Risse & M. 
Brewer (eds) Transnational Identities, 97–128. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Wodak, R.  (2008):  ’Us’ and  ‘Them’:  Inclusion/Exclusion – Discrimination via Discourse. 
In: Delanty, G., P. Jones & R. Wodak (eds) Migration, Identity, and Belonging, 54–78. 
Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press.  
Wollebæk,  D.  &  K.  Strømsnes  (2008):  Voluntary  Associations,  Trust,  and  Civic 
Engagement: A Multilevel Approach. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly  37 
(2), 249–263. 
Wollebaek, D. & P. Selle (2005): Women’s Power Under Threat? Voluntary Organizations 
in  Transition.  In:  Roßteutscher,  S.  (ed.)  Democracy  and  the  Role  of  Associations: 
Political, Organizational and Social Contexts, 197–218. London: Routledge. 
Wollebæk, D., B. Ibsen & M. Siisiäinen (2010): Voluntary Associations at the Local Level 
in Three Nordic Countries. In: Alapuro, R. & H. Stenius (eds) Nordic Associations in 
a European Perspective, 121–150. Baden‐Baden: Nomos. 
Yanacopulos, H.  (2005): The Strategies That Bind: NGO Coalitions and Their  Influence. 
Global Networks 5 (1), 93–110. 
Yeung,  A.  B.  (2003):  Civil  Society,  Social  Capital  and  Volunteering  in  Finland: 
Contemporary  Trends  in  Finnish  Volunteering.  Tidskrift  för  Kirke,  Religion  og 
Samfunn 3, 63–80.  
Ylä‐Anttila, T.  (2007): Kansalaisjärjestöt kukoistavat – mutta mikä on niiden poliittinen 
merkitys? Available  through: www.kansalaisfoorumi.net/sivu.php? artikkeli_id=201 
(September 17, 2008).  
Young, O. R. (1997): Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Zabin, C. (1997): Nongovernmental Organizations in Mexico’s Northern Border. Journal of 
Borderlands Studies 12 (1–2), 41–72. 
Zaleski, P. (2006): Global Non‐governmental Administrative System: Geosociology of the 
Third Sector. In: Gawin, D. & P. Glinski (eds) Civil Society in the Making, 113–143. 
Warsaw: IFiS Publishers. 
Zaleski,  P.  (2008):  Tocqueville  on  Civilian  Society:  A  Romantic  Vision  of  the  Dichotomic 
Structure of Social Reality. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. 
     455 
 
Zielonka, J. (2001): How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union. Journal 
of Common Market Studies 39 (3), 507–536 
Zielonka,  J.  (2006):  Europe  as  Empire:  The  Nature  of  the  Enlarged  EU.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press. 
Zielonka, J. (2008): Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example? International Affairs 84 
(3), 471–484. 
Zimmer,  A.  (2001):  Corporatism  Revisited:  The  Legacy  of  History  and  the  German 
Nonprofit  Sector.  In: Anheier, H. K. &  J. Kendall  (eds) Third Sector Policy at  the 
Crossroads: An International Nonprofit Analysis, 114–125. London: Routledge. 
 
   
 456     
 
Appendices 
APPENDIX 1. INTERVIEWED ORGANIZATIONS 
 
# Organization Pe
rs 
Re
c 
Field City Countr
y 
1 Finnish-Russian Network of Social and 
Health NGOs 
1  Social and health Helsinki  Finland 
2 Finnish Centre for Health Promotion 1 X Social and health Helsinki  Finland 
3 M. A. Castrén Society  2 X Culture Helsinki  Finland 
4 Finland-Russia society 4 X Cooperation/Cult
ure 
Helsinki  Finland 
5 Finnish Workers' Sports Federation (TUL) 1 X Sports Helsinki  Finland 
6 Society for Education and Development of 
Karelia 
1 X Education Helsinki  Finland 
7 Save the Children, Finland 1 X Social and health Helsinki  Finland 
8 
Finnish Youth Cooperation – Allianssi 1 X Culture Helsinki  Finland 
9 National Council of Women of Finland 1 X Women's 
rights/equality 
Helsinki  Finland 
10 Green Women’s Association 2  Women's 
rights/equality 
Helsinki  Finland 
11 Amnesty International, Finland 2 X Human rights Helsinki  Finland 
12 Finnish-Russian Chamber of Commerce 
(SVKK) 
1 X Trade Helsinki  Finland 
13 National Union of University Students (SYL) 1  Education/social 
politics  
Helsinki  Finland 
14 Coalition of Finnish Women´s Associations 
(NYTKIS) 
1 X Women's 
rights/equality 
Helsinki  Finland 
15 Trade Union for the Public and Welfare 
Sectors (JHL) 
1 X Trade union Helsinki  Finland 
16 Finn Church Aid (FCA) 1  Development/hu
manitarian 
assistance 
Helsinki  Finland 
17 Family Federation (Väestöliitto) 1 X Social and health Helsinki  Finland 
18 Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees 
(STTK)  
1 X Trade union Helsinki  Finland 
19 Service Union United (PAM) 1 X Labor 
confederation 
Helsinki  Finland 
20 International Solidarity Foundation, Helsinki 2 X Development 
cooperation  
Helsinki  Finland 
21 Left Women 1  Women's 
rights/equality 
Helsinki  Finland 
22 Svenska Kvinnoförbundet 2  Women's 
rights/equality 
Helsinki  Finland 
23 Soroptimist International of Finland 1 X Women's 
rights/equality 
Helsinki  Finland 
24 Karjalan Apu ry 1 X Humanitarian aid Joensuu Finland 
25 Mannerheim League for Child Welfare, North 
Karelian District 
1 X Social and health Joensuu Finland 
26 Finland’s Scouter ry, North Karelian District 1 X Children/young Joensuu Finland 
27 International Solidarity Foundation, Joensuu 1 X Development co-
op. 
Joensuu Finland 
28 Joensuun seudun diabetes ry 1 X Social and health Joensuu Finland 
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29 North Karelia Chamber of Commerce 1 X Trade Joensuu Finland 
30 Pohjois-Karjalan nuoret kotkat 1 X Children/young Joensuu Finland 
31 Joensuun Venäjän ystävät ry  1 X Culture/Friendshi
p 
Joensuu Finland 
32 North Karelia Center for Public Health 1 X Social and health Joensuu Finland 
33 Martha organization, North Karelian District  2 X Economics Joensuu Finland 
34 Union of Rural Education and Culture, North 
Karelian District 
1 X Education and 
Culture 
Joensuu Finland 
35 Finnish Red Cross, Savo-Karelian district 1 X Aid work Joensuu Finland 
36 Association for Educational Activity (AEA) 2 X Education Joensuu Finland 
37 Pro Agria North Karelia 1 X Education and 
Culture 
Joensuu Finland 
38 Regional Council of North Karelia 1 X Administration Joensuu Finland 
39 City of Joensuu 1 X Administration Joensuu Finland 
40 Joensuu Regional Development Company, 
JOSEK Ltd 
1 X Regional 
development 
Joensuu Finland 
41 State Provincial Office of Eastern Finland, 
Joensuu Regional Service Unit 
3 X Administration Joensuu Finland 
42 Toukolan Setlementti ry 1 X Education/social Kotka Finland 
43 Kaakkois-Suomen Sosiaalipsykiatrinen 
yhdistys ry  
1 X Social and health Kotka Finland 
44 Palmenia Centre for Continuing Education  1  Education Kouvola Finland 
45 Finland-Russia Society, LPR 2 X Cooperation/cult
ure 
Lappeen
ranta  
Finland 
46 Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, 
South Karelian District 
1 X Environmental Lappeen
ranta  
Finland 
47 Individ. Former NGO activist 1 X Trade Lappeen
ranta  
Finland 
48 The Baltic Institute of Finland 3 X Cooperation and 
management 
Tampere Finland 
49 The Finnish Association for Nature 
Conservation (FANC) 
1 X Environmental Helsinki Finland 
50 
Kehys – The Finnish NGDO Platform to the 
EU 
1  Relief and 
development 
work 
Helsinki Finland 
51 The Finnish-Russian Civic Forum 2  Cooperation/hum
an rights 
Helsinki Finland 
52 Finnish-Russian Network of Social and 
Health NGOs 
1  Social and health SPb Russia 
53 Association of Cooperation with the Nordic 
countries ‘NORDEN’ 
1  Cooperation/adm
inistration 
SPb Russia 
54 Early Intervention Institute 2  Social and health SPb Russia 
55 Association for the Protection of Children 1  Social and health SPb Russia 
56 Parents' Bridge 1  Social and health SPb Russia 
57 Asaria – Mothers against Drugs 1  Social and health SPb Russia 
58 Nochlezhka 1  Social and health SPb Russia 
59 Crisis Centre for Women 1  Social and health SPb Russia 
60 Centre for Social Help ‘Trust’ 1  Social and health SPb Russia 
61 Center for Humanities and Political Studies 
‘Strategy’ 
1  Policy institutions 
& civil society 
development 
SPb Russia 
62 Osiris – Revival of Folk Arts  1  Art/culture Vyborg  Russia 
63 Vyborg-Finland Friendship Society  1  Culture/Friendshi
p 
Vyborg  Russia 
64 Viipuri Centre 2  Culture/Friendshi
p 
Vyborg  Russia 
65 Vita Center For Women 1  Women's 
rights/equality 
Vyborg  Russia 
 458     
 
66 Women Center ‘Krstina’ 1  Women's 
rights/equality 
Vyborg  Russia 
67 Karelian Association of NGOs of disabled 
people  
1  Social and health Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
68 Uteshenie 1  Social and 
health/charity 
Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
69 Karelian Red Cross 1  Aid work Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
70 New education 1  Education Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
71 Centre for public policy, human rights and 
civic education 
1  Public policy/civil 
education/human 
rights 
Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
72 Association of women entrepreneurs  1  Entrepreneurship Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
73 Doroga 1  Youth work Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
74 Karelian Resource Centre of NGOs 1  Civil society 
development 
Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
75 Karelian Union for Child protection 1  Social and health Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
76 The Finnish-Russian Network of Social and 
Health NGOs 
1  Social and health Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
77 NGO ‘Center ‘Initiative’ 1  Education Petrozav
odsk  
Russia 
78 EU-Russia Centre 1  Information/expe
rtize 
Brussels Belgium 
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APPENDIX 2. INDICATIVE LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
A: General questions about the organization in question 
 When was your organization established? 
 What are your aims? 
 Which activities have you realized since your establishment? 
 What are your forthcoming activities? 
 Do you have relations with local and international organizations? Please state 
the names and the nature of your relationship? 
 How many members do you have? What are your requirements for 
membership?  
 Do you have branches in different cities (organizational structure)? 
 What is your decision-making mechanism? 
 What are the sources of funding? 
 Are people aware of your activities? What do you do in order to increase public 
attention? 
 Are you satisfied with the level of media coverage? If not, why? 
 
B. Cooperation agendas  
 Are you currently engaged in any CBC projects? How about in the past? If not, 
why not, with whom do you prefer to cooperate? 
 What kind of cooperation do you engage in?  
 How does your organization developed its cooperative strategies and define its 
priorities?  
 What projects have been prioritized and why? 
 Do you have a specific strategy towards Russia (CBC strategy)? What does it 
include? 
 Does the Russian partners’ priorities differ from yours? If yes, how? Who 
dominates? Why? 
 Which institutions and groups have been most supportive of cooperation? 
 Are you involved in any EU-supported projects? Do you have any other kinds 
of relations with the EU? (to be continued in section E) 
 Do you receive enough support (financial and other) for your work (in cross-
border context)? 
 Do you see that your work impacts the local economic and social development? 
How? 
 Are women active within the organization being interviewed? 
 Have gender issues increased in importance as an area of CSO cooperation? 
What might explain either a lack or an increase in such activity?  
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C: Practical experiences 
 What are the obstacles for cross-border cooperation? How do you deal with 
them?  
 Have there been any improvements? Have you hear about them? Do you think 
they will help you in realization of your projects?  
 What is your relationship with local communities and other domestic CSOs like? 
 How do you find the partners across the border (in Russia)? Do you have any 
specific preferences in terms of cooperation partners? 
 How would you assess the quality of the cross-border activities and contacts in 
general? What would like to improve?  
 What is your motivation to cooperate across the border? What does CBC bring 
to you? 
 Has the thematic focus of CSO cooperation shifted in recent years? If so, why?  
 What are your cooperation activities (e.g., advocacy; implementation; 
expertise)?  
 In general, which Finnish groups are active in interacting with partners across 
the border? Which groups remain reticent in engaging in cross-border activities? 
Why do you think this is? 
 
D: Inter-State Relationships and CSOs  
 What impacts do state agencies have on the development /promotion of this 
cooperation? 
 What role in your view state/state agencies should play?  
 What is you relationship with the state institutions? Do you receive any 
funding? If yes, do the priorities match the needs? 
 To what extent can you influence the agenda developed by state institutions?  
 Have there been any shifts in your role or ability to influence the agenda in 
recent years?  
 In what ways, if at all, is your work affected by inter-state developments?  
 How do you assess the role on civil society cooperation when compared to inter-
state relations? 
 Do you have any relations to political parties or the political elite? 
 Describe your relationship with other actors (Governmental, private sector, 
donor, other CSOs, EU institutions, CSO Brussels, etc.) 
 
E: Europeanization  
 From you personal opinion, in what ways the EU can contribute to development 
of civil society sector? How about cooperation agendas? 
 What implications does the EU have for you? What, if anything, has changed 
since Finland joined the EU? 
 Do you think the EU is an important actor (regarding your work/projects), why? 
In what areas would like to see the EU to be more pro-active? 
 In your opinion, do the EU’s policies ‘include’ Russia efficiently (as a partner, 
not as a target)? 
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 What are the advantages and disadvantages of or being a member state? 
 Do the EU policies/programs and their priorities match the local/regional 
priorities and need? 
 When cooperation with Russia partners, do you feel yourself as a representative 
of the EU, Finland, your region/city or something else? Why do you think this 
is? 
 Do you see Russia as a part of Europe? Why? What are the demarcation lines 
(issues, values)? 
 What do you have in common with the EU?  
 What does Europe/EU represent for you?  
